

**ADLAI E STEVENSON IN AMERICAN HISTORY
1948 - 1965**

**BY
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**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
TRIVANDRUM**

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**ADLAI E STEVENSON IN AMERICAN HISTORY
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this thesis “Adlai E. Stevenson in American History 1948-1965” submitted for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Kerala is a record of bonafide research carried out by Prof.. C.K. Alexander under my supervision. Be part of the thesis has been submitted for any Degree before

Dr. T.K. Ravindran
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DECLARATION

I. C.K. Alexander, do hereby declare that this thesis “Adlai E. Stevenson in American History 1948-1965” has not been submitted by me for the award of a Degree, Diploma, Title or Recognition. before.

(Prof. C.K. Alexander)

CONTENTS

PREFACE

i - iv

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER II STEVENSON AS THE GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS

CHAPTER III STEVENSON, THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

CHAPTER IV STEVENSON AS U. S. AMBASSADOR IN THE
UNITED STATES

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDICES

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PREFACE

Early in the morning of July 26, 1952, Adlai E. Stevenson, the Governor of Illinois, electrified a nation with a speech accepting the Democratic Presidential nomination.

It was a short speech 1720 words, to be exact - but to the millions of Americans who heard it on television and radio it was the voice of reason and sanity crying out in ' a land gradually succumbing to the voice of hatred and fear.

One of the big ifs in history is what United States might have become and how the world at large might have been affected if Adlai E. Stevenson had been elected President of the United States forty years ago. Talking about this if and about the various blows Stevenson had had to take, I asked one of his closest friends Mrs. Edison Dick, who had known him for forty years, whether she felt sorry for him. "Not at all" she said, "I can feel sorry for a person who hasn't prevailed against fate, but I think he has prevailed".

Adlai Stevenson influenced the lives of just about everybody who was ever associated with him. He certainly did mine. It was during my school days in the 1950's that I first heard of Adlai E. Stevenson. I knew neither his nationality nor his full name. But the name captured my imagination. It further increased when he visited my country any home state Kerala after brilliant Presidential campaign . It is from this visit that the inspiration for this thesis is drawn. Adlai Stevenson's life and work will always be sources of genuine and enduring inspiration to me

Stevenson was particularly interested in Jawaharlal Nehru and they were good friends too At the memorial service to Jawaharlal Nehru on 29 May, 1964 his longtime Friend Adlai E. Stevenson observed: "Jawaharlal Nehru is one of God's greatest creation in time. The Nation is his monument". Steven became fascinating personality in American history. At the Chapter President of the American History Congress of India. I became more interested in American Presidential campaigns.

Nevertheless, working with the Stevenson Papers has been an exhilarating experience. My respect for this great man has grown enormously not because of his eloquence, wit, intellect and courage, though he had these qualities in abundance. It is, rather, that the Stevenson Papers have helped me to appreciate the humanness of the man. He was not a Saint — he too could be jealous, petty, stubborn, vain, uncertain, insecure. But he was able to overcome his weaknesses — most of the time, and to build on his strength most of the time. He decided to be a man who made history. And in so doing, he showed all the rest of us the way.

The study is mostly based on the original records collected from the United States. Personal interviews have contributed the bulk of material for this study. The interview as a research device has certain definite limitations. Aside from the expense and problem of arranging interviews, and then earning and keeping the confidence of the respondent, there is the intervening variable of time. But as Stephen K. Bailey has pointed out, unless live sources are used in a study of political problem, a meaningful analysis is virtually impossible. By talking to as many people as time would permit, I have tried to double-check information whenever possible. I found personal interviews to be not only valuable sources of information, but also personally rewarding experiences. I was pleasantly surprised to find that the many personalities I talked with were, without exception. Eager to assist me in this undertaking and to express their opinions openly and frankly.

I would like to express my deep appreciation, to my Supervising Teacher Dr. T.K. Ravindran. Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Kerala and former Vice Chancellor of the University of Calicut for his valuable assistance in the organisational and technical aspects of this Thesis.

My gratitude goes to Princeton University, U.S.A, and the Indian Council of Historical Research for my visit to the United States. It enabled me to talk with many of Adlai Stevenson's friends who were closely connected with his life.

My thanks goes to Mrs. Nancy Bressler, the Curator of the Adlai E. Stevenson Papers. Mrs. Bressler's long and devoted work in the cataloguing of the 1500 boxes of Stevenson Papers will be invaluable to future Stevenson biographers. For suggestions and her help in locating important material have made a large contribution to this thesis.

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My gratitude to Governor Meyner and Mrs. Meyner Democratic Party leaders of New Jersey. Both Governor Meyner and his charming wife Helen Meyner were more the generous in allowing me to rummage through their basement looking for documents and letters. The privilege to explore this virgin material was deeply appreciate

My sincere thanks to all those people who so kindly gave me of their time and memory: Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III. Son of Governor Adlai E. Stevenson; Mrs. Earnest L. Ives, sister of Governor Stevenson: George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State and U.N. Ambassador: Robert Goheen, U.S. Ambassador to India: Ambassador William M. Blair Jr.. Stevenson's Law Partner: James I. McCord, President. Princeton Theological Seminary Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Mrs. Martin Luther King, Senator & Mrs. Edward Kennedy; President Richard M. Nixon: Mrs. Mariatta Tree, U.N. Ambassador and Mrs. Edison Dicks.

My heartfelt thanks goes to K.M. Kuriakose for the painstaking care with which he typed the manuscript.

A final note of personal appreciation to my family and friends especially my wife Mrs. Valsa Alexander whose hopes and expectations for this thesis have kept me working at it in some difficult times. I hope, to some small degree, this meets those expectations.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is predicated upon the belief that man make history, that it is within the power of the Individual human beings to shaped the destiny of nations and of mankind,

Adlai E. Stevenson was one of the outstanding American Statesmen during the period from 1948 to 1965 during this period he served his city in various capacities, as the Governor of Illinois state two-time Presidential Candidate for to the United Nations.

The Presidential election of 1952 was an even of unusual historical significance. After twenty years the most durable political coalition in the nation's history was cast from power at the Democratic Party last the Presidency. In its stead, the electorate entrusted the white house to a popular military hero a man who had and from the Second World war as an American legend

Perhaps of less obvious note, but profound significance to American political history, the Democratic Presidential Candidates in the year was Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois. A man of exceptional character and ability, he backed in to his party's nomination in an unprecedented manner. As a Presidential candidate, he swam against the current of America's popular mood with a grace and dignity unparalleled in American history. He strove to educate and to elevate, affecting America with a style of speech unique in American Political life style which possessed content as well as rhetoric. Yet, despite these attributes, he was defeated in the election.

What follows is, in part, an analysis of that defeat, and the investigator has endeavoured to record the basic cause of historical events. The investigator has sought to reach beyond the flow of facts in an effort to search out the essential nature of Adlai Stevenson as a man and his significance in history. In doing so, the investigator has necessarily taken an approach, relying heavily on Stevenson's own words and the words of his close friends and associates.

He was an ironic figure in American history a man of superior capabilities, optimistic vision, and immense faith, yet doomed to be defeated by the very nature of his political philosophy. He wished to "talk sense to the American people", to speak to them in enlightened prose. to engage them in a forthright discussion of political issues, and to appeal to their moral sense. He believed that America could respond to such an approach. History. However, has proved him wrong.

Frank Kent, a political reporter of the 1920's. once observed that, "despite the occasional shining exceptions, the great bulk of successes in politics are scored by the candidates who evade controversial questions. Avoid constructive proposals, devote themselves to the solemn advocacy of the obvious and say nothing calculated to arouse the prejudiced voter". In 1952, Adlai Stevenson believed in the possibility of a "shining exception". His unshakable sense of duty and exceptional energy were grounded in a deeply rooted conviction that he could successfully rise above the mediocrity of America politics. Though he remained outwardly undaunted by his resounding defeat in 1952, that election, coupled with similar result in 1956, served to demonstrate the fundamental futility of his effort.

This is not to say that every man makes history. Many men are, indeed, made by history. But the potential exists. To control events or to be controlled by them is a choice which every human being faces. And it is not exclusively the option of Kings and Presidents. The possibility to make history exists to a greater or lesser degree for the humblest of men, and the greatest of lovers.

It is for this reason that the examination of the life of one man is significant to the historical process. This is why biography is a legitimate offspring of the study of history. Adlai Ewing Stevenson is one of the great losers of American political history. His career in politics and public affairs spanned three decades. Yet only once. In 1948 the middle of his career, did he win a general election. In spite of this, the influence he exerted on the course of the American history of the 1950's and 1960's was so great that, as Kenneth Davis says, we could well dub this period "The Age of Stevenson as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has dubbed the 1830's the Age of Jackson and the 1930's The Age of Roosevelt".¹

It is important to remember that the influence Stevenson had on the making of history both in the 50's as the leader of the out of power Democrats and in the early 60's as Ambassador to the United Nations - was a function not of any power inherent in the positions he held, but of the power of his own personality. As Dean Rusk said in eulogizing him, "his universality did not rest upon his being a Prince among plain men, but rather upon his being a plain man even among Princes."²

¹ Kenneth S. Davis, *The Politics of Honor: A Biography of Adlai E. Stevenson* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, (1967), p.11

² Dean Rusk, *The United Nations Memorial Ceremony for Ambassador Stevenson*, July 19, 1965, in Michael H. Prosser, ed. *An Ethic for Survival, Adlai Stevenson Speaks On International Affairs 1936-1965* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc.1969), p.465

Perhaps Adlai Stevenson life was best summed up by a woman at his funeral who was trying to explain to her children what his life meant. “He was a failure. but not a failure at all”. she said ³. The events in this thesis reflect both the triumphs and the failures in the life of Adlai Stevenson. The gaps in the narrative are many. It makes no pretence of being a history of American foreign policy between 1961 and 1965. nor a history of the United Nations during these years. The episodes, the investigator hasten to deal with are those which, collectively, capture best the essence of the man, Stevenson. Throughout them, all runs the theme that this plain man, this loser, this failure - by his words, his deeds, and is very presence the course of history.

Stevenson himself, as reflected in his papers is often a major obstacle to an attempt at understanding his place in history. At the end of “Gone with the Wind” Rhett Butler turns to a veering Scarlet O’Hara and delivers himself of the observation, Never, in any crisis of your life. Scarlett, have I ever known you to eve hand kerchief. To Stevenson, his biographers will undoubtedly revise this to ‘never, in any crisis of your lite, Adlai, have we ever known you to have a pencil and paper It is almost possible to follow the course of Stevenson’s U.N. career by examining his personal correspondence. Every crisis is signalled by an abrupt cessation of letters to family and friends.

Adlai Stevenson was slightly younger than the 20th century he was born in Los Angeles, California, on February 5, 1900. But in 1903 the family returned to Bloomington. Illinois, where Stevenson’s grandparents owned farmland and a newspaper The Bloomington Pantograph.

Adlai Stevenson certainly possessed a family background of rich political tradition. Stevenson’s political heritage from both sides of the family. His rest father his mother’s side, Jesse W. Fall, was clone friend of Abraham Lincoln, and had been a founder of the Republican party. He was one of the first men to conceive the idea of Lincoln as a Presidential candidate, and it is generally believed that he originally suggested the Lincoln- Douglas debates.

³ Mary McGrory. “The Perfectionist and the Press”, in Edward P. Doyle, ed., As We Know Adlai: The Stevenson Story by Twenty-Two Friends (New York: Harper and Row. 1966), p.180

His paternal grandfather, for whom Adlai Stevenson was named, was elected Vice President in 1892 and served with Grover Cleveland during his second term. Lewis Stevenson, Adlai's father, was Secretary of State of Illinois from 1914 to 1916.

Young Adlai grew up in Bloomington, Illinois, where he attended Public Schools and later the high school attached to the Illinois Normal University which his great grandfather had founded.

In 1918 he volunteered for the Naval Reserve and served as an Apprentice Seaman. In 1922 he graduated from Princeton where he was editor of the Daily Princetonian. He went on to study at Harvard Law School until an uncle died in 1924 leaving him a share in the Pantagraph.

He returned to Bloomington to help run the paper. but after a year and a half resumed the study of law at North-western University in Chicago. On graduating in 1926 he travelled in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for an American newspaper chain, this getting an early view of Communism.

In 1927, he began practicing with the Chicago firm of Cutting, Moore and Sidley, and the following year married Ellen Borden. Two years later they have their first son, Adlai III. The Stevenson also have two other sons: Borden, born in 1932, and John, born in 1936.

Stevenson began his own public service in 1933 as a special Counsel for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. with the Depression and the coming of the New Deal, Stevenson went to Washington in 1933 to work on the farm problem under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

He returned to his law practice in 1935 but in the spring of 1941, as American defences were being hastily thrown up against the Nazi threat, he returned to Washington, this time as assistant to Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.

With his second entry into public life he gave up his law practice and since then there have been very few days in Stevenson's life that have not been devoted to public service.

In 1943, after two years with the navy, he was chosen to lead the first Economic Mission into liberated Italy. In 1944 he went on a War Department mission to France, England and Belgium. He was appointed special assistant to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius in 1945.

When Stettinius went to London in 1946 as head of the U. S. Delegation to the United Nations Preparatory Commission, Stevenson was his deputy; later took his place when Stettinius became ill. In 1946 and 1947 he served as alternate delegate to the U. N. General Assembly and gained particular distinction as a diplomat. "I never saw a man handle the Russians like he did". said one man who served with him.

It was inevitable that a man with Stevenson's family heritage and instinct for public service should be drawn into politics. But if any one thing could be said to be responsible for his entering politics, it was something he saw in the Stars and Stripes in Italy - a Public Opinion Poll in which seven out of ten American Parents said they didn't want their boys to enter Public life. "Think of it" says Stevenson, "Boys could suffer and die in their cold, muddy, bloody campaign for the things we believe in, but parents didn't want their children to work for those things. I decided then and there that, If I ever had a chance, I'd go into public life"

His chance came in 1948 When Illinois Democrats needed someone to overthrow the corrupt Administration of Governor Dwight Green in traditionally Republican Illinois. Stevenson staged a hard-hitting 10-month campaign and won by 572,000 votes - the biggest majority in the State's history.

After the election Stevenson quickly delivered on his campaign promises. He cleared out corruption, balanced the Illinois budget: increased state aid to education, raised teacher's salaries: increased State aid to the aged and the blind; and boldly tackled the problem of deteriorating highways.

Four years later, his extra-ordinary record as Governor caused him to be literally drafted to run for another office- opposing Dwight Eisenhower for the Presidency.

After his brilliant Presidential campaign Stevenson settled down to the staggering task of helping rid his party of its \$ 850,000 debts. In addition, he travelled extensively abroad and acted as a major spokesman for the Democratic Party in the four years of the Eisenhower Administration.

"It seems to me that it's terribly important for anyone who is speaking or writing about contemporary affairs to understand something of..... this revolution that is going on in the colonial areas of the world, and in Asia particularly". So said Adlai Stevenson on the eve of his departure in March 1953, for an extensive tour of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, to observe at first hand the far-Eastern rebellions against Colonialism, that were adding a new

dimension to world politics. In thirty different countries, among them Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia, Indonesia, India and major countries in the Middle-East, the Mediterranean, and East and West Europe, Stevenson kept up his tireless and practically limitless curiosity and questioning.

Stevenson's introduction to India came at 10.30 AM April 28, 1953 lasted till May 14, 1953. A host of Indian officials including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Ambassador George Allen and crowds of reporters welcomed Stevenson to the capital of India. When Stevenson asked Nehru about young leaders who might be emerging, Nehru shook his head and said "Yes, we must bring up such leaders for the future".

Stevenson also visited Trivandrum, the capital of my home State Kerala. In Trivandrum, Stevenson talked to A. J. John, Chief Minister of the State and met leaders of various political parties. They discussed the over population of the Malabar Coast and the widespread unemployment. After Stevenson called on the Mayor of Trivandrum, the Mayor introduced him to a large crowd that had gathered to greet him. When the mayor welcomed him on behalf of the common people of the State, Stevenson answered laughingly, "We of the Democratic Party also speak for the common people back home, and I have great pleasure in making all your good people of Trivandrum honorary members of the Democratic Party".

And Stevenson was the obvious choice to lead his party again in 1956. After his nomination he broke time-honoured convention tradition and threw the Vice- Presidential nomination wide open. It was won by Stevenson's tireless primary opponent, giving the party a one-two campaigning punch that has seldom been equalled.

Then in another characteristically eloquent acceptance speech, Stevenson set the theme for the 1956 Presidential Campaign. "We are on the thresh-hold of another great decisive era". History's headlong course has brought us, I devoutly believe, to the thresh-hold of a new America - to the America of the great ideals and noble visions which are the stuff our future must be made of what this country needs is leadership and truth. And that's what we mean to give it".

Twice he lost to the immensely popular Eisenhower, in the process became a hero to millions, bringing a new level of wit, intelligence and candour to American Politics.

Then, under President Kennedy, he began perhaps the most demanding chapter of his life, as America's Spokesman in the U.N. during a period of grave international crisis and peril.

No man has more eloquently voiced the ideals of democracy, or better exemplified the finest traditions of public service, than did Adlai Stevenson. A memorable Portrait of a man whose devotion to his country often cost him painful personal sacrifice, and whose only interest in power was the power to serve his fellow man.

When Adlai E. Stevenson died on July 14, 1965, not only his nation but the entire free world mourned. No man had more eloquently voiced the ideals of democracy, or so exemplified the finest traditions of public service than did this former Governor of Illinois, two-time Presidential candidate, and Ambassador to the United Nations.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I covers the Introduction. Chapter II Chronicles Stevenson's successful campaign for the governorship of Illinois, his determination to inform, to educate, to interest the people of his State in their government. It shows Stevenson speaking out on the local and national issues of his day and wrestling with such problems as revising the State's Constitution, improving its public welfare and aid to education programmes; drafting ant discriminatory employment laws, revamping road and highway programmes, fighting against organised crime and juvenile delinquency, reorganising branches of the State government, and bottling corruption within his own administration. This period brilliantly illustrates Adlai Stevenson's maturing political philosophy and the continuing growth in knowledge and prominence that eventually led him to the Presidential nomination.

Chapter III illuminates the nomination and campaign of Adlai Stevenson as a Presidential candidate in 1952. It shows Stevenson vigorously criss-crossing the country after accepting his party's draft, eloquently speaking out on such issues as foreign policy and trade, civil rights, the atom bomb, Communism and Communist hunters, the economy and fiscal responsibility.

The chapter also covers the years immediately succeeding his defeat, when resuming the same gruelling schedule, he fought strongly and successfully to rebuilt the Democratic Party and elect a Democratic Congress in 1954, all the while devoting his best efforts to combating drift and complacency in the federal government and to playing the characteristic role of "the conscience in politics". These aspects brilliantly demonstrate how Stevenson carried out his philosophy that "Candidates for important offices let alone for the Presidency of the United States in this age and day, should not treat us as fourteen year olds but as adults, challenging us, in the ancient tradition of all civilised people, with the assumption that we should and can and will respond to the appeal of reason and imagination." This chapter also

shows how the American Statesman educated himself through gruelling days and nights of intensive interviewing and observation. It shows how Adlai Stevenson gained a deeper understanding of world politics and with it a continuing growth and new maturity in his stature as a statesman - educator.

Chapter IV covers the turbulent years of Adlai Stevenson's United Nations Ambassadorship, from his appointment by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to his death in 1965. During that time, the United Nations faced one crisis after another: The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the UN forces in the Congo, on Cyprus, on the Egyptian- Israeli border, and in Kashmir, the death of Dag Hammarskjold the near bankruptcy and impasse over Article 19 of the UN charter, the wrangle with Portugal over its control of African Colonies; while racism in southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the quest for disarmament.

Convinced that the United Nations should be the "Very Centre" of United States foreign policy - dedicated to attaining global peace in accordance with the vision of the UN founders - Stevenson vigorously applied his remarkable combination of vitality, intellect, idealism, and courage to that end. A staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament and an opponent of the Cold War, Stevenson repeatedly ran up against the opposition of implacable Cold Warriors in Washington in the administration of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, particularly Secretaries of State Acheson and Rusk. Nevertheless, a founding father of the United Nations, Stevenson ended his life in its service tirelessly championing the cause of world peace.

Chapter V deals with Conclusions. Despite the discouraging conclusions to be drawn from Stevenson's failures in Presidential Politics, his stature as a man of principle has remained intact. The investigator undertaking this project has been motivated, at least in part, by the hope that the relentless torrent of history will not obscure the inspiration that one man provided to millions of thinking Americans, and share Stevenson's faith that the future will someday allow a man of superior character - a shining exception - triumph where he failed.

The thesis will attempt to show how Stevenson tried to implant his ideal into an unideal situation, where it grew strong, where it failed to take root, and how Stevenson coped with these failures.

Adlai Stevenson, like all public men, has been known to have devoted admirers and formidable adversaries, but he has never been known to have enemies. And it is because the goodness and sincerity that flowed from his personality which could not allow for feelings of enmity to be forged against him. Adlai Stevenson was a universal man.

The day that Adlai Stevenson died he was appraised by James Reston of the New York Times as “the right man at the wrong time”, implying that a man of such grace, dedication, and reason might have fared better as a Presidential candidate in the 1960’s than he did in the witch-hunting, Cold War fifties. It can also be argued, the investigator believes that Stevenson was the right man at the right time because the United States in the fifties badly needed the voice of reason that Stevenson so eloquently provided, and that election to office was not the measure of his stature.

CHAPTER II

STEVENSON AS THE GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS

1. The making of a Governor
2. The Stevenson State
3. Money for Illinois Municipalities
4. The Return to Morality
5. Civil Rights and Cicero
6. For your Neighbour

1. THE MAKING OF A GOVERNOR

A Chicago legend has it that Jacob M. Arvey, former chairman of the Cook County political machine and supporter of Adlai E. Stevenson's Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1948, was converted from an exploitive political philistine to an enlightened machine reformer in a muddy foxhole somewhere in the South Pacific. This tale of foxhole conversion is apocryphal; for though Arvey did serve in the South Pacific, his positions as judge, advocate and morale officer in the 33rd Division headquarters hardly exposed him to the same psychological traumas as a platoon leader under fire.¹

Yet, a change had occurred in Arvey, not during the war as many suspected, but, almost imperceptively, before the war began.² Before Pearl Harbour, Arvey represented the 24th Ward as a committeeman for the machine dominated by Chicago Mayor Edward Kelly. In the tradition of city bosses, Arvey kept a paternal eye on his constituency dolling out patronage, and trading sinecures for votes. He even established the Arvey Award, and inscribed wristwatch given to the best precinct captain. During the depression, forced to sacrifice honesty for efficiency, Arvey kept company with gangsters, racketeers, and experts in political exploitation.

Arvey's transformation began with the coming of the New Deal. These new programme of social security, relief, and public works with their underlying philosophy of security as well as equal opportunity impressed Arvey. Slowly, he began to abjure the blind loyalty and obedience of the political machine, and, instead, transformed his personal machine into a localized arm of the New Deal aiding disenfranchised minority groups and labour.³

During the war, Arvey wrote a letter to a Chicago friend which revealed the advanced stage of his new philosophy:

The main reason I got into the Army, outside of patriotic impulses, was to get out of the field of organizational politics. If I ever re-enter, it will be as a freelance, to effectuate those social

¹ Stanley A. Frankel and Alexander Holmes, "Arvey of Illinois", *Colliers*, July 23, 1949, p. 40

² Arthur Hopner, "Call Mc Jake", *New Republic*, March 24, 1947, p.22

³ *Idem*

reform which I believe are necessary to a true American way of life.⁴

Arvey returned to find the Kelly machine suffering from severe scandals, and Chicago on the brink of an administrative and moral collapse. Capone-dominated syndicates ran almost every restaurant, saloon, and nightclub. Despite ulcers and a gastric resection operation that left him with half a stomach, Arvey accepted the post of chairman of the Cook County Central Committee. Arvey soon realized that the Democrats could remain in office only by convincing Kelly that he had little chance for re-election as mayor. After a short meeting with Arvey, Kelly dropped out of the race and Arvey chose civic leader Martin Kennelly, to run in his place. In the May elections in 1947, Martin Kennelly was elected the next mayor of Chicago.

After Kennelly's victory, Arvey went to Washington for an appointment with former Secretary of State James F. Brynes. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss possible choices for the position of United

States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. "Mr. Arvey", Brynes answered, "you have a gold nugget in your own backyard. His name is Adlai Stevenson".⁵ Arvey knew of Chicago lawyer Adlai Stevenson in connection with the Navy Department during the war and with the founding of the United Nations. He also knew that Stevenson came from a well-respected Illinois family. Arvey knew little else.

Adlai Stevenson never regarded himself a mid-western Henry Adams born to an illustrious family political tradition. In fact, this first child of the twentieth century, born in 1900, could have assumed any one of a number of occupations and called it family tradition. His great-grandfather Jesse W. Fell founded his hometown newspaper, The Bloomington Pantagraph, in 1937. His grandfather and namesake Adlai Stevenson, an Illinois Populist, was chosen to balance the Democratic ticket in 1894 with Bourbon Democrat Grover Cleveland and proceeded to the vice-presidency that November. Lewis Stevenson, Adlai's father, moved from overseer of the Hearst estates in California to farm managing in Bloomington and finally served under Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels during the first world war.

Bloomington also offered a variety of possible perspectives. During the early part of the century. Bloomington had grown into the business centre of the second richest agricultural

⁴ "Arvey of Illinois", Collers, p. 44

⁵ Edward P. Doyle, ed. As We Knew Adlai, Harper & Row New York, 1966, p.50

county in the United States. While it fortunately escaped the impoverishment and paranoia associated with small farm life, nevertheless stories of rural America, its glory and its penury, filtered through Bloomington. Brought up in a well-to-do family, Stevenson also escaped the rural poverty and paranoia, but not rural idealization.⁶ Stevenson's own idealization of rural life fostered a respect, almost to the point of adulation, for community values, and for the individualism and common sense integrity of the sturdy yeoman. In his public years, this romantic vision of the past provided the emotional groundwork for his support of local initiative and home rule for urban centres. At a Farmersville Dedication in 1950, Stevenson praised "the community spirit, the self-reliant local action and local pride which built the towns and cities of America". "I wish", he concluded, "we could have a deep-rooted revival of that type of active, affirmative, citizenship everywhere".⁷

But Stevenson's urbane family background and its connections with the eastern establishment hardly qualified him for yeoman stature. Instead, at Choate boarding school and later, at Princeton University, Stevenson was something of a cultural paradox. He was as well-bred and cosmopolitan as any of them. But, he was also a Democrat, one of three in his graduating class at Choate, and one of the few Princetonians, aside from the Southern Democrats, who failed to vote for Coolidge. He disliked Harvard Law School and, after serving as an editor of the Pantagraph, Stevenson returned to the study of law and graduated from North-western University School of Law in 1926. Two years later, Stevenson married Ellen Borden of a fashionable Chicago family and settled down to practice law. The Stock Market crash and depression heightened Stevenson's sensitivity, as it had Jacob Arvey, toward public problems. He became involved in civic activities working closely with the Hull House and the Lower North Side Community Council. While he still clung to his beliefs in the self-reliant community, Stevenson was acutely aware that only through increased government intervention would any general national recovery take form. In 1934, he was asked to serve in Washington, D.C. as an assistant to Jerome Frank of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

When he returned to Chicago in 1934, Stevenson Joined the Legislative Voters' League to promote good government and was elected its president. However, he devoted most of his time serving as president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, organization of internationally-minded professional and businessmen who opposed the towering isolation of the Chicago Tribune. While presiding over the Council, Stevenson met Frank Knox who, as

⁶ Herbert J. Muller, *Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values*. Harper & Row, 1967, p.21

⁷ Farmersville Dedication Speech, May 29, 1950

Secretary of the Navy, asked Stevenson in July 1941 to serve as his special personal assistant. His duties ranged from conducting labour relations with striking ship workers, to ghost-writing speeches, to accompanying Secretary Knox on inspection tours of the Pacific theatre. He also induced the Navy to open up a greater variety of jobs to Negro personnel. While on one of his tours to Italy, Stevenson happened to read a public opinion poll which stated that seventy percent of American parents preferred that their children stay out of public life. It was then he decided that if he ever had the opportunity, he would enter public service.⁸

Toward the close of the war, Stevenson was appointed a special assistant to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinus and worked directly with Archibald MacLeish to publicize the need for post-war International peace organization. He accompanied Stettinus to the San Francisco Convention and handled press relations for the American delegation. Then, after a short return home, he was recalled by the new Secretary of State James F. Brynes to serve as deputy to Stettinus on the United Nations Preparatory Commission in London. When Stettinus fell ill, Stevenson assumed his position as chairman of the Executive Committee which was responsible for drafting recommendations on the structural framework of the United Nations. Later, he was asked to stay on as senior adviser to the United States delegation in the General Assembly. Early in 1946, Stevenson resumed his normal Law practice and continued to give speeches on foreign affairs and diplomacy in the Chicago area.

One of these speeches particularly impressed a Chicago lawyer named Louis Kohn. He had known Stevenson since their days together on the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations in the 1930's. Almost immediately, he began to envision Stevenson as a Senatorial candidate to run against Senator Wayland Brooks, a Taftian right-winger who served as a conservative handmaiden to Colonel Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune.

At a luncheon the next day, Kohn discussed his thoughts with Stevenson, found him receptive, and, together with lawyer Stephen A. Mitchell and Harman "Dutch" Smith an insurance executive and long-time friend of Stevenson, formed a Stevenson for Senator Committee. It was the leaders of this Committee, the Kohn-Mitchell-Smith triumverate, who visited Jacob Arvey in November 1947 to suggest the possible candidacy of Adlai Stevenson for the Senate. As mentioned earlier, Arvey had heard Stevenson's name only recently as a possible appointee to the position of United States Attorney. But that job had gone to another future governor of Illinois, Otto Kerner. As a party organisation man, Arvey recognised that

⁸ J.A. Morris, "Rebel in Illinois", Saturday Evening Post, April 2, 1949, p.112

these Stevenson supporters had little, if any, professional political experience. None were Democratic party regulars; in fact, “Dutch” Smith was a registered Republican. Still Arvey greeted them cordially and agreed that Stevenson would make a fine candidate for senator.

However, Arvey had another candidate in mind for the senatorial spot. Paul Douglas, a former professor of economics at the University of Illinois, had already displayed enough vote-getting ability to be Elected as city alderman. Arvey was convinced that Douglas, with his courageous war record, his greater popularity downstate, and his oratorical excellence, would have a better chance to defeat incumbent Brooks than the relatively unknown Stevenson. On the other hand, Arvey proposed that Stevenson run for governor against another McCormickite, Dwight H. Green. In retrospect, it seems almost a parody of candidate selection that an agrarian expert and alderman, Douglas, would win party endorsement for the United States Senate while the diplomat Stevenson was asked to run for state office. Stevenson recognized this mismatch. “I know the Congress like a book”,⁹ he argued, and, at first, refused to consider the governorship. But, after several days of anguished reflection, Stevenson accepted the party’s backing for governor.

Whether Arvey actually believed that Douglas and Stevenson had any chance of defeating their Republican opponents in 1948 is a matter of speculation. Arvey has repeatedly stated since that “most members of the organization felt that we had a chance, a better than even chance of winning”.¹⁰ Yet, Stephen Mitchell argues that the machine seriously doubted Democratic victory in November and that Arvey placed Stevenson and Douglas on the ticket as “sacrificial lambs” to add probity and respectability to a rather lackluster county slate.¹¹ The political facts and Arvey’s own actions seem to buttress Mitchell’s case.

Certainly, any pessimism was justified. In the 1946 Cook County elections, the Democrats received a severe beating. Richard J. Daley, later Mayor of Chicago, was defeated for the office of sheriff and a Republican took over as president of the Cook County Board.

Nationally, the 1948 Democratic ticket looked even worse. To many Americans, President Harry S. Truman appeared totally incompetent. During the post-war reconversion, bitter strikes in the mines and railroads forced Truman to seize both industries and ended in the fining of popular union leader John L. Lewis. A wild inflation gripped the economy. When the

⁹ Kenneth S. Davis, *Politics of Honor*, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1967, p. 184

¹⁰ Edward P. Doyle, ed., *As We Know Adlai*, Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p. 53

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 71

Republicans proposed a compromise bill to extend the Office of Price Administration for one year but which crippled its authority, Truman summarily vetoed the bill. He enraged management with his veto of Taft-Hartley in 1947 and intimidated Southern Democrats by introducing stronger civil rights legislation. The Republicans dominated both houses of Congress and looked forward eagerly to the November elections.

The Democrats were undergoing internal ruptures. Henry Wallace, removed by Truman as Secretary of Commerce for criticizing the administration's hard-line approach to Communism, organized the Progressive Citizens of America Party in 1947 and proposed a platform of collectivism and peaceful cooperation with Russia. As a reaction to Truman's civil rights programme Southern Democrats were also balking the party, nominating Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina to head the States' Rights Democratic Party. Convinced that Truman would lose the election, Arvey publicly called for an open convention, and privately began to search for an alternative candidate.¹²

Arvey's new candidate was Dwight David Eisenhower, former General of the Army during World War Two, now Army Chief of Staff, and probably the most popular man in America. Arvey was so sure that Eisenhower would accept the presidential nomination that he issued an unreserved endorsement of the General and even collaborated on a nominating speech for the Convention. However, Eisenhower flatly rejected any presidential offers that year from either party, and Instead, accepted the position of President of Columbia University. Reluctantly, Arvey made his way back to Truman.

Thus, it seems highly doubtful that Arvey, the astute political operator, was really optimistic. Perhaps he was compelled as party chief to exude the phoney political image of confidence, and when the events of the election confirmed his own artificial optimism, Arvey quickly took a low bow for his gift of political prophecy.

Dwight Green's eight years as governor of Illinois reads like a Greek tragedy. In 1940, Green ran for governor as the man who prosecuted "Scarface" Al Capone. Promising an end to machine politics in Illinois - "there will never be a Green machine",¹³ he won overwhelmingly, piling up a greater plurality than Franklin D. Roosevelt. Green then proceeded to build up one of the best-financed, well-organized, and scandal-scarred political machines in

¹² Stanley Frankel - Holmes Alexander, "Arvey of Illinois: New Style Political Boss", *Colliers*, July 22, 1949

¹³ John Bartlow Martin, "The Blast in Centralia No. 5" *Harper's Magazine*, March 1948, p. 210

Illinois history.¹⁴ A conservative isolationist, Green adopted the Chicago Tribune as his fact sheet and Tribune publisher McCormick, once called “the greatest mind of the fourteenth century”,¹⁵ as his political mentor. In the Cook County elections of 1946, Green reached the height of his political power. Soon, visions of the White House started dancing madly in front of him.¹⁶ Slowly, Green shifted his attention away from Illinois and toward Washington D.C., lambasting the “New Dealers” as “back alley revolutionaries and parlor anarchists”¹⁷ and warning the 1948 Republican Convention of possible over-extension of United States forces abroad. As he moved into national prominence, Green began to ignore Illinois administration and lose control of his own political machine.¹⁸ Springfield slumped into inefficiency, boondoggling, and corruption.

These examples of misgovernment remained beyond public scrutiny until, on March 25, 1947, a Centralia mine explosion killed 111 miners. However, this mine accident appeared even more outrageous when, in an article for Harper’s Magazine, in 1948, journalist John Bartlow Martin declared that the tragedy of Centralia could have been easily avoided. For months, ran the article, everybody concerned knew that the mine could explode any minute yet, nobody did anything effective about it. “Why not?” asked Martin. Then, in a brilliantly written expose, Martin charged the politically appointed mine inspectors with paying more attention to enriching the machine than to protecting the lives of the miners. In fact, Mine Department Director Robert M. Medill had authorised his mine inspectors to solicit money for the Republican Party from the coal operators. While no Illinois law forbade the mine inspectors from fund-raising; nevertheless, said Martin, it is certainly a question of political morality when inspectors, who should maintain a critical aloofness, befriend the operators for campaign contributions. The guilt for the Centralia mine disaster lies ultimately with Governor Green. For, “while the kingmakers were shunting him (Green) around the nation making speeches, back home his loyal followers were busier building a rich political machine for him than in administering the state”.¹⁹

by the summer of 1948, more Green administration scandals were uncovered. The Shelton Gang scandal. involving freedom of the press, was particularly repugnant. Crime

¹⁴ Kenneth S. Davis, Politics of Honor, 1967, p. 184

¹⁵ “The Colonel’s Century”, Time, June 9, 1947, p.60

¹⁶ John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson, New York, 1952, p. 77

¹⁷ Dwight H. Green, “Text of Keynote Address” at Republican Convention, New York Times, June 22, 1948, p. 10

¹⁸ John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson, New York, 1952, p.77

¹⁹ John Bartlow Martin, “The Blast in Centralia No.5” Harper’s Magazine, March 1948, pp. 193-220

reporter Theodore C. Link of the St. Louis Post Dispatch had learned that state officials were accepting bribes from hoodlums for overlooking gambling indictments. Immediately, Link sent the story off to the press. As a result, State's Attorney Roy Hull was charged with malfeasance in office and for taking a bribe from Bernie Shelton. Hull denied the charges and demanded another grand jury hearing. When Governor Green sent a special prosecutor to Peoria, a second grand jury was called and revised the earlier decision. Instead, it accused Link of kidnapping, conspiracy, and intimidating the witnesses for the prosecution. The St. Louis Post Dispatch was outraged. "The Post-Dispatch will not be intimidated. It will not be gagged", ran their editorial.²⁰

While Link was released after the November elections, his investigations were publicized before the elections. They disclosed that between January 1943 and November 1948, thirty-three editors and publishers, mostly from downstate Illinois newspapers, received a total of \$305,000 from the "compensation for personal service" payroll of Governor Green. Though several of the editors did hold responsible positions, one publisher drew \$5620 as a Highway Department messenger clerk.²¹

Stevenson's campaign developed as an onslaught against the inefficiency, waste and corruption of the Green administration. "The best way to win votes". believed Stevenson, "is through reason, for people are educable on issues".²² The "best way" for Stevenson did not connote political expediency but moral propriety. However, the issues of the 1948 campaign, morality and scandal, were inherently charged with emotion. Stevenson rarely delivered a speech without referring either to the Centralia mine disaster or the alliance of crime and politics. Often, he would quote directly from a St. Louis Dispatch editorial:

Under Dwight Green, state administration in Illinois has become a sinkhole of bribery and payoffs, of thugs and shakedowns, kickbacks and padded payrolls.²³

Or from the Chicago Daily News:

The Green administration is full of idle pay-rollers who make no pretense of working for their money. It nourishes a swarm of grafters, chiselers, and

²⁰ The Battle of Peoria", Time, November 1, 1948, p.58

²¹ 1 "publishers Linked to Political Jobs", New York Times April 26, 1949, p. 23

²² Russel Windes, Jr. and James A. Robinson, "Public Address in the Career of Adlai E. Stevenson", The Quarter Journal of Speech, October 1956, p. 228

²³ Speech at Bloomington's Young Men's Club, October 1948

racketeers, who grow bolder every year. They threaten the moral health of the state - to say nothing of the state treasury.²⁴

As the campaign progressed, Stevenson continued to unleash verbal barrages against Green. But from his negative political criticisms, Stevenson evolved a positive political programme. In many cases, his programme was simply a turning inside out of his Green critique. While at an August campaign rally in Champaign he would call the mine inspection system a “prostitution of a public service”,²⁵ on a return trip to Champaign in mid-October, he never mentioned Centralia but rather stated that, as governor, he would insist that the civil service and merit systems be respected and that political coercion of state servants would not be tolerated.²⁶

Stevenson’s platform hinged on a basic theme - the removal of politics and partisanship from state government. Post-election politics, with its sinecures, Jobbing, extravagant contracts, was as a governmental encumbrance costing the taxpayers millions of dollars. Thus, the disappearance of political influence from state government would help to end bureaucratic mismanagement and, more important, would save money which could be channeled into municipal improvements, public welfare and relief, a long-term highway rehabilitation programme, and common schools. If elected governor, he would sever existing ties between civil servants, whether mine inspectors or state police, and politics.

During the gubernatorial campaign, Stevenson maintained only the slenderest personal ties with the party machine. This non-partisan stature served both political and moral functions. In a traditionally Republican state and in an election year portending a Democratic debacle, Stevenson had little choice but to play down partisan politics and broaden his popular base. However, non-partisanship was no public pose. Stevenson shunned political and even economic and social alliances which, almost inevitably result in special interest group favors and dishonest favouritism after elections. “A man cannot be Governor and party boss at the same time”, said Stevenson, “without sacrificing obvious public interest to the apparent party interest.”²⁷ He would not be a messenger boy of Jacob Arvey, in fact, he ran his campaign independently of Arvey financial support, but proudly proclaimed “I am an amateur in

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Speech at Champaign, Illinois, August 10, 1948

²⁶ Speech at Champaign, Illinois, October 23, 1948

²⁷ Speech, New Trier High School, October 15, 1948

politics”.²⁸ He replaced the partisan ring of the New Deal label with the assertion. “I am the ‘No Deal candidate’”.²⁹

He transformed his campaign into a crusade to restore moral vigour in government affairs, not only on the state level but also on the community level. “Representative government cannot be wholesome, efficient, and healthy at the top, and corrupt, careless, and cynical at the bottom”³⁰ he told a New Trier Township audience. Thus, in effect, Stevenson tied a promise of moral purgation to his candidacy. A vote for Stevenson was a vote for morality, a vote of outrage against corruption, petty politics, and a ticket for the people’s own readmission into governmental affairs.

Stevenson won the election by 572,067 votes, the largest plurality in Illinois history. Not only did he carry the Democratic stronghold of Cook County by huge margins, but also successfully besieged the traditionally Republican downstate citadels winning 48 out of 101 counties by a combined total of 25,643. Paul Douglas swamped Brooks by well over 400,000 votes and joined his Democratic colleague Scott Lucas in the Senate. Though the Democrats captured the Illinois Assembly, the Senate remained in the Republican camp. However, Gallup and other pollsters swallowed their largest chunk of pride when the American people, ignoring the percentages, re-elected Harry S. Truman as President of the United States. To a large degree Truman’s 22,000 vote margin in Illinois was due to the extraordinary length of Stevenson’s coattails. Stevenson’s victory was never in doubt. While Truman was waving the Chicago Tribune headline of his premature political demise, Stevenson was already in the process of rewriting his Springfield inaugural address.

²⁸ Speech, West Frankfort, Illinois, October 20, 1948

²⁹ Speech, Chicago Stadium, October 25, 1948

³⁰ Speech, New Trier High School, October 15, 1948

2. THE STEVENSON STATE

“I have no fixed principles by which every issue is to be automatically resolved”.³¹ said Stevenson in his first year as governor. This is not to say that Stevenson lacked principles, but, rather, that his principles were not rigidly defined. For instance, when dealing with political appointments, Stevenson moved from an idealistic non-partisan as a candidate to an enlightened partisan as governor. While he sought to attract top professionals to head the various departments of state, Stevenson consulted with Jacob Arvey in regard to appointees in lesser positions.³²

As governor, Stevenson viewed patronage as a necessary evil inextricably bound to the organised political activity so crucial to sustaining a democracy. “A job on the public payroll.” “Stevenson told a Civil Service Convention, “ is the most compelling inducement possible... in our development as a self-governing people”.³³ Certainly, the people of Illinois knew the results of excessive political patronage. One of the main reasons so many Republicans split their ballot to vote for Stevenson was that they were disgusted with the patronage system under Governor Green.³⁴ But, an objective civil service system also had its defects. “It can become a shield”, said Stevenson, for the incompetent, the faithless, and the lazy. It can stifle imagination and initiative”.³⁵

In Stevenson’s mind, patronage and the civil service were both governmental rewards as well as instruments for honest and efficient government. However, to keep them functioning creatively and objectively. those people, once selected, should thenceforth be completely divorced from the political process. For example, Frank Annunzio, director of the Illinois Department of Labour, doubled as the Democratic committeeman for the first Ward. Stevenson knew that Annunzio might someday be forced to use his appointive power as labour head to pay off his debts incurred as a committeeman. Thus, Stevenson issued an ultimatum to Annunzio: either give up the political post or resign as director. Annunzio chose to stay on.³⁶ Within his first year, Stevenson abolished the “kick-in”, a procedure requiring percentage

³¹ Speech, New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 24, 1949

³² "How Stevenson Run His State", U.S. News and World Report, August 8, 1952, p.19

³³ Adlai E. Stevenson, Public Personnel Review, July, 1950, p.115

³⁴ Chicago Sun Times, Milburn Akers Column, “The Danger of Paul Powell”, December 17, 1948, p.42

³⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Public Personnel Review, July 1950, p.115

³⁶ "Politics and Law Enforcement", Chicago Sun Times, August 11, 1951, editorial, p. 13

assessment of state employees for political campaigns, and vetoed a proposal to force employees to buy membership cards in the Democratic party.

Stevenson also began to push early for the removal of the state police from party politics. In a column for the Chicago Sun Times, Milburn Akers spoofed the sad connection between politics and state policemen. “What the state too frequently gets nowadays is a batch of precinct captains running around in uniform with stars on their coats and guns in their hips”³⁷ A not-so-funny incident confirmed the need for expertise in the police force. In December, 1949, Chicago’s South Side Englewood district experienced a racial disorder which magnified the incompetence and negligence of the police, especially during their fruitless attempt to disperse a racist mob.³⁸

To the disappointment of Arvey, Stevenson presented a plan to place the state police on a merit basis. He appointed a temporary non-partisan board of three devise recruitment standards and asked both Democratic and Republican state organisations to compile separate lists of qualified personnel from which Stevenson would draw equally, by removing the police from party control, Stevenson removed some of the influence of partisan politics from state government.³⁹

Specialists from a variety of fields flocked to Springfield. Joseph D. Lohman, an expert in criminology and sociology from the University of Chicago, was appointed director of the State Payroll Board. Tappan Gregory, former President of the American Bar Association, also consented to serve on the Payroll Board. Stevenson plucked W. Willard Wirts and Walter V. Schaefer out of the Northwestern University School of Law to join his administration. Wirtz went to the State Liquor Board while Schaefer became Stevenson’s principal legal and legislative assistant and later headed Illinois’ “Little Hoover” Commission to revamp the executive branch. Expertise preceded party affiliation as a prerequisite for a high state position. Republican Walter T. Fisher, who possessed a distinguished background in public utility regulation, accepted the position of chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission. However the nomination of Frederick K. Hoehler to head the Public Welfare Department proved to be his stellar appointment. Hoehler, the executive director of the Chicago Community Fund, was

³⁷ Milburn Akers Column, “Politics and State Policemen” Chicago Sun Times, December 7, 1948, p.38

³⁸ William Peters, “Race War in Chicago”, New Republic January 9, 1950, pp.10-12

³⁹ Hub Logan, “Stevenson to Take State Police out of Political Field” Chicago Bun Times, February 15, 1949, p.3

past President of the American Public Welfare Association and one of the leading professionals in the field.

It is to Stevenson's tribute both as a crusader and persuader that he attracted such outstanding men to Springfield despite the state's depressingly low salary scale for employees. The scale, set by law, amounted to eight thousand dollars for cabinet level officials. It became increasingly clear to Stevenson that Illinois was losing skilled engineers and professionals to other states as a result of the low state salaries.⁴⁰ He was also convinced that "poorly paid employees tend to be unsatisfactory employees and they invariably cost more in the long run."

⁴¹ Thus Stevenson supported a ten percent across the board salary increase for state employees which was finally approved in June 1951. As additional compensation for key aides, Stevenson supplemented their salaries with money contributed during his campaign and throughout his administration from personal friends and admirers.⁴²

The elimination of political sinecures, thirteen hundred within the first six months of office, was part of Stevenson's broader programme in instill efficiency and economy in state government. In his inaugural address, Stevenson recommended that the public should be invited to scrutinize the state payroll periodically for payroll padding and excessive patronage. He denounced what was known as the Whitewall Club, a group of luxury auto owners in the state government, and ordered that every department head restudy his auto requests. During his budget pruning sessions, Stevenson would "blow up" at his state code department directors for failing to squeeze enough water out of their budget requests. In the evenings, Stevenson would turn off the lights in unoccupied rooms and require his last servant to leave the mansion before nine o'clock.⁴³

Within a few months of taking office, Stevenson urged a comprehensive study of the Illinois executive branch the first investigation in thirty years, and appointed Walter Schaefer to head the study. Named "The Little Hoover Commission", after the 1947 federal reorganization committee headed by President Hoover, the study would recommend ways to reduce the costs and simplify the structure of state government by eliminating administrative overlapping, and by regrouping related services.⁴⁴ The final report of the Commission, issued

⁴⁰ Ibid. "State Pay Hike Eyed by Adlai", John Dreiske.p.18

⁴¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Public Personnel Review, july 1950, p . 116

⁴² As We Knew Adlai", Edward P. Doyle, ed., New York, pp.79-80

⁴³ John Dreiske column, Chicago Sun Times, May 12, 1949, p. 32

⁴⁴ Chicago Sun Times, July 10, 1949, p.3

in late 1950, recommended the abolition of thirty state agencies which would save the state four and one-half million dollars annually. But, perhaps because the reduction of state agencies was so closely tied to patronage doled out by state legislators, the General Assembly passed very few of the principle money-saving proposals.

“Con-Con” and the Gateway Amendment

If Stevenson and Green had agreed on any one issue during the 1948 campaign, it was Illinois desperate need for a revised state constitution.⁴⁵ The Illinois Constitution, unchanged since its ratification in 1870, was a vestige of a predominately rural America. It was virtually impossible to amend. The amendment procedure required the approval of a majority of those voting in the election, whether they voted on the particular amendment or not. A voter, oblivious or indifferent to the particular amendment, would automatically register a negative vote. Thus, since 1870, Illinois had adopted fewer amendments than any other state but Missouri whose amendment count dated from 1945, the year of their own constitutional revision.⁴⁶

Not only was it impossible to amend the constitution, but rural politicians, disregarding the constitutional directive to reapportion the electoral districts every ten years, maintained absolute control over the General Assembly.⁴⁷ They knew that any reasonable representation policy would leave Chicago and other cities in control of the legislature and ensure their own elimination from political office.⁴⁸

The cities found themselves not only abused politically but shackled to Springfield economically. Under the 1870 Constitution, a municipality could exercise no power except that granted by the General Assembly. For every innovative measure, for every civic improvement, Illinois mayors depended on the General Assembly for moral and monetary approval. At the opening of every legislative session, the mayors perforce would trapse down to Springfield to implore the legislators for additional aid to the cities. Many mayors and several city newspapers began demanding increased home rule for the cities. To call attention to the inefficient and, at times, humiliating vassalage of the cities to Springfield, the Chicago Sun Times quoted Senator

⁴⁵ New York Times, June 6, 1948, Section 4, p.6

⁴⁶ Austin F. MacDonald, State and Local Government in the United States, Thomas Crowell Co., New York, 1955, p.93

⁴⁷ Milburn Akers column, Chicago Sun Times, March 14, 1949, p. 34

⁴⁸ A United States Supreme Court ruling in 1950 declared that it had no jurisdiction over a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions. (April 24, 1950. Chicago Sun Times editorial "Equal Votes for All", p.27).

Robert Taft in an editorial entitled “our Mousetrapped City”. “I do not believe”, said Senator Taft, “that we can have real freedom in this country without local self-government and the right of the people to determine the matters which affect them in their daily lives.”⁴⁹

However, home rule for the cities required economic self-sufficiency. Thus, before the umbilical cord could be cut and home rule born, the cities had to establish a firm tax base. A revised constitution could provide a proper tax base by either extending the city sales tax or by granting the cities licensing power over certain businesses.⁵⁰

The municipal debt limitation clause in the Constitution also caused governmental inefficiency. The limitation required that the ceiling for municipal debts not exceed the assessed value of the property therein. The limitation, however, had resulted in the multiplication of municipal corporations. For example, when the citizens would demand a new municipal service, they would form a municipal corporation with tax levying powers and with the same debt limitation based on the same property as already existing corporations. This wildcat growth of municipal corporations not only diffused responsibility, but also cost the state huge sums of money for administrative facilities.⁵¹ “We can never”, said Stevenson, “reduce substantially the waste and inefficiency that goes with our present multiplicity of governmental units until we succeed in modernizing our Constitution of 1870”.⁵²

Stevenson campaigned vigorously for a Constitutional Convention during his first months as governor. In his first radio broadcast to the people of Illinois on March 9, 1949. Stevenson appealed to their sense of civic responsibility in seeking out their active support for a Constitutional Convention. “You helped to put me in this huge job,” he said, “now I want you to help me do the job” (Stevenson’s underlined speech).⁵³ He presented to the people a cogent and forthright argument for constitutional revision citing the inequitable taxation laws, virtual disenfranchisement of urban citizens, an inefficient judicial structure, an impossible amendment procedure, and the municipal crisis.

He marched up and down the state informing the citizens of state problems and selling them the need for a Constitutional Convention. Once made aware of the fact, Stevenson believed that the people of Illinois would arrive at the proper decision. “Certainly, the better

⁴⁹ “Our Mousetrapped City”, Chicago Sun Times, editorial, June 11, 1940, p.21

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Speech to Illinois League of Women Voters, October 8, 1948

⁵² Speech to CIO State Convention, December 9, 1949

⁵³ Radio Broadcast on the Constitutional Convention, March 9, 1949

informed our people are about their government, the greater the interest they take in its affairs, the better our government is going to be”.⁵⁴

He sought out the opposition, entered their den, talked their language, and attempted to ease their doubts. In an address to the conservative Merchants and Manufacturers Club, Stevenson asked the businessmen why they insisted on obsolete methods of state administration when they would not tolerate such obsolete methods in their own offices. “I cannot understand why some leading business people who have so much at stake in orderly, efficient, responsible public administration should persist year after year in opposing constitutional reform”.⁵⁵ As a result of his speeches and radio broadcasts, constituents deluged their legislators with mail in support of “Con-Con”.⁵⁶ However, the House bill to call a statewide referendum for the Convention failed to gain the necessary two-thirds vote.

Opposition came from what Stevenson termed a “strange alliance” between the Illinois Federation of Labour and the Illinois Manufacturers Association. Both groups believed that a revised constitution would enlarge state authority at their expense: labour feared new regulation laws while the manufacturers believed that a constitutional revision would include a state income tax.⁵⁷

Stevenson was particularly upset over the conspicuous partisanship evoked by the bill. In several cases, those Republicans who supported the identical referendum under Green, repudiated their earlier stand and voted against the Stevenson bill.⁵⁸ “I am disappointed”, said Stevenson, “that a matter of such general public concern was defeated on party lines. I don’t believe, and I don’t think the people believe, that constitutional revision is a party matter. What the people want is more progress and less partisanship”.⁵⁹

As an alternative to the Constitutional Convention, the Republicans introduced the Gateway Amendment which would permit voters to approve or reject three amendments to the constitution at one time. It would also change the amendment procedure to a required two-thirds of those voting on the amendment. While Stevenson attacked the new amendment as “an effort to dodge responsibility for blocking much needed change”,⁶⁰ he finally accepted the half-

⁵⁴ Speech, Litchfield Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 1949

⁵⁵ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, March 17, 1949, pp.3-18

⁵⁶ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, March 14, 1949, p.29

⁵⁷ J. Edward Day, The Stevenson Administration: The First Three Years, 1952, p.24

⁵⁸ Idem

⁵⁹ Illinois State News, May 3, 1949

⁶⁰ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, May 4, 1949, p. 3

loaf. At least, he reasoned, the Gateway Amendment would enable Illinois “to crawl out of our ancient straitjacket if we can’t jump out as I had hoped”.⁶¹ (Stevenson’s underlined speech). He organized a concerted, non-partisan drive to secure its ratification in the 1950 election. At an unprecedented bi-partisan meeting on October 13, Stevenson invited eleven Democratic and Republican leaders to plan a campaign for Gateway’s adoption, set up a speaker’s bureau to address civic groups and political meetings on its behalf, and appointed J. Edward Day to head the Gateway publicity drive.

To win support for the Gateway Amendment, Stevenson tried to persuade the Illinois electorate that national party loyalties, which are determined by national issues, have little bearing on state and local issues. “Partisanship and party division on issue become less and less important at the state and local level.”⁶² For example, a voter’s position on a national issue such as isolationism has no relevance to a local issue such as bussing. However, Stevenson recognized that “straight ticket thinking does dominate our voting practices.”⁶³

This time, despite an overwhelming Republican victory on both the national and state levels, the Gateway Amendment was passed, the first amendment to the Illinois Constitution in 42 years. The Gateway victory proved that an informed electorate could disregard party labels and vote strictly on the issues. The Gateway Amendment also lived up to its name as a bridge uniting both parties. Rarely, throughout Stevenson’s four years as governor were bipartisan bridges constructed again.

State Local Relations

Decentralization, returning to the community those services which could best be handled by the community and which are essentially community responsibilities, was an overriding theme of Stevenson’s governorship. “our objective”, said Stevenson, “should be in the steady relinquishment by higher levels of power and direction over lower, the constant pushing of government authority and administration back as close to the people as they can go”.⁶⁴ Centralization, particularly in the areas of health, education, and welfare, was not inevitable. It resulted from the voluntary abdication of authority on the part of the local communities and their leaders.⁶⁵ Stevenson was not trying to force local governments into

⁶¹ Speech, New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 24, 1949

⁶² Speech, Litchfield Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 1949

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Speech, Illinois Retail Farm Equipment Association, **Cember** 3, 1949

⁶⁵ 1949. Speech, Litchfield Chamber of Commerce, September 27

assuming responsibilities that they were incapable of handling. Rather, he saw the community as a unique, but untapped power structure.

Yet, Stevenson was aware that “There is no more magic in smallness than in bigness... The virtues of increased emphasis on government at the local level will not be realized unless there is responsibility. The community which would govern itself must accept responsibility for governmental functions”.⁶⁶ To prick civic consciences, to reawaken the citizen’s moral and financial responsibilities to his community -these were vital aims of the Stevenson administration.

Because of community indifference to its own problems, the local governments defaulted their responsibilities to the states. To a large extent, party machines helped to spin this web of apathy around a community. They discouraged any form of political activity Independent of the machines. Under what was known as the minority system of representation, Illinois candidates for the state legislature were selected by senatorial committees of the two major parties. In each of 51 senatorial districts, these two committees, acting together, nominated only as many candidates as positions. It was true that other districts were open to more nominations, but, in these cases, the political machines spent huge sums, and used public employees and public facilities to dominate the primary. In either case, voters had little choice, thus little incentive to vote or even to participate in the primaries or November elections.⁶⁷

Despite these political handicaps, Stevenson attempted to stimulate interest in state affairs as a way to reawaken citizens to community problems. “One of my main concerns is salesmanship - how to reawaken public interest and support”.⁶⁸ In nearly every speech, Stevenson tried to glamorize state government. Each month, Illinois citizens could see their governor on television, in a fireside chat format, discussing Important state matters with one of his cabinet members. Every six months, he delivered on radio a “state of the state” message to the people of Illinois. He began to write a newspaper column, not as a political propaganda device, but rather to inform the citizens about state problems and the functioning of state government. By informing the citizens and stimulating their interest in state matters, Stevenson believed that better and more efficient government would inevitably result. “I need not tell this group, “said Stevenson to the Inland Daily Press Association, “about the power and influence

⁶⁶ Speech, Illinois Retail Farm Equipment Association, December 3, 1949

⁶⁷ Milburn Akers Column, Chicago Sun Times, November 20, 1949, p.12; August 23, 1949, p. 32; August 24, 1949, p.44

⁶⁸ Speech to National Reorganization Conference, December 12, 1949

for better government and better public officials that lies in a vigilant public and pitiless publicity". An informed electorate was a concerned electorate and would assume responsibility for pressing local problems.

Juvenile delinquency was one problem which could best be solved at the local level. A rapid increase of youth crimes had persisted throughout the post-war years. The average age of the inmates in the Illinois penitentiaries, in the low twenties, reflected the rise in juvenile felonies in Illinois. On March 12, 1949, Stevenson called a state-wide meeting on youth crime where he urged that his Youthful Offenders Commission devise an overall programme for juvenile delinquency. In a report issued in June, the Commission stated that "communities must help rebuild the lives of wayward boys". Without community help, particularly in their willingness to readmit delinquents into community life, rehabilitation of the youths is difficult, if not impossible.⁶⁹

Stevenson understood that the attitude of the community was closely tied to the prevalence of delinquency. "If there is respect for law in the community, children naturally develop the same attitude". He also knew that a uniform state plan to control delinquency, could not possibly take into account community differences."⁷⁰

In the area of mental health, Stevenson believed that the quickest methods of rehabilitation and adjustment lay in a shift of emphasis from state hospitalization to home care.⁷¹ Illinois institutions, with 48,000 patients, were overcrowded by sixty percent. The buildings, themselves, were in terrible condition. However, Stevenson was quick to point out that the overcrowding, was not only the product of the state's failure to build more Institutions but also the failure of community preventive services.⁷²

The increase in mental illness can be broken, said Stevenson, not by building bigger and better state hospitals but by finding and correcting the root causes of mental illness, in better curative methods, and in the wider acceptance by local communities of their responsibilities.⁷³ Stevenson adopted the position of Dr. Walter Baer, medical director of the Peoria Mental Hygiene Clinic, who stated that "Early diagnosis and treatment of personality

⁶⁹ Roman Pucinski, Chicago Sun Times, June 14, 1949, p.5

⁷⁰ Speech, Farmersville Dedication, May 29, 1950

⁷¹ . Inaugural Address, Springfield, January 10, 1949

⁷² Speech, Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, April 17, 1951

⁷³ Speech, Abbott Children's Center Dedication, Peoria State Hospital, October 8, 1951

disorders in children and adults at the local level - in the most immediate community - is most essential".⁷⁴

While Stevenson agreed that the local community must assume responsibility for mental health problems, he was equally aware that the local governments were helpless to build mental health clinics without state funds. Thus, as part of his decentralization plans, Stevenson hoped to supplement local funds and, at the same time, help communities to mobilize and build up their own resources.⁷⁵ Stevenson was especially proud of the new Peoria Mental Health Clinic. Supported by the community with some state and federal assistance, the clinic attempted to correct and treat mental disorders on the local level and with local resources rather than refer patients to a state institution. He also praised the establishment of community child guidance centres, supported by the state-funded Institute for Juvenile Research, to treat psychotic children.

In 1951, Stevenson introduced a broad mental health programme which would transfer part of the responsibility back to the local communities. The programme gave the superintendents of state hospitals the power to accept only those patients who, in their judgment, would benefit from institutionalized care. It also granted the courts the authority to decide whether cases demanded immediate hospitalization. Finally, the programme transferred the financial burden from the state back to those families or patients who could afford it. They would be compelled to pay seventy-five dollars per month, still well below the cost of private treatment; while those patients unable to pay would continue to receive care without charge.⁷⁶

Public services, especially public welfare, demanded increased local participation and community concern. Stevenson perceived that only on the local level could indigenous causes of poverty be detected and rooted out.⁷⁷ While the state must continue to keep public assistance at a decent rate and act as repository for cases of extreme hardship, prevention and rehabilitation could be handled most successfully at the local level.⁷⁸ Put the spiritual values of the small towns, "the neighbourliness, the understanding, the common interest, and the mutual help, "to use in the field of public welfare."⁷⁹ Increased centralization of public welfare would not only discourage citizen responsibility but might stifle any public outcry over obvious abuse.

⁷⁴ Roman Pucinski, Chicago Sun Times, October 31, 1949, p.12

⁷⁵ Speech, American Public Welfare Association, December 1, 1950

⁷⁶ Roman Pucinski, Chicago Sun Times, October 5, 1950, p.21

⁷⁷ "A Governor Looks at Public Welfare", Public Welfare, January 1951, p. 30

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 31

⁷⁹ Speech for St. Anne Centennial, July 28, 1950

“When public services; said Director of Welfare Hoehler, “are removed from citizenship participation and the people’s wishes ignored, they may become dangerous to the common welfare”.⁸⁰

To encourage public involvement, Hoehler organized a “voluntary aid” programs which recruited volunteers from neighbouring communities near a state institution to talk to or read to the inmates.

Stevenson sought a government partnership with private volunteer agencies. Speaking at a dinner before the Federation of Jewish Philanthropy, Stevenson stressed this necessary partnership between those public and private agencies with common problems and common goals. “The job (welfare) is much too big for either government or private initiative working separately... We must work together”.⁸¹

Ultimately, the basic aim of Stevenson’s welfare programme was to rehabilitate the individual so that he could take care of himself. The state government must seek to aid the poor without destroying individual responsibility. As part of this plan, Stevenson authorized the Illinois Public Aid Commission to institute stricter controls so that ineligible welfare recipients can be weeded out. The IPAC also demanded that relatives of recipients take on a greater share of the financial support.⁸² “We must seek”, said Stevenson, “to put an end to the ever-increasing number of persons seeking financial aid”⁸³

As part of his attempt to increase the efficiency and streamline the economy of Illinois government, Stevenson proposed to consolidate the IPAC with the Department of Welfare. This merger fit into Stevenson’s long-range plans of bringing state family services closer to the community. With the money lost in the overlap of duties, the communities would be able to localize social service clinics and facilities.⁸⁴ However, the Senate failed to pass the consolidation bill.

Despite the economy drive in state government, by January, 1950, a financial crisis had developed in the welfare department. Though the biennial budget allotted over 250 million dollars for dependent children, old age pensioners, and general relief, it was clear by winter

⁸⁰ Speech given by Adlai Stevenson to Federation of Jewish Philanthropy, quoting Frederick Hochler, January 19, 1950

⁸¹ Speech given by Adlai Stevenson to Federation of Jewish Philanthropy, quoting Frederick Hochler, January 19, 1950

⁸² J. Edward Day, *Stevenson’s Administration*, p. 13

⁸³ Chicago *Sun Times*, May 23, 1949, Hub Logan, p. 7

⁸⁴ Chicago *Sun Times*, January 15, 1950, p. 6

1949 that the increased number of recipients would force the IPAC to “overextend its appropriation”. General assistance roles indicated an increase of 42 percent between March, 1949 and March, 1950; aid to dependent children also reached an all-time high of 93,000 recipients in January, 1950, an increase of 13.5 percent over the previous year.

To keep within their restricted budget, the IPAC was forced, in September 1949, to reduce general assistance allowances by 10 percent and aid to dependent children by 5 percent. Despite the cut-backs, the Commission doled out assistance well in excess of the monthly average permitted by their appropriation. Nevertheless, concerned organizations pleaded with Stevenson to call a special session of Congress which would restore relief cuts. Chicago Industrial Union Secretary, Michael Mann stated that assistance standards in Illinois had reached a “shameful, sub-human level”.⁸⁵ Finally, in late January, the IPAC promised no more relief cuts. Stevenson agreed that a shortage in appropriated funds must not be permitted to interfere with justified demands for public assistance.⁸⁶ But it appeared probable that Commission funds would not hold out until the next Congressional session and that the Commission might be forced into deficiency appropriations.

In March 1950, Stevenson made an emergency change in the budget by adding a new item in the assistance budget called “personal incidentals”. The change almost entirely restored the allowances so its pre-September 1949 level. At Stevenson’s personal request, the federal government distributed 2.4 million pounds a month of surplus potatoes, dried milk, and eggs to welfare recipients. However, Stevenson realized that he would have to call a special session of the legislature for additional appropriations.

In the field of education, Stevenson recognized the Imperative need for increased state aid to the public schools.⁸⁷ Illinois ranked lowest of all the states in per capita grants to local schools. However, in his 1949 budget message, Stevenson deplored any idea that the state would become a dumping ground for local problems. “Excessive emphasis has been placed on state aid as the remedy for all the defects of our common school system”.⁸⁸ Stevenson established distinctions between those communities which have begun to set up effective

⁸⁵ Chicago Sun Times, January 15, 1950, p. 5

⁸⁶ Chicago, Sun Times, January 23, 1950, p. 4

⁸⁷ Stevenson Administration, J. Edward Day, p. 21

⁸⁸ Budget Message, April 19, 1949

school organizations and, thereby, qualify for state aid, and those obsolete and inefficient school systems, ignored by the local community, who fail to qualify.⁸⁹

In the 1949 legislative session, Stevenson supported an appropriation of 112 million dollars for aid to the common schools financed by a proposed broadening of the state sales tax. While most of the appropriation passed both Houses, the sales tax was defeated and Stevenson was required to cut back on the already approved appropriation. Tax increases, particularly the gas and truck license taxes, gave Stevenson enough money to support the 125 million dollars appropriated in the 1951 session.

Under the Stevenson administration, Illinois moved from the lowest to one of the highest states in per capita grants to public schools.⁹⁰

Stevenson cautioned against those federal and state education programmes which do not take into account the variations between school districts and which inevitably lead to uniformity and stifle local initiative. In a speech given at the commencement exercises of Western Illinois State College, Stevenson warned that depression of diversity “points not in the direction of free inquiry in a free society but in the direction of thought control which we abhor”.⁹¹ Stevenson urged that federal and state programmes seek out distinguishing local features and earmark their grants to correspond to these local distinctions.⁹²

Federal State Relations

While Stevenson repeatedly harped on the twin themes of limited higher government intervention and home rule, he also recognized that the industrial age had created vast problems in the areas of health, education, transportation, employment and others which overflow state boundaries and could seriously cripple state budgets without federal assistance. “No amount of violent pleading for ‘states rights’, said Stevenson, “can possibly stop the ever-increasing scope of these national problems”.⁹³ At a Governor’s Conference in June, 1949, Stevenson led a group who opposed a resolution which demanded that the federal government reduce its aid programmes to the states by 20 percent. Utah’s Governor J. Bracken Lee urged the states to refuse federal grants and return to taxing themselves. Stevenson responded, “We must face the fact that in many instances the states either wouldn’t or couldn’t begin to cope with these vast

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ J. Edward Day, Stevenson Administration, p. 37

⁹¹ Speech to Western State College, June 1, 1950

⁹² John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, May 31, 1951, p.5

⁹³ Speech, Governor’s Conference, June 21, 1949

industrial age problems". Geographic proximity had little to do with administrative efficiency.⁹⁴

Stevenson upheld the position that the power to govern oneself at the local level was one of the greatest features of a democratic society and agreed that ear-marked federal grants-in-aid carry with them federal control, But evoking the doctrine of "states' rights" would not and should not exorcise federal intervention.⁹⁵ He once quoted Elihu Root who said:

The true and only way to preserve state authority is to be found in the awakened conscience of the states, their broadened views and higher standards of responsibility to the general public; in effective legislation by the states, in conformity to the general moral sense of the country; and in the vigorous exercise for the general public good for that state authority which is to be preserved.⁹⁶

States' rights require states' responsibilities and these responsibilities can be met only "by the taxpayers" pocket- books more than by frightened proclamations of states' rights". Taxation is central to the returning of legitimate state matters back to the states. Taxation is also crucial to local home rule. Reading from the Hoover Commission Report, Stevenson said, "every effort must be made to leave to localities and states adequate resources from which to raise revenue to meet the responsibilities of local and state governments". When the states and local authorities have enough capital to deal with whatever problems may arise, then the circles of authority based on efficiency, economy, and diversity can be drawn and any necessary overlap be defined. "With 48 active, efficient state centers", Stevenson assured the governors, "there is little or no danger of too great a consolidation of governmental authority".⁹⁷

Stevenson perceived the close interaction, in a world of cole war propaganda and instant intercontinental communication, between a local community and the world. "Our shortcomings which yesterday were local in their impact are today exploited around the world."⁹⁸ This idea was sadly confirmed during the 1952 Cicero race riots when Soviet propagandists broadcasted news of the riot as an example of American brutality toward Negro citizens.⁹⁹ Stevenson, with his diplomatic background, saw this relationship more clearly and, therefore, recognized that

⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵ Speech, Governor's Conference, June 21, 1949

⁹⁶ Speech to Inland Dairy Press Association, October 18, 1949

⁹⁷ Speech, Governor's Conference, June 21, 1949

⁹⁸ Speech for St. Anne Centennial, July 28, 1950

⁹⁹ John Dreiske, Chicago, Sun Times, March 7, 1952, p.3

the way local administrators handle local matters is often an index of our ability to act together as a unified nation.¹⁰⁰ “our republic”, said Stevenson, “can be no better, no stronger than the states, no better, no stronger than their local communities, The whole can be no better than the parts”.¹⁰¹

Public-Private Relations

In theory, Stevenson subscribed to the doctrine that least government was often the best government. He believed that, under ideal conditions, ultimate responsibility rested not with the federal, state, or even local governments but with the private sector and the individual. However, as governor, Stevenson recognized that the world proceeded under less than ideal conditions and, consequently, higher levels of government were compelled to step in when the individual, the private sector, and lower levels of government abrogated their “ideal” responsibilities. Stevenson would often quote Abraham Lincoln who said:

The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done but cannot do at all or cannot do as well for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. In all that the people can do as well for themselves, the government not to interfere.¹⁰²

Stevenson encouraged private groups to assume greater responsibility. For instance, he would have preferred that private industry set minimum wage and maximum hour standards and safety requirements, “I believe in less government interference, not more” he told The Retail Farm Equipment Association, “but if business does not do the job, the people will demand and they will get the interference”¹⁰³

Stevenson refused to enlarge government supervision any more than was necessary. “I do not believe that government, whether federal, state, or local, should take on any job which is not absolutely required by the facts of the case”.¹⁰⁴ Stevenson drew a distinct line between public authority and Individual freedom in his veto message of the 1951 Sunday Auto Bill. The supporters of the bill were a group of car dealers who sought to bar other dealers from selling or exchanging cars on Sunday. “Under our free enterprise system”, wrote Stevenson, “government should not interfere by regulatory or prohibitory laws in the business field except

¹⁰⁰ Speech, American Prison Association, October 9, 1950

¹⁰¹ Speech, League of Women Voters, September 15, 1950

¹⁰² Speech, Rockford Tuberculosis Sanitarium Dedication, October 3, 1950

¹⁰³ Speech, Illinois Retail Farm Equipment Association, December 1, 1949

¹⁰⁴ “Quizzing Stevenson”, U.S. News and World Report, April 25, 1952, p.11

1) where the activity in question is directly related to the public health safety, morals, or welfare or 2) to enforce competition".¹⁰⁵

The basic cause of the private sector deferring responsibility to the local government, local to state, and state to federal was the inability of each level to raise the necessary funds either through lack of courage, will, or legal authority. The people who clamour the loudest for more spending and for increased public services, said, Stevenson, were the same ones who lobby the hardest for reduced taxes and cutting costs. Local authorities, who are nearest the people, are also the most sensitive to voters' clamour.¹⁰⁶ As the taxing power moves away from the locality to Springfield, and, then to Washington, the ability to raise taxes and ignore public outcry becomes that much easier. In his attempt to institute greater provisions for home rule and decentralized public services, Stevenson had to continually take into account the problem of fund-raising.

¹⁰⁵ Chicago Sun Times, August 8, 1951, p.8

¹⁰⁶ Speech, Insurance Federation of Illinois, April 28, 1950

3. MONEY FOR ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES

The cities of Illinois faced a dangerous financial shortage after World War Two. No longer did a wartime “do without” psychology prevail among urban citizens.¹⁰⁷ The pent-up mass demands for increased welfare and mental health services, better education and housing exploded with the war’s end. The post-war inflationary trends, due in part to the collapse of federal price controls and a series of labour strikes, placed an especially difficult burden on welfare recipients and the unemployed. But city governments had reached the bottom of their financial barrels. Illinois law restricted municipalities to levies on property which were themselves limited by a statutory rate ceiling.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, the state government in Springfield had grown fat by soaking the cities with a state sales tax. “Cut it (the sales tax) up or cut it out”, insisted Illinois mayors.¹⁰⁹

Stevenson recognized the financial straits of the cities. During the gubernatorial race, Stevenson promised an active, constructive programme of aid to the cities.¹¹⁰ Specifically, he proposed increased state aid to the common schools. In the long run, however, Stevenson believed that the cities should acquire financial self-sufficiency as a prerequisite for eventual home rule. “I believe in more home rule for all our cities”, said Stevenson. “They shouldn’t have to come to Springfield begging help”¹¹¹ Nevertheless, in this case, as in others, expediency overruled doctrine. “Until our tax structure undergoes some major repairs or municipal costs are reduced, additional relief from the pyramiding costs of urbanization is needed”.¹¹²

In his inaugural address, Stevenson failed to offer any long-ranged state aid proposals. Instead, he called for economy and efficiency on the local level, based on the already existing tax structure. State aid, should support only those communities which can boast of effective local administration and not those communities improperly administered. “For well-organized local units”, said Stevenson, “the state should relax restrictions for its aid so as to insure the maximum of local initiative and responsibility in the management of local affairs.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ John Dreiske Column, Chicago Sun Times, November 16, 1948, p. 33

¹⁰⁸ Stevenson Budget Message, April 19, 1949

¹⁰⁹ J. Edward Day, Stevenson’s First Three Years, 1952, p.41

¹¹⁰ John Dreiske Column, “Remember Stevenson”, Chicago Sun Times, November 16, 1948, p. 33

¹¹¹ Speech, Radio Report to the People, July 7, 1949

¹¹² Stevenson Budget Message, April 19, 1949

¹¹³ Stevenson Inaugural Address, January 10, 1949

Stevenson's budget message in April 1949 did represent an increase in state assumption of urban financial problems. For the biennium, 1949-50, the budget proposed forty million dollars in direct state aid to the cities. Six million dollars would be channeled into the six urban tubercular clinics while the remaining 34 million would be split evenly between Chicago and the other Illinois cities. While the 8 ½ million dollars granted to Chicago was a substantial improvement over preceding years, it hardly met the urgent request of Mayor Kennelly of 25 million dollars for Chicago alone.¹¹⁴ However, even these new expenses assumed additional sources of revenue including a broadening of the ill-fated 2 percent retailer's occupation of state sales tax.

Stevenson saw two possible ways to distribute state funds to the local communities. The state could lend assistance directly to the required local service and, thereby, cut across local interests, or it could allot a flat or per capita grant to each community and permit local authorities to decide on the financial breakdown and final distribution. The second alternative clearly allows a portion of home rule denied by the first. Yet, Stevenson eliminated choice two. He questioned the constitutionality of returning money directly back to the local communities. More important, he questioned its efficiency. "One of the most effective restraints upon excessive and unwise public spending is the responsibility for imposing taxes, and I am loathe to endorse a further separation of the spending and taxing function unless other methods fail".¹¹⁵ Thus, Stevenson's drive for efficiency, for a while, tempered his feeling for home rule. In 1950, Stevenson agreed to support the flat or per capita grants on the condition that they be paid out of new state revenue. Much of the "so-called" state surplus had gone to schools, welfare institutions, debt retirement and other essential services of the state government.¹¹⁶ Thus, the real problem lay with the lack of funds on both the state and local levels.

After months of neutrality, Stevenson finally came out in favour of a "licensing for revenue" bill proposed by Mayor Kennelly. The bill granted Chicago and every other Illinois city, town, and village the power to license the businesses and occupations within its boundaries. It would raise eight million dollars in new municipal revenue and provide a sound, independent financial base pre-required for local autonomy. Though Stevenson feared that broad licensing powers may lead to "mal administration", he also understood that, "For cities to be self-reliant, they must have some freedom to choose revenue measures best suited to their

¹¹⁴ "Cut It Up or Cut It Out", Chicago Sun Times, editorial, April 30, 1949, p.25

¹¹⁵ Stevenson Budget Message, April 19, 1949

¹¹⁶ Speech to the Illinois Agricultural Association, November 16, 1949

needs.¹¹⁷ Before the 1949 General Assembly, Stevenson also presented bill to increase the gasoline tax from three to five cents. The gas tax increase was designed to raise 17 million dollars in additional state revenue for the rehabilitation of town roads as well as city streets.

Then, in one hasty act of so-called fiscal conservatism, the General Assembly voted down the increased gas tax, the broadening of the sales tax, and the licensing for revenue bill. In a radio report to the people in July, Stevenson reviewed the “harsh judgement” of the legislature and revealed his own attitude toward municipal state relations:

I believe in more home rule for all our cities. They shouldn't have to come to Springfield begging help. I agree that direct state aid to cities is not the long-term answer, and I was not enthusiastic about the Chicago licensing bill as a way to raise money. But It seems to me very unfair to deny the city any aid and at the same time deny it the means of aiding itself.¹¹⁸

Although the Senate killed any increases in state income, they approved the increased appropriations and refused to cut back these additional expenses to fit revenue. This political manoeuvre forced Stevenson to veto appropriations which he had previously supported. The Governor was outraged over the blatant partisanship of the Senate Republicans. They reminded Stevenson of “the wolf who posed as little Red Riding Hood’s grandmother. With one hand they cozened and the other sprang their trap. I suppose their motive was to embarrass me”.¹¹⁹ Stevenson also learned the powerful effects of lobbyists, especially the Illinois Manufacturers and the Taxpayers Federation of Illinois, both of whom opposed the sales tax bill.¹²⁰

Lamenting defeat, however, did nothing to relieve city problems nor did it temper their cries for state aid. At a meeting of the Illinois Municipal League in October, 1949, the Illinois mayors requested that Stevenson call an immediate session of the state legislature to furnish financial aid for the cities. While some mayors proposed an increase in the state sales tax from 3 to 5 cents, others backed Mayor Kennelly’s original “license for revenue” bill.

League President and Mayor of Decatur, James Hedrick painted an ominous picture of rising insurance rates and rapid crime increases because cities can no longer afford large and

¹¹⁷ Chicago Sun Times, June 14, 1949, p.23

¹¹⁸ Radio Report to the People of Illinois, July 7, 1949

¹¹⁹ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, July 8, 1949, p. 3

¹²⁰ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, July 4, 1949, p. 4

honest police and fire departments. “It’s high time we served notice on the legislature”, said Hedrick, “that we are not going to sit by and let them push us around anymore”.¹²¹

Another feared increase also worried the city mayors in early 1950 rent prices. During World War Two and after, Congress passed a series of rent control maximums and a device to control inflation. However, before the outbreak of the Korean War, prices had levelled off and various congressmen began to advocate the removal of these federal controls. It was estimated that 38 million tenants would be faced with rent hikes if Congress refused to extend controls beyond June 30, 1950.¹²² For Chicago, already experiencing a severe housing shortage, the removal of rent controls would prove disastrous.¹²³

At a hearing before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Stevenson called Chicago “the nation’s number one distress area” and warned of violent outbreaks if rent control was discontinued. He also told the Senate committee that he would be forced to call a special session of the Illinois General Assembly to enact some kind of temporary rent control law. “Illinois is satisfied with the federal administration of rent control and with the federal law. I am frank to say”, said Stevenson, “that the federal government can do a better job than we could”.¹²⁴

In anticipation of the removal of rent control, Stevenson endorsed a local option plan. Under this plan, rent controls would be continued in areas which declared “by resolution of its governing board or by referendum” that control was required.¹²⁵ As the United States Congress was considering this proposal, Stevenson and Kennelly was meeting to decide on the format of a state rent control measure in the event of federal inaction by June 30. Both the Governor and the Mayor agreed to a state local option method similar to the federal plan.

Two weeks before rent control would automatically end, the Senate voted to extend it for six months under the local option plan. However, the extension provoked another problem; for Illinois law made no provision for the implementation for the local option clause. For this and other reasons, Stevenson was forced to call a special session of the Illinois General Assembly.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Thomas Drennan, Chicago Sun Times, October 12, 1949, p.18

¹²² “Rent Control Warning”, New Republic, May 8, 1950, p.7

¹²³ Gerry Robichaud, Chicago Sun Times, April 26, 1950, p.3

¹²⁴ Idem

¹²⁵ Edward Day, Stevenson’s First Three Years, 1952, p.28

¹²⁶ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, June 18, 1950, p.10

Stevenson called the Special Session of the 1950 General Assembly for June 18, and, in his opening address to the legislators, placed before them three major proposals: 1) enabling legislation to empower municipalities to declare their need for continued rent control, 2) a revenue measure for the cities, 3) passage of a deficiency relief appropriation of 20 million dollars for the IPAC.¹²⁷

The conflicting relationships between these bills were obvious. Renters would not tolerate an increase in the city property taxes while, at the same time, rent ceilings restricted their incomes.¹²⁸ The unanticipated deficiency appropriations for public assistance limited state aid to the cities.¹²⁹ Mayor Kennelly had assumed that state aid would be forthcoming from the Special Session.¹³⁰ However, Stevenson authorized the session to consider only those bills which enable the cities to help themselves. “The state itself”, explained Stevenson, “will need substantial new revenue in the next biennium if it is to maintain its services and continue its distributions to individuals and local units of government at the present level”. He warned the assemblymen that if the cities are not properly equipped to finance “even their historic function”, then the state government has no choice but to take over their responsibilities.¹³¹

The issue of state aid to municipalities created deep fissure between Stevenson and Kennelly, a rift that the Republican legislators were eager to exploit.¹³² Thus, once again, partisan politics played a significant role in the defeat of both the “license for revenue” bill and the property of “pegged levy” bill. In their place, the Republicans proposed that Chicago vote by referendum whether they wish to raise property taxes. Kennelly rejected this proposal. “The people. said Kennelly, “never vote to increase their own taxes”.¹³³ The Republicans also hoped that, by tacking a tax referendum on to the ballot, the voters would associate the potential tax increase with the incumbent Democratic administration and vote them out of office.¹³⁴

The Special Session also rejected the bill for general and for additional aid to dependent children under IPAC. The argument against the increased public aid was based on the admission by IPAC Executive Secretary, Carl Schmidt, that the IPAC could operate on its present funds at 90 percent of normal capacity until January, 1951, when new funds could be

¹²⁷ Special Session Message, June 19, 1950

¹²⁸ John Dreiske Column, Chicago Sun Times, June 20, 1950, p. 32

¹²⁹ Special Session Message, June 19, 1950

¹³⁰ John Dreiske Column, Chicago Sun Times, June 18, 1950, p. 34

¹³¹ Special Session Message, June 19, 1950

¹³² John Dreiske column, Chicago Sun Times, June 16, 1950, p.34

¹³³ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, June 29, 1950, p.17

¹³⁴ J. Edward Day, Stevenson's First Three Years, 1952, p.30

appropriated. Partisan politics entered this issue as well; for any increase in public aid would give the Democrats a favourable pre-election position.¹³⁵ By November, 1950, however, the United States had become engaged in a war with North Korea, which accelerated economic activity and sharply reduced the number of welfare recipients.¹³⁶

Despite these two defeats, the Special Session did pass a bill granting municipal governments the authority to accept or reject continued federal rent control. In support of the bill, House Speaker Paul Powell said, “The Republicans have been worrying about the continuance of controls and getting back to home rule. The bill we purpose gets back to home rule, if the cities want it”.¹³⁷

The election of 1950 saw the Republicans assume control of both houses of the General Assembly. In a press conference, Stevenson warned the newly elected Republicans of their responsibility to the people. “It is to be hoped”, said Stevenson, “that partisanship can be subordinated to the public advantage. There are many fields in which the public interest crosses party lines”.¹³⁸ While the Republican victory augured ill for state aid programmes to the cities, the Korean War also sharply curtailed any increased state grants outside of possible civil defence programmes.

Instead, at the opening session of the General Assembly in January 1951, Stevenson suggested that the legislature enact legislation to give the cities the authority to meet their own financial problems, declaring that restrictions on local taxing authority lay at the root of the cities’ financial crisis.¹³⁹ He also proposed programmes which would shift part of the city’s expenses to the state. Hospitalization expenses for the indigent sick in Cook County would be turned over to the state releasing four million dollars of city funds for other urban problems. Stevenson also recommended that the state grant one million dollars for the operation of the Chicago Teacher’s College, which was supported entirely by the city, and 6.3 million dollars for the construction of a pharmacy building on the University of Illinois Chicago campus. Finally, Stevenson resubmitted a proposal for a two-cent hike in the gasoline tax, and supported an increase in the truck license fees. The money raised from both taxes would go toward the rehabilitation of county roads, city streets, and state highways.

¹³⁵ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, June 22, 1950, p.2

¹³⁶ Arthur S.Link and William B. Catton, American Epoch, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1966, p. 592

¹³⁷ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, June 23, 1950, p.6

¹³⁸ Chicago Sun Times, December 3, 1950, p. 8

¹³⁹ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, January 4, 1951, p.4

While most city officials agreed with Stevenson that some kind of local taxing authority was necessary, they disputed with each other over just what to tax. Mayor Kennelly offered a plan to boost Chicago's real estate tax from 50 cents to 68 cents per 100 dollars. However, the City Council demanded that Kennelly seek legislative approval of a one-half cent city sales tax effected without a referendum. Kennelly argued that the legislature would never permit the city to adopt the sales tax and, as Kennelly predicted, the Republican Senate flatly rejected it. However, the legislature did approve an increase in the real estate tax to 56 cents per hundred dollars which brought an additional 4.1 million dollars into the Chicago coffers. It also passed a compromise gas tax hike to four cents and increased truck license fees. The gas tax and truck license bills were personal victories for Stevenson who had engineered a state-wide campaign, exposing the dangerous condition of the state roads since 1949.¹⁴⁰

The General Assembly concluded the session by ratifying a bill which would enable Illinois towns, with the exception of Chicago, to install city manager form of government by referendum. Previously, only cities with under 5000 residents were permitted to use the city manager system. This "more efficient, executive form of administration", as Stevenson described it, would save which could then be directed toward solving local problems and lead to home rule. By May 1952, many Illinois towns. Including Galesburg, Peoria, and Stevenson's home town of Bloomington, had abandoned the mayor council system in favour of employing a trained city manager.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ J. Edward Day, *Stevenson's First Three Years*, 1952. p.34. Though not directly germane to my paper, it is interesting to ask why Stevenson had a better legislative record in 1951 with an all Republican Assembly, than in 1949, when the Democrats controlled the House. John B. Martin in his 1952 biography *Adlai Stevenson* lists among the reasons that Stevenson's attitude toward the legislature changed. He was "more reasonable, pervasive, conciliatory". He had more opportunity to use his talent as mediator and negotiator. Also, his prestige had increased considerably among the people. (See *Adlai Stevenson*, John B. Martin, New York, 1952, p. 99-100)

¹⁴¹ Chicago Sun Times, July 29, 1951, p. 25

4. THE RETURN TO MORALITY

If the Post World War One atmosphere promised a return to normalcy”, the feeling, or, at least the hope of many Americans after the second World War was a “return to morality”.¹⁴² In a post-war world of rapid change and confusion, Americans searched for absolute standards of moral behavior. Many returned to organized religion and religious bodies grew both in membership and material resources after the war.¹⁴³ While Reverend Norman Vincent Peale preached his power of positive thinking, “The Hour of Decision” program, broadcasting the worlds of evangelist Billy Graham, soon earned the highest rating ever recorded for a religious programme.¹⁴⁴

However, the crusade for morality, both in and out of government, closely followed federal hearings which focused America’s attention on its own immorality. Probing the connections between organized crime and big business, labour unions, and municipal governments, these hearings showed millions of tele viewers how racketeers wielded vast political power by corrupting police and local officials. Headlines screened out stories of “the five percenters” who obtained business contracts from the federal government: based not on the higher quality of their goods but on their personal influence with government officials.¹⁴⁵ Senator William Fulbright’s subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee exposed the devious loan practices of the Reconstruction Finance Commission whose commissioners would contract a loan for a certain company, then resign from the Commission to accept a high paying position in that same company.¹⁴⁶

With the dislocation and tension of the post war years came an increase in juvenile delinquency. Overcrowding in schools, racial and ethnic disturbances, technological unemployment in the unskilled and semiskilled sectors all contributed to the rapid increase in youth crimes. Crimes of theft, homicide, rape, and manslaughter also rose sharply.¹⁴⁷

Some saw this “breakdown of morality” on a reflection of social disorganization and cultural anarchy. Others believed that it symbolized a falling away from religion. Dr. James A. Pike, chaplain of Columbia University, used the jargon of his time to depict his outlook, “There

¹⁴² Senator Charles W. Tobey, a member of the Kefauver Commission, The Return to Morality

¹⁴³ Arthur S.Link and William B. Catton, American Epoch, 635

¹⁴⁴ John Pollock, Billy Graham, McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1966, p. 86

¹⁴⁵ Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, Random House, New York, 1950

¹⁴⁶ Paul Douglas, Ethics in Government, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, p.2

¹⁴⁷ Arthur S. Link and William B. Catton, American Epoch, p.635

is fission in the community. fission in the family, and fission in the individual personality”,¹⁴⁸ Stevenson felt that the basic differences between the anxiety of 1950 and the optimism of 1900 lay not so much with any external changes but changes within ourselves. “our vision has become more acute and our conscience has been sharpened”.¹⁴⁹

In January 1950, Senator Estes Kefauver, a Democrat from Tennessee, introduced a bill calling for a full-scale Senate investigation of crime in interstate commerce. After several months of Congressional equabbling, the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce was formed. Millions of Americans knew it as “The Kefauver Committee”. From May 10, 1950 “to May 1, 1951, the Kefauver Committee travelled 52,380 miles, conducted hearings millions of words “of shocking and at times incredible testimony” from nearly 800 witnesses.

“Through it all” reflected Kefauver, “I listened with mounting Indignation and revulsion to the shocking story of our national disgrace”.¹⁵⁰

Of all the cities visited by the Commission. Kefauver selected Chicago as a “model” of the national crime wave replete with interstate commerce scandals, strong ties between organized crime and politics, gambling, and payoffs.¹⁵¹ A group of state legislators from Chicago, known as the “West Side Bloc”, most clearly reflected the Interpenetration of crime and politics. Dearing no allegiance to either party, the West Siders maintained a firm attachment to the descendants of the Al Capone mob. One member of the Bloc, James J. Adduci, had been arrested on several occasions while in the company of Capone mobsters and admitted accepting campaign funds from underworld figures. In 1951, Adduci was Indicated by a special grand jury for defrauding Cook Country.¹⁵²

During the 1949-50 legislative session, Stevenson ran up against the powerful West Side Bloc when he advanced three bills to tighten law enforcement in Cook County. Written and supported by the Chicago Crime Commission, these bills stated that: 1) a grand jury must stay in session six months, rather than 30 days, to insure complete coverage of facts and witnesses, 2) the prosecuting attorney need not have to prove which of two conflicting statements given under oath is true, 3) witnesses must testify in return for immunity from any

¹⁴⁸ Charles W. Tobey, The Return to Morality, Doubleday & Co. Garden City, N. Y., 1952, p. 109

¹⁴⁹ Speech, Jewish Federation, January 19, 1950

¹⁵⁰ Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, Doubleday & Co. Garden City, N.Y., 1951, p.12

¹⁵¹ . The Kefauver Report on Organized Crime, New York, 1951, p.40

¹⁵² John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, March 30, 1951, p.3

misdeemeanor or felony revealed under oath. The Bloc threw its entire weight against the bills. In fact, administration sources disclosed efforts on the part of the Bloc to dissuade Stevenson from supporting the crime bills in return for their support of the Constitutional Convention referendum.¹⁵³

Since his first days in office, Stevenson had received reports from concerned citizens that illegal gambling was flourishing in local communities. Moreover, they maintained that community officials had failed to suppress even the most overt gambling.¹⁵⁴ These reports signalled to Stevenson more than just the existence of widespread gambling. Not only was gambling the central funding device of Illinois racketeers, but it also had a way of motivating other criminal acts, paralyzing law enforcement and infesting the entire society.¹⁵⁵ Wisconsin had only recently ended commercialized gambling by empowering the governor to remove derelict local officials. However, Stevenson noted that the Illinois constitution did not provide the governor with such legal authority nor did the Illinois government have the financial resources to take over local law enforcement on a continued basis.¹⁵⁶

After personal talks with officials failed to arouse local law enforcement, Stevenson saw no other alternative but to authorize direct state intervention.¹⁵⁷ In April and May 1950, Stevenson ordered state police raids on two notorious gambling hangouts in downstate Madison County. Over the next several months, state police entered 73 towns, stormed 308 gambling establishments, and seized hundreds of slot machines.¹⁵⁸

"Illinois is not and must not be a gambling state", said Stevenson, justifying the raids. Yet, he regretted the need for these state raids into local communities. The problem of commercialized gambling, believed Stevenson, could have been easily handled by local law enforcement. Local citizens and their elected officials could have stopped commercialized gambling and its accompanying corruption and Lawlessness without state Intervention¹⁵⁹. "In ordering these raids", said Stevenson, "I did not feel the joyful exhilaration of a knight in shining armor tilting with the forces of darkness. I felt more like a mourner at a wake. For something had died in Illinois - at least temporarily".¹⁶⁰ The postmortem indicated both a

¹⁵³ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, April 14, 1949, p.32

¹⁵⁴ Speech, American Bar Association, September 19, 1950

¹⁵⁵ Speech, Illinois Bar Association, October 24, 1951

¹⁵⁶ First Year End Report of Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, Jan. 2, 1950

¹⁵⁷ Speech, American Bar Association, September 19, 1950

¹⁵⁸ "Governor Stevenson Cracks Down", editorial, Chicago Sun Times, May 17, 1950, p.27

¹⁵⁹ Speech, Illinois Bar Association, October 24, 1951

¹⁶⁰ Speech, American Bar Association, September 19, 1950

breakdown of local law enforcement and the intimidation of unwholesome links between the local police force, politics, and crime.

Stevenson realized that, in situations such as these, the public officials often acted as middlemen between the criminals and the police. The local policeman owed his job to the politician. The politician, in turn, received ample campaign and post-campaign “funds” from criminals. As a result, a policeman’s loyalty to his criminally-linked political sponsor was stronger than to his commanding officer. “Crime and politics must be divorced”, said Stevenson, and local governments must remove the police from political influence. Police must also be paid adequate salaries so they are not inclined to accept payoffs directly from the underworld.¹⁶¹ Again, the problem rested with the community’s desire and ability to raise enough revenue for increases in police salaries.

The continued battle against organized crime and listless law enforcement required not only public money but a vigilant public opinion. “Too often”, said Stevenson, “public opinion is a sleeping giant”.¹⁶² Citizens should not look upon organized crime as an inevitable part of the social system but should mobilize against immorality and local gangsterism. “I suppose the major problem of our age”, wrote Stevenson for the Journal of Criminal Law, “is whether or not we have enough citizens who are willing to labour unceasingly to achieve good government”.¹⁶³ It is only when good men do nothing that the forces of evil, always diligently at work, can disrupt a community.

Stevenson’s campaign against gambling soon ran into legal trouble. Two court decisions stated that the state had overextended its authority by entering local affairs. Judge Michael Kenney of Edwardsville held that the Governor was overstepping his constitutional limits by ordering state police raids into Madison and Hyde Park Counties.¹⁶⁴ In a second decision, the State Supreme Court ruled that only local authorities, and not the State Liquor Control Commission, had power to close taverns which permitted gambling. Although the first decision was overruled in a higher court, the second emasculated any effective programming against gambling.¹⁶⁵ “No reasonable person”, contested Stevenson, “can object to a

¹⁶¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, “Crime and Politics”, Journal of Criminal Law, November, 1950, p. 402

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 407

¹⁶³ Adlai E. Stevenson, “Crime and Politics”, Journal of Criminal Law, November, 1950, p. 404

¹⁶⁴ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, October 1, 1950, p.7

¹⁶⁵ Chicago Sun Times, January 19, 1951, p. 16

requirement that a person who has sought and received the privilege of selling liquor should obey the gambling laws as well as the liquor laws".¹⁶⁶

As a response to the court decision on tavern gambling, Stevenson proposed measures to give the state more authority over state-licensed taverns. As was expected, the legislators defended the court decision. Stevenson's liquor bills, they argued, infringed on home rule; only local authorities can make such arrests. The Stevensonian ideal of home rule was thrown back at him and resulted in the perpetuation of local gambling.

Stevenson also attempted to push through a law which forbade the manufacturing of slot machines and other gambling devices in Illinois. At the time, Chicago was known as the leading coin machine manufacturer in the United States. However, this proposal as well failed passage. Stevenson expressed his disappointment, saying, "I believe people who want honest, vigorous law enforcement will be shocked by the Senate's action".¹⁶⁷

On three separate occasions, in October and December 1950, and January 1951, the Kefauver Commission held hearings in Chicago. At the first hearing, Stevenson appeared before the Committee and repeated his earlier position,

I don't like to see the State intervene on matters of local law enforcement. I think..... that it is wrong in theory, and it is expensive and inefficient in practice, but I see nothing else to do in circumstances as we have encountered, where there has been a prolonged breakdown of local law enforcement. In that case, I think people will demand and they will get the service of higher levels of government.

168

public indifference, he reiterated, was "a very major contributing factor" in the breakdown of local law enforcement. How to arouse public indignation and concern became a crucial question for the Stevenson administration.¹⁶⁹

"Illinois needs a permanent investigating committee", said Senator Kefauver after his final hearings in Chicago.¹⁷⁰ In response to Kefauver's recommendation and as a way to

¹⁶⁶ Idem

¹⁶⁷ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, June 20, 1951, p.3

¹⁶⁸ Investigation of organized crime in Interstate Commerce, Vol.5, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, p.22

¹⁶⁹ Investigation of organized crime in Interstate Commerce, Vol.5, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, p.214

¹⁷⁰ The Kefauver Report on Organized Crime, New York, 1951, p.55

activate public concern, Stevenson supported the establishment of a “Little Kefauver Commission”. The new Commission proposed to make a study of crime in Illinois with particular emphasis on narcotics and gambling. While some legislators held firm to the home rule doctrine and opposed the bill, others who actually voted against the Crime commission bills and turned down the anti-slot machine proposal, backed the Little Kefauver Commission. Perhaps investigating crime was “safer” than getting rid of it.¹⁷¹

The Kefauver Commission drew up a series of recommendations leading to state assumption of local law enforcement responsibilities. These recommendations also received the unanimous support of the American Bar Association. However, Stevenson opposed the measures. “I do not want to see Springfield take over the control and direction of law enforcement throughout Illinois”.¹⁷² On October 3, 1951, Governor’s Conference voted down the Kefauver proposals and jointly declared, “We insist that the prime responsibility for the elimination of such evils as may exist lies in the vigilance of local law enforcement officials”. In an individual statement, Stevenson asserted that local law enforcement “has not yet abdicated” its position.¹⁷³

Instead, Stevenson offered a programme which required increased local responsibility for the rehabilitation of criminal offenders. “The greatest deterrent to criminality”, believed Stevenson, “is not fear of punishment but fear of social disapproval.”¹⁷⁴ The state and federal authorities must not usurp but rather strengthen the local community’s ability to cope with local problems. As part of this programme, Stevenson advocated that the courts should rely more exclusively on probation as a way to readjust criminals to their communities. “The chief merit of this procedure” “said Stevenson, “is that the entire process of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and treatment remains within the reach and control of the local community.”¹⁷⁵ But Stevenson was also aware that a community, indifferent to the problems of rehabilitation, would only cause a moral relapse in the criminal.¹⁷⁶

Because Stevenson placed so much faith in a morally responsible community, he was especially irked over the “double standard” set by private social organizations such as the private country clubs and the American Region. In an article for Atlantic magazine, Stevenson

¹⁷¹ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, April 7, 1951, p.3

¹⁷² Speech, Illinois Bar Association, October 24, 1951

¹⁷³ John Dreiske, Chicago Sun Times, October 4, 1951, p.4

¹⁷⁴ A Governor Looks at Public Welfare”, Public Welfare, January 1951, p. 30

¹⁷⁵ Speech, American Prison Association, October 9, 1950

¹⁷⁶ Governor Looks at Public Welfare”, Public Welfare, January, 1951, p.32

condemned those citizens who rise to great heights of indignation over saloon slot machines and, yet, return to their clubs for cocktail and one-armed bandits. Stevenson said,

Now this situation presents, it seems to me a classic case of why governmental functions climb the ladder to higher levels. In the enforcement of gambling law, certainly, there is no one higher up reaching down for added power. Rather, it is being thrust upon us by local default. And it is time we recognize that the “conspiracy” against our liberties from above is too often only a device to excuse our own inaction.¹⁷⁷

Those people who play the numbers’ games and then squawk about corrupted public officials, and lower class immorality must show a sense of personal responsibility by abstaining from private gambling. Public outrage should not be limited to willful violators of the law, but also to those who violate the moral code; for “legality is not a synonym for morality”. “Not a passing flurry of indignation but a continuing crusade”, and Stevenson, “will drive out the lawless element from society”.¹⁷⁸

With the departure of the Kefauver Commission, the Chicago Crime Commission charged that organized crime had already begun to seep back into Cook County. Specifically, the C.C.C. accused State Attorney John S. Boyle and Cook County Sheriff John Babb for failing to eradicate local gambling. After making a public pledge to accelerate the drive against gambling, Boyle launched several raids including the first Chicago booze raid in ten years. However, for some reason, Boyle’s cases against casino proprietors collapsed in the courts.

A month after the court decisions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation staged the largest single coordinated anti-gambling raid in Illinois history. In 18 downstate cities the FBI seized 1,159 slot machines, almost as many as Governor Stevenson had taken during his entire three year effort, and arrested proprietors on charges of the illegal transportation of coin-operated gambling devices in inter-state commerce. Stevenson welcomed the raid. “It will help our effort to secure more rigid enforcement of the state laws by responsible authorities”. He did not see the FBI raids as indicative of an abdication of states’ rights, nor as a federal encroachment on home rule, but rather as part of a multi- level attack on criminal rackets.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson, “Who Runs the Gambling Machines”. Atlantic February 1952. p. 36

¹⁷⁸ Governor Stevenson Hits Corruption in Public Office”. Chicago Sun Times, February 25, 1952, p.3

¹⁷⁹ Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1952, p.1

Then, in late 1951 and early 1952, two state-wide scandals broke in the news. During an eleven-month period, racketeers had sold two million pounds of horsemeat, rejected as unfit for pet consumption, as beef and pork to unsuspecting buyers, and cleared a ten- million dollar profit. Stevenson took immediate action. He fired the superintendent of foods and dairies, Charles W. Wray for failing to uncover the illegal sale as well as 18 state inspectors for alleged complicity with the racketeers.¹⁸⁰

The second scandal involved the forging of cigarette stamps. Illinois had lost several million dollars because a forgery, conducted with stolen stamp machines, had not been detected by the cigarette tax collection division. In response, Stevenson ordered state police raids which confiscated the machines and arrested a large number of cigarette distributors. He also demanded the resignation of three state tax collection officials.¹⁸¹ As a result of these scandals, Stevenson encouraged the formation of a state bureau of investigation, nicknamed the “Little FBI” to uncover possible government scandals on the local and state levels.¹⁸²

Mounting violence around the University of Chicago at Hyde Park in 1952 compelled Stevenson to declare publicly that he would consider sending state police units into Chicago if the residents asked him to do so. This statement marked the first time that Stevenson had ever announced openly the possibility of sending state police into a city to perform general law enforcement work. However, most community leaders opposed any form of state interference. While Stevenson insisted that the move would merely augment local citizen efforts, local leaders asserted that they could handle local problems without outside help. “We are not so demoralized as to need state aid”, insisted Rabbi Louis Mann of Hyde Park. While Stevenson was governor, the state never intervened.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Chicago Sun Times, January 15, 1952, p.14. 2. Chicago Sun Times, March 19, 1952, p. 3

¹⁸¹ Chicago Sun Times, March 28, 1952, p. 3

¹⁸² Chicago Sun Times, March 28, 1952, p. 28

¹⁸³ Chicago Sun Times, May 16, 1952, p. 3

5. CIVIL RIGHTS AND CICERO

Cicero, Illinois is an all-white suburb located on the Western boundary of Chicago. Except for its notoriety as the main head-quarters of Al Capone in the 1920's, it is an average workingman's town. Most of its citizens are of Eastern European descent and earn their wages in one of Cicero's seven huge manufacturing plants.¹⁸⁴

Cicero was the only incorporated town in Illinois chartered under a special state law in 1869. Since then, a town board, famous as an easy mark for graft and payoffs, governed Cicero. Then, in 1949, a reform movement called the Cicero Good Government Council submitted a petition to the town board of 10,000 signatures, asking for a referendum which, if passed, would reorganize Cicero as a city corporation. Fearing that the referendum would cost them political control, the town board proposed the Marek bill which would, in effect, deny Cicero the opportunity to choose their own form of government. Stevenson vetoed the bill, declaring that the state could deny a community this important aspect of home rule. The governor's action", said Council Chairman John C. Stoffel. "pavesthe way for home rule in Cicero".¹⁸⁵

The Good Government Council was making strong headway in Cicero until election night. That night, opposition inserted a pamphlet in each mailbox, allegedly written by Negroes in support of the referendum and stating that its passage would insure black integration into the community. On the following election day, Cicero rejected city status voting 3-2 against the proposal. Less than half of Cicero's 44,000 eligible voters turned out to cast their ballot. By attaching reform to Negro integration, the town board played on the racial fears of the Cicero community and killed any measure for reform.¹⁸⁶

The fear of black integration into white sections of Chicago intensified after World War II with the sharp rise in black migration.¹⁸⁷ Between 1945 and 1950, over 100,000 Negroes poured into Chicago, a climb of 42 percent, at a time when a severe housing shortage gripped the city.¹⁸⁸ Violence erupted at the Airport Homes and Fernwood.

¹⁸⁴ Byron S. Miller, "Cicero Covenants", New Republic, August 6, 1951

¹⁸⁵ Chicago Sun Times, July 29, 1949, p. 21

¹⁸⁶ Byron S. Miller, "Cicero Covenants", New Republic August 6, 1951, pp.12-13

¹⁸⁷ William Peters, "Race War in Chicago", New Republic, p.10

¹⁸⁸ Chicago's New Resident", Chicago Sun Times, October 25 1949, p.27

Housing Projects in 1946 and 1947 as a result of Negro attempts to enter the communities. No longer could segregationists rely on the Courts to keep their neighbourhoods “lily-white”. In 1948, the United States Supreme Court, ruled that racial restrictive covenants, while valid in themselves, were not enforceable in the state courts.¹⁸⁹

White segregationists in Illinois resorted to another tactic. They introduced the Larsen Bill which stated that five percent of a community could demand a referendum on whether to erect a housing site adjacent to their neighbourhood. While supporters of the bill hailed it as being in the highest traditions of home rule and local self-government, the Larsen Public Housing Bill was actually a thinly veiled attempt to prevent Negro integration into neighbouring townships.¹⁹⁰

Stevenson vetoed the Larsen bill and his message to the General Assembly added several conditions to his own home rule ideal. In his message, Stevenson questioned the use of popular referendum as a vehicle for an “interested minority” to block improvements which might benefit the entire community. Carrying this reasoning further, Stevenson stated that, “It would be a dangerous doctrine to say that a public improvement which by law and judicial interpretation is for a public purpose.... is now of concern only to the people in the immediate surrounding community.”¹⁹¹

Stevenson’s attitude toward the implementation of his coincided with his position on the role of civil rights government. On the federal level, Stevenson believed that significant differences among the various states argued against any overriding federal civil rights measures. Rather, each state should act as an experimental laboratory working out individual means to a common end.¹⁹² However, Stevenson also recognized that a failure to protect civil rights on the state level warranted federal intervention. “States’ rights means states’ responsibilities”, said Stevenson. “Too often, many of the problems of states’ rights are caused by states’ wrongs”. “States’ wrong” must inevitably lead to federal intervention.¹⁹³

One “state wrong”, the segregation of the public schools, did eventually lead to federal interference in 1954. Five years before that decision, Stevenson began an intensive campaign to desegregate the public schools of Illinois. By custom or by local school board ruling, thirteen

¹⁸⁹ William Peters, “Race War in Chicago”, New Republic, p.11

¹⁹⁰ Noel Busch, *Adlai Stevenson of Illinois*, New York, 1952, pp.144-5

¹⁹¹ Noel Busch, *Adlai Stevenson of Illinois*, New York, 1952, P. 145-6

¹⁹² “Quizzing Stevenson”, *U.S. News and World Report*, April 25, 1952, p. 53

¹⁹³ Speech, National Reorganization Conference, December 12, 1949

Illinois counties practiced school segregation.¹⁹⁴ Then, in 1949 Stevenson signed a law which gave him the power as governor to withdraw state funds from any school which refused to integrate. After a careful study of social segregation in Illinois, a seven man House committee found “patterns of segregation” in East St. Louis, Alton, Cairo, and Harrisburg and warned them that the state would cut off financial aid if they refused to integrate their schools.¹⁹⁵ Desegregation soon followed and by 1952, Negro students began to enrol in all four counties.

Stevenson preferred that private business voluntarily use fair employment and sales practices.¹⁹⁶ In a speech to the Illinois Insurance Federation, Stevenson complained that insurance salesmen were refusing insurance coverage to Negroes on the South side of Chicago, and warned the insurance companies to abandon these discriminatory practices in order “to prevent an attempt by legislation to stamp out this type of unfair discrimination”.¹⁹⁷

However, Stevenson realized that in most cases, the process of educating businessmen was too slow and, in the meantime, job discrimination continued to exist in Illinois.¹⁹⁸ Thus, Stevenson proposed a bill to establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission in Illinois. Yet, in both 1949 and 1951, the FEPC bill was narrowly defeated. Senator Merritt J. Little, chairman of the Senate Industrial Affairs Committee and leader of the downstate block which solidly opposed the bill, summarized the majority opinion, “No law is any good until the people are ready to accept it. But the time is not yet”.¹⁹⁹

Although the FEPC legislation was unsuccessful, Stevenson signed a bill in 1949 to ban racial discrimination and segregation in the Illinois National Guard and Naval Militia.²⁰⁰ He revamped state employment procedures to delete application questions regarding race, religion, or nationality as well as forbade outside employers from specifying racial requirements when seeking employees from the state. Under Stevenson’s administration, State’s Attorney Boyle demanded that the Illinois Central Railroad halt discrimination toward Negro passengers.²⁰¹ Stevenson also transformed the Illinois Interracial Commission into the Illinois Commission on Human Relations increasing its authority to include the “promotion

¹⁹⁴ William Peters, “Race War in Chicago”, New Republic, p.11

¹⁹⁵ Chicago Sun Times, July 7, 1951, p.6

¹⁹⁶ Speech, Illinois Retail Farmers Association, December 3, 1949

¹⁹⁷ Speech, Illinois Insurance Federation, April 28, 1950

¹⁹⁸ Speech, New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 24, 1949

¹⁹⁹ Hug Logan, Chicago Sun Times, April 25, 1951, p.8

²⁰⁰ Hub Logan, Chicago Sun Times, August 2, 1949, p.7

²⁰¹ Chicago Sun Times, March 21, 1951, p. 23

and encouragement of interfaith and interracial harmony and good will”.²⁰² While all these progressive steps helped to protect black citizens from racial discrimination, Stevenson was not motivated on purely grounds, but by an overall desire to aid all minority groups. He did not define civil rights strictly in terms of Negro rights, but rather, as human rights.

Stevenson’s civil rights legislation, however, did not discourage civil violence. In Chicago, white mobs acted as vigilante groups intimidating any Negroes who tried to rent a neighbourhood apartment. The police would look on indifferently, often tacitly encouraging the mob’s actions. “Chicago”, wrote one reporter, “is sitting on a powder keg calmly smoking a cigarette”. In the middle of July 1951, the powder keg exploded in Cicero.²⁰³

Harvey E. Clark Jr., a black war veteran and Chicago Transit Authority bus driver, rented an apartment at 6139 West 19th Street in Cicero. When city officials learned of this transaction, they warned the apartment owner to expect “trouble” if Clark moved in. On June 8, Clark and his family arrived in Cicero. That evening, according to Clark’s later testimony, the chief of police rushed out of the alley with twenty men, grabbed him by the arm, and told him to leave Cicero or, “you’ll get a bullet through you”.²⁰⁴

Instead of leaving Cicero, Clark filed a suit through the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People in federal court on the grounds that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. In a U.S. District Court decision, Judge John P. Barnes issued a preliminary injunction restraining the city from “shooting, beating or otherwise harassing Clark”.²⁰⁵

On July 10, Clark and his family entered their apartment buffeted on all sides by boos, Jeers, and catcalls from a growing crowd. That night, throngs of wild teenagers threw rocks and stones through the apartment windows while the police failed to make any arrests. The next night, the band of teenagers had turned into an enraged mob of four thousand and gathered in front of the apartment. Then, as the crowd charged the apartment, the police on duty seemed to melt away. The mob over- turned and set fire to police cars, threw lighted flares into the building and onto the roof, and smashed Clark’s furniture. The police were the only ones to remain calm.²⁰⁶

²⁰² Kenneth Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 245

²⁰³ William Peters, “Race War in Chicago, *New Republic*, pp.11-13

²⁰⁴ Charles Abrace, *Forbidden Neighbours*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955, p. 104

²⁰⁵ Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbours*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955, p. 104

²⁰⁶ Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1951, p.1

The next day, at the request of Sheriff Babb and First Assistant States' Attorney Edwin T. Breen, Stevenson declared martial law in Cicero and called out 500 units of the Illinois National Guard. Stevenson made his decision only after local authorities formally admitted the breakdown of local law enforcement resulting from the riot situation.²⁰⁷ Aided by triple strand barbed wire which stretched for block, and tear gas bombs, the National Guard made 114 arrests,²⁰⁸ including four bayonettings, and finally restored peace to Cicero.

The subsequent investigations and trials concerning the Cicero riots were almost as tragic as the riot itself. The Cook County Investigating jury failed to indict any of the 114 arrested. On the basis of FBI reports, President Truman ordered a federal Investigation which obtained indictments against the town president, police chiefs, fire chief, the town attorney, and three policemen for misconduct in public office and conspiracy to incite a riot. While under federal indictment, town president, Harry S. Sandusky, was re-elected to his third term as president of the Cicero Town Board.²⁰⁹ However, the jury dropped the charges against all but the police chief and his men, who were fined a total of \$2500.

The Cicero race riot represented a serious break- down of local law enforcement. In a conversation which preceded the riot. Sandusky had assured Stevenson that local authorities could handle any outbreak of violence.

But both Sandusky and the local police chief fell for short of their predicted ability to handle the riot situation. Perhaps it was not their ability but their desire to control the riot that was lacking, for no crowd grows to a level of 4000 without the explicit or tacit support of community leaders.²¹⁰ Neither Cicero police nor Sheriff Babb's deputies made any arrests during the disturbances and, later, failed to help the National Guard deploy their forces at the trouble site.²¹¹

The declaration of martial law to enforce the equal rights of the Clark family shockingly proved Stevenson's personal belief that the trend toward increased centralization in government arises "not so much from a legislative appetite for more concentrated power at the

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 4

²⁰⁸ Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1951, p.1

²⁰⁹ Chicago Sun Times, April 2, 1952, p. 15

²¹⁰ Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbours, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955, p.111

²¹¹ Chicago Sun Times, July 14, 1951

top, as it does from a demand by the people at the bottom for services and protection that local government fails to give them”.²¹²

To Stevenson’s dismay, the citizens of Cicero supported the breakdown as shown by their resounding re-election of Sandusky as town president. The immorality of town officials in, many times, merely a reflection of the actual character of the town”. “Your public servants serve you right”, and Stevenson, “we, the people corrupt them”.²¹³

However, Stevenson did not acquiesce to accelerated centralization as a result of the Cicero riots. As a result of the riot, Stevenson advocated the formation of a citizen’s committee from the Chicago Metropolitan area to undertake a study of the housing shortage. The study was neither conducted nor financed by the state government, but remained under the direction of private citizens supported by private funds.²¹⁴ Another important result of the riot was the establishment of training courses in human relations for the Cook County police department supervised by the University of Illinois. Finally, it was hoped, at least by Stevenson, that the Cicero riots convinced local officials that they, and not the state or federal governments, were primarily responsible for maintaining law and order during racial disturbances.²¹⁵

6. FOR YOUR NEIGHBOUR

As part of his programme to protect the lives of Illinois miners, Stevenson introduced a new mine safety code to the 1951 state legislature. However, lobbyists, from both the mine operators and the unions, pressured the assemblymen to reject the new code.²¹⁶

Then, in December of 1951, a huge mine explosion in West Frankfort killed 119 miners. Only a few hours before the blast, a group of miners, acting as examiners, approved the safety of the mine.

The disaster at West Frankfort tragically reconfirmed the need for modern mine safety laws. Stevenson predicted that if a new code was not enacted, the federal government should and would take over mine inspection. Said Stevenson:

I deplore the tendency of the states to abdicate their responsibilities. I deplore the concentration of power and authority in Washington, not because

²¹² Speech, Township Officials Association, September 25, 1951

²¹³ Carl Larsen, Chicago Sun Times, May 6, 1952, p. 6

²¹⁴ Speech, Illinois Commission on Human Rights, October 11, 1951

²¹⁵ The State of Illinois Commission of Human Relations, 5th Biennial Report, March 1953

²¹⁶ J Edward Day, The Stevenson Administration, p. 44

Washington wants it, but because the states defaulted. For myself, I would like to see Illinois do something besides complain about the concentration of power in Washington.²¹⁷

Tremore from the blast did reach Washington. While spokesmen for the mine owners argued that a federal safety code was an “unwarranted intrusion of states’ rights”, the United States Senate passed a mine bill which permitted the Secretary of the Interior to fix safety standards and to punish those mine operators who failed to comply with the code.²¹⁸

As governor of Illinois, Adlai Stevenson sadly watched this perhaps inevitable stream of power flow from local tributaries into state rivers, and these rivers into the federal sea. Yet, while he deplored centralization, he also recognized that the fault lay not with usurpation at a higher level, but with irresponsible or unresponsive local communities and community leaders. At the beginning of his administration, Stevenson saw the local community as the salvation for good government; by 1952, he perceived that the community itself was responsible for corrupt local government. “Behind every fix is a fixer. Behind every bribe is a briber. Behind every lobby and influence peddler is someone who wants influence”.²¹⁹ As much as he preached for morality in government, Stevenson realized that local officials are usually no better than the constituency they represent.

Stevenson looked back on a Jeffersonian tradition which glorified individual initiative, the strong spiritual values of family, and the self-sufficient, self-governed local community. He organized programmes of mental health, crime and delinquency, welfare, and education to take full advantage of individual, family, and community strength. He supported programmes of more economic and political home rule for the municipalities and led a crusade to reawaken local concern for local problems. However, as governor, Stevenson learned how his ideal of home rules could be twisted and manipulated into a defence of the status quo and used as a label to mask prejudice, inefficiency and corruption.

It is difficult to determine exactly how much Stevenson’s belief in home rule interfered with or impeded his effectiveness as governor. He did not order his gambling raids until well over a year after he had received first reports of the existence of illegal gambling. He refused to call out the National Guard until local law enforcers publicly admitted their inability to

²¹⁷ Chicago Sun Times, January 11, 1952, p. 16

²¹⁸ Chicago Sun Times, May 8, 1952, p. 17

²¹⁹ Carl Larsen, Chicago Sun Times, May 6, 1952, p. 6

control the riot situation. Once convinced that local authority had slackened, Stevenson acted decisively, with none of the “Hamlet-like” hesitation later tagged on him by his political foes. Stevenson preferred to view these acts of state intervention not as a crack in his doctrine of home rule but as pragmatic exceptions. During his four years as governor, Stevenson never seriously modified his belief in the ultimate utility and benefits of home rule. As a presidential candidate in 1952, Stevenson told an audience in Denver, “the effort should be always to leave as wide a range of activity as possible in private hands and to keep public intervention as far down the scale and as close to the people governed as possible”.²²⁰ Stevenson had made similar statements in his Inaugural Address as governor in 1949. However, as an elected official, Stevenson learned first-hand that there is a moral and financial price tag for good local governments:

It must be paid for in active and continuing interest in local affairs, in self-denial in all those situations where self-indulgence - the double standard - has a harmful effect on the community at large, in willingness to press issues insistently in the face of strong personal and social pressures.²²¹

What the late President John F. Kennedy asked the people to do for their country, Adlai Stevenson asked the people to do their neighbour.

²²⁰ Speech, Denver, Colorado, September 5, 1952

²²¹ “Who runs the Gambling Machines”, *Atlantic*, February, 1952

CHAPTER III

STEVENSON THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

1. A Genuine Draft
2. The Declaration of Independence
3. “Let’s Talk Sense to the American People”
4. Strategy Re-evaluation and Stevenson’s Attack
5. “When the Tumult and the Shouting Die...”

1. A GENUINE DRAFT

On the evening of January 22, 1952, Adlai E. Stevenson, Governor of Illinois, arrived at Blair House in Washington, D.C., at the request of President Harry S. Truman. At this meeting Truman offered to support Stevenson as a candidate for President in the 1952 election.¹ Governor Stevenson refused this support, saying that he wished to run again for Governor in order to complete the programme he had initiated. Adlai Stevenson then left Blair House with no intention of seeking the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952.

The Blair House meeting had brought face to face two Democratic leaders who were hesitant to seek the Presidency of the United States in 1952. The reluctance of these two men to seek the nation's highest office can be partially understood by looking at America at the midpoint of the twentieth century. Having endured two world wars and a serious depression, the country was now facing still more trials and more difficulties. Senator McCarthy and other Republicans were uncovering the presence of Communists in government, senate investigators were revealing corruption in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the economy was plagued by soaring prices. Most distressing, though, to a people weary of battle and not yet fully comprehending the meaning of limited war, was the seemingly endless conflict in Korea. These various difficulties together had produced the general feeling that it was time for a change.

This widespread public dissatisfaction was reflected in the precarious state of the New Deal coalition. Having brought victories, first to Franklin D. Roosevelt and then to Harry S. Truman, this alliance of disparate elements was now cracking under the pressure of its own internal contradictions. The South, for example, was greatly angered by the President's position on civil rights and on the tidelands oil question. Accordingly, under the leadership of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the Southern states were threatening to deny the Democratic party 176 electoral votes if Truman should again be the party's nominee. Other segments of the coalition shared this disillusionment with the result that Truman's popularity sank to a record

¹ Harry S. Truman, "How Stevenson Let Me Down", *Look*, 24(1960), 116.

low. From a high in 1945, when 87 per cent of the people liked “the way he was handling his job”, his popularity had now declined to a point where only 25 per cent held this opinion.²

Recognizing, therefore, that his candidacy might prove unsuccessful and split the Democratic party, President Truman confirmed his decision of April 16, 1950, not to be a candidate for re-election.³ In seeking to locate a successor for his position, he turned first to Fred M. Vinson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Vinson, however, declined for personal reasons, and the President’s attention quickly shifted to the first term Governor of Illinois, Adlai Stevenson.⁴ Prior to his election, the Governor had served nationally in the State Department and the United Nations, and now his stature was rising rapidly in Springfield. Moreover, Truman had been impressed by Stevenson’s margin of over 500,000 votes in the 1948 election, which had doubtless given the President his own plurality of 30,000 in the state⁵.

Convinced that Stevenson was the best available candidate, Truman approached him through the Washington law office of George Ball, one of the Governor’s friends. Ball telephoned Stevenson in order to arrange a meeting, but found him very hesitant because he had already announced his intention to seek re-election as Governor of Illinois. Nevertheless, with considerable pressure, Ball persuaded Stevenson to visit the President while in the Capital on state business⁶.

The visit came on January 22, At Blair House, Stevenson heard Truman’s offer rejected it as politely as possible, and left with the President’s recommendation to “go home and think it over”. The next morning Stevenson telephoned Ball to say that he had “made a hash” of his talk

² Gallup Poll, U.S. News and World Report. Feb.8, 1952,11

³ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope, (New York, 1956), 488.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 489

⁵ Jacob Arvey, “A Gold Nugget in Your Own Backyard”, in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, (New York, 1966), 57.

⁶ George Ball, “With Adlai Stevenson in war and Politics”, in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, (New York, 1966), 144.

and that the President had failed to understand his feelings. He was satisfied that President Truman had written him off as hopeless and that the incident was closed.⁷

Stevenson's appraisal was inaccurate. Newspapers reported his visit and Time magazine followed with a three-page cover story on his achievements as Governor. It commented, "Whatever the truth behind the rumours, this much was evident; in a cold season for the Democrats, Adlai Stevenson is politically hot, and Harry Truman feels the need of a little warmth".⁸

While this publicity did little more than stimulate talk on the national level, it prompted more concrete action locally. In Chicago on February 21, the "Illinois Stevenson for President Committee" was established. Under the co-chairmanship of Walter Johnson, Professor of History at the University of Chicago, and George Overton, Attorney, the Committee directed its efforts toward making Stevenson better known nationally. While receiving no encouragement from the Governor, the Committee nevertheless continued to grow throughout the spring, and by convention time had become a national organization.⁹

Another committee, with quite a different objective, was being formed at about the same time. In January of 1952, the Governor asked Stephen Mitchell, a Chicago lawyer and long-time friend, to "establish a planning group to organize an independent campaign committee" for his re-nomination and re-election as Governor. Even after the Washington meeting and the subsequent speculation, the Governor insisted that Mitchell organize the committee, hire a manager, and rent offices."¹⁰

While both of these committees began to pursue their conflicting goals, reporters flocked to the Illinois capital; and George Ball did his best to maintain communication between Stevenson and the White House. Stevenson had obligated himself to talk again with the President. Fearing that a public trip would kindle new speculation, he decided to travel secretly. On March 4 he was driven to the St. Louis airport in an unmarked car and boarded the plane under the name

⁷ Ibid., 145.

⁸ Walter Johnson, *How We Drafted Adlai*, (New York, 1955)

⁹ George Ball, Personal Interview, May 21, 1983.

¹⁰ Richard Nelson, Personal interview, August 29, 1982

of William Blair, his administrative assistant.¹¹ The plane stopped at Louisville where Stevenson's old friend, Barry Bingham, of the Courier-Journal, had been alerted to meet him. Bingham argued with as much force as the brief period allowed that Stevenson should leave himself uncommitted so that a genuine draft would have an opportunity to develop. The Governor departed shortly, laughing and saying, "Well, you certainly haven't been much help to me".¹²

After arriving in Washington, Stevenson reiterated his previous position to President Truman. He stated that he had already committed himself to run again for Governor and did not think he could back out of it honorably.¹³ A few days later Stevenson explained to writer John Bartlow Martin the reasoning behind this position. He said:

People don't believe me but I'm absolutely frank when I say I don't want to run for President. And having said that I'll be equally frank and say that four years from now, that's another matter. If by then it has become clear that I'm going to be a politician all the rest of my life... and if by then I have the sense of self-confidence it takes and I've had a chance to get this Illinois business done, why then yes, I might want to be a candidate. My boys will be grown up by then too.

For right now, I think the thing to do is stay in Illinois and finish the job. I feel a sense of obligation to finish the job.¹⁴

Up until this point the pressure on Governor Stevenson had been somewhat restrained. Many people felt that President Truman, though busy appraising other possibilities, would in time declare his own candidacy. This misconception was corrected at the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner on March 29 in the Washington National Guard Armory. Stevenson was among the 5,300 Democrats present who heard President Truman make this announcement: "I

¹¹ Stephen A. Mitchell, "Adlai's Amateurs", in Edward Doyle, As We Knew Adlai, (New York, 1966), 80.

¹² Johnson, How We Drafted Adlai, 19.

¹³ Truman, Memoirs, 492.

¹⁴ John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson. (New York, 1952), 163.

shall not be a candidate for re-election. I have served my country long, and I think efficiently and honestly. I shall not accept a renomination.”¹⁵

At the conclusion of the President’s address, newsmen rushed to surround Governor Stevenson. Cameras flashed as reporters bombarded him with questions. The result was a new flurry of press speculation heightening both the public and private pressure on the Governor. Plagued by this urgent and constant interest in his candidacy, Stevenson felt compelled to issue a formal statement on April 16, eight days after his re-nomination for Governor. It read:

I have been urged to announce my candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President... Others have asked me merely to say that I would accept a nomination I did not seek. To state my position now on a prospect so remote in time and probability seems to me a little presumptuous. But I would rather presume than embarrass or mislead...

I have repeatedly said that I was a candidate for Governor of Illinois and had no other ambition. To this I must now add... I could not accept the nomination for any other office this summer.¹⁶

While this statement fell short of Sherman’s, “will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected”, it nevertheless effectively lowered the boom the new wave of Stevenson sentiment. Arthur Krock pointed out in the next morning’s New York Times, that the Democrats would have their first open convention twenty years since Stevenson “seems effectively to have closed the door to his nomination”.¹⁷

On April 17, the day after his statement, Stevenson was scheduled to fly to New York City for a Banquet honouring his old friend, the Mutual Security Director, Averell Harriman. The Governor was reluctant to attend the dinner because it was designed to give Presidential hopefuls a chance to present their views. However, Jacob Arvey, the head of the Cook County Democratic Committee, argued that his presence would help to raise badly needed funds for the party.

¹⁵ Trueman, *Memoirs*, 492

¹⁶ Johnson, *How We Drafted Adlai*, 30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Moreover, Stevenson himself recognized the opportunity to secure Arvey's support for Harriman as the nominee. Therefore, confident that his statement would eliminate any misunderstanding about his appearance, Stevenson decided to attend.¹⁸

The Governor's remarks at the dinner were so impressive that Congressman Emanuel Celler came up to Arvey after the programme and urged, "Jake, you must make this man run. It is unthinkable that any other man should be the nominee of our party at this time. He wouldn't have a chance". Encouraged by the Governor's words and this type of enthusiastic response, Arvey was able to resist Stevenson's insistence that they meet with Harriman that evening.

The next morning's New York Post captured the temper of the occasion with this report: The man who said he could not accept the presidential nomination... was the one speaker whose oratory, wit and liberal commentary evoked a spontaneous and prolonged response... the dinner for Harriman may come to be remembered as the starting point for a real draft-Stevenson movement".¹⁹

Despite this brilliance, Stevenson's statement of the previous day had quieted activity in all but the most devoted quarters. Only Walter Johnson's group remained active. It clung tenaciously to the distinction that Stevenson had said he "could not accept the nomination for any other office this summer", rather than he would not accept the nomination for any other office. This apparently indicated, they thought, that circumstances might change which would allow him to be heir to a genuine draft. Many party regulars, though, were simultaneously rejecting this possibility, believing that no man could be drafted without making pledges in advance.²⁰

While the Governor's withdrawal statement discouraged his own supporters, it did encourage more vigorous activity on the part of other avowed candidates. The campaign of Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee received the greatest push from the announcement. Kefauver, who had gained fame by investigating crime syndicates over nationwide television, had already won primaries in states sending 318 delegates to the convention. Nevertheless, many

¹⁸ Arvey, "A Gold Nugget". 59.

¹⁹ Johnson, How We Drafted Adlai, 31.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 33, 35, 36.

high ranking party officials still opposed his candidacy because of his disclosure of links between organized crime and some big-city Democratic machines.

Another prominent candidate, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia had led the Southern opposition to many of the "Fair Deal" measures. Russell, however, was definitely a sectional candidate, and with the civil rights debate so heated, he did not actually stand a chance for the nomination. His goal, therefore, was to secure convention recognition of Southern interests in the 1952 candidate selection and party platform.

Senator Robert S. Kerr, the favourite son candidate of Oklahoma, served this same function. His support of the exclusion of natural gas producers from federal legislation, and his sympathy toward state ownership of the tidelands oil, made him a captive of special Interests in the eyes of most Northern liberals and thus militated against his chances for the nomination.

While Vice-President Alben Barkley was being mentioned frequently as a candidate, many felt that his seventy-five years of age ruled him out of serious contention.

A latecomer to the 1952 race was Averell Harriman, who had waited for Truman's approval and Stevenson's withdrawal before announcing his candidacy. Though a New Yorker who had held numerous high appointive positions, he was greatly handicapped by his hesitant public speaking, reserved manner, and lack of experience in the elective arena. He failed to arouse even Northern enthusiasm and was far too liberal for the South's liking.

As each of these presidential hopefuls presented themselves to the American public, it became obvious that each of them drew strong opposition from some source able to deny them the nomination. And with this growing realisation it became increasingly evident that only Adlai Stevenson of Illinois could unite the various factions of the Democratic party and thereby maintain the winning New Deal coalition. Accordingly, the Governor again became the centre of attention. Now recognizing the necessity of his candidacy, the public no longer wanted to know if he would seek the nomination, but rather if he would accept it if granted him. It was this question, therefore, that Stevenson was asked frequently while making a series of speeches during late April and May - speeches that had been scheduled before the presidential talk had begun.

In Dallas the Governor repeated that he was not a candidate, but refused to comment on whether he would accept a draft; and he added in Portland, Oregon, that “I cannot speculate about hypothetical situations”²¹.

Two days later in California he was asked frankly what he would do if the convention attempted a draft, and again he responded, “I had better wait until the improbable arrival of that situation before I comment”²²

Finally, at the annual Conference of State Governors on June 30, he told reporters the following: “I have not participated, nor will I participate, overtly or covertly, in any movement to draft me. Without such participation on my part, I do not believe any such draft can or will develop. In the unlikely event that it does, I will decide what to do at the time in the light of the conditions then existing”²³

After the election, Stevenson recorded his own reasoning behind these equivocal statements. He wrote:

If I said, “Yes”, publicly or covertly, it would start the draft movement in earnest. If I said, “No”, how would it reconcile with all my preaching about public service and politics? How could I foretell them, long before the convention, what manner of deadlock and bitterness might develop to the lasting damage of my party?... So I concluded to keep still and say nothing more to anyone, contenting myself with confidence that no one could in fact be drafted by a modern convention against his often-expressed wish.”²⁴

Unable to obtain a frank answer from Stevenson, reporters turned elsewhere with their questions. At the Governors Conference, Henry P. Schricker of Indiana was quick to oblige them.

²¹ Johnson, How We Drafted Adlai, 35.

²² *Ibid.*, 36.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Adlai Stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1952 (New York, 1953), xxii.

“I’d say Governor Stevenson is definitely available”, he told the newsmen. “And I’d like to ask how any man could possibly turn down a sincere draft?”²⁵

It fell to Jake Arvey, though, to receive the most inquiries. Many people suspected that he was secretly behind the draft movement, but Arvey constantly pointed out that it was spontaneous. It was springing up in different parts of the country with different people and by different organizations²⁶. In fact, he himself was surprised by the movement’s continued growth, claiming that “it changes my whole experience in politics”.²⁷

While Arvey was not the source of Stevenson’s support he did encourage it. Spending a few hundred dollars on strategically placed phone calls and visits. Arvey spread the word about Stevenson’s availability. “Stevenson would not ask for the nomination”, he told David Lawrence, Mayor of Pittsburgh and an important Pennsylvania leader, “but I doubt that he would refuse to accept”.²⁸ Arvey continually stressed to the Democratic bosses that Stevenson’s keen sense of public responsibility would certainly dictate an affirmative response to a genuine draft²⁹. Thus, while Stevenson’s public draft movement continued to grow, private political support was also being courted.

The spring of 1952 was also seeing a spirited contest for the Republican presidential nomination. Robert A. Taft, the conservative Senator from Ohio, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a World War II hero and the Commander of NATO forces in Europe, were seeking a nomination that seemed valuable for the first time in a long while. In early July these two men met face to face at the Republican convention in Chicago, and the ensuing battle for delegates was keen and vicious. Although Eisenhower emerged the victor, he led a somewhat divided “crusade” out of the Windy City on July 12.

²⁵ Johnson, How We Drafted Adlai, 36.

²⁶ Arvey, “A Gold Nugget”, 63.

²⁷ Johnson, How We Drafted Adlai, 34.

²⁸ Arvey, “A Gold Nugget”, 60.

²⁹ Dorothy Christianson, Personal Interview, August 31, 1982.

Stevenson's own decision would have been far less difficult had Taft become the nominee. The conservative Senator was an isolationist and a campaign could have rested on clearly defined issues. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was an internationalist whom Stevenson genuinely liked and respected. Moreover, since the Republicans had been so long out of power, he could even "see a strong case for giving them a taste of responsibility" under the General's leadership.³⁰ Stevenson, furthermore, believed that Eisenhower was unbeatable, and the Governor's close friends had advised him not to make the race against the General³¹. With these considerations in mind, Stevenson directed his press officer to issue the following statement on July 12, the day the Republican convention adjourned: "He is a candidate for re-election as Governor of Illinois, and as he has often said, wants no other office. He will ask the Illinois delegation to continue to respect his wishes and hopes all the delegates will do likewise"³²

This statement was followed closely by a July 15 telegram to Walter Johnson. It read: "I do not want to embarrass you and I am grateful for your good will and confidence but my attitude is utterly sincere and I desperately want and intend to stay on this job, with your help I hope."³³

While Stevenson was reacting negatively to the news of Eisenhower's nomination, many delegates responded by becoming even more convinced of the necessity of nominating the Governor. Aware of this new thinking, the Governor read Merlo Pusey's biography of Justice Hughes in order to learn the details of his 1916 draft. "If it has to come, he told a friend, "I hope it comes in that way only after it is apparent that nobody else can be nominated"³⁴ In fact, Stevenson decided that his nomination would have to come by a genuine draft in order to avoid the liabilities of being tagged as "Truman's choice" and of being indebted to any special interest.³⁵

³⁰ Ball, "With Adlai Stevenson", 148 Mrs. Edison Dick, Personal Interview, August 31, 1982

³¹ Mrs. Edison Dick, Personal Interview, August 31, 1982.

³² Johnson, *How We Drafted Adlai*, 37.

³³ *Ibid.*, 54.

³⁴ *New York Times*, July 21, 1952, p. 5.

³⁵ Mitchell, "Adlai's Amateurs", 81.

Discovering these sentiments during long telephone conversations with George Ball, Dutch Smith, and Stevenson, Stephen Mitchell leaked a story to Arthur Krock.³⁶ The resulting page-one story indicated that the Governor could be drafted and spurred the interests of the delegates as they arrived in Chicago for the Democratic National Convention.

Stevenson, Bill Blair, and Carl McGowan travelled to Chicago on Friday, July 18, and took up residence at the home of Bill Blair's father at 1416 North Astor Street. Stevenson quickly became the target for people who attributed their own lack of knowledge of the Governor's position, to indecision on his part. For example, when Stevenson attended the Fourth Presbyterian Church on Sunday, he heard his friend, Dr. Harrison Ray Anderson, speak on the perils of indecision. Using as his text, "If any of you lack wisdom let him ask God that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him", Dr. Anderson delivered a sermon that Stevenson described afterwards as "superb".

on Sunday afternoon Stevenson tried to counter the charges of indecision and to halt the draft movement. "There has been no indecision, no coyness, and no uncertainty on my part," he told the Illinois delegates in a closed meeting. "I do not dream myself fit for the job-mentally, mentally, or physically. And I ask therefore that you all abide by my wishes not to nominate me, nor to vote for me if I should be nominated".³⁷

Arvey, however, firmly committed to the Governor's candidacy by this time, followed Stevenson to the podium "The Democratic Party and the country", he declared, "are more important than the personal wishes of Arvey or Stevenson or anybody else. It is inconceivable that the Governor would not respond affirmatively to an honest draft"³⁸

Reporters, hiding behind a plastic curtain, overheard this confrontation and watched as the Illinois delegates voted to disregard the Governor's wishes. Stevenson sat silently, unwilling to deny the delegates the right to vote their conscience. About one o'clock that night, however, he did confront Jake Arvey again for the second time. In a two-hour conversation at Arvey's home, the Governor constantly pleaded with the Democratic boss to undo what he had done.

³⁶ *New York Times*, July 21, 1952, p. 1

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

“You got me into this, now please get me out”, insisted Stevenson. “I don’t want to be the nominee for President”.

“Governor”, responded Arvey, “this is out of your hands, this is out of my hands, and I don’t know that you will be nominated but if the convention nominates you, there is nothing you can do but accept it”.³⁹

The Democratic National Convention opened on Monday morning, July 21. As Governor of the host state, it was Stevenson’s duty to welcome the delegates. For days the Governor’s aides had been indicating that his speech would be purposely dull in order to avoid any enthusiastic reactions. However, even before Stevenson had a chance to speak, he was greeted by a full ten minutes of cheering. Quieting the chant, “we want Stevenson”, by turning thumbs down to the demonstrators, he began his address. He traced the proud record of accomplishment of the Democratic party and then spoke of the challenges of the future. As he put it:

There can be no complacency perhaps for years to come. We dare not just look back to great yesterdays. We must look forward to great tomorrows.

.....What counts now is not just what we are against, but what we are for. And who leads us is less important than what leads us - what convictions, what courage, what faith - win or lose. A man does not save a century or a civilization, but a militant party wedded to a principle can.⁴⁰

Stevenson’s humorous, incisive, and powerful oratory brought applause twenty-two times and caused James Reston to make this comment: “The reluctant candidate who has been trying to talk himself out of the Democratic presidential nomination for the last five months, talked himself right into the leading candidate’s role this morning with a fifteen-minute address that impressed the convention from left to right”.⁴¹

³⁹ Arvey, “A Gold Nugget”, 62.

⁴⁰ New York Times, July 22, 1952, p. 12.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 1.

The withdrawal of Vice-President Barkley from the race later Monday afternoon gave added impetus to the Stevenson movement. Barkley had become Truman's choice after Stevenson's persistent reluctance had forced the President to turn elsewhere. Now, again, he was losing his candidate because the Vice-President, failing to receive labour's endorsement, was quitting the race.⁴²

Prodded by the welcoming address and Barkley's withdrawal, Stevenson's strength grew throughout the day on Tuesday. Delegates from more than thirty states reported to former Senator Francis Meyers of Pennsylvania, the draft Stevenson floor manager, that their delegations were breaking toward the Governor. In an Illinois caucus forty-six of sixty votes went for Stevenson, and Indiana followed by giving him a 25 to one margin. These gains were reflected in an Associated Press evening tabulation which showed Stevenson passing Harriman with 148 votes pledged on the first ballot. While Kefauver and Russell still led, James A. Farley, former Democratic National Chairman, predicted that Stevenson would be nominated on the third or fourth ballot.⁴³

Toward evening the day's progress was capped by Indiana Governor Henry F. Schricker's announcement that he would nominate Stevenson. He and Archibald Alexander of New Jersey had both been asked by the Governor not to do so, but now rebelling, Schricker went even further to reveal the following: "I asked him what his position would be if a majority of delegates in the convention voted for him and he replied that if the nomination came to him in that way he could not decline"⁴⁴

By Wednesday morning the Stevenson bandwagon was unmistakably gaining momentum. Realizing that their positions were in great jeopardy, two of the principals of the race, Harriman and Kefauver, met to discuss the logistics of a "stop -Stevenson" movement. Unable to reach agreement, members of the two camps contented themselves with conducting whispering campaigns against the front-runner. Delegates circulated Stevenson's statement of Sunday that he was not "tempermentally" fit for the job of President and referred often to his

⁴² Truman, *Memoirs*, 495.

⁴³ New York Times, July 23, 1952, pp.13,17,16.

⁴⁴ Stevenson, *Speeches*, xxii: New York Times, July 23, 1952, p.1.

deposition for Alger Hiss, the former State Department employee convicted of perjury. Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York joined in the resistance by trying to rally Negroes against the Governor. Despite these efforts, the Stevenson movement continued unabated⁴⁵.

Stevenson himself was following these events by television. Since he had made previous commitments to Harriman and Barkley not to become an active candidate, he was somewhat embarrassed by the constant growth in his delegate strength.⁴⁶ However, since this development differed greatly from the type of deadlocked convention he had envisioned, he felt that they could not blame him for circumstances over which he had no control.⁴⁷

These circumstances had been partly created by Walter Johnson and his group of amateurs. Headquartered in three hotel rooms and utilizing three telephones, this group had helped to keep Stevenson's name before the convention before the bandwagon had started to roll.⁴⁸ However, many of the old pros viewed this Johnson group with skepticism and disbelief realizing that a draft movement of this magnitude could not be organized and directed by a few amateurs⁴⁹. It was rather a genuinely spontaneous movement that was growing out of the inexorable logic that demanded Stevenson's nomination. An independent candidate was needed to maintain the Democratic coalition by drawing support from all the warring factions. Only Adlai Stevenson of Illinois could accomplish this feat.

Governor Stevenson finally accepted the logic which demanded his nomination on Thursday evening, July 24. That the nomination could pursue him so relentlessly, in spite of his vehement protests, had finally convinced him of its inevitability. He immediately telephoned President Truman to ask if he might be nominated. The President fumed at Stevenson's tradiness, but nevertheless transmitted instructions to his Missouri alternate to get behind the Illinois Governor. Stevenson was nominated by Governor Schricker at 5:15 in the afternoon on

⁴⁵ New York Times, July 23, 1952, pp.1,17,18.

⁴⁶ Ibid., July 21, 1952, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., July 23, 1952, p.17.

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Richard Nelson, personal interview, August 29, 1982; William Flannagan, personal interview, August 30, 1982; Mrs. Edison Dick, personal interview, August 31, 1982.

Thursday, and the Missouri delegate, Thomas Gavin, indicated Truman's support just prior to the balloting.

Even with the President's backing, the first two ballots on Friday, July 25, were inconclusive. Senator Kefauver led Stevenson on the first ballot by a vote of 340 to 273, and on the second ballot by a vote of 362 to 324. Senator Russel had received 294 votes on the second ballot. While the direction of the balloting was clear, Kefauver, Russel, and Harriman were holding their delegates in the hope of gaining influence in the naming of the vice-presidential nominee.⁵⁰

The convention recessed for dinner after the second ballot, and immediately the leading candidates undertook negotiations with Governor Stevenson. Realizing that they would receive no promises, and wanting to be the first to switch to the Governor, they were prepared to release their delegates as soon as the convention reconvened.⁵¹ Paul E. Fitzpatrick, the New York state party chairman, was the first to take the floor to announce the withdrawal of Averell Harriman. Massachusetts's favorite son, Governor Paul Dever, was quick to follow suit. Then, as the roll call for the third ballot was nearing completion, Senator Kefauver walked to the rostrum to announce his concession. A courteous silence prevailed through his remarks, and then a giant roar greeted the call for a unanimous nomination⁵². Chairman Sam Rayburn made the decisive ruling: "The Chair declares Governor Adlai Stevenson the nominee of the Democratic Party for President of the United States". The band and the delegations joined in a tremendous and tumultuous celebration.

President Truman had travelled from Washington to introduce the nominee to the convention, and he did so with one of his traditional hard-hitting addresses. Promising to "take off his coat and go out and help him win", he summoned the Democratic candidate to the platform.⁵³

⁵⁰ New York Times, July 26, 1952, p. 5

⁵¹ Arvey, "A Gold Nugget", 63.

⁵² New York Times, July 26, 1952, p. 8: Third Ballot results: Stevenson 617.5, Kefauver 275.5. Russell 261, Barkley 67.5, Harriman 0.

⁵³ New York Times, July 26, 1952, pp.1.7.

“I accept your nomination – and your program”, began Governor Stevenson. It was a hot July night, the hour was late, and the delegates were tired, but they were deeply moved by the words that followed: (Appendix A)

And, my friends, more important than winning the election is governing the nation. That is the test of a political party – the acid, final test. When the bands are gone and the lights are dimmed, there is the stark reality of responsibility....

The ordeal of the twentieth century- the bloodiest, most urbulent era of Christian age - is far from over. Sacrifice, patience, understanding, and implacable purpose may be or lot for years to come. Let’s Face it. Let’s talk sense to the American people. Let’s tell them the truth, that there are no gains without pains, that we are now on the eve of great decisions, not easy decisions... but a long, patient, costly struggle which alone war, poverty, and tyranny – and the assaults upon human dignity which are the most grievous consequences of each...

That I think, is our ancient mission. Where we have deserted it we have failed. With your help there will be no desertation now. Better we lose the election than mislead the people; and better we lose

And Finally, my friends, in the staggering task you have assigned me, I shall always try “to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with my God”.⁵⁴

Following this address, a group of Democratic leaders, including Truman, Stevenson, McKinney, and Rayburn, gathered behind the podium to select a vice-presidential nominee. They considered names from a list prepared by the Governor. Eliminating those who would evoke opposition, they finally chose Senator John Sparkman of Alabama about four o’clock in the morning. Sparkman received unanimous approval at the convention’s Saturday morning session.

55

⁵⁴ Stevenson, Speeches, 10.

⁵⁵ John Sparkman, “Let’s Talk Sense to the American People” in Edward Doyle, *As We Know Adlal*, (New York, 1966) 119.

After the Democratic National Convention recessed early Saturday afternoon, Stevenson visited Walter Johnson and the amateurs “to rebuke them for their efforts”. He then asked the National Committee, and particularly Chairman Frank McKinney, to carry on temporarily until he had time to assess the situation.⁵⁶ Finally, he conferred with the defeated contenders and the new vice-presidential nominee on possible campaign strategies.⁵⁷

On Sunday evening, July 27, with the events of the convention still swirling in his head, Adlai Stevenson went once again to the Presbyterian Church he had attended just one short week before. Reverend Anderson spoke on the passage, “If thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my will but thine be done”.⁵⁸ This same text from Luke had been used in Stevenson’s acceptance address. Anderson undertook to explain in the Governor’s presence the meaning of this poignant moment in Christ’s life. Adlai Stevenson could not help but ponder its meaning for his own.

⁵⁶ New York Times, July 27, 1952, pp.1, 21

⁵⁷ “Sparkman, “Let’s Talk Sense”, 120.

⁵⁸ New York Times, July 28, 1952, p. 8

2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

A tired Adlai Stevenson returned to Springfield on Monday, July 28. Deeply moved by the warm welcome of twentyfive thousand fellow citizens, he spoke from the courthouse steps where, ninety-four years before, Lincoln had delivered his house-divided speech. On this summer evening Stevenson, near to tears, made this pledge: “I am going to do what has been assigned to me by fate and to do it with all the heart and all the courage I can muster”.⁵⁹

On Tuesday morning the Governor began the two-fold task of attending to state administrative matters while planning for the campaign ahead. Dismayed by a long day with little progress, he slipped out of the Executive Mansion about midnight and walked to the Springfield home of Abraham Lincoln. He woke the caretaker, entered the house, and sat alone for an hour in Lincoln’s living room rocker. Later he revealed what must have been his thoughts on that evening:

I went to Springfield, there to contemplate the wreckage of any hopes to run for Governor and the problems of a highly inexperienced candidate for the Presidency. I had limited political acquaintance, no manager, no staff, little money in the till, little press support. And I was running against General Eisenhower, national hero for ten years, and also the inevitable accumulation of irritations and anxieties of twenty years of government in a time of profound changes.... The best confidential polls indicated that we had no more than thirty-five percent of the vote”.⁶⁰

Despite these disadvantages Stevenson drew strength from the memories evoked by the Lincoln home. He admired Lincoln more than any other person. He loved his wit, his charm, and his peculiar blending of pragmatism and idealism.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid,

⁶⁰ Adlai Stevenson, *Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1952*, (New York, 1953), xxiii.

⁶¹ Mrs. Edison Dick, personal interview, Aug. 31, 1982.

By reflecting on the difficulties that Lincoln had met and surmounted with less advantages, Stevenson opened some hidden sources of strength within himself.⁶² He began to see his own advantages a strong party, loyal friends, and a nomination gained without incurring obligations to anyone. Refreshed by these thoughts, Stevenson left the Lincoln home having come to some sort of terms with the incredible burden that now was his.

Stevenson was a new person in the following morning when he met the press for the first time since his nomination. Strolling on the state house lawn, he and reporters had this exchange:

A. I'am quite content with the Democratic Convention and its results. I'm feeling more combatative every moment.

Q. Are you still a reluctant candidate,

A. No, I get more aggressive all the time.

Q. Are you going to continue to mention reluctance?

A. I think I am very positive now.

Q. Governor, what caused you to change your mind? Who did persuade you?

A. Sleep.⁶³

While some of the reporter's present were aware of Stevenson's whereabouts on the previous evening, he forbade any mention of his own personal omotions in the press.

The Republicans, meanwhile, were losing no time in launching their attack on the new Democratic presidential nominee. Richard Nixon, the Republican vice-presidential candidate, set

⁶² Portrait of Adial Stevenson, Spoken Arts Recording, Stevenson in Conversation with Arnold Michaelis, June 19, 1956.

⁶³ New York Times, July 31, 1952, p.1.

out to shatter the “myth of Adlai Stevenson’s independence” in his first campaign appearance. Speaking in Columbus Ohio, he said, “He is a captive candidate and would be a captive President. He’s Jack Kroll’s candidate. He’s Jake Arvey’s candidate. And this is his greatest handicap he is Harry Truman’s candidate”.⁶⁴

Even though this charge was untrue, it nevertheless articulated what Stevenson felt to be his biggest handicap in the campaign. He realized that the widespread “time for a change” sentiment could spell his own defeat if he became too closely linked with the unpopular Truman administration. He believed, therefore, that he had to head off the strong Republican argument that his election would mean a continuation of Truman’s policies. He first considered trying to convince the public that it was not time for a change, but with the Republicans shouting about Korea, communism, and corruption, he quickly viewed this as impossible. He chose, therefore, to recognize the need for change, and to take actions which would allow him to offer it to the electorate. If change was sincerely wanted, he felt that it should be made available within the framework of the Democratic party. Consequently, he set out to demonstrate his independence from Washington, Truman, and the Democratic party regulars.⁶⁵

Stevenson’s first action in this new endeavour was to appoint Wilson W. Wyatt, a Louisville lawyer, as his personal campaign manager. While Wyatt had been Mayor of Louisville, Lieutenant-Governor of Kentucky, and National Housing Administrator, he was still, from the viewpoint of the Washington professionals, an “amateur” as far as national campaigning was concerned. Wyatt had been brought to the Governor’s attention by Fred Hoehler, the Illinois Director of Public Welfare, who had known the Kentuckian from Washington.⁶⁶ After conferring with Wyatt twice on July 31, Stevenson announced his appointment the following day.

Wilson Wyatt’s first action as campaign manager was also directed toward the Governor’s goal. He declared that the entire campaign, including the activities of Truman, Barkley, and the Democratic National Committee, would be directed from Springfield. “Only, he

⁶⁴ 1 Ibid., August 1, 1952, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982, George Ball, personal interview, August 29, 1982.

⁶⁶ George Ball, personal interview, Aug. 29, 1982.

added, “we’ll move back to Washington, of course, the day after Governor Stevenson wins in November”⁶⁷

The idea of conducting the campaign from Springfield had been conceived at convention time. Its rationale was fourfold. First, it did emphasize that Stevenson was a change from the present Washington administration. Secondly, it would help to minimize the number of professional party leaches who regularly attach themselves to campaign activities.⁶⁸ Thirdly, it would allow Stevenson to continue as Governor although much of the executive power would, of course, be transferred to the Lieutenant Governor, Sherwood Dixon. Finally, by emphasizing his middle position both ideologically and geographically, Stevenson hoped to appeal again to the rural and small-town midwestern farmers who had given President Truman considerable support in 1948.⁶⁹

This move to Springfield and the appointment of yatt naturally raised considerable press speculation. While it was never officially or publicly stated that the Governor was trying to assert his independence, the reporters were nevertheless repeatedly encouraged to read this interpretation into his actions.⁷⁰ Stevenson, in fact, gave evidence of his own independent attitude in an August 4 press conference. He termed as “nonsense” idea that he was being taken over by the Democratic left wing. However, he was quick to add that his actions were not to be construed as a repudiation of the Democratic party record. He had become confident, he said, that “what the nation wants is a refreshing and not any sharp alterations of the policies which have meant strength and progress during the past two decades.”⁷¹

The next step in the development of Stevenson’s “new look” was taken on August 8 when he appointed Stephen A. Mitchell to replace Frank McKinney as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Mitchell, a fortynine year old Chicago lawyer, had helped to push Stevenson into politics in 1947 by joining with three others to form the “Stevenson for Senator Committee”. Stevenson had offered Mitchell the party chairmanship on August 1 because he was an “amateur” who fulfilled the traditional requirement of being an Irish Roman Catholic.⁷²

⁶⁷ New York Times, Aug. 2, 1952, p.1.

⁶⁸ William Plannagan, personal interivew, Aug. 30, 1982.

⁶⁹ New York Times, Aug. 2, 1952, p.5.

⁷⁰ New York Times, Aug. 2, 1952, p.5.

⁷¹ Ibid., Aug. 5, 1952, p. 1.

⁷² Stephen Mitchell, “Adlai’s Amateurs”, in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, (New York, 1966), 83.

Mitchell had reluctantly accepted the position, but his appointment had been kept secret while certain Democratic leaders were sounded out. As expected, several high officials were against Mitchell's selection because he was not a professional politician. Truman also was opposed to Mitchell because in his present position as Counsel to the Chelf Committee, he was busily investigating the Justice Department.⁷³ Stevenson, however, viewed this as advantageous because it further symbolized his own separation from the incumbent administration. Furthermore, his experience with the regular party organisation in Illinois had convinced him to appoint someone he could trust as party leader. This would be especially important in a campaign which would be directed from two different locations with the head of the Committee situated in Washington. For these reasons, Stevenson stood firm in his selection of Mitchell.⁷⁴

Extremely bothered by this decision and the Stevenson campaign preparations in general, President Truman invited Governor Stevenson and Senator Sparkman to Washington. On August 12 the Democratic candidates toured the newly remodeled White House before the two campaign staffs set to work discussing strategy. Truman expressed concern over the Governor's attempt to disassociation himself from the administration in Washington, and offered to assist in the campaign. This offer renewed a statement he had made in Kansas City on August 2. "If the national chairman and the nominee", he had said, "want me to take another train ride all they have to do is order me. I'm just a buck private in the rear ranks now"⁷⁵. The Stevenson aides asked Truman to refrain from such "whistle-stop" activities at the present time so that the public's attention would focus on the relatively unknown Governor. They also stressed that the Democratic treasury could ill afford extensive travels by both men.⁷⁶

Apparently satisfied, the President agreed to the aides' requests. Moreover, he sent two of his own staff members back to Springfield to assist in campaign preparations and to improve communications between the two camps. Clayton Fritchey, former director of Public Information at the Defence Department, departed to head the public relations organization, and David Bell, skilled in utilizing government information facilities, joined the speech- writing staff.⁷⁷ Pleased

⁷³ Mitchell, "Adlai's Amateurs", 81.

⁷⁴ Richard Nelson, personal interview, Aug. 29, 1982.

⁷⁵ New York Times, August 3, 1952, p. 51.

⁷⁶ John Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense to the American People", in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, (New York, 1966), p.1.

⁷⁷ Richard Nelson, personal interview, August 29, 1982.

to have defined Truman's role the campaign, the Governor, with these two additional men, returned to Springfield.

The Republicans, meanwhile, were unwilling to let the visit pass without comment. Both General Eisenhower and Senator Nixon declared that the White House meeting was new evidence of Stevenson's "captivity". "The Truman administration", charged the General at Denver, Colorado, "is determined to nail down through its hand-picked successors every detail of the doctrines and policies that have brought us to the present situation of bewilderment, indecision, and fear for the future. The American people wanted a change not just for the sake of change. They Want more than just a change of names and places".⁷⁸ At Illinois State Fair on August 14 Stevenson ridiculed the idea of his captivity, but thereafter let the matter drop in order to concentrate on the more urgent matters of organizing the campaign.

Wilson Wyatt had been overseeing the acquisition and organization of a personal campaign staff. While Wyatt added new talents, a nucleus of trusted state aides modified their previous responsibilities. Carl powalt, the Governor's legal adviser, became the "Chief of Staff" of the campaign and worked closely with Stevenson on strategy, policy formulation, and speech preparation. William McCormick Blair continued to serve as adviser and appointment's secretary. Richard Nelson, an aide and national President of the Young Democrats, began to divide his time between state and campaign work. William I. Flannagan, a Chicago newspaperman, became the press secretary and Don Hyndman handled the Governor's correspondence. Wyatt's personal staff was enlarged to include George Ball and Thomas Finletter who operated in ad hoc capacities.⁷⁹

The research and speech-writing staff was headed by the young Harvard history professor, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. His assistants included McGowan's close friend, Willard Wirtz, David Bell from the White House staff, Robert Tufts, a former member of the State Department's policy planning division, William Reddig, a Kansas editor, and Sidney Hyman, an associate of Harry Hopkins and Robert Sherwood in wartime Washington. John Bartlow Martin was added

⁷⁸ New York Times, Aug. 13, 1952, p.1.

⁷⁹ Richard Nelson, personal interview. August 29, 1982;

to do magazine articles, but due to the limited duration of the campaign, was soon shifted to speech-writing. In addition to this hard-core staff, Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard economist, Jack Fischer of Harper's Magazine, David Cohn, Eric Hodgins, and Bernard devoto all contributed when they were able.⁸⁰

This speech-writing team became known as the "Elk's Club" because of its location on the third floor of the Springfield Elk's club. It functioned smoothly with Schlesinger at its head and with Bell serving as office manager. The group's drafts were submitted to Carl McGowan who would undertake extensive revisions.⁸¹ The Governor would then receive the speech for his own comments and changes. These numerous alterations meant that the delivered address often bore little resemblance to the original.⁸²

From the speech-writing and campaign staffs, an inner circle of top advisers soon emerged. Wyatt, McGowan, Schlesinger, and Ball formed the central strategy team, with Finletter and Blair contributing occasionally.⁸³

This nucleus was surrounded by a staff with predominantly legal rather than political backgrounds. It was also a staff characterized by its youth, with the average age of men around the Governor being thirty-three.

This staff centered its operations in a large red brick house about a half block from the Executive Mansion. The sign in front of the building signifying "Stevenson Campaign Headquarters" was so small that many tourists were unable to find the location. The house soon became overcrowded and additional space was rented in the Leland and other Springfield hotels.

With the difficult problem of acquiring a campaign staff behind him, Stevenson now set out to develop a campaign strategy. For this purpose, eleven staff members were called to the Executive Mansion on August 16 for a weekend planning conference.⁸⁴ These strategists

⁸⁰ Geroage Ball, Personal interview, Oct. 22, 1982.

⁸¹ William Flannagan, personal interview, Aug. 30, 1982.

⁸² George Ball, personal interview, Oct. 22, 1982.

⁸³ George Ball,, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982.

⁸⁴ Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense", p. 120.

believed that Stevenson's major problem was his own obscurity compared to Eisenhower's popularity.⁸⁵ A spring Gallup poll, for example, had found that only 33 per cent of all voters and 20 percent of Democratic voters knew who Stevenson was. A 1952 Roper Survey, on the other hand had found that Eisenhower was "the most admired living American". Therefore, the strategy had to be directed toward acquainting the public with the Governor and his views as quickly as possible. Stevenson decided that he would personally determine what he would say, and leave to others the decisions as to where, when, and under what conditions he would say it.⁸⁶

In deciding what to say, Stevenson was guided by his conviction that it was the public leader's duty to inform the people truthfully so that they would have the tools for good judgment and wise decision.⁸⁷ In his acceptance address he had viewed the campaign "not as a crusade to exterminate the opposing party... but as a great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership, " and he added, "Let's talk sense to the American people. Let's tell them the truth. Better we lose the election than mislead the people".⁸⁸

Thus reason was to replace emotion as the theme of Stevenson's campaign. This was not an artificial device designed merely to catch votes, but a true reflection of Stevenson's character.⁸⁹ His conception of a candidate's responsibility had stemmed from a deep respect of Woodrow Wilson's intellect, idealism, and spirit.⁹⁰ Stevenson now wanted to speak to the national again in a manner reminiscent of that great President's eloquence and integrity. Looking forward to the 1952 campaign, Stevenson later described how he prepared to fulfill his noble philosophy with the following words:

we prepared a list of some twelve or thirteen major topics or issues which I wanted to discuss, like agriculture, foreign policy, labour, natural resources, inflation, corruption, etc.... Next I decided that I would discuss these major questions one by

⁸⁵ Robert Goheen, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982.

⁸⁶ Stevenson, Speeches, xxiv.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁸⁹ Edward McDougal, personal interview, Aug. 30, 1982.

⁹⁰ Mrs. Edison Dick, personal interview, Aug. 31, 1982

one in separate speeches during September, thereby setting forth my whole program and identifying myself and my views as quickly as possible. One must bear in mind that I had not campaigned in the primaries and that my views as well as myself were little known about the country. So it seemed to me wise to ... set forth my position as clearly, comprehensively, and unequivocally as possible, reserving October, the second half of the campaign, for amplification and rebuttal in the debate that I thought would develop on some of the domestic issues at least.⁹¹

While Stevenson was reflecting on the content of his speeches, his staff was busy deciding when and where he would deliver them. They devised an itinerary which would take him into every section of the country on five major campaign trips. The airplane would be his major mode of transportation since his well-prepared addresses would substitute for the “whistle-stop” appearances. The candidate would begin and end each of his campaign excursions in Springfield because, as Wyatt said, “Adlai Stevenson is still the Governor of Illinois and is determined to come back here and discharge his duties.”⁹²

While these extensive travels would be an important part of the Governor’s campaign, the strategists nevertheless realized that a much larger audience could be reached through the new medium of television.⁹³ For the first time in 1952 the use of eighteen million television sets made it possible for about forty percent of all American and fifty percent of the voting public to view national broadcasts.⁹⁴ In order to reach these people, the Democratic party bought eighteen half-hour national network spots at a cost of one million dollars. These shows would be from ten-thirty to eleven on Tuesday and Thursday evenings from September 2, through election day.⁹⁵ The party also contracted with the Joseph Katz Advertising Company to buy additional television time, to purchase space for newspaper ads, and to produce campaign literature.⁹⁶ The advertising agency would be limited to these purely technical functions rather than exercising any significant influence on strategy decisions.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Stevenson, *Speeches*, xxvi

⁹² *New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1952, 56: Robert Goheen personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

⁹³ William Flannagan, personal interview, Aug. 30, 1982

⁹⁴ Charles Thomson, *Television and Presidential Politics, The Experience in 1952 and the Problems Ahead*, (Washington, 1956, p.1

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 61

⁹⁶ Stanley Kelley, *Professional Public Relations and Political Power*, (Baltimore, 1956), 158

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 160

One additional method for increasing the Governor's popularity was also available. The head of one of the major television networks had proposed televised debates between Stevenson and General Eisenhower. Although several of Stevenson's aides encouraged him to undertake these debates, the Governor indicated at the strategy session that he had no intention of wrongfully intruding on the General's greater popularity.⁹⁸ Even without these debates, though, the Governor's extensive travel plans coupled with his own television appearances would insure that, as Wyatt predicted, "it would be the most intensive campaign in the history of the country".⁹⁹

On the same weekend that Stevenson and his staff were finalizing these campaign plans, another sign of the uneasiness between the President and the Governor came to the public's attention. The Incident was precipitated on August 16 when Stevenson repeated the phrase, "the mess in Washington", in replying to questions sent to him by Tom Humphrey, the editor of the *Oregon Journal*.¹⁰⁰ when the phrase was published without quotation marks, Republicans immediately thanked Stevenson for helping to establish one of their main campaign arguments. The press also picked up the reference and was ready for President Truman's press conference on August 21. "Do you have comment on the charge of the letter?" the reporters asked. "No", responded Truman, "because I do not know of any mess". He replied that he "could not possibly be: that he was the key of the campaign and, of course, could not be a target on the Democratic side". Asked to explain "key", the President said that the Democratic party had to run on the record of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations because that is all it can run on. Throughout his responses, the President displayed annoyance at Stevenson's attempts to present an independent position.¹⁰¹

Stevenson privately telephoned the President to explain the omission of the quotation marks, but publicly he maintained his aloofness. In reference to the President's statement that he must run on the record of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the Governor spoke in general terms. "Of course", he said, "I approve and applaud the vast accomplishments for the public good under Democratic leadership", It was his comment on the ident as a "key figure", though, that really underscored the distance between the two men. Implying that the President was belaboring the obvious, Stevenson said, "of course President Truman or any President is a

⁹⁸ Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense", 121

⁹⁹ New York Times, August 17, 1952, p.1

¹⁰⁰ Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense", 123

¹⁰¹ Harry Truman, *Memoirs, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope*, (New York, 1956), 498. New York Times, August 22, 1952, p.1

key figure in a national campaign”. This two-day exchange between Stevenson and Truman brought to the surface their underlying disagreements on the proper conduct of the upcoming contest.¹⁰²

Another letter written by Governor Stevenson at about this time was also worthy of public notice. On August 8, Stevenson wrote to *Look* magazine and termed the divorce rate in the United States “appalling”. This action was in response to one of their recent articles entitled, “Can a Divorced Man be Elected President?” The article had quoted church and public opinion polls on the possible effect of Stevenson’s divorce on the November elections. Thus the Governor’s attention was called to an issue which would have underlying and indeterminable an influence on the 1952 outcome.¹⁰³

As the month of August moved on, Stevenson turned attention increasingly to the task of defining and developing his major policy positions.¹⁰⁴ The visits of several public officials, in fact, encouraged him to make certain policy decisions at this early point in the campaign. On August 23, Governor Alan Shivers of Texas came to Springfield to ascertain Stevenson’s stance on the tidelands oil question. The Supreme Court had ruled that the oil-rich lands off the coasts of Texas, Louisiana, and California were federal property. President Truman had upheld this determination by vetoing two congressional bills designed to transfer the ownership to the states. Stevenson now told Shivers, after an afternoon of debate, that he also would support the Supreme Court’s ruling. A disappointed Shivers nevertheless admitted that the Illinois Governor had doubtless been both politically and morally honest in reaching his decision. This was evident since he was clearly risking the financial and electrical support of the Texas citizenry.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, during the afternoon session a group of powerful party leaders had threatened, “But otherwise you can’t win”. Stevenson had coldly responded, “But I don’t have to win”¹⁰⁶. This statement demonstrated that personal integrity and not political expediency would be the sole determinant of Stevenson’s policy positions.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² New York *Times*, August 23, 1952, p.1

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, August 16, 1952, p. 16

¹⁰⁴ George Ball, personal interview, August 30, 1982

¹⁰⁵ New York *Times*, August 24, 1952, p.1: John Bartlow Martin, personal interview, October 22, 1982

¹⁰⁶ George Ball, personal interview, August 30, 1982

¹⁰⁷ Robert Goheen, personal interview, August 30, 1982: Edward Medougal, personal interview, August 30, 1982

On August 25 Walter Ruther, the President of the United Auto Workers, travelled to Springfield. He had come to collect the commitments that labour annually receives in exchange for its support of the Democratic candidate. After his conference with the Governor, the newsmen asked him for a catalogue of this year's promises. Reuther promptly replied, "When you have complete confidence in a man, you don't have to get commitments".¹⁰⁸

He went on to say that the Governor was perhaps the most independent candidate ever to run for President. "The thing that makes Governor Stevenson's candidacy attractive," Ruther explained, is that he is not a candidate of labour, not a candidate of the political bosses".¹⁰⁹

With most of his campaign preparations behind and the official opening of the campaign still several days away, Stevenson went to New York during the last week of August for a two-day trial run. Speaking before the American Legion National Convention on August 27, Stevenson asserted publicly for the first time the philosophy that had been privately guiding his policy decisions. "Consider the groups", he said, "who seek to identify their special Interests with the general welfare.... I have resisted them before and I hope the Almighty will give me the strength to do so again and again.... I intend to resist them if I think their demands are excessive or in conflict with the public interest, which must always be the paramount interest".¹¹⁰

In addition to this American Legion address, the Governor made five other speeches and then returned to Springfield. The New York trip had been successful and the Governor's staff was optimistic. Stevenson, himself, was pleased with his independence, his staff, and his strategy.

Waiting for Labour Day, the staff watched as President Truman made a brief whistle-stop tour to Pinneapolis.¹¹¹ The raised cries of "Give-em hell, Harry", reminded the Stevenson camp of Truman's presence, of his effectiveness, and of his warnings. But, still supremely confident of their own strategy, they braced for the ordeal ahead.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Goheen, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

¹⁰⁹ New York Times, August 25, 1952, p. 1

¹¹⁰ Stevenson, *Speeches*, p. 19

¹¹¹ New York Times, November 2, 1952

3. "LET'S TALK SENSE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE"

On September 1, 1952, Adlai Stevenson set out in nearby Michigan "to talk sense to the American people" at the various Labour Day rallies which traditionally open Democratic presidential campaigns. He appeared first at Grand Rapids, Michigan, the hometown of the late Senator Vandenberg, and appropriately chose the subject of bipartisan foreign policy for his first speech of the campaign. The Governor began by telling the attentive crowds of 4,000 what he considered to be the ground rules for foreign policy discussion. "I think it should be discussed in this campaign soberly and with restraint", he said. "we could pay a sad price in misunderstanding... abroad by what we say...unwisely to beguile the voters here at home... I say to you with all sincerity that winning the peace is far dearer to me... than winning the election".¹¹²

The candidate then went directly to the crucial question of the Korean War. "If we had not chosen to Light in Korea", he suggested, "sooner or later, we would have to fight a bigger war somewhere else... the memory of Munich is still fresh. The quicker aggression Is stopped the better... it is quite possible that our action in Korea may have headed off World War Three".¹¹³

The Governor's second appearance was at a Labour Day rally in Detroit where he faced about 20,000 workers gathered in Cadillac Square. "You are not my captives and I am not yours", he stated. "I might as well make it clear right now that I intend to do exactly what I think right and best for all of us - business, labour, agriculture alike.... So if either of us thinks in terms of captivity let's agree right here and now on a mutual pact of liberation".¹¹⁴

Having again stated his ground rules, the Governor then moved to the more specific issue of the unpopular Taft-Hartley Act. While indicating that not everything in the law was wrong, he did maintain that it was biased, politically inspired, and ineffectual. Therefore, he said, "We must have a new law and my conclusion is that we can best remedy the defects of the old law by scrapping it and starting over again".¹¹⁵

Stevenson's third visit of the day was to the predominantly Polish municipality of Hamtramack where he returned to the subject to foreign policy. He referred to Eisenhower's

¹¹² Adlai Stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai 2. Stevenson, 1952 (New York, 1953), 42

¹¹³ Stevenson, Speeches, 44

¹¹⁴ New York Times, September 2, 1952, p.1

¹¹⁵ Ibid

American Legion address which he said “aroused speculations here and abroad that, if he were elected, some reckless action might ensue in an attempt to liberate the people of Eastern Europe from Soviet tyranny”.¹¹⁶ The Governor then spoke harshly of the speech. “I want to make one thing very plain”, he declared, “even if votes could be won by it. I would not say one reckless word on this matter during the campaign. Some things are more precious than votes. The cruel grip of Soviet tyranny upon your friends and relatives cannot be loosened by loose talk or idle threats”.¹¹⁷

The Governor concluded his day’s activities by stopping at Flint where an alert photographer took a picture of a hole in the sole of his shoe. While the Governor’s words in Flint were quickly forgotten, the picture was widely circulated because it humorously portrayed the paucity of Democratic campaign funds.

Returning to Springfield in the evening, the Governor undertook an assessment of his first day’s activities. While he had spoken on several subjects, the theme of personal independence had pervaded all of his addresses. By telling several minority groups that their interests would always be secondary to the national interest, he had apparently rejected the Truman strategy of 1948. This strategy had called for winning the minorities by catering to their special interests.

Instead, Stevenson was taking the big-city vote more or less for granted and reaching for more independent sport. It was still too early to ascertain the overall effectiveness of this approach, but after one day the Governor said he was “more than pleased with the turnout” although he “didn’t think he did too well” with his audiences.¹¹⁸

While Stevenson was busy campaigning in Michigan, President Truman made his first speech of the campaign in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The President commenced with his traditional hard-hitting rhetoric that caused at least one Stevenson adviser to consider using him more actively. The adviser explained. “Let Adlai take the high road and Harry take the low road and the pair of them will meet in the White House in January”.¹¹⁹ Actually, the probability of such

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ New York Times, Sept. 2, 1952, p.1

¹¹⁸ New York Times, September 2, 1952, p.1

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Sept. 5, 1952, p.10

teamwork was increasing because on the three crucial questions of Taft-Hartley, tidelands oil, and Rule 22 of the Senate, the Governor had shifted from his more independent position of convention time to one very near that of the administration.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the question of greater participation by the President still remained in the background.

In Springfield, Stevenson was preparing for the first of his five major campaign trips. His first journey would take him to the West because he was little known in that area and because he had been encouraged to appear in California before registration closed in that state.¹²¹ Mitchell was convinced that a registration drive was essential for victory. On this he concurred with his predecessor, Frank McKinney, who had said that every bit of tangible evidence shows that the majority of non-voters are favourable to the Democratic party.¹²²

The western tour would take Stevenson into nine states, eight of which President Truman had carried in 1948. Whereas the margin in each state had been less than five per cent, it was nevertheless hoped that the midwestern Governor could repeat this performance. The Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain states were thus viewed as key battlegrounds with 79 electoral votes going to the winner. Bernard de Voto, the prominent western historian, had been called to Springfield to help prepare progressive speeches on conservation policy.¹²³

Stevenson launched his tour of 7,600 miles with a nationally televised speech from Denver, Colorado, on September 5. He chose this occasion to explode the major Republican proposition that “it’s time for a change”. His speech read something like a lawyer’s brief. While admitting that “change” was indeed the most important word in the world today, he went further to ask these questions: “Which party best understands the meaning of change in the modern world? Which party has ignored it? Which has anticipated the need for a change and done something about it? And looking ahead now, which party is most likely to cope effectively with the vast changes already in the making?” After systematically answering these questions, the Governor concluded his address in apologetic tones. “You’ll forgive me”, he said, “if I’m a little

¹²⁰ Ibid., Sept. 3, 1952, p. 3

¹²¹ New York Times, September 8, 1952, p.15

¹²² Stanley Kelley, Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore, 1956), p. 160

¹²³ New York Times, September 4, 1952, p. 18

cynical which I hear shouting the loudest for change the politicians who have consistently opposed change at every turn as far back as most of us can remember".¹²⁴

Still heading westward, the Governor stopped the next day at the National Plowing Contest in Kasson, Minnesota. Since the Republican candidate had spoken there earlier in the day, Stevenson took the opportunity to examine some of the General's farm policy pronouncements. He pointed out that while the Democratic platform states clearly that it will maintain prices at not less than ninety per cent of parity, the Republican platform is merely aimed at parity levels. "How good is their aim anyway?" he asked. "Their sights were a mile off in June of this year whom more than half the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against the law that extended price support at ninety per cent of parity through 1954".¹²⁵ Stevenson continued his attack with such exceptional niceness that it inhibited some. One farmer looked at Harry Truman's successor and yelled, "Give 'em." He paused. "Er. heck", he finished.¹²⁶

On September 6, Governor Stevenson arrived in Cheyenne, Wyoming, to outline a middle-of-the-road conservation policy for the new West. Praising a mixed economy, he said, "People sometimes talk as if government and free enterprise were mortal enemies. In this part of the country you know that they are working together as partners... The Democratic Party knows, as you know, that sound public conservation policies provide the best foundation for healthy, private enterprise..."¹²⁷

Two days later in Seattle, Washington, the Governor went further on the subject of resource development. "We must be eagle-eyed and we must be tight-fisted about these expenditure", he warned, "and the blessings of local Interests are not enough to justify a public project. It must pass the harder test, it seems to me, of comparison...."¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Stevenson, Speeches, pp.57-63

¹²⁵ Stevenson, Speeches, pp.64-71

¹²⁶ Mary McGrary, "Uneasy Politician", in Eric Servareid, Candidates, 1960 (New York, 1959), 220

¹²⁷ Stevenson, Speeches, p.75

¹²⁸ Stevenson, Speeches, pp.79-80

The same day Stevenson abandoned this theme in order to treat quite a different subject in a speech before the **Portland Journal** luncheon for Oregon newsmen. He complemented the democratic free press in general, but expressed reservations about the “way some of our nation’s great papers rushed to commit themselves to a candidate last spring, long before they knew what the candidate stood for, or what his party platform would be, or who his opponent was, or what would be the issues of the campaign”. He stated, “I am frankly considerably concerned when I see the extent to which we are developing a one-party press in a two-party country”.¹²⁹ Stevenson’s concern was not unfounded. Editor and Publisher, a newspaper trade publication, indicated that by September, 75 per cent of the newspapers had already come out for General Eisenhower while 15 per cent supported the Governor. Only nine per cent were still undecided.¹³⁰

On September 9, Stevenson addressed a capacity crowd of 12,000 at the Veterans Memorial Auditorium in San Francisco. He began his second television appearance by warning those abroad not to “mistake our present wrangling for weakness”, declaring that, “the costliest blunders have been made by dictators who did not quite understand the workings of real democracy and who mistook diversity for disunity”. He then proceeded to define the term “coexistence”. “It is,” he said, “not a form of passive acceptance of things as they are. It is waging the contest between freedom and tyranny by peaceful means. It will involve negotiation and adjustment-compromise but not appeasement”. This statement drew the loudest applause of the day.

Finally, the candidate discussed Korea and the necessity of limited war. He placed the local conflict in a broader context with the following words:

We may in time look back at Korea as... the first historic demonstration that an effective system of collective security is possible... But some men in this country seem to think that if definitive victory cannot be won, we should either take reckless military action or give the whole thing up. Such advice plays into the enemy’s hands. The contest with tyranny is not a hundred-yard dash—it is a test of endurance... I say that America has been called to greatness”.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 75

¹³⁰ New York Times, September 9, 1952, p. 19

¹³¹ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 91-99

On the following day, September 10, the Governor wide his first whistle-stop appearances of the campaigns while travelling through the central valley of California of route to Los Angeles, he stopped at San Jose. Tracy, Modesto, Meroed, Madera, Fresno, Tulare, and Bakersfield. At each of the eight locations the candidate extolled the irrigation accomplishments of the Democratic party and criticized Ike for his tactics and his associates. In Fresno, he asserted, “I feel sometimes as though I am running against slogans and epithets more than I am running against candidates and issues”.¹³²

Throughout the afternoon the Governor put his wit and humour to good use. Several times he offered the Republicans this deal: “If they will stop telling lies about the Democrats, we will stop telling the truth about them”.¹³³ While Eisenhower had criticized this use of humour, the Stevenson aides suspected it was because much of it was at his expense. Besides, they felt that the humour aided in establishing Stevenson as a unique and appealing personality. Therefore, they insisted that the Governor continue to quip.

Stevenson reached Los Angeles in the evening and spoke the following morning at the Town Hall luncheon. “The last time I was in this room” he opened, “was in May of 1942.....ten years ago.... with my beloved and celebrated boss at that time, Colonel Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy. He made a much better speech to you at the time than I will today and I know because I wrote both of them”. Stevenson then discussed political morality. He indicated that corruption should be an issue in every campaign because “when we lose faith in the system, we have lost faith in everything we fight and stand for”. He described his own efforts to combat corruption in Illinois and claimed he could do the same on the national level. To refute the slanderous assaults of the Republicans, he recalled a statement made during the Harding Era scandals. “Neither political party”, Justice Hughes had said, “has a monopoly of virtue or of rascality... Guilt is personal and knows no party”.¹³⁴

While Stevenson’s speeches were tallored to specific subjects they were embellished with more philo- sophical utterances. Stevenson revived the Roosevelt theme of faith and fear while speaking before Phoenix voters on September 12. “We Democrate are not afraid of the challenge of tomorrow”, he asserted, “We are the party of faith.... We will let the Republicans continue to

¹³² New York Times, September 11, 1952, p.1

¹³³ George Ball, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

¹³⁴ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 100-110

deal in moans and groans and lamentations and despair.... That is the party of fear-and this contest between fear and faith will decide the future of our country".¹³⁵

Later in the evening, a full nine days after the start of his first campaign trip, Stevenson returned to Springfield. The crowd waiting at the airport mistook Wilson Wyatt for the Governor and applauded loudly as the Kentuokian departed from the plane.¹³⁶ This confusion was not a typical. It simply illustrated Stevenson's difficulty of getting himself known even with the heavy use of the airplane and television.

In the five days before his second tour would begin, Stevenson's staff scrutinized the happenings of the previous week in order to extract lessons for future excursions. The first major realization was that the Governor had attempted too much on this trip. A pace similar to the 6,700 miles in nine days with twenty-one speeches simply could not be maintained.¹³⁷ Stevenson himself later described the rigorous demands in these terms:

...I suppose we have contrived few more exacting ordeals than a Presidential campaign. You must emerge, bright and bubbling with wisdom and well-being, every morning at 8 o'clock, just in time for a charming and profound breakfast talk, shake hands with hundred, often literally thousands, of people, make several inspiring, "newsworthy" speeches during the day, confer with political leaders along the way and with your staff all the time, write at every chance, think if possible, read mail and newspapers, talk on the telephone... and ride through city after city on the back of an open car, smiling until your mouth is dehydrated by the wind, waving until the blood runs out of your arm, and then bounce gally. confidently, masterfully into great howling halls.... Then all you have to do is make a great, imperishable speech...

But the real work has just commenced two or three, sometimes four hours of frenzied writing and editing of the next day's immortal mouthings so you can get something to the stenographers, so they can get something to the mimeograph machines, so they can get something to the reporters, so they can get something to

¹³⁵ Stevenson, *Speeches*, 122

¹³⁶ *New York Times*, September 14, 1952, p.1

¹³⁷ *Ibid*

their papers by deadline time. Finally sleep, sweet sleep, steals you away, unless you worry— which I do.

The next day is the same.¹³⁸

The second major realization was that Stevenson was more effective speaking with a prepared text than from the back of a train extemporaneously. Accordingly, it was decided that whistle-stops like the California trip would be kept to a minimum. The Governor would speak instead before indoor crowds which would be used, more or less, as a studio audience for the benefit of the much larger radio and television audience.¹³⁹

While it was generally thought that the Governor restrict himself to prepared addresses, there was no agreement as to what form these addresses should take. The eloquent and oratorical style which had characterized his first set of speeches, was not universally applauded. Some felt that he was “speaking over the heads of the people”. Several of the advisers secretly held this view, but were unwilling to tell Stevenson for fear that he would lose respect for them.¹⁴⁰ Wyatt and Ball were more frank, “You are a fine poet but a lousy architect”, said Ball on numerous occasions. “You say the right things and say them eloquently, but you don’t let the structure of your speeches show through. Consequently, your listeners cannot recall what you have said for that you have recommended anything specific”.¹⁴¹ Ball insisted that people think in schematic terms and advocated the method employed by Eisenhower’s speechwriters of regularly inserting in each speech eight, ten, or twelve points, which the General would solemnly enumerate as the ultimate solution to a particular problem.¹⁴²

Stevenson was annoyed by this kind of advice because it was poor writing and mistakenly implied that “a list was a concept or a litany a programme”.¹⁴³ More significantly, though, Stevenson was not convinced that his speeches were too sophisticated. As he later put it:

¹³⁸ Stevenson, *Speeches*, xii

¹³⁹ Adlai Stevenson III, Personal interview, April 1, 1983

¹⁴⁰ Helen Meiner, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

¹⁴¹ George Ball, “With Adlai Stevenson in War and Politics”, In Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai* (New York, 1966), 151

¹⁴² George Ball, “With Adlai Stevenson in War and Politics”, In Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai* (New York, 1966), 151

¹⁴³ *Ibid*

Did I talk over the people's heads? No - and that's about the only aspect of the campaign I am sure of.... I think candidates for important offices, let alone for the Presidency of the United States in this day and age, should not treat us as fourteen-year-olds but as adults, challenging us.... What's more, I doubt if I could have talked over people's heads even if I had foolishly wanted to. As Franklin P. Adams said, "The average man is a great deal above the average".¹⁴⁴

Stevenson and his aides, of course, could not be sure of the impact of his speeches on those who heard them. They could only hope that John Steinbeck, writing from Europe, was accurate in his appraisal. This was his observation:

..... the speeches are a new experience to every- one. The listeners set up no hullabaloo. The speaker is never cancelled out by emotional roars of inattentive applause. People seem to resent applause because in the noise they might miss something. I've read that the meetings are quiet because the audiences are not moved. Then I've watched them leaning forward, their eyes never leaving the speaker's face and turning irritably toward any distraction. They're listening all right, listening as an audience does to fine theatre or fine music or fine thinking.¹⁴⁵

The production of the Stevenson masterpieces was no easy task. The writers in the "Elk's Club" worked long hours and Stevenson himself would rewrite and edit each manuscript. He wanted to capture perfectly his precise thought and unique style. These changes inevitably caused great difficulty for the press. Either the newsmen were unable to obtain advanced copies of addresses or when they did receive them, found them quite different from the delivered versions.¹⁴⁶ On one occasion the Stevenson aircraft was kept circling the field until advanced copies could be mimeographed; on other occasions, Stevenson, while being introduced, was observed sitting by the podium still scribbling on his text.¹⁴⁷ So committed was Stevenson to uttering his exact thoughts, even when it entailed missing newspaper deadlines, that Ball and others would jokingly tell him that "he would rather write than in President".¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Stevenson, *Speeches*, xxviii

¹⁴⁵ John Steinbeck, *1952 Campaign Speeches*. (New York, 1952), Forward, p.5

¹⁴⁶ William Flenneagan, personal interview. Aug.30, 1982

¹⁴⁷ *New York 1956, 282*

¹⁴⁸ *Can't see anything in original*

These realisations on the part of the campaign staff confirmed, for better or worse, the campaign strategy that had been told in August. It differed radically from the old-style campaign of whistle-stopping before large crowds. It differed radically from the type of campaign that the Republican candidate was running this year. But the times had changed, the airplane and television were now available, and Stevenson's own style was best suited to this now approach.

While Stevenson's strategy remained unaltered, his attitude was not the same.¹⁴⁹ The activities of Eisenhower and Nixon during the first two weeks of the race had cast the campaign in a new light. In the first place, the Governor was deeply disturbed by the General's undue emphasis of the corruption issue. Intensely proud of his clean-up record in Illinois, he strongly resented the Eisenhower intimations that he could not handle the matter in Washington. Secondly, the Governor suspected that the General's adoption of the Dulles' plan for liberating Eastern European peoples was politically motivated. Finally, the reconciliation meeting of Eisenhower and Taft in New York on September 12 was viewed with amazement. The General had emerged from the discussion committed to the orthodox Taft position on all major points except for some "differences of degree" in foreign policy. To the Democratic candidate this was nothing short of a blatant exchange of primary principles for political profit.¹⁵⁰

That the Governor was greatly annoyed by these Republican campaign tactics was evident at his press conference on September 15. He suggested that the General was no longer in charge of his campaign at all. To an earlier statement that "it looks as if Taft lost the nomination but won the nominee", he now added, "This is the first time I ever heard a party go into battle under the slogan 'Throw the rascals in!?'¹⁵¹ Stevenson no longer thought that Eisenhower would make a satisfactory President, and so for the first time his own heart was really in the struggle.

The upcoming eastern campaign trip would provide an inviting opportunity to act on this new attitude. It was in the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia, Vermont, and New York that Taft had run well behind Eisenhower in the summer pre-convention activity.¹⁵² Now the Governor could play up, to his advantage, the "surrender" of Eisenhower to Taft and the

¹⁴⁹ George Ball, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

¹⁵⁰ Stevenson, *Speeches*, xxvii, New York *Times*, Sept. 8, 1952, p.1, New York Times, Sept. 14, 1952, p.71

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1952, p.1

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1952, p.1

inevitable central position that the conservative senator would occupy in a Republican administration.¹⁵³

September 18 found Stevenson in Hartford, Connecticut, for the opening of his second campaign tour. “There has always seemed to me”, he warned, “a danger in making the atomic bomb the center of defense strategy. The bomb is but one part of a general system of defense. It cannot be a substitute for such a general system. It cannot be our only answer to aggression”. Linked to this discussion of the atomic future was a blast at General Eisenhower for supporting the re-election of such men as Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin and William E. Jenner of Indiana. “In recent weeks”, he declared, “my opponent has adopted the singular theory that a candidate for President should support all state and local candidates on his party ticket—good, bad, Indifferent—and regardless of their views and records”. Clarifying his own policy, Stevenson affirmed, “Win or lose. I will not accept the proposition that party regularity is more important than political ethics. Victory can be bought too dearly.”¹⁵⁴

On the following day, September 19, the campaign was sidetracked by the revelation of a “supplementary expenditure fund” that the Republican vice-presidential candidate, Richard M. Nixon, had received for his past political activities.¹⁵⁵ A total of \$18,235 had been given by seventy-six southern Californian businessmen who were sympathetic to the Senator’s views. The fund had expired with the Senator’s nomination, but an article in the New York Post had now forced him to verify its existence. Immediately there was widespread talk of Nixon’s possible Withdrawal from the race. People were shocked because the Republicans had been emphasizing the very issue of corruption in government. Denunciatory telegrams poured into the Republican campaign headquarters, and the nation’s press condemned the fund by a two to one margin.¹⁵⁶

Stevenson rejected the temptation to join in the demagogic clamour for Nixon’s dismissal and made this statement on September 19, “I am sure the great ‘Republican party will ascertain the facts, will make them public, and meet in accordance with our best traditions and with due

¹⁵³ New York Times, September 18, 1952, p.1

¹⁵⁴ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 134-139

¹⁵⁵ New York Times, September 21, 1952, p.1

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

respect for the second most important position in the land. Condemnation without all the evidence, a practice all too familiar to us, would be wrong".¹⁵⁷

Eisenhower, in the face of the public disapproval, informed Nixon that he would have to come out "as clean as a hound's tooth" on the issue. Therefore, the Senator and his wife went on nationwide television on September 23 in order to review his personal finances. The resulting melodramatic performance produced such a favourable response that Ike declared Nixon "completely vindicated" the next day.¹⁵⁸ On September 25 Arthur Summerfield, the Republican National Chairman, notified the Senator that he would remain on the ticket.¹⁵⁹

Stevenson, meanwhile, was facing difficulties with a fund of his own, Disgruntled by the Nixon expose, a Chicago Republican, Kent Chandler, demanded on September 22 that Stevenson acknowledge publicly "that he had approved financial assistance to appointed members of his administration in Springfield during the past four years."¹⁶⁰ From New York the Governor responded immediately that "there has never been any secret about the fact that I have tried to reduce the financial sacrifice of a number of men whom I induced to leave private employment to work for the state of Illinois".¹⁶¹

The "Stevenson fund", as it became known, had originated after the 1948 election when Stephen Mitchell had proposed that the Governor utilize the \$23,000 campaign surplus to help supplement the salaries of certain state employees.¹⁶² Feeling that this would help to attract quality talent to public life, Stevenson had established the "Gifts for Illinois, Inc." and additional donations had been accepted.¹⁶³ How that the fund was receiving public attention Stevenson was reluctant to reveal the names of the officials helped and the amounts they had received.¹⁶⁴ He felt that no useful purpose would be served. However, since his hesitancy caused mounting criticism and an unfavourable comparison to the Nixon fund, he finally agreed to issue the names.¹⁶⁵ In addition, he announced that he and Sparkman would release their personal income tax returns for

¹⁵⁷ New York Times, Sept. 20, 1952, p.9

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., Sept. 24, 1952, p. 1

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., Sept. 26, 1952, p. 1

¹⁶⁰ New York Times, Sept. 25, 1952, p.1

¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹⁶² Stephen Mitchell, "Adlai's Amateurs", in Edward Doyle, As We Knew Adlai (New York, 1966), 79

¹⁶³ New York Times, September 25, 1952, p.1

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., Sept. 26, 1952, p. 1

¹⁶⁵ New York Times, Sept. 26, 1952, p.1

the last ten years.¹⁶⁶ These disclosures prompted Eisenhower to issue an auditor's statement of his own finances, and Nixon alone refused to make a full financial accounting.

With these public disclosures the "funds" issue gradually subsided. During the ten days that it occupied the public's attention, Stevenson adhered strictly to his previously determined schedule. No commitments were altered to capitalize on the new issue. On September 20, the Governor travelled to the South for the first time and spoke at the Mosque Auditorium in Richmond, Virginia. Reporters had been anxiously waiting to see southern reaction to Stevenson and his stand on civil rights. This question had split the Democratic party in 1948 and had cost President Truman 33 electoral votes. The present Democratic platform pledged to continue efforts to eradicate discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. Consequently, it called for federal legislation to secure the right to equal opportunity for employment, the right to security of persons, and the right to full and equal participation in the nation's political life.¹⁶⁷ The 5000 southerners heard the Governor frankly embrace these pledges. "In the broad field of minority rights", he said, "the Democratic party has stated its position in the platform, a position to which I adhere. I should justly earn your contempt if I talked one way in the South and another way elsewhere. Certainly no intellectually dishonest Presidential candidate could, by an alchemy of election, be converted into an honest President. I shall not go anywhere with beguiling serpent words".¹⁶⁸ While the non-segregated audience greeted this honesty with forty-four bursts of applause, not all were equally pleased. Senator Byrd, up for re-election, was not present nor mentioned at the meeting.¹⁶⁹

The Governor flew back to New York after the address in order to receive labour's official endorsement at the American Federation of Labour convention on September 22.¹⁷⁰ He concluded by praising labour's role in the social legislation of the last twenty years and challenged the Republicans to indicate which programmes they wanted changed.¹⁷¹

The Governor continued to discuss economic problems in his next two speeches. He told a Baltimore audience of 9000 that he would not hesitate to impose tighter wage and price controls

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., Sept. 28, 1952, p.1

¹⁶⁷ New York Times, Sept. 25, 1952, p.1

¹⁶⁸ Stevenson, *Speeches*, 154

¹⁶⁹ New York Times, Sept. 21, 1952, p.1

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., Sept. 22, 1952, p.1

¹⁷¹ Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 157-164

to halt inflation¹⁷² and on September 26 he lectured an Indianapolis audience on economy in government.¹⁷³

The next evening in Louisville, Kentucky, Stevenson analyzed the Korean problem in a one-hour address at the Memorial Auditorium. The Governor began by tracing through Eisenhower's campaign statements on the subject which he called "a barrage of ugly, twisted, demagogic, distortions". Then he stated the basis of his own position in these words:

"Strength is the road to peace. Weakness is the road to war. This is the simple truth of peace and war in our times. The Democratic Party has been consistently the party of strength - and thus the party of peace. With equal consistency, the opposition has been the party of weakness - the party that persists in the dreary obsession that we must fear above all, not the Kremlin, but our own Government..."¹⁷⁴

The Governor brought his second campaign tour to a close by recalling the theme that had marked his first address of the month in Grand Rapids, Michigan. "Peace is far more important than who wins this election", he said. "Whichever party wins, the American people must be sure to win. Let us not place victory in a political campaign ahead of national interest...." Then, the first month of the 1952 Democratic presidential campaign ended as it had begun with Adlai Stevenson calling out, "Let's talk sense to the American people!"¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 165-172

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 173-180

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 181-100

¹⁷⁵ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 181-188

4. STRATEGY RE-EVALUATION AND STEVENSON'S ATTACK

Adlai Stevenson delivered his first fireside speech of the campaign from Chicago on September 29. "I have expressed my views as best I could", he told the nation. "I have done the best I could to keep my promise to talk sense to the American people. I had hoped my opponent would also state his position on the issues so that we could debate them out in the American way".¹⁷⁶

With these words, Stevenson described his view of the first month of the 1952 campaign. He had indeed talked sense by taking two extensive campaign trips and outlining his programme in thirteen different policy areas. However, he was keenly disappointed with the Republican response. As Wyatt indicated on September 25, the Governor had sincerely planned to use the second month of the campaign to "underscore, fill in, elaborate and distinguish his program from that of the Republican party".¹⁷⁷ It now appeared that this would be impossible for, as Stevenson stated in the fireside speech, "what the General now believes on most of the big questions that trouble us, I do not know".¹⁷⁸ It, therefore, now fell to the Governor and his staff to develop a new strategy for the second month of the 1952 campaign.

Extensive travel plans had already been finalized for the month of October. Except for brief returns to Springfield on October 12 and 13 and on October 19 and 20, the Governor would be on the road almost constantly in the final four weeks of the campaign. He would take a mid-western and southern tour, a western tour, and an eastern tour. Together these trips would necessitate 15,000 miles of travel in 24 states and appearances in over 100 cities.¹⁷⁹

It remained only to devise a master plan to buttress these activities and it was to this task that the Stevenson aides directed their efforts from September 28 to October 3 in Springfield.

The camp's deliberations were conducted in an atmosphere of mild crisis because the Governor's own campaign appeared to be bogged down for several reasons. First, it was thought

¹⁷⁶ Adlai Stevenson, *Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson*, 1952, (New York, 1953), 191

¹⁷⁷ New York *Times*, September 26, 1952, p.15

¹⁷⁸ Stevenson, *Speeches*, 191

¹⁷⁹ New York *Times*, October 6, 1952, p.1

that the Republicans had gained more in the “funds” skirmish than the Democrats.¹⁸⁰ Nixon’s television appeal combined with the imagery of Eisenhower, the father, forgiving Nixon, the son, had proved immensely popular. Secondly, Eisenhower was consistently drawing larger and more enthusiastic crowds than the Governor and the polls indicated that the General was still leading.¹⁸¹ Thirdly, Stevenson was in danger of losing major sections of the South. Governor Shivers of Texas had already announced that he would vote for Eisenhower, and it was feared that the State’s Democratic party would follow shortly with an endorsement of the General.¹⁸² Other Southern states were likewise showing discontent. These minor crises, along with the General’s tactics, produced a compelling case for a change in strategy.¹⁸³

Seeking to develop a new strategy, the Stevenson camp became convinced that they were up against what they called, “the Eisenhower father symbol”. This meant that the General’s popularity was based on a willingness of people to view him as a strong man who would relieve them of their worries about war and taxes and inflation - a sort of “let papa worry about it” attitude. This image, the strategists felt, had been built up by a massive advertising campaign. Annoyed and angered by this tactic, they realized that this Eisenhower myth had to be destroyed. Accordingly, they planned “to cut the General down to size” by the implementation of a three-prong programme. First, while Truman’s activity had been previously restricted, it was now thought that he should undertake a hard-hitting personal attack on the General. Secondly, it was thought that Stevenson himself should utilize his sarcastic wit in order to make more direct assaults on the Republican nominee. Thirdly, it was thought that the Governor’s speeches should stress the proven vote-getting theme of “prosperity and peace under the Democrats as opposed to depression and war under the Republicans”.¹⁸⁴

Stevenson himself was skeptical of this new strategy because it fell short of the high plane on which he hoped the campaign could be conducted. However, his disillusionment with Eisenhower and his tactics made him feel that he had no other choice but to shift his own approach.¹⁸⁵ On top of the General’s undue emphasis of the corruption issue and his surrender to Taft at Morningside Heights, Stevenson was most shocked by his discovery that Eisenhower

¹⁸⁰ New York Times, October 6, 1952, p.1

¹⁸¹ United States News and World Report, October 3, 1952, 7

¹⁸² New York Times, October 3, 1952, p.12

¹⁸³ Adlai Stevenson III, personal interview, April 1, 1983

¹⁸⁴ George Ball, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982; New York Times, October 7, 1954, p. 18

¹⁸⁵ Ibid

had failed to defend his close friend, General George Marshall, against vicious and slanderous attacks.¹⁸⁶ This revelation firmly convinced the Governor that he had been too restrained in his own attack on the General in September and he therefore consented to give the three points of the new strategy a try.

President Truman had predicted at his August 21 press conference that he would be the “key” to the Democratic campaign and it now appeared that he would get his chance. Stevenson found Truman eager to enter the campaign because he thought his own place in history was being jeopardized by the Republican assaults on the Administration. Even though the President feared it might be too late, he boarded a special train that would take him around the country in a fashion very similar to his famous 1948 tour.¹⁸⁷

From the very start Truman began giving speeches with a ferocity that appeared to surpass even his 1948 effort. It was clear that he was out to destroy Ike’s prestige, to knock the General off his “pedestal”, and to enter the campaign on the fundamental issue of depression versus prosperity. On October 1, in Spokane, Washington, he declared the General to be a dupe of the utilities lobby.¹⁸⁸ In San Francisco, on October 4, Truman criticized him for “abandoning his principles” in his “wild” attacks on policies.¹⁸⁹ The President would often begin his speeches in a sad tone saying, “I like Ike”. Then he would rapidly pick up speed saying that the General knew little of politics, was a “captive” of the old Guard, had betrayed his principles, and even endorsed Senators who had stabbed his chief, General Marshall, in the back. After these attacks Truman would unfailingly urge that the people vote in their own interest. He asked them to think about the issues that concerned them and said that if then they didn’t vote Democratic, they ought to have their heads examined. This line generally elicited good-natured laughter. As Truman stumped across the country, the newspaper headlines made it appear as if he were running again. The crowds along the railroad tracks were reacting favourably and a repeat of the 1948 occurrence seemed possible.¹⁹⁰

Stevenson was temporarily pushed into the back- ground by Truman’s activity. Nevertheless, he also began to implement the new strategy. While his attacks were not as sharp

¹⁸⁶ Elizabeth Ives, *My Brother Adlai*, (New York, 1956), 275

¹⁸⁷ Harry Truman, *Memoirs: Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope*, (New York, 1956), 499

¹⁸⁸ *New York Times*, October 2, 1952, p.1

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, October 5, 1952, p.1

¹⁹⁰ *New York Times*, October 5, 1952, p. 25

as the President's, they were considerably more intense and personal than his September statements had been. The Governor remarked to a Cincinnati audience of October 3 that "at least you know where Senator Taft stands and what he thinks about most things, which is more than I can say for the General, who seems to be receding into a ghostly fog".¹⁹¹ In Columbus on the same day he made this charges "The new isolationists have stopped at nothing in their drive to control the Republican party. They have the money. They have the organization. And the Republican candidate seeks their support and bows to their demands. May be this is all very agreeable to the General and may be this is a personal tragedy. I don't know but I do know that it could also be national tragedy".¹⁹²

On October 4, in Fort Dodge, Iowa, Stevenson described Senator Taft as "the greatest living authority on what General Eisenhower thinks" and accused Eisenhower of being "a 'me too' candidate running on a 'yes but' platform advised by a 'has been' staff".¹⁹³ Later, in St. Paul, Minnesota, the Governor coupled his personal attack on Eisenhower with an appeal to the fear of war and depression. "With do-nothing, care-nothing, mindless, mumbo jumbo", he said, "they will let America and the world slide into a depression. And such a misery bears the seeds of another war".¹⁹⁴

While Stevenson and Truman were actively engaged in carrying out the new strategy, the Stevenson aids were becoming convinced that their rationale for it was sound. The advisers had learned that the Republican party had plans to execute an intensive three-week television and radio "saturation campaign". George Ball described this undertaking as "a super-colossal, multi-million-dollar production designed to sell an inadequate ticket to the American people in precisely the way they sell soap, ammoniated toothpaste, hair tonic or bubblegum".¹⁹⁵ Ball had received a telegram from James A. Finnegan, Chairman of the Philadelphia Volunteers, indicating that the Republicans would conduct "a radio and TV blitz" in that city. Over 1,300 spot announcements on the eleven radio and TV stations had been purchased.¹⁹⁶ This tactic so worried the Stevenson camp that they too would have used spot saturation if funds had been available. As it was, only a small amount, \$77,000, was spent on spot announcements.¹⁹⁷ Thus

¹⁹¹ New York Times, October 7, 1952, p.18

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Ibid

¹⁹⁴ Marvin Weisbord, *Campaigning for President*, (Washington, 1964), 159

¹⁹⁵ Marvin Weisbord, *Campaigning for President*, (Washington, 1964), 159

¹⁹⁶ New York Times, October 13, 1952, p.1

¹⁹⁷ Weisbord, Campaigning, 159

the major effect of the Republican undertaking was to confirm the aides' belief that their previously determined course of action was absolutely necessary.

In his press conference on October 6, Wilson Wyatt gave every indication that the new strategy would be continued. First, he said that President Truman's campaign in the West and definitely helping because he was reading the record and pointing out the facts.¹⁹⁸ Secondly, Wyatt announced that Senator J. William Fulbright had been asked to join the Governor's staff as a liason man with the professional politicians and the Democratic candidates for the House and Senate.¹⁹⁹ This move was designed to help eliminate the friction that had developed between the amateur volunteer organizations and the regular party machinery.²⁰⁰ Thirdly, foreseeing the possibility of an eighty-million dollar campaign, Wyatt admitted, "I would be very much less than frank with you if I didn't tell you we have no over- confidence in this subject of funds".²⁰¹ The new strategy would heopefully stimulate campaign contributions.

Encouraged by Wyatt's vote of confidence, Truman continued his stumping. He came charging into New York tour.²⁰² He had already passed through 24 states from coast to coast and would arrive back in Washington on October 12. He would rest there for three days before departing for New England and the Midwest. His utterances continued to draw headlines and, with New York and other states indicating all-time records in voter registration, it seemed that the voters were stirred up as never before.²⁰³

Refreshed by a short rest in Springfield, the Governor travelled to Detroit on October 7 to resume his own campaign activities. Speaking to a nationwide audience, Stevenson blamed the Republicans for creating the Communist menace in America by "fumbling and bumbling the nation into the Great Depression" and credited the Democrats with turning them back by saving the country through the New Deal recovery programmes. He then pointed out that a Republican administration might be an encouragement to the Communists in the future. "Even today", he said, "the Republican Party opposes those cost-of-living controls which the Democratic Party

¹⁹⁸ New York Times, October 7, 1952, p.18

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ John B. Martin, personal interview, Oct. 22, 1966

²⁰¹ New York Times, Oct. 7, 1952, p.8

²⁰² Ibid., Oct. 11, 1952, p.1

²⁰³ New York Times, Oct. 12, 1952, sect. 4, p.1

supports in order to prevent another boom and bust another period when the backoning finger of Communism's false light would grow stronger in America".²⁰⁴

On October 8 the Governor stumped across Wisconsin praising the state's political tradition of free inquiry and free debate. In Milwaukee, he said, "My opponent has been worrying about my funnybone. I'm worried about his backbone.... He puts his arm around Senator Jenner who called General Marshall a willing front man for traitors, and here in Milwaukee, we are told, he deleted a defense of General Marshall from his text when Senator McCarthy requested it".²⁰⁵

That the Governor was not entirely happy with his newly adopted strategy, became evident when he talked with a small group of party workers in Madison, Wisconsin. He explained his misgivings as follows:

My job in this campaign has been to try, in a very brief period of time, to offset a national hero.... One way we have sought to do this was the simple and obvious way, it was to go around the country stating precisely what we thought about things.... This has been my objective and if I have departed from it here and there shall we say under force of political necessity or some other course, perhaps exhaustion - I hope you can forgive me.²⁰⁶

Stevenson was sincere in his dislike for the new approach. It forced him to repeat the same attacks on the approach. General almost endlessly, which not only bored him but also forced him to eliminate weighty material from his addresses. Therefore, Stevenson decided to emphasize his attacks in minor talks and to keep his major speeches as constructive documents. In this way, even though clearly on the attack, his speeches would retain the eloquence and integrity of those earlier in the campaign.²⁰⁷

The Governor's subsequent addresses in the South were sure testimonies of this intention. "I would speak to you tonight of America's new frontier", he informed at St. Louis audience on October 9. He then went on to enumerate the following duties of government:

²⁰⁴ Stevens Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 213-219

²⁰⁵ *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1952, p.26

²⁰⁶ Alden Whitman, *Portrait, Adlai E. Stevenson*, [New York, 1966], 100

²⁰⁷ Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

First, government is an umpire, denying special privilege, ensuring equal rights, restraining monopoly and greed and bigotry, making sure that the game is played according to the rules... Second, government has the duty of creating an economic climate in which creative men can take risks and reap rewards.. and, of course, it means the building of solid defenses against... depression. Third, Government has the duty of helping the people develop their country”.²⁰⁸

In New Orleans, on October 10, Stevenson went directly to the tidelands oil question in order to express his honest convictions. “The man who becomes the next President of the U.S”, he said, “must, in my judgment, take up the submerged lands controversy at the point where the Supreme Court left off. He cannot and should not begin to go behind Supreme Court decisions, saying that this one is right and that one is wrong and acting accordingly.... I do not think it it wise policy for the Congress to institute a practice of giving away such national assets to individual states”.²⁰⁹

The Governor spoke with similar frankness the following day in the southern cities of Miami, Tampa, and Nashville. “At Richmond”, he recalled, “I said that I would never be found guilty of talking one way in the South and another way elsewhere. So I must say to you that I stand on the platform of the Democratic Party - which means that on the question of minority rights a great many of you probably disagree with me.”²¹⁰

With these appearances the Democratic nominee concluded his tour to the midwestern and southern states. Wilson Wyatt hailed Stevenson’s return to Springfield by predicting a landslide in an October 13 press conference. Nevertheless, he cautioned, “we are still running a completely scared election and expect to continue to do so right up to election day”.²¹¹ After one day’s rest in the Illinois capital Stevenson embarked on his fourth tour of the campaign - his final trip to the West and the South.

The Governor delivered one of his most moving and eloquent addresses of the campaign on October 14 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Drawing inspiration from the Normon Tabernacle in

²⁰⁸ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 235-244

²⁰⁹ Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 235-244

²¹⁰ New York Times, Oct. 12, 1952, p.1

²¹¹ New York Times, Oct. 14, 1952, p.1

which he spoke, he said he was striving to seek the response of hearts and minds rather than of hands and voices. Adlai Stevenson fulfilled his goal by uttering memorable and enduring words-words that reflected his own profound faith and idealism

In 1915 Woodrow Wilson said: “The interesting and inspiring thought about America is that she asks nothing for herself except what she has a right to ask for humanity itself”.

By that time, we were a world power, about to enter into a world war. But there was no doubt, no fear, in Woodrow Wilson’s mind. He knew, as in truth we have always known, that we were destined to be an example and to assume the burden of greatness.

So we are marked men, we Americans at this mid-century point. We have been tapped by fate for which we should forever give thanks, not laments. What a day we live in!...

And precisely because we are tapped by fate, we must be wise and patient as well as strong....

American power is not just coal and iron and oil, cotton and wheat and corn. It is not meandering and our mountain ranges, and the huge meandering rivers of our central plains, and the high dry cattle country, and this lucky land of yours between the mountains and the sea. It is not even all these things plus a hundred and sixty million people. It is these things, plus the people, plus the idea..

...I suggest that the heart of it is the simple but challenging statement that no government may interfere with our conscience, may tell us what to think. All our freedoms, all our dynamic unleashed energies, stem from this.²¹²

The following evening in San Francisco’s Cow Palace, the Governor shifted gears in order to deliver a rousing political address. The giant throng interrupted time and again to shout

²¹² Stevenson, Speeches, pp. 247-248

“pour it on” as Stevenson lit into the Republican campaign professionals. “I confess that the Republican campaign still fills me with something like awe”, he admitted. “They have all the money, all those newspapers, all those advertising agencies, all those balloons, all those slogan makers and sky writers, all the confetti for all those ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations. It must be the biggest year in the confetti business since Linbergh flew the Atlantic. Never haver so many said so much so loudly - about so little”.²¹³

After several other West Coast stops, the Democratic candidate proceeded to Texas where he hoped to quell the threatening party revolt. Addressing audiences in San Antonio, Houston, Fort Worth, and Dallas, Stevenson reiterated his stand on the offshore oil question, but added that it should be kept in perspective. “Most of us”, he stated, “are smart enough not to throw in a hand that holds four aces just because we don’t like the fifth card”.²¹⁴ He accused Eisenhower and Governor Shivers of confusing the issue for political purposes and said of the Texas Governor that “I have heard it argued that if a person is a Republican, he ought to be willing to call himself one”.²¹⁵

These comments notwithstanding, it was evident everywhere Stevenson went that the party split was real, open, and dangerous. Word came from Virginia, at about the same time, that Senator Harry Byrd had termed the election a “referendum on Trumanism”, something he had always fought.²¹⁶ Thus the Governor returned to Springfield at the end of his 6,000 mile journey with no assurance that all of the Southern states would be his on November 4.

Nevertheless, when Stevenson arrived at the Illinois capital, he found his aides brimming with optimism.²¹⁷ His fourth tour had been punctuated by encouraging reports. “The contrast between Stevenson’s reception in California last month and this week was striking”, James Reston had observed. “The crowds were larger, they were more enthusiastic, and there was a sense of new independent support, judging from the way persons who said they were not identified with either party stood waiting to see him”.²¹⁸

²¹³ New York Times, Oct. 16, 1952, p 1

²¹⁴ New York Times, Oct. 16, 1952, p 1

²¹⁵ Ibid., Oct. 16, 1952, p.1

²¹⁶ Ibid., Oct. 19, 1952, p. E3

²¹⁷ William Flannagan, personal interview, Aug. 30, 1982

²¹⁸ New York Times, Oct. 19, 1952, p.83

“Stevenson has really picked up confidence on this trip”, had wired another correspondent. “He never let’s up. After the day’s campaigning, he writes until two or three in the morning. The next morning, he is full of bounce again. How he does it, I don’t know”.²¹⁹ From all indications this had clearly been the Governor’s most successful tour.

But more than this tour was behind the Stevenson camp’s optimism. First, the polls finally showed Stevenson gaining with the implication that a “switch to Stevenson” movement had at last caught on.²²⁰ Secondly, while the overall fund drive was lagging, there was a significant increase in the number of five- dollar contributions. Since these contributors were voters, it was encouraging to see as many as 20,000 people give in Kentucky, “an unheard-of number of contributors”, according to Wyatt.²²¹ Thirdly, the camp believed that Eisenhower was hurting himself by altering his stand with the geography. People were beginning to realize that he was a Vandenberg Republican in Michigan on one day and an isolationist in nearby Illinois on the next. Finally, the staff had received encouraging reports from Virginia despite Senator Byrd’s coolness.

The camp’s new-found enthusiasm was clearly exhibited in Wilson Wyatt’s press conference on October 20. He predicted victory even though “a good many states are hard fought over territory where the popular vote will be reasonably close”. The campaign manager declined to enumerate all the state he thought the Democrats would carry but he did mention New York, Pennsylvania, and California, as well as stating that no Southern state, including Texas, would be lost to the Republicans.²²²

It was in this optimistic atmosphere that the plans for the Governor’s final campaign trip were being finalized. whistle-stop type of tour and would carry him over 4,221 miles in twelve states in eleven days. Travelling through Illinois, Ohio, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and West Virginia, states with 206 electoral votes, the candidate would make over forty rear-platform speeches and twelve major rally appearances.²²³

²¹⁹ Ibid., sect. 4, p.1

²²⁰ Ibid., Oct. 20, 1952, p.1

²²¹ New York Times, Oct. 20, 1952, p.21

²²² Ibid., p. 1

²²³ New York Times, Oct. 21, 1952, p. 18

A fourteen car special train departed from Springfield at 12:15 in the afternoon of October 21. Immediately the Governor resumed his two-pronged task of attacking the General and of recalling the themes of prosperity and peace. In South Bend, Indiana, on October 22, Stevenson criticized the General's confused foreign policy in the following words:

We haven't the slightest idea whether, if he were President, the Republican candidate would take the position he took as General of the Army, the position he now takes as a candidate for office, or the position of your Senator Jenner, whom the candidate has endorsed. Well, there are three different positions. I think that the old hidden ball game was great when the Four Horsemen used it at Notre Dame, but you can't help feeling a little differently when the ball that these men are hiding is their program for the future of 160 million people".²²⁴

The train continued eastward into Pennsylvania and New York, and Stevenson came back continually to what he termed the two most fateful issues in the campaign. "This has been a long campaign", he observed, "perhaps the issues have seemed to you not too clear. But the facts of the matter are clear and they are very simple. Two, I suppose, are basic to all of us - your prosperity and the world's peace. They can't be separated; either we have both, or we have neither".²²⁵

At ten o'clock on the evening of October 23, Stevenson was forced to abandon his positive attack in order to deliver a full-length nationally televised defence of his role in the Alger Hiss case. This tele- cast, originating in Cleveland, had been made necessary by Nixon's speech of October 13. Nixon had declared that Stevenson had disqualified himself for the Presidency by exercising bad judgment in giving a deposition attesting to Alger Hiss's good reputation.²²⁶ Responding to Nixon's speech, twenty-two lawyers had issued a statement upholding Stevenson's action.²²⁷ However, in order to answer Nixon's televised charges and to head off a similarly scheduled appearance by Senator McCarthy, Stevenson thought it best to discuss the

²²⁴ New York Times, Oct. 23, 1952, p.27

²²⁵ Ibid., Oct. 24, 1952, p. 14

²²⁶ Ibid., Oct. 14, 1952, p. 1

²²⁷ New York Times, Oct. 15, 1952, p.1

matter comprehensively. The Governor described his action in the 1947 Hiss perjury trial as follows:

I am a lawyer. I think that one of the fundamental responsibilities not only of every citizen but particularly of lawyers is to give testimony in a court of law and to give it honestly and willingly. It will be a sorry day for American justice when a man, particularly one in public life, is too timid to state what he knows or what he has heard about a defendant in a criminal trial, for fear that the defendant might be later convicted.²²⁸

I testified only as to his reputation at the time I knew him. His reputation was good. If I had said it was bad, I would have been a liar. If I had refused to testify at all, I would have been a coward...²²⁹

Stevenson then moved to counter Nixon's allegation about his judgment. He said:

"Thou shalt not bear false witness", is one of the Ten Commandments, in case Senator Nixon had not read them lately. And if he would not tell and tell honestly what he knew of a defendant's reputation, he would be a coward and unfit for any office..

He has criticized my Judgment. I hope and pray that his standards of "judgment" never prevail in our courts, or our public life at any level, let alone in exalted positions of respect and responsibility.²³⁰

Having given up the offensive in order to deliver this necessary defense, Adlai Stevenson retired on October 23 planning to rise again the next morning to resume his positive attack. What Stevenson did not know, however, was that the Republican strategists had already laid plans to prevent him from regaining this preferred position.

²²⁸ Stevenson, Speeches, 271-272

²²⁹ Stevenson, Speeches, pp 228-234

²³⁰ Stevenson, Speeches, 272

5. “WHEN THE TUMULT AND THE SHOUTING DIE...”

During the early part of October, the Republican camp had been following closely the Democratic shift in tactics. They say that the Democrats had seized the initiative in the campaign and were registering tremendous gains. Governor John S. Fine of Pennsylvania articulated their fears. “We can never forget, of course, the campaign goes the more they talk about the depression, and that’s still a nightmare to a lot of people”.²³¹ Determined to regain the initiative in the struggle, the Republican strategists decided to focus on two important issues- Communism and Korea.

The October Roper polls had indicated that four out of five people believed that only the Republicans could successfully drive the Communists out of Washington.²³² Accordingly, both Nixon and McCarthy were ordered to centre on this issue in major television address. Their personal attacks on Stevenson’s Hiss deposition accomplished the purpose of forcing the Governor to assume defensive position in his Cleveland address.

The Korean war, according to the Roper polls, was also on the public’s mind. Whereas in January of 1952 only one-fourth of those asked named it as a serious problem, by September the number had risen to one-third: and by October over one-half were voluntarily raising the issue.²³³ This growth of public interest had been carefully nurtured by the Republican campaign. Now appeared to be the time to capitalize on it.

Accordingly, on October 24, the day after Stevenson’s Hiss defense, Eisenhower discussed Korea in Detroit before a national television audience. After stating that the conflict was never inevitable, the General then promised to bring the war to an early and honorable end. “That job”, he said, “requires a personal trip to Korea. Only in that way could I learn to best serve the American people in the cause of peace. I shall go to Korea”.²³⁴

The response to this five-word pledge was immediate and far-reaching. “We knew it was right long before Eisenhower delivered it”, said Sherman Adams, his campaign manager. “When mimeographed copies of it were distributed to reporters on the train, they said to us excitedly, as

²³¹ New York Times, Oct. 28, 1952, p.25

²³² Stanley Keyloy, Professional Public Relations and Political Power, (Baltimore, 1956), 200

²³³ Kelley. Professional Public Relations, 200

²³⁴ New York Times, Oct. 25, 1952, p.1

soon as they saw the “I shall go to Korea’ line, ‘That does it- Ike is in!’”²³⁵ Jake Arvey, listening to the General’s speech by radio, turned to Mrs. Arvey and said instinctively, “That’s the speech that will beat us”.²³⁶

When Stevenson was told of the pledge by his sister, Mrs. Ernest Ives, he responded, “Well, I’ve known for quite some time where I’d go and why” ²³⁷ The Governor had, in fact, decided in early August to go to Korea if elected, but had refused to publicize this intent during the campaign for fear of wrongly capitalizing on the tragic war and of compromising future negotiations.²³⁸ At any rate, the statement would not have had nearly the same effect coming from Stevenson, the civilian, as from Eisenhower, the General of the Army. “The statement was for him (Eisenhower)” said its creator Emmet Hughes, “natural and appropriate, almost to the point of being banal”.²³⁹

Stevenson and his aides were quick to recognize the importance of the General’s pledge and reacted immediately to it. On October 25 they inserted a special answer into the previously prepared Boston address. ²⁴⁰ A nationwide television audience then heard the Governor make this statement:

The General has announced his intention to go to Korea. But the root of the Korean problem does not lie in Korea—it lies in Moscow. If the purpose of the General’s trip is to settle the Korean war by a larger military challenge, then the sooner we all know about it, the better. The Korean war must end and will end, as we all know, only when Moscow is convinced that the people of this country... are united in an unshakable determination to stand firm—which is the only background against which honourable and final settlements can ever be reached.²⁴¹

²³⁵ Marvin Welsbord, *Campaigning for President*, (Washington, 1964), 164

²³⁶ Jake Arvey, “A Gold Nugget in Your Own Backyard”, 3 in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, (New York, 1966).64

²³⁷ Elizabeth Ives, *My Brother Adlai*, (New York, 1956), 268

²³⁸ Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept.1, 1982; Adlai Stevenson, *Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai Stevenson, 1952*, (New York, 1953), xxvii

²³⁹ Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power*, (New York, 1962), 31

²⁴⁰ *New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1952, p.1

²⁴¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1952, p.1

Other prominent Democrats reacted similarly. “Taking a trip doesn’t seem like much to me”, said Stephen Mitchell. “What is his plan?... I think it is a grandstand play to get votes”.²⁴² President Truman, busily preparing for his final campaign tour to the midwest, commented, “Anyone who goes and talks like Supreman is a fraud”.²⁴³

The Stevenson camp could really do nothing more than issue these statements at this time. The Governor, therefore, resumed his own whistle-stop activities on route to New York. He tried to deliver positive and original talks at each stop but, as in the past, this proved difficult. Since some of the appearances were only twenty minutes apart, the Governor would rush to his compartment after and statement in order to begin preparing the next. In the process, his contact with local candidates and politicians was extremely limited. Wyatt objected to this and recommended that Stevenson say the same thing at each stop. The Governor refused claiming that the local people preferred to hear something fresh. Fortunately, Bill Blair worked out a system whereby the locals were greeted and photographed with the candidate just as they were leaving the train. This pattern was repeated throughout the day as the train pushed on toward New York City.²⁴⁴

In the evening, Stevenson arrived in Harlem where a tremendous and unmanageable crowd of 125,000 people, roughly five times as many as had met Eisenhower a week before, welcomed him with wild cheers.²⁴⁵ In front of the Theresa Hotel, Representative Adam Clayton Powell introduced the candidate. Stevenson spoke on the same themes he had been hammering on throughout the day. He criticized Eisenhower’s “bewildering variety of positions” on major campaign issues and indicated the whole Republican party for its bent for isolationism. Only briefly did he mention civil rights promising to work for a world “where men can live as brothers under the laws of God”.²⁴⁶

A huge crowd turned out to see Stevenson the following evening. October 28, at Madison Square Garden. Twenty-five thousand people were in the arena and another one-hundred thousand supporters listened to the address over loud-speakers which had been placed on the

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Ibid., Oct. 30, 1952, p.1

²⁴⁴ Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982; Mrs. Edison Dick, personal interview, Aug. 31, 1982

²⁴⁵ William Flannagan, personal interview, Aug.30, 1982

²⁴⁶ New York Times, Oct. 28, 1952, p.1

adjoining side streets.²⁴⁷ The Governor told these people about a new force that was alive in America. “people”, he said, “are looking for something more in the conduct of their public affairs, a more exalted meaning of democracy”. The thousands interrupted the speech repeatedly with shouts of approval.²⁴⁸

While Stevenson continued to discuss these various issues of the campaign, the public was still concerned with the Korean stalemate. Consequently, in Philadelphia’s Constitution Hall on October 29, the Governor launched a direct assault on Ike’s Korea pledge. Having discovered that Emmet John Hughes of Life magazine had created the phrase, he appropriately remarked that it had originated with “a speechwriter from a slick magazine in one last desperate bid” for support in the upcoming election.²⁴⁹

The campaign train rolled through Pennsylvania the following day and Stevenson spoke at Pittsburgh in the evening. After his speech the Governor telephoned Wyatt in New York City. He said that he was interrupting his campaign tour in order to fly back to Chester, Illinois, to help put down a riot at the Kenard State Prison. Wyatt pointed out the importance of the next day’s activities and warned that a failure to assuage a settlement might adversely affect the campaign. Nevertheless, Stevenson instructed Wyatt to have Senator Fulbright fill his speaking engagements. “This”, he concluded, “is a situation in which there might be a loss of life and this is a responsibility I cannot delegate”.²⁵⁰

The Governor arrived at the prison at five o’clock in the morning. Immediately a previously approved entry plan was put into effect and the mutineers yielded. Stevenson followed the state troopers into the prison and rested for two hours before flying back to New York to resume his schedule. He had made no statements before or after the entry into the prison, refusing to capitalize on his gubernatorial responsibilities.²⁵¹

The Brooklyn Academy of Music is the traditional scene of closing Democratic rallies in New York. Stevenson brought his final eastern tour to a close by speaking there before 2,500

²⁴⁷ Ibid., Oct. 29, 1952, p. 24

²⁴⁸ Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 286-291

²⁴⁹ New York Times, Oct. 30, 1952, p.1

²⁵⁰ Wilson Wyatt, “What I think is still What I Thought”, in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai* (New York 1966). 109

²⁵¹ Ibid: Mrs. Edison Dick, August 31, 1966

cheering partisans on the evening of October 31, He denounced Eisenhower for raising false hopes with his statements about Korea. These were his words:

This new proposal is simplicity itself. Elect me President', the General says, 'and you can forget about Korea: I will go there personally'. I don't think for a moment that the American people are taken in by a promise without a program. It is not enough to say, 'I will fix it for you'. The principle of blind leadership is alien to our tradition"²⁵²

The Governor returned to Illinois the next day and was welcomed in a giant rally in the Chicago Stadium. "There has been learn Stevenson, "an electric feeling of victory in the air all the way home". He then went on to explain that his two-month journey had renewed his faith in his country and its future. "But", he cautioned, "we have much to do in this century in this country of ours before its greatness may be fully realized and shared by all Americans". He called for high visions that would "encompass every single hope and dream of both the greatest and the humblest among us". Finally, he concluded, "...to those who say that the design defies our abilities to complete it, I answer: To act with enthusiasm and faith is the condition of acting greatly".²⁵³

After the speech Stevenson returned to Springfield and Slept in the Mansion. On Sunday he rested in the capital and in Bloomington, his boyhood home. Then, on Monday, November 3, he flew back to Chicago for his final television address of the campaign and was met at the airport by Senator Sparkman. As they rode toward the studio, Stevenson began to talk of prospective cabinet members.²⁵⁴ Previously he had refrained from talking about such plans, only once mentioning to George Ball that he regarded John J. McCloy, a distinguished Republican, as the best man for Secretary of state.²⁵⁵ Naturally, Sparkman was somewhat surprised by his talk now and so asked if he were confident of the election. Stevenson's reply, "I'm as confident as I can be", left Sparkman puzzled as to his actual feeling.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 301-302

²⁵³ Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 301-302

²⁵⁴ John Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense to the American People in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai* (New York, 1966), 125

²⁵⁵ George Ball, "With Adlai Stevenson in war and Politics", in Edward Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai* (New York, 1966), 147

²⁵⁶ Sparkman, "Let's Talk Sense", 125

At the studio the Governor reviewed the campaign in the light of his July promises. He uttered the following words:

Looking back, I am not wholly content that I have said or said well everything that was in my heart.... But I have not evaded and I have tried and tried diligently, day and night, to talk sensibly, honestly, candidly about our many problems... Win or lose. I have told you the truth as I see it. I have said what I meant and meant what I said. I have done my best frankly and forthrightly; no man can do more, and you are entitled to no less".²⁵⁷

Stevenson voted the next morning at Half-Day near his Libertyville, Illinois, home and then returned to the capital. The afternoon was consumed with speculation about the outcome. A few members of the personal staff wrote their predications on pieces of paper which were sealed in an envelope and locked in the safe. While it was later revealed that no man bet that Stevenson would lose, Blair and one other man indicated the narrowest possible margins of electoral victory. Stevenson himself predicted a landslide victory of 381 electoral votes.²⁵⁸

Wyatt and Ball, meanwhile, were frankly discussing Stevenson's chances while strolling along the back streets of Springfield. "It hasn't worked", confessed Wyatt. "We haven't had time. We haven't been able to turn it around".²⁵⁹ Both men were in accord, though, that Stevenson still believed he would win. Wyatt remembered the Governor's words when he had recently asked him to undertake a distasteful political task. "Don't you characters believe, "Stevenson had responded, "that we are going to win with such a big vote that kind of noxious business isn't necessary?"²⁶⁰

Stevenson's question was answered later that evening. After dinner the Governor went to his basement office to listen to the election returns on a small portable radio. Around nine o'clock, when returns from key states indicated a landslide victory for his opponent, he and William Blair decided to concede. Nevertheless, they decided to delay the announcement for several hours to

²⁵⁷ Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 313-316

²⁵⁸ Kenneth Davis, *A Prophet in His Own Country*, (New York, 1957), 427

²⁵⁹ George Ball, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

²⁶⁰ Ball, "With Adlai Stevenson", 151

avoid adversely affecting local candidates who would lose their Democratic poll watchers as soon as the big race was decided.²⁶¹

At 12:35 the Governor left the Mansion and drove with Wyatt to the Leland Hotel where the election-night party was being held.²⁶² The ballroom, with giant television lights, was filled with loyal supporters.²⁶³ As Stevenson entered, the organist played the University of Illinois fight song and the throng began to chant, “We want Stevenson”. The Governor made his way slowly to the platform and began to speak in sombre but courageous tones. “The people have rendered their verdict”, he said, “and I gladly accept it... I urge you all to give General Eisenhower the support he will need to carry out the great tasks that lie before him. I pledge him mine. We vote as many, but we pray as one”.

The Governor then read his telegram of congratulations to Eisenhower. Finally, Stevenson revealed his own feelings by concluding with this story.

Someone asked me, as I came in, down on the street, how I felt, and I was reminded of a story that a fellow-townsmen of ours used to tell—Abraham Lincoln. They asked him how he felt once after an unsuccessful election. He said he felt like a little boy who had stubbed his toe in the dark. He said that he was too old to cry, but it hurt too much to laugh.²⁶⁴

Both men and women, in the hotel and at home, wept as he spoke.

Stevenson returned to the Mansion where a small group of friends gathered. Not wishing to waste the victory champagne, Wyatt, Stevenson offered a toast to “Wilson the best campaign manager, any unsuccessful politician ever had”.²⁶⁵

“Only one person present that evening would have dared call Adlai Stevenson ‘unsuccessful’—”, George Ball later wrote, “and we loved him for it”.²⁶⁶ When these friends

²⁶¹ Davis, *Prophet*, 427

²⁶² Wilson Wyatt, “What I Think”, 111

²⁶³ New York *Times*, Nov. 5, 1952, p.16

²⁶⁴ Stevenson, *Speeches*, pp. 319-320

²⁶⁵ Ball, “With Adlai Stevenson”, 152

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*

had finally departed, the Governor's sister, Buffie, asked him how he felt. "I've no regrets", he replied, "I didn't ask for any of this, and I've done the best I could".²⁶⁷

Adlai Stevenson had lost to Dwight Eisenhower by over six million votes in an election that saw more than sixty million people go to the polls for the first time in American history. This was an increase of nearly thirteen million votes over 1948. Stevenson had received 27,314,992 popular votes to Eisenhower's 33,936,252. In the electoral college, Eisenhower had taken 39 states with a total of 442 votes, while Stevenson had carried nine states Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia with a total of 89 votes.²⁶⁸ (Appendix B).

Since the outcome of any Presidential election depends on the personalities involved, the issues discussed, and the conduct of the campaign, it is to these three factors that one must look to understand Adlai Stevenson's defeat in 1952.

That the personal popularity of Dwight D. Eisenhower was a crucial factor in the 1952 race is a fact beyond debate. The General realized a personal victory that greatly exceeded his party's success. His weak 'coattails brought only a narrow margin of 221 Republicans to 213 Democrats in the House and of 48 Republicans to 47 Democrats in the Senate.²⁶⁹ This result prompted the Cabinet to develop an official explanation of the outcome. "It can't be a repudiation of the Democratic party, said Attorney General James P. McGranery, emerging from a November 11 Cabinet meeting. "All you have to do is look at your Congress. It was a popularity contest, so far as the Presidency is concerned".²⁷⁰

Despite this official party line, the 1952 election outcome also rested on certain important issues. The Korean war, in particular, aroused great opposition against the Democrats. Carefully cultivated by the Republican campaign, this issue had emerged as the single most important question by election time.²⁷¹ In fact, the issue was so important that it precipitated a disintegration of the New Deal coalition. While the coalition had been growing weaker as the

²⁶⁷ Ives, *My Brother Adlai*, 302

²⁶⁸ Alden Whitman, *Portrait, Adlai E. Stevenson*, (New York, 1966), 104

²⁶⁹ Eugene Rosebloom, *A history of Presidential Elections* (New York, 1959), 522

²⁷⁰ New York *Times*, Nov. 8, 1952, p.6

²⁷¹ New York *Times*, October 26, 1952, section 4, E1, *U. S. News World Report*, Oct. 24, 1952, 13., , *U. S. News World Report*, Oct. 31, 1952, 5., Kelley, *Professional Public Relations*, 200

Depression memory reded into history, it nevertheless had produced victories as long as the elections had rested on domestic affairs. Now, for the first time in 1952, a foreign policy issue had emerged to rival domestic concerns for the voter's interest. Thus, the people were forced to make a choice between voting for prosperity under the Democrats or for peace under the Republicans. "Millions of voters", wrote Lubell, "fought within within themselves the battle between two clashing sets of emotions their dread of another depression and their frustration over the seemingly endless stalemate in Korea. To many persons the election became a choice of voting for war or hard time".²⁷²

The voters resolved this inner conflict in different ways. Some felt that the Democratic prosperity was derived from the war in Korea and thus, feeling guilty, voted to end the war. "We must stop trading blood for money", declared James Stringham, an Iowa farmer who supported Truman in 1948. "Anyone can see the Korean war is all that is holding up prices. I'd rather see prices come down than keep them up through war".²⁷³

Other voters saw the war directly affecting their own lives. From the outbreak of hostilities to Election Day more than one million youths were drafted and nearly one million more reservists and National Guardsmen were called into active duty. Thus women voted in large numbers to keep their husbands and their sons from the Korean hills. Since the draft calls were highest in low income areas, Eisenhower registered his most spectacular gains in these locations.²⁷⁴

Whatever the motivation, the desire to end the war and cut across the economic lines of the New Deal coalition. A sizable percentage of the voters had decided to let the foreign policy question take precedence over their pocket-book interests. Thus with the election no longer turning exclusively on domestic issues, the very basis of the New Deal coalition was undermined. While it did not disintegrate entirely, a sufficient part of each of its elements bolted in order to provide an Eisenhower victory.²⁷⁵

²⁷² Samuel Lubell, "Who Elected Eisenhower?", *The Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 10, 1953, 27

²⁷³ Ibid

²⁷⁴ Samuel Lubell, "Who Elected Eisenhower?", *The Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 10, 1953, 27

²⁷⁵ Kelley, *Professional Public Relations*, 199

Since foreign policy played such a prominent role in the 1952 outcome, domestic concerns were relegated to a somewhat different position than they had held previously. The Eisenhower camp was careful to adopt all of the important innovations of the New Deal and so the election became a referendum on the present rather than on the past. Consequently, as Lubell pointed out. “It was not a vote for a twenty-year rollback of history, but a concern of voters as to how to preserve the gains of those years”.²⁷⁶ For example, Lubell continued, “their alarm over inflation largely reflected the fear that these gains were being imperiled by a Government which had pushed spending too far to where all savings were losing value”.²⁷⁷ In short, people were not voting against the basic New Deal structures but only against certain undesirable additions. The Eisenhower administration would subsequently bear out this fact by accepting the fundamental progressive programme and thus placing the final stamp of approval on them.²⁷⁸

The domestic issues were important in the 1952 race from a negative rather than a positive standpoint; people were more united in what they were against than in what they were for. Various issues such as communism, corruption, tideland’s oil, civil rights or inflation, created a general dissatisfaction that produced the wide- spread feeling that it was “time for a change”. While the specific concern differed from person to person and section to section it was united under this co non phrase. Wilson Wyatt described this slogan as “an irresistible force which no single issue and no single person could have changed”.²⁷⁹

The 1952 election depended on both personalities and issues, not simply one or the other. It was Eisenhower’s popularity together with the over-riding issue that it’s “time for a change” that produced the victory combination; it was clearly the case of the right man at the right time. The General’s strong character, self-confidence, and indomitable faith seemed to be the perfect answer to a time of crisis, doubt, and confusion. Stevenson, on the other hand, was a humble, doubting, and self-deprecating man who failed to offer the assurance that the times called for. To a people exhausted by conflict and constant demands, Stevenson’s promise of endless sacrifice was not a welcomed prospect. An October poll, in fact, found that “the ability to inspire confidence” was the quality least often ascribed to Stevenson.²⁸⁰ Eisenhower’s personality, in

²⁷⁶ Lubell, “Who Elected Eisenhower?”, 78.

²⁷⁷ Ibid

²⁷⁸ Arthur S. Link, Lecture at Princeton University

²⁷⁹ Wilson Wyatt, interview in U.S. News and World Report, November 14, 1952, 69

²⁸⁰ Elmo Roper, You and Your Leaders (New York, 1957), 221

short, seemed to better offer the escape from responsibility that so many people seemed to long for.²⁸¹

That Eisenhower was indeed the right man for the times was quickly realized by the voters who made their decisions early in the 1952 race. A survey by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller demonstrated that roughly one-third of the electorate had made up their minds before the conventions and another third did so at the time of the conventions, thus meaning that two-thirds had already decided before the campaigns even started.²⁸² The Miami Panel study confirmed this finding by discovering that 75 per cent of those on the Panel who voted for Eisenhower had made their decisions by the end of the convention.²⁸³

In summary, it was against a popular hero, a nation ready for change, and a public convinced that the hero was the best man to provide it, that the Stevenson campaign machine had to battle in 1952. Despite these seemingly insurmountable handicaps, (it) it is nevertheless advantageous to consider the effectiveness of the Stevenson campaign techniques.

In retrospect, it appears that the strategy outlined to overcome the Governor's obscurity was successful. His travels which totalled over 32,500 miles, 27,000 by air and 5,500 by rail, had indeed taken him into every area of the country and his two hundred speeches had acquainted the public with his positions.²⁸⁴ Moreover, television had been used to the Governor's advantage. Twenty-one of his speeches had been televised and the Nielson ratings recorded an average of 3,620,000 television sets tuned in to each appearance.²⁸⁵ "Stevenson gained more than did Eisenhower from this medium", concluded the Miami survey. "Part of this result stems from the lower level of recognition at which Stevenson began the campaign, and part stems from the less friendly press, a matter of common awareness during the campaign".²⁸⁶

Stevenson's use of amateurs in place of professional politicians in the 1952 campaign was of mixed consequence. The breakdown of large Democratic organizations in some big cities

²⁸¹ Richard Nelson, personal interview, Aug.29, 1982. Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

²⁸² Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 1954), 14

²⁸³ Charles Thomason, Television and Presidential Politics, The Experience in 1952 and the Problems Ahead, (Washington D.C., 1956), 63

²⁸⁴ New York Times, Nov. 6, 1952, p.17

²⁸⁵ Kelley, Professional Public Relations, 196

²⁸⁶ Thomson, Television and Presidential Politics, 65

did cause the loss of votes but this appeared to be the result of worn out and sluggish machines rather than any deliberate cutting on the part of the bosses.²⁸⁷ In Philadelphia, for example, where there was a new and younger organization, the Governor was given the tremendous margin of 160,000 votes.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, the growth of amateur volunteer groups under the stimulus of the Stevenson candidacy not only produced significant gains in other areas but also seemed to provide a sounder base for future Democratic campaigns. James Q. Wilson described Stevenson's influence as follows:

The significance of the Presidential election... can scarcely be exaggerated... It was the lure of the national campaign on behalf of a national figure that first brought most of the reformers into politics as part of the Volunteers for Stevenson. In New York, one west side reform leader said, "We would never have grown up without Adlai Stevenson. He, so far as I am concerned, is the spiritual and intellectual father of the reform movement..." In California, six months after Stevenson made his acceptance address in Chicago, Professor Carney writes, "the number of clubs had risen from 75 to 175".

The enthusiasm for Stevenson transcended his defeat. Having discovered politics and an intellectually gratifying leader, the new club members were anxious to continue after 1952 in hopes of electing him in 1956.²⁸⁹

Since 1952 was the first year in which the suburbs of New York, Chicago, and Cleveland actually rolled up greater margins for the Republicans than the inner cities did for the Democrats,²⁹⁰ it was evident that new techniques would be needed to attract these more independent minded voters. Stevenson's amateur organizations in 1952 were a step in this direction.

The net effect of President Truman's participation in the 1952 campaign is an irresolvable question. Truman, himself, still maintains that the party, lost from three to four million votes by not aligning itself more closely with the incumbent administration from the start.²⁹¹ Other

²⁸⁷ New York Times, Nov. 6, 1952, p.17

²⁸⁸ Ibid

²⁸⁹ James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago, 1962), 52, 110

²⁹⁰ Lubell, "Who Elected Eisenhower?", 75

²⁹¹ Harry S. Truman, "How Stevenson Let Me Down", Look 24 (1960), 120

observers, however, feel just as strongly that his subsequent participation aroused great resentment among the mass of the voters.²⁹² In the South, for example, Truman's entry clearly stirred up antagonisms and one Texan said, "My doubts about voting for Eisenhower were settled when Truman started campaigning".²⁹³ Regardless of the President's influence on the election, he certainly did not alter the outcome. Stevenson, for his part, continued to wonder what the result would have been had he conducted the entire campaign independently. However, he realized that it was a moot point since he really had no other choice than to let the President pursue his own way.²⁹⁴

While these various factors of the Stevenson campaign are still subject to dispute, its overall effect-iveness seems to be unquestionable. Running against serious handicaps, Stevenson nevertheless managed to draw more votes than any other loser had ever received and even more votes than Truman's winning number in 1948. Elmo Roper wrote to Wilson Wyatt after the election informing him that a vote distribution of 65 per cent to 35 per cent at convention time had become 56 per cent to 44 percent by election day. This, Roper explained, was an amazing achievement since in normal election years the post-convention tally is usually very near the final outcome. Accordingly, Roper congratulated Wyatt and his staff for accomplishing the unbelievable feat of gaining ten million votes by their campaign. This feat would certainly seem to validate the effectiveness of the overall Stevenson approach.²⁹⁵

With the 1952 election over, and the Democrats out of power for the first time in twenty years, the question of future party leadership naturally came to the forefront, President Truman offered the reins of leadership to the defeated Adlai Stevenson in a telegram on November 8. "I hope" he said, "that you may see your way clear as the head of our party to initiate steps as soon as possible to revitalize that national committee and set the wheels in motion toward a victory in 1954".²⁹⁶

Ten long months before, Stevenson had received a similar offer of party leadership from President Truman in Blair House. In January the Governor had refused this position which called for defending the past; in November the Governor now accepted this position which called for

²⁹² Lubell, "Who Elected Eisenhower?", 78.

²⁹³ Ibid

²⁹⁴ New York Times, Nov. 5, 1952, p.17

²⁹⁵ Wilson Wyatt, personal interview, Sept. 1, 1982

²⁹⁶ New York Times, Nov. 9, 1952, 1

shaping the future. In reality, though, neither decision was Stevenson's to make. On a hot July night, he had been summoned by his people and his party to fill both positions—to assume the burdens of the past and to accept the opportunities of the future.

In accepting the first of these challenges he had promised to fight to win the Presidency with all his heart and soul. This he had done. In accepting the second of these challenges, he now promised to express his views from time to time on public questions of interest and of value to the nation.²⁹⁷ This he would do.

Adlai Stevenson's destiny was to help guide America in her "torment of transition from an age that had died to an age struggling to be born".²⁹⁸

Adlai Stevenson's duty was to do no less.

Adlai Stevenson's dream was that he could do more. It was not, however, for the immediate position of power but for the more enduring role of prophet that Adlai E. Stevenson had been tapped by fate.

²⁹⁷ New York Times, Nov. 9, 1952, p. 65

²⁹⁸ Stevenson, Speeches, 5

CHAPTER IV

STEVENSON AS U.S. AMBASSADOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Secretary or Ambassador: Adlai E. Stevenson in 1960:
2. The First Ordeal: The Bay of Pigs...
3. John, Dick and Adlai: The Illinois Senate Race
4. "The Bitter Aftertaste" The Cuban Missile Crisis
5. "They sent you our best"

1. SECRETARY OR AMBASSADOR: ADLAI E. STEVENSON IN 1960

In the early afternoon of December 8, 1960, Adlai Ewing Stevenson walked from the home of a friend to a red-brick house at 3307 N Street in Georgetown, the residence of President-elect John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

He was positively jaunty as he arrived. A group of reporters were huddled in the cold outside of the house. A little crowd of spectators was standing behind a police rope across the street.

Some of them were Georgetown University students holding up signs urging “Stevenson for Secretary of State”.

“What’s this?” Stevenson asked, stopping to look at the signs. Then he called over, with a grin, “Do you have time for a few words?”

Kennedy came out on the stoop to greet his guest and pose for pictures. “Am I on time?” Stevenson inquired. It was exactly 2:30, the appointment hour for the conference. “I tried to be abnormally punctual”, he said.

Then he teased his host with, “They tell me you are not always punctual”, Kennedy allowed as how “there was a time”.¹

An hour later, the nation’s two most prominent Democrats emerged from the house and Kennedy announced that he had asked the two-time Presidential nominee to serve, not as Secretary of State, but as United States Ambassador to the United Nations. (See Appendix C).

Instead of accepting immediately, as had become customary in these front-stoop Cabinet appointee announcements, Adlai Stevenson told the press:

“I appreciate Senator Kennedy’s confidence. and I share his views about the difficulty and the importance of this assignment. The United Nations is the very

¹ Chicago Daily News, December 9, 1960, p.1. in Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, Princeton University Library, Box 789

center of our foreign policy, and its effectiveness is indispensable to the peace and security of the world.

“While I have not sought this assignment, I want to be helpful. I have some matters both of organization of the work and of ways and means of strengthening it that I want to discuss with Kennedy further. This I hope to do in the very near future”.²

The President-elect hastened to add that he hoped these discussions would take place “before the middle of next week”.³ Observers noted, however, that “there was obvious displeasure spread across Kennedy’s face”⁴ as Stevenson’s hesitation to accept the post became public knowledge.

The events of that afternoon signalled unmistakably changing-of-the-guard had occurred in the Democratic Party: Kennedy was in, and Stevenson was out -- farther removed from the centre of policy-making than he and his supporters ever thought possible under a Democratic administration. To be sure, appearances belied this truth. To meet people, it seemed as though Stevenson, the elder statesman was being honoured by his successor with an important and prestigious post befitting his talents and abilities. They were excited by the prospect of having the nation’s two great liberals working side by side to strengthen the international power and prestige of America.

In fact, however, the December 8 announcement marked the end of a struggle of personality and ideology that Kennedy and Stevenson had waged for control of the Democratic Party. It was a struggle that Stevenson -- perhaps inevitably — had lost. Kennedy had already taken the Presidency from him; now he was denying Stevenson his second dream, that of being Secretary of State. It was not the fact that Stevenson could be U.N. Ambassador that was the important part of the announcement: it was the fact that he could not be Secretary of State.

² Richard J. Walton, The Remnants of Power: The Tragic Past Years of Adlai Stevenson (New York: Coward McCann, Inc. 1968), p.20

³ New York Times, December 9, 1960, p.24, in Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁴ Stan Opatowsky, The Kennedy Government (New York: E.P. Dutton Co., Inc. 1961), p.70

The question, then, is why. Why could not these two men, who had so much in common, unite in the kind of productive coalition the country's liberals dreamed of? why were differences in personality and style allowed to prevent them from working closely together? Why did Kennedy pass over the eminently qualified Stevenson for Secretary of State and relegate him to the U.N. Ambassadorship? And why did Adlai Stevenson, who knew from the start that this job and this type of relationship with the President would bring him only humiliation and frustration, take up responsibilities that made his last years of life miserable and hastened his death?

The first signs of the clash came in 1956. John Kennedy was already beginning his move for power by seeking the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination under Stevenson. Kennedy's aides, led by Theodore C. Sorensen, had prepared an elaborate report to show how a Catholic Vice Presidential candidate would lend support to the Stevenson ticket in highly populated states. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy was using his considerable influence with the party bosses to get them to support his son.

Stevenson recognized the importance of providing the party's future leaders with some national exposure and accordingly, gave John Kennedy the much sought-after assignment of placing Stevenson's name in nomination for the Presidency. However, when his attention turned to choosing a running mate, Stevenson had other considerations. He was appalled at the dull and closed- convention atmosphere in which the Republicans had renominated Eisenhower and Nixon. He decided to contrast this by leaving the choice of his running mate to an open convention.

Ted Sorensen insists that the stories "that Kennedy was furious with Stevenson for throwing the convention open. that the Senator was stunned, tear-ful or deeply hurt when he failed to secure the nomination" were absolutely false.⁵ the idea of coming in second. But no Kennedy runs with "This thing is really worth winning now," Kennedys said when he received unexpected support from several Southern states. "He muttered something unprintable when Ohio's Mike Disalle and Pennsylvania's David Lawrence. delivered more than 100 of their 132 combined votes to Kefauver"⁶

⁵ Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 98

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99

Obviously, the young Senator wanted the nomination. Another Kennedy ally, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., provides further support for the stories of Kennedy's ill feeling toward Stevenson. Schlesinger says that both Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey had expected to be chosen by Stevenson as his running mate, "though neither had solid ground for such hopes". Both were somewhat resentful of the open-convention device and Kennedy, in particular, "began to look on Stevenson as indecisive and elusive."⁷

Apparently. Kennedy's reaction to losing the Vice Presidential nomination and his feelings toward Stevenson regarding this event were of some importance to him as late as 1960. For, in a letter to Stevenson dated January 5 1960, Kennedy made a great effort to correct a misconception that he "was extremely unhappy about the voting on the Vice Presidential nomination in Chicago".⁸ Kennedy was concerned that this rumour, which he attributed to Amherst Professor Earl Latham, might have reached Stevenson, and wanted to set the record straight:

I have not talked personally to Professor Latham for six months and I have never had a conversation with him about the Chicago convention. My feeling in wholly the reverse of what he described. In my opinion you and your people had a completely hands-off attitude toward the balloting. The fact that I secured the almost unanimous support of Illinois, your home state, is the best evidence of that as well as the fact that I came within a margin of securing the support of California which was pleased to you. The race for Vice President was a great opportunity for me and has been most beneficial to me since that time, so I have the strongest feelings one appreciation for the chance. In addition, ofcourse, I was honored to have the opportunity to nominate you.

I would not write you this except I would not want anything to mar our extremely cordial relationship...⁹

While it is somewhat difficult to refute such a definite statement of good feelings on Senator Kennedy's part, it is also necessary to consider that the (as the time of the letter) three-

⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), p.17

⁸ John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Ja. 3, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁹ John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Ja.5, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box. 789

day-old Presidential candidacy of John Kennedy certainly would not suffer from the support of the titular head of the Democratic Party. (The letter also happens to include a request for a Kennedy- Stevenson get-together).

Politicians have a remarkable ability to forget old differences during an election campaign, however, and to get the support of Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy would have forgiven much more than the supposed 1956 slight. The Senator from Massachusetts had recognized early on in the game that “his problem would not be with the professional politicians, but with the liberal- Intellectual wing of the party, influential far beyond its numbers because of its relations with, and impart upon the media. “But this sector of the party was skeptical of Kennedy’s credentials as a liberal and an intellectual - largely due to his failure to record his vote on the censure of Joe McCarthy. And the liberal-intellectuals were “staunchy loyal” to Adlai Stevenson.¹⁰ Stevenson, and the forces he led, was the big prize in the 1960 Democratic campaign, and Kennedy went all out to win him. “Stevenson, said a close friend.... ‘could have had anything if he had supported Jack then. He could have been Secretary of State. He could have even been Vice-President.¹¹

But Adlai Stevenson did not jump on the Kennedy bandwagon which was even then rolling well. He himself was under great pressure from his supporters, led by Senator Mike Monroney, Eleanor Roosevelt, John Sharon, George Ball, and Dore Schary, to announce his own candidacy. Deep down, it is pretty universally agreed, Stevenson did want the nomination in 1960. Yet, he had said in 1956 that he would not again be a candidate. He did not feel that he had the “right to become President through any egoistic assertion that violated his pledged word.¹² Moreover, Stevenson’s desire to be President was counter balanced by his aversion to the all-too-common sordidness and dishonour of politics. Theodore H. White described his feelings best.

Adlai Stevenson was.... torn in attitude to the two great systems of power that mesh in the unity of the American Presidency. Stevenson’s attitude to public affairs approaches a nobility rarely encountered in the political system of any country; but

¹⁰ David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Green- which, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1972), pp.16-19

¹¹ Alden Whitman and the New York Times, Portrait Adlai E. Stevenson: Politician, Din lomat, Friend (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p.201

¹² Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 426

his attitude to politics -- the grubby, rooty politics of noise and deals and cruelties and chicaneries — is one of contempt. Yet public affairs and politics are linked as are love and sex. Stevenson's attitude to politics has always seemed that of a man who believes love is the most ennobling of human emotion while the mechanics of sex are dirty and squalid.¹³

As Senator Monroney said later, his friends “had placed Stevenson in an impossible dilemma”. He was torn on the one hand by his old statement of non-candidacy on the basis of which several of his old supporters had now launched their own candidacies and on the other by his loyalty to the friends who had gives him the nomination twice before and now felt they needed him again. “The first commitment prevented an active candidacy. The second prevented a graceful withdrawal. Our cause was to flounder solely on this dilemma.”¹⁴

All that Stevenson could do was to promise his supporters that he would do or say nothing to undermine their efforts. On February 9, 1960, he departed for Latin America on a combination business-and-pleasure tour. It was not long before he was once again in conflict with the Kennedy camp. On February 19, Stevenson's aids Newton Minow cabled him in Colombia, sending him the text of s story which had appeared that day in the New York Times. The item read in part:

Adlai E. Stevenson said here tonight that “the amount of money being spent” on Senator Kennedy's Presidential campaign “is phenomenal, probably the highest amount spent on a campaign in history” ... “Sometimes”, Mr. Stevenson said, “all this spending and show of power is not a good thing politically because people are apt to show natural sympathy for the underdog”. Mr. Stevenson... said that he considered it “somewhat arrogant” of Mr. Kennedy to announce that he would not accept the Vice Presidential nomination.

Minow further reported to the Stevenson party that

Kennedy called regarding clarification saying facts are erroneous as no large sums are being expended, etc. Kennedy and we believe story must be garbled. Urge

¹³ Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1960* (New York: Signet Books, 1967), p. 61

¹⁴ A.S. Mike Monroney, “The Plot Against Adlai”, in Doyle ed. *As We Knew Adlai*, p. 250

you immediately cable Kennedy in Washington with correction or whatever appropriate. Kennedy very upset and immediate action required.¹⁵

The incident arose when Stevenson attended a given in his honour by President Jose Figueres of Costa Rica. The remarks attributed to Stevenson were reportedly overheard by reporter Paul P. Kennedy of the New York Times and Mrs. Elizabeth Dyer, publisher of the Tico Times of San Jose. Mrs. Dyer was reported in Newsweek as saying that Stevenson called her at home upon hearing about her story. "He said he'd never been treated like this in all his years in public office except by the hostile press", she reported later. "He appeared extremely worried about how Jack Kennedy would react".¹⁶ Stevenson also cabled Turner Catledge, the managing editor of the New York Times, to protest the story filed by Paul Kennedy, describing it as "very embarrassing and inaccurate"¹⁷

Stevenson authorized Minow to cable Kennedy on his behalf, granting the Senator authorization to release, if he so desired, the following statement:

I am astonished by the New York Times story, and neither authorized nor made any such statements. At a reception a Costa Rican, not a newspaperman, was discussing the recent Time Magazine story about Senator Kennedy's very active campaigning. He referred to the Time emphasis on the expense involved. In response to his question, I agreed would be that if the Time story was very correct it would be very expensive and might create sympathy for his opponents. I made no reference or remark about Senator Kennedy's position with respect to the Vice Presidency.¹⁸

Fortunately, the controversy died down quickly. The question however, remains: did Stevenson make those remarks? Biographer Kenneth Davis says he did, adding that "His personal disapproval (of the Kennedy expenses) was obvious".¹⁹ Moreover, the urgency and sense of guilt that underlies the various messages between Stevenson and his aides would suggest that the

¹⁵ Cablegram from Newton Minow to William M. Blair, Feb.19, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box. 789

¹⁶ Democrats: Tippy-Toes with Adlai, (Feb. 29, 1960),22. Newsweek, LV

¹⁷ Cablegram from Adlai E. Stevenson to Turner Catledge, Feb. 19, 1969, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

¹⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Telegram from Newton Minow to John F. Kennedy, Feb. 19, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box.789

¹⁹ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 404

statements attributed to him came very close to the truth. It seems likely that, in the case of Kennedy and professor Latham, Stevenson was protesting too much.

Stevenson returned to the United States on April 11, just in time to view the campaigning for the May 10 West Virginia primary. Kennedy had defeated Humphrey in the Wisconsin primary on April 5, and was surprised and annoyed when the Minnesotan did not drop out of the race. "Great bitterness was engendered in the Kennedy camp by Humphrey's refusal to withdraw at this point, and much of this bitterness ... was directed against Stevenson's supporters because some of them encouraged Humphrey's move and helped finance it".²⁰

Kennedy viewed Humphrey's West Virginia campaign as nothing more than a Stop-Kennedy movement promoted by the other candidates, especially Stevenson. "Evidently the Kennedy people regarded this as dirty politics".²¹ They staged an intensive drive to end the Humphrey campaign. Kennedy "approached friends they had in common in the liberal and labour movement on the possibility of obtaining a Humphrey withdrawal",²² and Walter Reuther, Alex Rose, and California Governor Pat Brown urged Humphrey to withdraw in order to insure that the two liberals did not knock each other out of contention for the nomination.²³ Theodore White adds that "some forms of pressure" applied to Humphrey "by men unauthorized to speak for Kennedy yet assuming to speak in his name were so vile as to amount to little short of blackmail"

²⁴

Finding themselves unable to force Humphrey to withdraw, the Kennedy forces turned their attention to the next best thing, cutting off his already scanty sources of funding. This led then straight to the wallets of the Stevensonians, who were financing Humphrey in the hopes of obtaining a deadlocked convention from which their man would emerge as the candidate of party unity. Kennedy lieutenant Abe Ribicoff was instructed to tell New York Stevensonians "that if they continued to finance the hopeless campaign of Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson would not even be considered for Secretary of State. Connecticut boss John Bailey warned former Senator Bill Benton that any further contributions to the Humphrey campaign (Benton had already given \$5,000) would mean that Benton "would never hold another elective or appointive

²⁰ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 404

²¹ Ibid., p. 405

²² Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 157

²³ White, Making of the President 1960, p. 115

²⁴ Ibid., p. 116

job in Connecticut as long as... Connecticut politics". Bailey had any say in Connecticut politics".²⁵

Crippled by poor financing and psychologically worn by the pressures and betrayals of supposed friends, Humphrey lost decisively in West Virginia and put an end to his Presidential candidacy. The Kennedy bandwagon rolled on relatively unhindered from then on, as Kennedy scored further victories in Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oregon.

On his way back from Oregon, Kennedy stopped off at Stevenson's farm in Libertyville, Illinois. For all his primary victories, he had still been largely unsuccessful in wooing the old liberal element of the party, and had in fact further alienated some groups by the pressure tactics used against Humphrey, Kennedy was prepared "to offer Stevenson the Secretaryship of State in a straight deal for his support".²⁶ He was met at the airport by Stevenson's law partners and aides, Newton Minow and Bill Blair, both of whom, taking Stevenson at his word that he would not be a candidate, had become Kennedy supporters. Upon hearing of the Senator's intention, "Minow had replied with an emphatic No! Stevenson, Minow knew, would resent any such proposition: he would regard it as an attempted bribe".²⁷ Kennedy took their advice and left Libertyville as he had come, without a Stevenson endorsement.

The behind-the-scenes rivalry between the Kennedy and Stevenson factions of the Democratic Party finally came out in the open in mid-July when the Democratic National Convention convened in Los Angeles. Although Lyndon Johnson was by far Kennedy's strongest rival for the nomination in terms of pledged delegates, it was Adlai Stevenson whom the Kennedy people most feared. The convention was meeting in California, a stronghold of pro-Stevenson sentiment, and as the numbers of Stevenson citizen-demonstrators marching around the Sports Arena grew daily, the Kennedyites watched as their sentiment seeped into the convention hall itself and awakened old loyalties and affections among the delegates. Many liberal Democrats found themselves with sharply divided loyalties. Not a few were in positions similar to that of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. a long-time Stevenson adviser who, in the absence of an announced

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ White, Making of the President 1960, p. 130

²⁷ Bert Cochran, Adlai Stevenson: Patrician Among the Politicians (New York: Punk and Wagnalls, 1969), p.315

Stevenson candidacy, had joined the Kennedy camp. To the historian's considerable embarrassment Mrs. Schlesinger maintained her Stevenson loyalties in a very vocal manner.²⁸

The pressure on Stevenson to announce for Kennedy became more intense than ever. Going on the assumption that Stevenson would not want his name placed in nomination because of the few votes he would get, the Kennedy staffers tried to persuade the Illinoisan to nominate Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy's attitude about Stevenson's reluctance to do so was "Just like always. He can't make up his mind".²⁹ To these requests that he place Kennedy's name in nomination. Stevenson began to reply "that he might if it was the only way to unify the party, but that, because of his commitments to Johnson and Symington, he could not nominate Kennedy without their concurrence".³⁰ Mutual friends of the two men appealed to Stevenson to put a stop to the vain efforts being conducted on his behalf. "It was with some disdain that Kennedy told Stevenson had replied that he wanted to disengage but just didn't know how".³¹

There were times, though, when even the most seasoned political veterans wondered if the nomination was not again within Adlai's reach. Stevenson's first appearance at the convention, on the day before the Presidential balloting, touched off such a huge and enthusiastic demonstration that the convention chairman was forced to call Stevenson to the podium to help restore order. It took twelve minutes to get Stevenson from his seat in the Illinois delegation to the podium. The huge crowd quieted instantaneously upon his arrival at the rostrum, waiting eagerly to hear what he would say. "It seemed to almost everyone at the time that to start an avalanche of Stevenson sentiment which no one could have stopped he had only to indicate a rapport with his audience, a willingness to do what so many so obviously longed for him to do"

32

Instead, Adlai Stevenson looked out on these people who wanted to make him President of the United States and said,

²⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 38

²⁹ Robert Kennedy, quoted in Victor Lasky, *J.F.K., The Man and the Myth* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p.391

³⁰ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 41

³¹ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 176

³² Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 435

“I won’t attempt to tell you how grateful I am for this tumultuous welcome to the 1960 Democratic convention. I have, however, one observation after getting in and out of the Biltmore Hotel and this hall, I know whom you are going to nominate. It will be the last survivor”.³³

Then he turned and left. Why had he not issued that call to battle? Burt Cochram speculates:

The explanation for his failure to act was not to be found in transcendental verities. He just could not work up the single-minded passion to thrust his clubman’s code aside. It was not that the natural hue of his resolution was sicklied over with the pale cast of thought; it was demeaning to him to go around again — hat in hand, as he saw it — to solicit the favour of others, and he was not going to demean himself.³⁴

Once again, on Wednesday night, the night of the balloting, the Stevenson spark threatened to burst into flame when Senator Eugene McCarthy gave the most moving and eloquent of nominating speeches on behalf of “this prophet”.³⁵ (See Appendix D). While Stevenson proclaimed “Magnificent”, the longest demonstration of the 1960 convention unfurled.³⁶ But it was too late. The Kennedy forces had already locked up enough votes to give their man the victory. The final vote tally: Kennedy 806, Johnson 409, Symington 86, Stevenson 79 ½. Stevenson “as silent for about thirty seconds after hearing the news. ‘I was just reflecting on what you might think I was thinking! Adlai quipped”.³⁷ He then sat down to write Kennedy a congratulatory statement in which he said “he was ‘enthusiastically’ for the nominee and called on his supporters to bring about a Democratic victory”.³⁸ Stevenson watched on television as Kennedy appeared before the convention

³³ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 205

³⁴ Cochram, *Patrician Among the Politicians*, p. 306

³⁵ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 209

³⁶ *Ibid*

³⁷ McGrory, “Perfectionist and the Press”, in Doyle, *As We Knew Adlai*, p. 177

³⁸ Lasky, *Man and the Myth*, p. 398

just to say hello. But he also expressed his sympathy for his opponents, Senators Johnson and Symington, for that awful moment when they knew he has been nominated.

The fact that the just-nominated candidate neglected to mention Adlai Stevenson was not lost on the Stevenson suite. It was taken as pointed reminder that John F. Kennedy even in victory was not a magnanimous man.³⁹

The next morning, Arthur Schlesinger began to urge Robert Kennedy that some move be made to reconcile the embittered Stevensonians to the Kennedy nomination. Bobby replied, “Arthur, human nature requires that you allow us forty-eight hours. Adlai has given us a rough time over the last three days. In forty-eight hours, I will do anything you want, but right now I don’t want to hear anything about the Stevensonians. You must allow for human nature”.⁴⁰ “Whatever you want” turned out to be closer to whatever Kennedy wanted, and Kennedy wanted to give the country the impression that Stevenson’s great experience in foreign affairs was lined up solidly behind Kennedy. James Reston wrote:

“The Republican argument will be that the conduct of foreign affairs is the central issue of the campaign and that the choice before the country is between the experienced Republicans and the inexperienced Democrats.

“Stevenson’s active support of Kennedy is widely regarded as useful counter to this argument. He carries more weight in both the Allied and the Communist worlds than Kennedy, Nixon or Lodge, He is more experienced and more articulate in this field than either candidate, which is why Kennedy said during the primary campaign that he ‘assumed’ any Democratic President would nominate Stevenson as Secretary of State.

“There is, however, no commitment to Stevenson on this score and much will depend on the relations between the two men in the next few months....”⁴¹

³⁹ Lasky, *Man and the Myth*, p. 399

⁴⁰ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 45

⁴¹ James Reston, Quoted in Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 211

Kennedy certainly did nothing to discourage the widespread speculation that if elected, Stevenson would be his Secretary of State. At a news conference held on Saturday, July 16, the nominee announced that he would ask Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles to serve as his representatives in foreign affairs briefings which President Eisenhower was going to give the two candidates. At the same press conference, Kennedy was asked if he felt he had made a commitment to name Stevenson Secretary of state. “No, I don’t think so”, he replied. “I’m quite willing to discuss the matter with him, and I think I’ve indicated by my previous statement this morning that I value his judgment highly”. Pressed further on the matter, Kennedy reiterated his “strong regard” for Stevenson and said that he believed their “association in this campaign will become increasingly intimate. I do think, however, that it would be a mistake and I don’t plan to make it to attempt to decide with finality the Cabinet position”.⁴²

“Increasingly intimate” their relationship never became. But increasingly dependent on Stevenson Kennedy did become.

It was Stevenson who had created the style and intellectual tradition in which Kennedy campaigned and who (more than anyone else) had defined for the public the basic campaign issues. It was Stevenson, perhaps mindful of his great-grandfather Jesse Fell’s proposal of the Lincoln- Douglas debates, who initially and most persuasively proposed a great debate on TV between the rival Presidential candidates -a debate which Nixon early agreed to in mistaken self- confidence and which removed once and for all Kennedy’s greatest handicaps, namely, his being less well known than Nixon and his alleged boyish inexperience contrasted with Nixon’s maturity and competence. It was Stevenson and only Stevenson who, by personal example and effort, could finally persuade into activity on Kennedy’s behalf myriads of disgruntled Stevensonians who had done yeoman’s work for the Democrats in 1952 and 1956 but, in the bitter aftermath of Los Angeles, were prepared to “sit this one out”.⁴³

It was Stevenson whom Kennedy assigned to head his foreign policy task force. However, Stevenson was obliged to leave the bulk of the work on the report to staff headed by George Ball when Kennedy decided that the Illinoisan could make an even greater contribution on the

⁴² New York Times, July 17, 1960, p. 34, in Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁴³ Davis, Politics of Honor, pp. 441-42

campaign trail. Stevenson had originally agreed to make 10 speeches for Kennedy. He wound up giving 84, concentrating on liberal strongholds in California, Minnesota, Illinois, and New York. One would have thought that his prodigious effort would have dissipated the bitterness the Kennedys felt toward Stevenson “for not submerging his own lingering ambitions” during the convention. But it did not, “and this enmity was to plague Stevenson’s relations with the White House” throughout the Kennedy years.⁴⁴

Even during the campaign, some observers sensed an insincerity in the manner in which candidate Kennedy treated his foremost campaigner. Murray Kempton wrote that after Stevenson had introduced Kennedy at a California rally on November 1, Kennedy “called Adlai Stevenson ‘our leader’. I do not think that expression has had much content; it is hard to believe that there is a place of great substance in any Kennedy administration for Adlai Stevenson”. After citing the ways, in terms of style and ideology, in which Kennedy was indebted to Stevenson, Kempton reminded liberals, “Let us never forget that if a light still rises above this dreary land, it is because for so long and lonely a time this man held it Up”⁴⁵

It often seemed as if the Kennedy-Stevenson relationship was fated to be one of perpetual slights, strife, and misunderstanding. Hundreds of Stevenson supporters tried various methods of pressuring Kennedy into naming Adlai as his choice for Secretary of State. Typical of these was the vaguely threatening tone of a letter sent to JFK of Bob Dickholtz, Publicity Chairman of the Adlai E. Stevenson Democratic Club of Altadena Pasadena:

Since we here in California... like to work very hard for goals that we believe in, we are concerned over a point that seems to be dangling in front of us and holding us back from working for the Democratic ticket right now and this fall. We feel that unless Adlai E. Stevenson is unequivocally stated to be your only choice for Secretary of State, that we have a lethargic and unwilling group of people who will not campaign actively for you.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 16

⁴⁵ *New York Post*, Nov. 2, 1960, p.46, in Stevenson Par Box 789

⁴⁶ Bob Dickholtz to John F. Kennedy, July 18, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

The form letter that Kennedy had prepared to respond to such communications expressed his high regard for Governor Stevenson and mentioned how closely the two were working together. It concluded:

You will appreciate that I cannot at this time select members of a cabinet. To designate one member would open pressures to make other appointments. The folly of making cabinets in advance was never clearer than in 1948. Governor Dewey's cabinet evaporated in the early hours of November 3, and the experiment was not considered a notable success. I do expect, however, that Mr. Stevenson will have a significant role in our future affairs.⁴⁷

One can easily imagine the annoyance and anger this type of pressure must have aroused in Kennedy.

The Republicans too, although unwittingly, contributed to Kennedy-Stevenson tension. President Eisenhower objected to having Stevenson and Bowles sit in for Kennedy on intelligence briefings. Ike insisted that only the candidates themselves would be briefed. Indications were however, that the Senator was not terribly upset about this turn of events. Eisenhower's firm stance against the briefings gave "the Kennedy forces a chance to ease Stevenson out of the picture for the present, if not altogether".⁴⁸

Kennedy's election to the Presidency only served to intensify the call for Stevenson for Secretary of State. As soon as the vote had been tallied, buttons and bumper stickers calling for "Stevenson for Secretary of State" began to appear throughout the country.⁴⁹ Nor did the call come solely from the rank-and-file, the common voter. It is customary for the new leader of a political party to pay homage to the party's old warhorses, its one-time rulers. In 1960, this meant that Kennedy made pilgrimages to former President Harry Truman in Missouri, to former Vice President John Nance Garner in Texas, and, in New York, to the woman who had been First Lady of the Democratic Party for almost three decades, Eleanor Roosevelt. Kennedy "found her... filled with suspicion. You don't really trust me entirely, he said. No, that's right, she answered.

⁴⁷ John F. Kennedy to Bob Kickholtz, Aug. 30, 1960; John F. Kennedy to Mrs. Ida Flayer, Sept. 23, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁴⁸ Lasky, *Man and the Myth*, pp.450-51

⁴⁹ Stuart Gerry Brown, *Adlai E. Stevenson: A Short Biography* (Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Woodbury Press, 1965), p.174

‘What can I do to ease your suspicions?’ he asked. ‘Make Adlai Secretary of State, ‘she answered’”⁵⁰

Adlai Stevenson’s qualifications for the post of Secretary of State were impeccable. All his life, Stevenson had been an enthusiastic world traveller. Some of this was undertaken for pleasure, but much was involved with the business of the numerous governmental agencies and departments for which he worked in the 1930’s and 1940’s. His interest in foreign affairs had been heightened after World War II when he served; as Assistant to Secretary of State Stettinius at the birth of the U.N. in San Francisco in 1945; as Chief of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Preparatory Commission in London in 1946, and as a member of the U.S. delegation to the First and Second General Assemblies. His presidential campaigns gave him an opportunity to articulate many of his ideas on foreign policy — including his ahead-of-its-time advocacy of a disarmament treaty — and he did so in such a way that he came to be regarded as one of the Democratic Party’s leading experts on foreign policy. Nor did his two defeats dim his interest - or his world travels. By 1960, there were few countries in the world Stevenson had not visited, and fewer heads of state he had not met.

Moreover, “it was known that he had set his heart on being Secretary of State”.⁵¹ Considering the enormous contribution, he had made to the Kennedy campaign, the job, by all logic, should have gone to him. But it did not. The Senator tended to view Stevenson’s campaigning as repayment for the stumping Kennedy had done for Stevenson in 1956, when he had visited twenty-six states on behalf of the Democratic ticket. That Stevenson had brought the disenchanted liberals back into the Kennedy camp seemed only fair to JFK: they would not have been disenchanted in the first place if Stevenson had made it clear that he was not a candidate.

Surely Kennedy’s anxieties would have been greatly reduced and his victory margin greatly widened if Stevenson had declared for him after West Virginia and then made the nominating speech for him in Los Angeles. Surely it had been made sufficiently clear that the state Department would be Stevenson’s reward for this truly valuable service. Stevenson had refused the tacit offer.⁵²

⁵⁰ Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 32

⁵¹ Cochran, Patrician Among the Politicians, p. 314

⁵² Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 443

Aside from more campaign services, the Kennedy's refused to recognize the degree to which they were the heirs of the new Democratic politics created by Stevenson. The Kennedy style and the Kennedy flair were the direct descendants of the qualities Stevenson had exhibited in the 1950's. "He had, at what should have been a particularly low point for the party, managed to keep it vibrant and vital, and to involve a new kind of people in politics".⁵³ Kennedy's men "did not have the faintest idea of the debt they owed to Stevenson and his friends. They calculated debts and obligations as politicians, not historians".⁵⁴

Having disregarded any sense of debt to Stevenson, Kennedy allowed his personal feelings for the man to guide him in his choice of a secretary of State. And as had been demonstrated time and again, the predominant feeling in the Kennedy-Stevenson relationship was one of mutual antipathy. "Stevenson seemed to see in Kennedy a coldly calculating ambition, a lust for power, a willingness to use other people as a means to his ends, a lack of profound commitment to ideals whose realization (in Stevenson's view) was essential to that world order whose only alternative was world destruction".⁵⁵ He considered Kennedy a cold-blooded, overambitious, cocksure and arrogant parvenu.⁵⁶ "This was a view that Stevenson was not careful enough to keep to himself, and his remarks to friends and at cocktail parties worried some of his admirers. Of course Stevenson's talk got back to Kennedy."⁵⁷

In turn,

the Kennedy brothers regarded him as indecisive and almost prissy, and somewhat disingenuous in the way that he seemed to like to portray himself being above politics and yet accepting the support of the above policies and yet accepting the support of the Daley machine. It was all right, they thought, to present an image as the citizen-leader rather than the politician who made deals, but it was dangerous to believe it yourself. The Kennedys regarded him as weak and lacking in toughness,

⁵³ Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 37

⁵⁴ Cochran, *Patrician Among the Politicians*, p. 315

⁵⁵ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 444

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* See also: Cochran, *Patrician Among the Politicians*, p. 315; and Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 202

⁵⁷ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 202

despite the fact that the races against great odds in 1952 and 1956 might historically be viewed in 1952 and courage...⁵⁸

Again and again, we find that Stevenson's statesman-above-politics image was a sore point for the Kennedys. This is undoubtedly attributable to the sense of jealousy they must have felt when they compared the hard-driving pressure tactics they had had to resort to in order to obtain the nomination with the relative ease with which it was twice (and almost three times) handed to Adlai Stevenson.

Kennedy had been more than irritated by what seemed to him Stevenson's false pose of lofty indifference to personal advancement in 1960... and by Stevenson's sly stratagems (Kennedy saw them so) for gaining without personal risk or effort the prize Kennedy had so arduously earned with his primary victories. What in fact was Stevenson's compulsion to do everything the hard way, so far as the realization of personal ambition was concerned (his diffidence, his habitual self-deprecation), seemed to Kennedy a penchant for easy ways: it seemed to manifest a finicky aversion to the sweat and grime of practical politics, a deficiency of will power, a certain overall softness of character.⁵⁹

The charge of indecisiveness against Stevenson was an old one, and the Kennedys latched onto it eagerly in 1960. Stevenson's Indecision was not of the kind characterized by changeability or wavering", wrote one critic. "Indecision also refers to one who cannot grapple with his problem in an incisive way, who wants to let events bail him out of his difficulties, or who refuses to battle for his ends".⁶⁰ Senator Mike Monroney, however, interpreted Stevenson's 'Indecisiveness' differently: "Humility is a rare quality among politicians. So rare, in fact, that when we encounter it, we are apt to call it by another name, either guile or indecisiveness".⁶¹

Naturally, these personality conflicts could not be the reason Kennedy gave Stevenson for not putting him in charge of the State Department. Instead, when the two met in an

⁵⁸ Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 37

⁵⁹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 444

⁶⁰ Cochran, *Patrician Among the Politicians*, p. 305

⁶¹ Monroney, "Plot Against Adlai", in Doyle, ed., *As We Knew Adlai*, p. 244

unpublicized session prior to their December 8 meeting, the President-elect told Stevenson that it was “too controversial an appointment”.⁶²

Kennedy cited the narrowness of his victory. Many Democratic Congressmen had run ahead of him in the polls and owed him nothing for their seats. The election had made the old Republican-conservative Democrat coalition stronger than ever. Kennedy could not afford to nominate for Secretary of State “a man... already tagged by controversial stands on a great number of public issues and thereby hampered from the outset in his dealings with Congress”.⁶³

According to Stevenson’s notes, Kennedy also referred to “difficulties in relations with... Truman and Acheson”.⁶⁴ The strongly anti Communist Acheson wing of the Democratic Party viewed the Stevensonian liberals as

do-gooders who did not understand power and force, who were too quick to believe in the UN. Adlai became a ready target — he was depicted as being too quick to talk and too slow to act; he was indecisive. The Stevenson group was seen as too committed to some vague idea of morality in world affairs and too committed to the search for world opinion, willing to waste real relationships with solid European nations in return for vague promises from untrustworthy little wog nations that would probably vote against us in the UN anyway.⁶⁵

Another of the implicit reasons for Kennedy’s decision (of which Stevenson was perfectly well aware) was Kennedy’s desire to make his own foreign policy. A strong-minded and prestigious Secretary of State just would not do. Richard Walton notes that Kennedy feared that the combination of Stevenson’s worldwide (by far overshadowing Kennedy’s own) and the large number of Stevensonians being brought into the Administration might give Adlai “such a grip on the State Department that it would not be responsive to Kennedy’s will”.⁶⁶ It was well known that the new President wanted to be his own Secretary of State “and did not relish the prospect

⁶² Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Conference JFK and Blair, Dec. 6, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789. There is some discrepancy as to the date of this session. Both Kenneth Davis and Arthur Schlesinger place it in late November. These notes indicate December 6. It is possible that there may have been two sessions, that one or both was a telephone conversation, or that the Stevenson notes refer to a conference not “with” but “between” JFK and Blair and that Stevenson is merely “bet recording what he was told had occurred

⁶³ Davis, *Politics of Hoper*, p. 445

⁶⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Conference JFK and Blair, ec. 6, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁶⁵ Halberstam, *Rest and the Brightest*, p. 32

⁶⁶ Walton. *Remnants of Power*, pp.17-18

of debating his plans for foreign policy with Adlai Stevenson behind closed doors before being able to present them publicly”.⁶⁷ Then, there was the problem of Stevenson’s constituency rivalling the President’s own. “Kennedy knew that he could not really perform as a President until he had taken Stevenson’s people away from him”.⁶⁸

Kennedy assured Stevenson that his decision was no reflection on my qualities or capabilities”. Kennedy told Stevenson that the leading candidates for the secretaryship were Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee veteran Ambassador David Bruce, and Ford Foundation President Dean Rusk. “Bruce”, according to Kennedy, had “no fire in his belly”. He had a “high opinion of Fulbright, but doesn’t know Rusk”. Another often-mentioned possibility, Chester Bowles, was, Stevenson was told, “controversial too”, he might be made “Undersecretary for Economic Affairs” or be given “Any Job-” Kennedy said that he wanted Stevenson in the administration an Ambassador to the United Nations. He stated that he considered “State, Treasury and Defense and UN the 4 most important positions in the administration”. The President-elect stressed that Stevenson would “sit with the Cabinet; have his ear”,⁶⁹ “that he would participate in all aspects of foreign policy planning. This would include sitting in the National Security Council where matters of national defense would be considered”.⁷⁰ Stevenson would have a “free hand with the delegation”,⁷¹ including recommending the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs whose job was to ‘backstop’ the United Nations Mission from Washington. Stevenson’s appointment, said JFK, “would underscore a new American emphasis upon the importance of the United Nations”.⁷² He hinted that it was Stevenson’s “patriotic responsibility”⁷³ to accept the job.

In order to grasp the essence of the conflict Stevenson now faced, it is important to understand something about the personality and self-concept of the man. Richard Walton offers the following description:

He was entirely aware that he was a unique figure in American life. He enjoyed this status and the admiration, even adulation, that went with it. He regarded

⁶⁷ Opatowsky, Kennedy Government, p. 15

⁶⁸ Halberstam, Rest and the Brightest, p. 39

⁶⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Conference JFK and Blair, Dec. 6, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁷⁰ Brown, Stevenson, pp. 175-76

⁷¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Conference JFK and Blair, Dec. 6, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁷² Brown, Stevenson, p. 176

⁷³ Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Conference JFK and Blair, Dec.6, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

himself as superior to the men who had succeeded in reaching the White House where he had not. There is little question that he was superior to Eisenhower, and after 1952 he prepared himself to serve in the Presidency, whereas Kennedy and Johnson prepared themselves to get the Presidency. And he believed himself clearly better equipped to serve as chief adviser on foreign policy than any of the hard-nosed “realists” around Kennedy and Johnson, whose realistic advice was to lead to one foreign policy disaster after another. He certainly was on firm ground here. Also, he was not a little vain of his skill as a public speaker, and he was entirely aware that he alone of the Kennedy and Johnson Cabinets had a significant political following. Stevenson liked to think of himself as an intellectual and took considerable pride in being the politician most welcome in faculty clubs and lecture halls.⁷⁴

Thus, the conflict: on the one hand he was a man of great pride and a strong sense of who he was and what he represented, a man who was highly sensitive to a slight of this nature, a man whose sense of duty, of “Princeton in the nation’s service” was unmatched. The section excruciatingly painful.

During their hour-long conference on December 8, Stevenson told Kennedy, “I’ll be frank. I expected to be Secretary of State - something of value to you and the country. Administration and policy making - not representation is my interest”. The U.N. was a “most difficult assignment - 99 nations - in trouble everywhere: Soviet attack - budget — Africa. China, colonial identification, disarmament. Aid, Cuba—Congo”.⁷⁵ He told Kennedy that he could not accept until he knew who would be Secretary of State.

Stevenson was bombarded with opinions and suggestions as to what he ought to do. Many of his friends “were urging him to accept the ambassadorship for the obvious reason, his ideal qualifications”.⁷⁶ still others advised that “he stay in private life Stevenson, they said, more useful to the country as an independent voice foreign policy than he would be under the discipline of responsibility to the Administration.”⁷⁷ George Ball felt “that he had no choice but to accept

⁷⁴ Walton, Remnants of Power, pp. 23-24

⁷⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Notes on Talk with JK, Dec. 8, 1960, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁷⁶ Herbert J. Muller, Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 273

⁷⁷ Brown, Stevenson, p. 175

the post, ‘He had no place to go. He would have been unhappy in private life with a Democratic Administration in power.’⁷⁸

Adlai Stevenson took copious notes of the advice he received from his friends and admirers. Hubert Humphrey told him that he thought “You should be secretary of state. Kennedy seems to feel he should look around”. Humphrey thought that the U.N. offered Stevenson an “up front role. You will be a central figure if you are in the act. You will be needed more and more”⁷⁹

A conversation with someone Stevenson designated as ‘M’ (Minow?) prompted him to write that the

“Family” was against me. I tried to hurt him at the convention: didn’t nominate him. This makes me a threat. The press is revolving around them — everyone outside is unimportant or threatening I will be miserable if inactive? Be a good soldier. I can’t allow bitterness. Just doing this because I feel I ought to.⁸⁰

while Illinois one-time Democratic boss Jacob Arvey simply advised, “To make AES more effective let it be known that he is going to have a part in policy making”. Stevenson’s old running mate, Alabama Senator John Sparkman said, “I have wished you would be Secretary! But I hope you’ll accept”.⁸¹

Of his law partners, Adlai Stevenson wrote, “All feel I should accept. They are full of sympathy. Their prophecy is that I will be co-equal at least with Secretary with freedom to shape policy and travel. I will be not only a national but world figure. If I don’t accept, decline in frustration and loneliness”.⁸²

Senator Monroney advised that

⁷⁸ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 19

⁷⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, *Miscellaneous Notes*, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁸⁰ *Ibid*

⁸¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, *Miscellaneous Notes*, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁸² *Ibid*.

State Dept. now a factory management job — great advantage not to be saddled with civil service etc. Would insist that Kennedy would want direct policy proposals. Must have some way to communicate. Would not willingly undertake this job except the President trying to beef up the U.N.⁸³

Mary McGrory wrote later, “We all knew, despite his doubts and disappointments, he would end up saying yes. Professionally and socially, he needed to be needed. He groaned when asked; he inevitably accepted”⁸⁴ His friends may have known that his acceptance was inevitable; Stevenson did not.

“I Just don’t know”, he told a friend at the time. I know everyone wants me to jump up and down with delight and say this is the thing I want to do more than anything else in the world, but I just don’t know. I don’t want to be a lawyer arguing a case whether he believes in it or not. It I’m not interested in explaining or defending a policy; I want to be involved in the making of that policy”.⁸⁵

George Ball, who was later to be U.N. Ambassador Simmelf, wrote.

“Anybody in his right mind, and Adlal was in his right mind, knew he was taking on some thing frustrating. It has all the trappings. but to a large extent it doesn’t play much of a role... When a big man takes the job, it locks him in, he can’t speak his mind and he can’t quit”.⁸⁶

Stevenson’s mind rambled over the pros and cons of accepting the Ambassadorship. He thought that Kennedy’s charge that he was too controversial” was” poppycock”. He had no obligation to Kennedy”, he reminded himself.

Do we do a better job on the outside?” he wondered, remembering the suggestions of some friends that he would be more effective as an independent voice for a liberal foreign policy, unbound by ties of loyalty to the Administration, a sort of national conscience. He remembered George Ball’s warning that the “whole Truman.... group was opposed,” and he

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ McGrory, *Perfectionist and the Press*, “in Doyle, ed., *At The Knew Adlal*. p. 178

⁸⁵ Whitman. *Portrait*, pp. 213-14

⁸⁶ George Ball. quoted in Walton, *Ramnants of Power*, p. 19

wondered about Ball's theory that some West Va. Enters" into Kennedy's decision, along with "Irish vindictiveness". On the other hand he considered, "If I say no... in 6 mos. I may feel frustrated: something may jeopardize the whole UN". "Got to be in there," he thought. And he would "be made to look like a sour grapes fellow" if he not accept.⁸⁷

He worried considerably about the amount of impact he would have:

"The point is that Jack Kennedy is going to make his own foreign policy, as he should, and there simply isn't enough in his record to indicate how much of it I might agree with", he said. "And yet if I accept this appointment, I am committed to support him this side of treason or madness. There is no way for a man as prominent as I am to quietly step down. If I were to resign, no matter the excuse, it would signal a major political break over United States policy."⁸⁸

Who would be Secretary of State was an equally important factor. "Stevenson insisted that the Secretary would have to someone with whom he could have a relationship of mutual confidence"⁸⁹ Halberstam asserts that Stevenson had a virtual veto power over the choice of a Secretary of State, and that he exercised it against McGeorge Bundy. Halberstam describes Bundy as that "brilliant intellectual, great liberal, who had voted for Tom Dewey over Harry Truman, and twice for Dwight Eisenhower over Adlai Stevenson". And he notes, "If there were limits to Bundy's liberalism, there were also limits to Stevenson's tolerance"⁹⁰ Years later, Stevenson was to deny this charge: "So far as I can recall, Bundy's name was never mentioned, nor could I have commented on him, in view of the fact that I didn't even know him. The President-elect did discuss with me other possibilities for Secretary of State, and I gave him my candid opinion on each of them".⁹¹

Arthur Schlesinger tried to explain to an annoyed Kennedy that Stevenson had already had the U.N. post, and that he wanted to make policy, not just represent it. Kennedy protested that "The U.N. is different now. I think this job has great possibilities".⁹² Then he relented a bit

⁸⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellanes Notes. n.d. Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁸⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Harry S. Ashmore, "Too old to Cry, in Doyle, ed. As We Know Adlai pp.231-32

⁸⁹ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 134-35

⁹⁰ Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 42

⁹¹ Adlai E. Stevenson to John Steele, Dec. 10, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 853

⁹² Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 135

and suggested that Stevenson be named Attorney General. Feelers were immediately sent out to Stevenson through Bill Blair, but Adlai said that, of the two, he preferred the UN post.

Finally, Stevenson learned that Dean Rusk had been selected Secretary of State. (Rusk, coincidentally, had been chairman of the Scarsdale Stevenson-for-President Committee in the spring of 1960).⁹³ At Kennedy's urging, Rusk had telephoned Stevenson to encourage him to accept the Ambassadorship.

Kennedy, who was annoyed by Stevenson's refusal to accept the offer immediately, and who had decided upon Rusk as Secretary, asked Rusk to call Stevenson. Kennedy took no small amount of pleasure in recounting to friends how Rusk had hooked Stevenson. "Adlai", Rusk had said, "the President has asked me to take this job and it is a sacrifice, but I have given it careful consideration, despite the element of sacrifice, and I have decided I cannot refuse. I cannot say no. I feel all of us have a loyalty greater than our own interests. I'm going to be a soldier; I think this is necessary. We need you, the country needs you. I hope you will serve as he has asked you to serve". In retelling the story to friends, Kennedy would chuckle and say, "I think old Adlai was really impressed".⁹⁴

Impressed or not, Adlai Stevenson decided to accept the appointment. In a memorandum entitled "Negotiations with Senator Kennedy Regarding UN Post", he wrote:

My tastes and experience are executive administrative and creative - or legislative or representational. Don't know whether I can do this job or will care for it, but willing to try if JK and Sec want me to - and are sympathetic to following suggestions.

Located beneath that were ten items, which can be divided into three categories: those which dealt with Stevenson's rights, duties, and privileges as U. N. Ambassador: those which made general policy recommendations on the structure of the State Department: and those which outlined the Administration's attitude toward the U.N.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 136

⁹⁴ Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 38

For himself, Stevenson wanted assurances that he would be a “member of the Cabinet” with the “option to attend National Security Council meetings when foreign policy matters were being considered. He wanted to be “in the mainstream of policy making. No important decisions were to be made without giving him the opportunity to express his views”. In particular, Stevenson wanted to “be consulted about the organization and direction of disarmament”, although the “negotiations should be the responsibility” of Secretary Rusk. Lastly he wanted a “free hand with the U.N. staff in Washington and New York” or “at least a veto” over the selection of staff members. He wanted “3 deputies of Ambassadorial rank” assigned to the Mission in New York, and he made sure that the “Chief of the mission and senior members of the staff” were to be given adequate quarters and representation allowance”.⁹⁵

In terms of the structure of the State Department Stevenson recommended that the U.N. Ambassador should be “restored to his traditional position of ‘counsellor’ to the Secretary” and should be the “senior advisor’ to the Secretary extending even beyond the U.N.”. He believed that the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs should be made a Deputy Under Secretary and become the deputy of both the Secretary and the U.N. Ambassador. He thought that the “Ambassador should meet at least once a week with the Secretary and his staff.” He urged that there be “better coordination between State and Defense on U.N. matters”.⁹⁶

Finally, Stevenson asked that the Kennedy Administration come up with a “clear definition of its attitude toward the U.N. and a better conceptual idea of its mission”. He suggested that the U.N. could and should be the “center” of our foreign policy, and said that the U.S. should “use it more - not just occasion- ally in desperation”. The “U.S. should get on the offensive not just the defensive in the U.N. said Adlai Stevenson, but not in a hard line sense. He felt that the U.S. should “create the feeling that we want to end the cold war as soon as possible”. Our focus, instead, should be on constructive work like speeding economic development. He urged that the U.S. “channel more of our aid through the U.N.,” but stressed that our aid should not just be anti-communist but pro the improvement of standards of living, literacy, health, etc.”⁹⁷

At 7 p.m. on Saturday, December 10, Stevenson telephoned John Kennedy in Palm Beach. He told the President-elect that he had drawn up a set of conditions under which he would

⁹⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Negotiations with Senator Kennedy Regarding UN Post, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson, Negotiations with Senator Kennedy Regarding UN Post, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

serve if the new Secretary of State and Kennedy approved. Stevenson “recited his conditions Kennedy took notes”.⁹⁸ By this time, Stevenson had reworded much of his earlier writing, and had reordered his priorities, but the gist of his suggestions remained the same. Through these notes, Stevenson’s concept of the United Nations Ambassadorship emerges clearly. He envisioned a powerful figure, subordinate only to the President and the Secretary of State. Stevenson’s Ambassador would have a large hand in policy-making and a great deal of leeway in handling U.S. affairs at the U.N. And his vision of the United Nations emerges too. It was a place not for the harsh rhetoric of the Cold War, but for cooperation between the great powers for the purpose of uplifting the poor and underdeveloped countries of the world. The energies formerly invested in the waging of the Cold war would now be channeled into a friendly rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a rivalry whose beneficiaries would be the unfed, the unclothed, the uneducated, the unhoused, and the unhealthy of mankind. This was the plan for the U.N. that Adlai Stevenson outlined. John Kennedy approved.⁹⁹

On December 12, 1960, Kennedy announced to the press that Dean Rusk had accepted appointment as Secretary of State, Chester Bowles as Under Secretary and Adlai Stevenson as Ambassador to the United Nations.

On January 18, 1961, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearing on the confirmation of Adlai as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Stevenson opened the very cordial session by saying.

“I welcome this opportunity to serve the United States at the United Nations. I do not minimize its difficulties, but I also regard it as a great opportunity” ... The United States, Stevenson said, believed that “the United Nations is man’s best hope for peace. But it is something more than that. It is our best hope for fashioning a peace marked with freedom and justice”.¹⁰⁰

“The identity of the United Nations with our deepest convictions about the nature and destiny of man is a central fact we need to keep in mind as we move through a period of relentless turmoil and travail”, he said at one point. “The

⁹⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 780

⁹⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Conditions-- given to JK by phone 7 PM Sat. Dec. 10, Stevenson Papers, Box 789

¹⁰⁰ Brown, Stevenson, p. 176

membership has almost doubled since my time, and we are likely to encounter some unaccustomed rebuffs and disappointments in that political area in the months ahead”.

“At its best”, he observed, the United Nations “is not a formula for stability’ but a framework for change. All the world’s tensions are not bad, some of the incentives of hope and the drives for self-expression and self-government are what makes the free world hum. It is a mistake, in my judgment, for us to see in the United Nations merely a desperate survival operation, without also exploiting its potential as a cooperative search for better answers to the overhanging question, ‘After survival, what then? Peoples are best cemented together, after all, not by mutual fear but by mutual hope’”.¹⁰¹

Both Republican and Democratic Senators on the Committee congratulated him on his performance and wished him good luck in his new duties. They voted unanimously to approve his appointment.¹⁰²

The American public echoed the sentiments of Capitol Hill, showing almost 90 percent approval of the Stevenson appointment, according to a Gallup poll.¹⁰³ Praise for Kennedy’s choice of U.N. Ambassador flooded in from around the world. Stevenson’s colleagues in the Kennedy Administration treated him with much deference and respect.

At John Kennedy’s inauguration Adlai Stevenson sat beside Dean Rusk on the platform. The next day when the Cabinet was sworn into office by the new President, Stevenson, at the insistence of Rusk and his colleagues, headed the list. At the first meeting of the Cabinet it was Stevenson, again at the request of his colleagues, who made the formal response on behalf of the Cabinet to the President’s opening remarks. His high position in the Administration thus underscored by these ceremonial events, the new U.S. Representative took up his residence in New York.

¹⁰¹ Whitman, *Portrait*, pp. 214-15

¹⁰² Brown, *Stevenson*, p. 177

¹⁰³ Muller, *Study in Values*, p. 271

On January 23, Stevenson presented his credentials to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and began his four- and-a-half years as United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

He was conducted on a tour of the Security Council chamber. He spotted the United States name plate and was told that he was next in line for the Council's rotating presidency. Shaking his head, he remarked: "That's the way it is. when I want the Presidency, I can't have it; when I don't, I can."¹⁰⁴

His first official appearance at the U.N. was at Security Council meeting on February 1. The galleries applauded him loudly and his fellow delegates greeted him with warmth and praise. He walked around the Council table to shake hands with Valerian Zorin, the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. and then opened his Ambassadorship with characteristically eloquent speech. "Let us be united", he urged the delegates, "— united in a patient and persevering attempt to find the things we can agree upon and to build upon them a structure of understanding and cooperation against which whatever storms may be ahead shall beat in vain".¹⁰⁵ (See Appendix E for complete text).

¹⁰⁴ Whitman, Portrait, p. 215

¹⁰⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Looking Outward: Years of Crisis at the United Nations, Robert L. and Selma Schiffer, eds. (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p.4

2 THE FIRST ORDEAL: THE BAY OF PIGS

It all started out so well. Stevenson's appointment as U.N. Ambassador was received warmly by the Senate. He occupied a place of honor and prominence throughout the Inaugural festivities. His Cabinet colleagues deferred to him and asked him to address the President on their behalf at the first Cabinet meeting on January 26, 1961.¹⁰⁶

He departed Washington drenched in assurances of his importance to and stature in the Kennedy Administration. He arrived in New York to the enthusiastic kudos of Dag Hammarskjöld and the delegates to the United Nations who believed that his international reputation and prestige did honour to the U.N. He plunged enthusiastically into the world of the U.N. He delighted his fellow delegates with his humour, much of it self-deprecatory. One of his favourite stories was about the matronly clubwoman who came up to him after a speech and cooed.

"Oh, Mr. Stevenson, your speech was superfluous" "Thank you, madam, I've been thinking of having it published posthumously" "Oh, won't that be nice. The sooner the better".¹⁰⁷

The delegates found him warm and accessible. "It took me two years to meet Lodge", one Arab delegate told a newsman. "Stevenson I met in two weeks"¹⁰⁸ He went out of his way to meet his fellow delegates, especially those from the smaller, younger nations, Africans, Asians. Latin Americans. He believed that they were the backbone of the United Nations, and that one of the U.N.'s major purposes was to protect their rights and interests. The small nations were at the same time guardians and orphans of the international organization of peace. Stevenson became "known as the 'Housemother of the U.N. The sobriquet pleased him immensely, not only because it reflected the esteem and respect accorded him by his United Nations colleagues, but also because it acknowledged that Stevenson was their confidant and friend"¹⁰⁹

On the surface, it seemed to be the happiest time of his life. But, Davis writes,

¹⁰⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, Cabinet Notes, Jan. 26, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

¹⁰⁷ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 24

¹⁰⁸ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 219.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222

there were some, a few among his intimates who wondered if the appearance did not obscure a very different reality. Was there not something driven, feverish, almost hysterical at times in his hyperactivity? Did he not seem, on close inspection, to be operating now sometimes a little out of control, as if his vitality were a kind of fatality?

He did not budget his time well. He had to deal in his work with the representatives of more than one hundred nations. Crisis was an everyday thing at the U.N. Yet Stevenson seemed continually eager to give up what little free time was left him. Even apart from the enormous round of diplomatic functions he was required to attend, the Ambassador carried on an incredible social life. He attended parties, sports events, concerts, movie premieres, Broadway openings. He was the frequent and popular escort of society ladies, actresses, opera stars, and First Ladies. He ate too much, drank too much, smoked too much, and exercised and rested far too little.¹¹⁰ To be sure, he enjoyed it all enormously. But it was also reminiscent of a man searching for something, filling his life with society and laughter so that he might not feel a great void in his life. His wife had divorced him. His sons were grown and on their own. He had many friends, but were there any who really knew him, who were really close? Is it possible that he was afraid to be alone?

And, beneath it all, there was the atmosphere of the U.N., the constant, trembling pressure of a nerve drawn out too tight. His previous experience at the U.N. had prepared him for its tension-filled world in which “those who lived in it, to the extent of their commitment to its promise, were drawn spiritually taut between tent and despair in an atmosphere of chronic crisis”.¹¹¹ It was a strain Stevenson had not been accustomed to for many, many years. Later, in May, after three months on the job, he would quip, “What with Cuba, Congo, Korea, and now Laos. I sometimes yearn for the simple brutalities of bi-partisan politics”.¹¹²

The biggest strain and disappointment he suffered was in the slow but steady realization that Kennedy was not keeping his word about Stevenson’s position in the Administration. Before accepting the U.N. Ambassadorship, Stevenson had insisted on the upgrading of the post. Kennedy had given him Cabinet rank. Stevenson “had demanded and received assurances that

¹¹⁰ Davin, *Politics of Honor*, pp. 450-55

¹¹¹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 450

¹¹² Bill Adler, ed., *The Stevenson wit* (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p.75

he would be no mere mouthpiece of policy, that he would be consulted on every important matter pertaining to his work before a final decision was made and would function, day by day, as an integral part of the administration's foreign policy-making apparatus"¹¹³ But it did not happen.

Within two months, Stevenson's frustrations were showing up in his conversations and his letters to close friends. On March 31, 1961, he wrote to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. asking for help in preparing a Memorial Day speech "I think this occasion may afford an opportunity to say something thoughtful and useful about the Administration's position. And you know more about that than the mouth piece".¹¹⁴

Stevenson's dream of input into foreign policy decisions was, in all likelihood, an impossible one. No one was more aware than he of the differences in personality and philosophy between him and the President. He had similarly known from the start that John Kennedy intended to be his own Secretary of State, and that the President had surrounded himself with advisers like Rusk and Bundy, who were competent but definitely subordinate. There was simply no room for Stevenson. Nor, in all practicality, was there time. The demands on the U.N. Ambassador in New York are enormous, it was physically impossible for anyone to fulfill his U.N. duties and sit in on Washington policy sessions at the same time.

Even so, Stevenson believed, the President and the State Department were ignoring him and restricting his freedom far more than was necessary. His sense of humility, his habit of trying not to make unreasonable demands with his sense of pride, and his recognition of his own worth. He felt himself used as an "errand boy" by "men less competent, less experienced than he". And he was angered at having "not only the policy substance" but even "the language and style" of his speeches altered "by State Department underlings".¹¹⁵ During the three-month honeymoon period of his Ambassadorship, Stevenson was thankful that the positions Kennedy asked him to take in the U.N. were well in accord with his own views. The issue which dominated the U.N. in those months was the Congo, and both Stevenson and Kennedy firmly supported the efforts of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in that troubled land. Yet Stevenson must have dreaded that inevitable day when his and Kennedy's paths would diverge and he would be forced "to define

¹¹³ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 460

¹¹⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., March 31, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

¹¹⁵ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 460

and defend before the eyes of the world positions that he personally thought mistaken”.¹¹⁶ The day was not long in coming.

On April 8, 1961, Arthur Schlesinger and Tracy Barnes, a highly respected agent of the CIA, arrived in New York for talks with Stevenson. In a briefing which Schlesinger describes as “probably unduly vague” they informed him that an army of Cuban exiles, under CIA direction, were then training in Guatemala.¹¹⁷ An Invasion of Cuba would take place “in the near future”.¹¹⁸ Stevenson was informed that the project had been initiated under the Eisenhower Administration, but had been reviewed and approved by key figures in the new administration including Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President. The attack would be carried out by exiled Cubans alone, who would fly the air cover, form the landing parties, and who “understood that, once landed, they were on their own literally and figuratively”.¹¹⁹ The invasion was expected to spark a popular uprising and a revolt of the Cuban armed forces against the Castro regime.¹²⁰

Stevenson’s deputy at the U.S. Mission, Francis T.P. Plimpton, denied that his boss was even that well informed. Richard J. Walton reports on a 1967 interview with Plimpton:

According to Plimpton, what the CIA told them “bore no resemblance to what happened”. They were advised that the exile force was financed by Cuban emigres, and they got the impression - as plimpton put it with wry bitterness - “that, in the dark of night a few canoes were going to Cuba and that the men would gather in the Sierra Madre”.¹²¹

No matter what he was told - and considering Walton’s distinct anti-Kennedyism it seems probable that the Schlesinger and Davis accounts cited above are closer to the truth - Stevenson was tremendously disturbed by the briefing. Since July, 1960, the Cuban delegation to the U.N.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 254

¹¹⁸ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 455

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 232, 238

¹²¹ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 30

had been charging the United States with planning aggression against the island. Monday, April 17 had finally been set for a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly's Main Political Committee to discuss the Cuban charges. Clearly, the Cuban charges were true. The training, planning, equipment, and financing required for the invasion pointed directly to the U.S. as its sponsor. The political consequences of the invasion occurring before or during the debate would be of disastrous proportions.¹²² Schlesinger admits that he and Barnes wrongfully "left Stevenson with the impression that no action would take place during the U.N. discussion of the Cuban item".¹²³

Stevenson had further grounds to be disturbed. On January 13, 1961, he had sent a lengthy memorandum to both Kennedy and Rusk, reporting on a conversation he had had that day with Sidney Lens, Director of United Service Employees Union, Local 329 AFL-CIO in Chicago, and a writer for liberal magazines such as The Progressive. Stevenson had apparently checked Lens out through a friend, Morris Rubin, who said that Lens was "a sensitive and perceptive and experienced reporter of the social revolution, that 'he is completely clean', so far as Rubin knows, 'and that he trusts him implicitly'".¹²⁴ Stevenson appears to have been impressed with the man, for his memorandum was, as he said, a "verbatim" account of their conversation.

Lens had just returned from Cuba, where he was much disturbed by the loss of freedom and civil liberties in the country, especially the loss of freedom of the press. Despite these conditions, Lens reported that opposition to Castro was considerably weaker than was commonly supposed in the United States, defections being "only about one-third of what they were during the American revolution". Lens suggested that Castro's support was due to his concerted efforts at reform. Large housing and school construction programmes had been undertaken. wages had been raised, and unemployment had been cut from 700,000 to 400,000. He maintained that the Cubans were not so interested in spreading Communism to the rest of Latin America as the

¹²² Davis, *Polities of Honor*. p. 456

¹²³ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. P. 354

¹²⁴ Memorandum from Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy and Dean Rusk, Jan. 13, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832. The report that follows is all contained in this memorandum.

It is interesting that none of the other accounts of the Bay of Pigs incident mention these memoranda. Since there are two copies in two different files in the Stevenson Papers (both on the onion skin paper frequently used for carbons), I have no reason to doubt that the memoranda were sent to Kennedy and Rusk. Whether or not the two men read them is another matter. There are no letters verifying the receipt of the memo by either man and the memoranda were sent during the hectic interregnum period just before Kennedy took office. Still it seems unlikely and definitely inappropriate — that both Kennedy and Rusk should refer a personal memorandum from Stevenson to a subordinate without having read it.

American government liked to believe. Indeed, Lens said, “Khrushchev has been alarmed by the rapidity of the revolution and has urged Castro to slow down”. Lens added that “the American reporting from Cuba is not good. The American Journalists are culling the negative and not reporting the positive”. And, ominously, “he says that the anti-Castro groups in the U.S. are heavily infiltrated with Castro spies and Castro is fully informed about their plans and conspiracies”.

Lens’ report was obviously of major significance. for it called into question many of the assumption under which the Day of Pigs planners were proceeding. The reporter challenged the belief that Castro were more thanm eager to use Cuba on a base from which to spread Communism throughout Latin America. His remarks about the Cuban intelligence cast grave doubts on the secrecy under which the CIA thought they were operating - and also explained the basis for the long-standing Cuban charges in the U.N. Finally, Lens’ report Flatly contradicted the major premise upon which the entire Bay of Pigs operation was based, “that the Castro regime had no popular support and was so incompetent, Castro himself being an hysterical fanatic, that it could not effectively react to a well-prepared attack”.¹²⁵

According to Schlesinger, in late March he and President Kennedy received a similar report on the strength of Castro’s following from Joseph Newman of the New York Herald Tribune. Newman reported that “Castro still roused enthusiasm and faith, especially among the young and among those who had benefitted from the social changes of the revolution. These two groups, Newman added, constituted a considerable part of the population”. A third group, which was disaffected with Castro, would not support a U.S.-backed invasion “because we were so thoroughly identified in their minds with Batista”.¹²⁶

Stevenson was understandingly bitter that Kennedy had neglected to consult with him about the memorandum of about the project in any way. After the briefing, he lunched with Schlesinger and Mission colleagues Clayton Fritchey and Harlan Cleveland. He expressed his strong objections to the invasion.

He thought it morally wrong. He believed that Even if it succeeded in the purely pragmatic terms in which it had been conceived (and this was by no means

¹²⁵ Davis, Politics of Honor, pp. 455-56

¹²⁶ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 233

certain) it was likely to do immense long-term damage to U.S. prestige, to U. N. effectiveness, and hence to the cause of peace and freedom in the world.¹²⁷

Stevenson's error at this point was that he failed to voice his objections to the President. Schlesinger and Barnes had presented the plan as a fait accompli. It is also entirely possible that Schlesinger, who in two separate memoranda to JFK had outlined his objections to the proposal, told Stevenson that his points had already been raised and overruled by the President.¹²⁸ This fact combined with his resentment at the President's neglect of him, was enough to forestall any action by Stevenson. One can only speculate about what might have occurred had Stevenson and Schlesinger made a joint call of protest to the President, to add their voices to those of Senator J. William Fulbright and Undersecretary of state Chester bowles (of whose dissenting memorandum to Rusk Kennedy was unaware).¹²⁹ Instead, Stevenson agreed weakly, "if it was national policy, he was prepared to make out the best possible case"¹³⁰

In his April 12 press conference, responding to a question about the widespread invasion rumors, President Kennedy said:

There will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United State Armed Forces. The basic issue in Cuba is not one between the United States and Cuba. It is between the Cubans themselves. I intend to see that we adhere to the principle and as I understand it this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti- Castro exiles from Cuba in this country.¹³¹

Unaware of how misleading the statement was, Stevenson was encouraged by the President's words.¹³² He was soon to be disillusioned.

In the dawn of Saturday, April 15, nine CIA- provided B-26 airplanes, piloted by CIA-trained Cuban exiles, took off from Nicaraguan airfields. Eight of the planes flew to Cuba, where they bombed the three major airfields, Ciudad Liberated, San Antonio de los Banos, and

¹²⁷ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 456

¹²⁸ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 238-39

¹²⁹ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 235-36

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 254

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 245

¹³² Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 31

Santiago. One of these soon developed engine trouble and landed in Key West, Florida. The ninth plane, painted as they all were in Cuban colors, flew directly to Miami International Airport, where the pilot declared himself a defector from the Cuban air force. The air strikes were not nearly as effective as had been hoped, in large part because the White House had inexplicably ordered a last-minute reduction in the strike force from sixteen to eight planes. Castro's air force consisted of approximately twelve American-made B-26's, twelve British-built Sea Furies, and eight of the more modern American T-33 trainers. Only half of these planes were destroyed.¹³³ It would prove a fatal error.

Later that morning, Dr. Raul Ron, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, rose in the General Assembly's Main Political Committee to charge the United States with the attacks. Frederick H. Boland of Ireland, presiding, gavelled Roa to order, reminding the Committee that the business on the agenda was the Congo: not Cuba. Russian Ambassador Valerian A. Zorin moved that the Congo debate be shelved and the motion was passed by the required two-thirds vote. (All member nations are represented on the Committee).¹³⁴

Regarding the floor, Roa mounted the attack:

"I have instructed by my government... to denounce before this Committee the vandalistic aggression carried out at dawn today against the territorial integrity of Cuba, with the most grave implications The responsibility for this act of imperialistic piracy falls squarely on the government of the United States".¹³⁵

Seven Cubans had been killed in the attacks, Roa said, and his government had recovered fragments of the bombs used.¹³⁶ The bombings, he added, were "undoubtedly the prelude to a larger-scale invasion attempt, organized, supplied and financed by the United States with the complicity of satellite dictatorships of the Western Hemisphere".¹³⁷

¹³³ Malcolm E. Smith, Jr., Kennedy's 13 Great Mistakes in the White House (New York: The National Forum of America, Inc., 1968), p.63

¹³⁴ Malcolm E. Smith, Jr., Kennedy's 13 Great Mistakes in the White House Inc., 1968), (New York: The National Forum of America, p.64

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 31

¹³⁷ Smith, 13 Great Mistakes, P. 64

Roa's charges threw the U.S. Mission into a flurry of research activity. Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and chief liaison between the Mission and the State Department, called the Department's "Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which in turn called the CIA. Word promptly and definitely came back that it was the work of genuine defectors and Cleveland passed this information on to Stevenson.¹³⁸

Relying on the only information available to him Stevenson denied Roa's charges: "No U.S. personnel participated. No U.S. Planes of any kind participated. The U.S.A. will do everything to ensure that no Americans participate in any actions against Cuba".¹³⁹ Not realizing they had been doctored by the CIA, Stevenson showed the Committee photographs of the planes which had landed in Florida, their Cuban insignia clearly visible. He read the Committee President Kennedy's non-Intervention declaration of April 12.¹⁴⁰

Almost immediately, the CIA's cover story began to crack. In Miami, skeptical reporters began to point to "the undisturbed dust and grease covering the bomb-bay fittings, the corroded electrical connections to rocket mounts, the uncooked guns". It all added up to a plane that had not been in combat.¹⁴¹ In New York, "Roa had no trouble in exploding the story. The B-26 flown to Miami by the 'defecting' pilot had a few features which made it recognizably different from Castro's B-26's."¹⁴²

Stevenson was furious about having been permitted to misinform the United Nations. That weekend, he conferred with Rusk and apparently aired his views on the whole project. Rusk was "remorseful at the position into which State had thrust its U.N. ambassador". His conversation with Stevenson helped convince him that another strike "would put the United States in an untenable position internationally and that no further strikes should be launched until

¹³⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 254.

The major writers on Kennedy foreign policy limit their commentary on Stevenson's role in the crisis to saying that he was uninformed about the invasion, lied to the U.N. as a consequence, and would have objected to the plan if he had known about it in advance. See: Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counter-revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc. 1973), p. 43; Louise Fitts Simons, *The Kennedy Doctrine* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 55; and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p.83

¹³⁹ Hans Tanner, *Counter-revolutionary Agent* (London: G.T. Foulis and Co. Ltd., 1962), p.72

¹⁴⁰ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 31

¹⁴¹ Smith, *13 Great Mistakes*, p. 65

¹⁴² Mario Lazo, *Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p.276

the plans could fly (or appear to fly) from the beachhead.¹⁴³ Rusk and McGeorge Bundy conferred by telephone with the President, who decided to order the second strike, planned to coincide with the actual invasion, canceled. Rusk then sent Bundy to New York to answer any more questions Stevenson might have.

The distress and confusion and uncertainty under which Adlai Stevenson was operating in these middle days of April, 1961 are reflected in some of the jottings he made while listening to the U.N. debate on Cuba. He was no longer sure of anything. At one point he wrote down a list of questions he wanted to ask McGeorge Bundy:

Mr. Bundy. Can I deny that the invasion came from Florida? Did JFK say “let us do in Cuba what we did in Guatemala - but let us not be afraid to say so(?)” Can U.S. deny “Hundreds of planes from Fla.to burn sugar canes”. Can U.S. deny one of main bases for planes in Apalachicola? 50 aerial incursions from U.S. U.S. planes dropped arms - listing them and leaflets. Is it true that these weapons are only available through treaty? “undeclared war”. 180000 gals. on peaceful cable ship - explain.¹⁴⁴

Clearly, some of these questions are absurd. But to Stevenson, nothing was absurd, it was all part of this nightmare. He seems to have lost track of time. He asked his staff for a chronology of the Pay of Pigs: “When did Tracy Barnes come? When did Bundy come? when did debate start?”¹⁴⁵

Yet even in despair and confusion, the Stevenson eloquence shone through. On the backs of two tally sheets on various resolutions proposed to handle the crisis he wrote.

Why do so many Communist speakers spring to Cuba’s defence? Cuba is the First great penetration of the Western Hemisphere by the new imperialism of international communism. They fear they may lose their foothold —The Spirit of liberty is the real rival. It May be crushed — but it will never die in Cuba — any more than it will die in Baltic Black Sea and... in Hungary and Tibet — in all armas

¹⁴³ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 255

¹⁴⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d. Stevenson Papers, Box 830

¹⁴⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d. Stevenson Papers, Box 830

crushed under the heels of aggressors — not patriats — but foreign armies who now shriek with horror about American aggression and armed mercenaries - When a handful of ill equipped sic; ill armed Cuban refugees try to gallantly and hopelessly... recover their lost land.

When black is white, when up is down, when day is night — when truth is falsehood - then perhaps the Soviet Union can denounce aggression.¹⁴⁶

On Monday morning, April 17, 1400 Cuban exiles landed on a beach of the Zapata Swamp and were abandoned there when the ship carrying their supplies and ammunition was sunk by the four Cuban T-33's not destroyed in the first air strike. The Joint Chiefs of staff and the CIA put heavy pressure on Kennedy to send in American armed forces. The President refused. Such a move would destroy the United States in world opinion and Kennedy, beginning to perceive the dimensions of the disaster, knew that the U.S. would need as much good will as she could get. In addition, such an attack could well tie up over half of America's conventional armed strength, leaving us totally incapable of responding to Communist aggression in other parts of the world, which an invasion would almost surely invite.¹⁴⁷ By Wednesday, all the Cubans had been killed or captured.

At the United Nations, an irate Raul Roa charged that the invasion was launched from Florida and Guatemala with U.S. backing. He promised that his country would not be defeated. "My tiny and heroic nation", he orated, 'is proving again the story of David and Goliath. May I cry "Fatherland or Death!" but we will conquer".¹⁴⁸

Stevenson's reply was sharp and flowing and often wittily sarcastic.

Dr. Roa, speaking for Cuba, has just charged the United States with aggression against Cuba and invasion coming from Florida. These charges are totally false and I deny them categorically. The United States had committed no aggression against Cuba and no offensive has been launched from Florida or from any other part of the United States.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 457

¹⁴⁸ Tanner, Counter-revolutionary Agent, p. 73

We sympathize with the desire of the people of Cuba - including those in exile who do not stop being Cubans merely because they could no longer stand to live in today's Cuba - we sympathize with their desire to seek Cuban independence and freedom. We hope that the Cuban people will succeed in doing what Castro's revolution never really tried to do: that is, to bring democratic processes to Cuba.¹⁴⁹

It was a long speech, lasting forty minutes, in it, Stevenson attacked Roa, talked about Castro's betrayal of the revolution, talked about Soviet aggression in Hungary. But he did not speak to the point, he did not talk about the Bay of Pigs invasion. He did not have the heart. He was lying to the U.N., and this time he knew it.

In order to understand how Adlai Stevenson could knowingly lie to the United Nations he respected to highly, it is necessary to recall the extraordinary sense of duty and the great patriotism of the man. His background had been one filled with pride in America from the political traditions in his family to his penchant for Lincolniana to his "Princeton in the nation's service" college days. He had a great investment in this country: he would not let it down.

We do not know what Rusk and Bundy told Stevenson in that weekend prior to the invasion. Perhaps their belated concern for the Ambassador's position mollified him somewhat. Perhaps they gave him a pep talk stressing how much the U.S. needed him now. Perhaps, as several critics have alleged, Stevenson agreed to stay on in return for the cancellation of the second air strike. But, whatever the precise reason, we know that Stevenson's sense of duty was appealed to. Although the crisis — and his resultant humiliation - was the product of men for whom he had little respect, the Ambassador realized that, in the long run, it was his country whose reputation was at stake here. He knew that his resignation at this time would come as a large and cruel blow. It was not right, in Stevenson's code of ethics, to abandon a cause - and certainly not the cause of the United States - simply because it was having hard times. In later years, this theme would recur again and again. "That's not the way we play the game", he would say over and over to Vietnam critics urging his resignation.¹⁵⁰ Now, in the Bay of Pigs crisis, Adlai Stevenson found himself torn between two of the largest elements in his personal code —

¹⁴⁹ Prosser, ed., *Ethic for Survival*, p. 291

¹⁵⁰ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 176

his sense of duty and his sense of pride. He chose to - or he had no choice but to - place the honour of his country above his own.

Yet, the fact that the decision was made did not make it any less excruciating. Afterwards, his friend Jane Dick found Stevenson in a shocked daze. He walked past her without recognition. She followed him back to the embassy suite and listened as he agonized. “He had told lies to the U.N. He had not known they were lies, but he had told them and they had been exposed... His credibility was destroyed, his effectiveness destroyed”.¹⁵¹ “Feeling that he could never hand in his resignation at so critical a moment as this, he felt worse when gossip had it that Kennedy had referred to him as ‘my official liar’. At the U.N. he was pained most of all by the conclusion a foreign delegate expressed to Norman Thomas: ‘What American can we ever believe?’”¹⁵²

Throughout the rest of the year — and indeed all the way into 1964 - Stevenson was to find himself the subject of some heated controversy over his role in the cancellation of the second air strike. In a speech in October, 1961. Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota charged “that it was Stevenson’s pressure ‘that caused postponement of the second and crucial phase of the invasion, the knocking out of T-33 planes which would later bomb the invasion craft”. Stevenson wrote the Congressman, stating “that I was uninformed about the plans for an air strike by U.S. forces in Cuba. Evidently you have overlooked my contradiction many months ago of your statement. I hope I need not conclude that you choose to overlook it”.¹⁵³

On October 31, Ambassador Stevenson was moved to telegram General James A. Van Fleet:

You are quoted by the press as stating that United States air cover for the Cuban invasion was called off at my insistence. You have apparently not familiarized yourself with public statements I issued on this long ago denying any such interference or even knowledge of the matter. The charge you have repeated is totally false.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 458

¹⁵² Muller, *Study in Values*, pp. 283-84

¹⁵³ Adlai E. Stevenson to Walter H. Judd, Oct. 20, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

¹⁵⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson to James A. Van Fleet, Oct. 31, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 838

Both Judd and Van Fleet were quick to retract their statements.¹⁵⁵

It is easy to see why various people might have wanted to lay the blame for the cancellation of the strike (and its disastrous consequences) at the feet of Adlai Stevenson. The charge that Adlai was “soft” on Communism had, in 1961, a lengthy past and a not inconsiderable future, as we shall see. It is not too difficult to imagine motives behind the charges of (Republican) Congressman Judd and General Van Fleet. But other charges were more difficult to understand,

The biggest brouhaha about the strike erupted in September of 1964 when Mario Lazo produced an article for the Reader's Digest promising to reveal “The Truth About the Bay of Pigs”. Lazo told about the cancellation and McGeorge Bundy’s “hurried trip to New York to confer with Stevenson. Said Hanson Baldwin, military analyst of the New York Times, some three months after the invasion: That cancellation was apparently the result of representations by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and through him by Mr. Stevenson”.¹⁵⁶

Stevenson wrote to Dewitt Wallace, the editor of Reader's Digest, protesting the implication that he was responsible for the strike cancellation.¹⁵⁷ Not only did Wallace defend Lazo, but he attacked Stevenson with some other contradictions Lazo and Digest editor James Monaghan had found in Stevenson's statements on Cuba. In 1962, Lazo had written to Stevenson requesting clarification on his participation in the Bay of Pigs decisions. The letter was answered by Elinor Green, Stevenson's Public Information Officer, who wrote:

“Mr. Stevenson had no information in advance of the Bay of Pigs incident, as he said only last week on a televised interview, and had no hand in any decisions concerning United States action or inaction. As he stated in answer to a question on the ‘Today’ Show, December 5th 1962, I wasn't told about the Bay of Pigs in advance, so I couldn't have had any disagreement”.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Geraldine M. Greagan to Adlai E. Stevenson, Nov. 6, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832; James A. Van Fleet to Adlai E. Stevenson, Nov. 1, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 838

¹⁵⁶ Mario Lazo, “Decision for Disaster: A Last — The Truth About the Bay of Pigs”, Reader's Digest, LXXXV (Sept. 1964), p. 257

¹⁵⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson to Dewitt Wallace, Sept. 16, 1964, Stevenson Papers, Box 883

¹⁵⁸ Elinor Green to Mario Lazo, Dec. 10, 1962, quoted in Dewitt Wallace to Adlai E. Stevenson, Sept. 28, 1964, Stevenson Papers, Box 883

Wallace pointed out that Monaghan and Lazo were aware that the Ambassador had indeed been told about the Bay of Pigs “approximately one week before the day of the invasion” by Tracy Barnes. He said that Dr. Lazo had deleted the entire section on this contradiction from his article because it “would unquestionably embarrass Mr. Stevenson”.¹⁵⁹

It was with some exasperation that Stevenson replied to Wallace that he had stated as unequivocally as possible that he “was not consulted or informed about any of the air strikes in connection with the Cuban invasion of April 1961. The gist of Monaghan’s memorandum to you seems to be that he and Dr. Lazo know better”. The Ambassador raised a skeptical eyebrow at the “unidentified reliable sources’ unnamed ‘highly respectable individuals’: and unspecified ‘sources we respected’ with whose statements the reporters defended their charges. Evidently sic my word is no match for ‘reliable sources’”, Stevenson concluded. “I guess there is nothing more I can say”.¹⁶⁰

There appears to be no good reason to doubt Stevenson’s word on this matter, there is no evidence to indicate that he had been in touch with JFK in person. His only contacts with insiders in the administration after the Bay of Pigs project began seem to have been telephone conversations with Rusk and the meeting with Bundy - and we do not know if either of them informed him about the second strike. And considering the relationship between Stevenson and Kennedy, it is highly unlikely that, even if Stevenson had been told about the strike and had objected, Kennedy would have changed his mind on the strength of Stevenson’s opinion. It is possible, however, to envision the following scenario: Rusk, who greatly respected Stevenson, may have been upset enough by the position the Ambassador had been placed in to be swayed by Stevenson’s general arguments against the project as a whole. He could then have indicated his change of opinion to the President, probably using Stevenson’s objections as support. And the President, shaken by Rusk’s turn-about, canceled the strike.

The contradiction Monaghan and Lazo pointed out about the extent of Stevenson’s foreknowledge of the Bay of Pigs plan is largely a matter of semantics. In his last letter to Wallace, Stevenson states that he was not “informed about any of the air strikes in connection with the Cuban invasion”, whereas in the television interviews he had generalized this to “I

¹⁵⁹ DeWitt Wallace to Adlai E. Stevenson, Sept. 28, 1964 Stevenson Papers, Box 883

¹⁶⁰ Adlai E. Stevenson to DeWitt Wallace, Oct. 15, 1964, Stevenson Papers, Box 883

wasn't told about the Bay of Pigs in advance".¹⁶¹ The distinction between the strikes and the invasion as a whole is a fine one. (A second possibility would be that Stevenson may have shared Plimpton's view that the April 8 briefing "bore no resemblance to what happened" ¹⁶² In this case, the Ambassador may well have believed that he was not told in advance about the Bay of Pigs.)

Pierre Salinger reports that "Governor Stevenson later told me that the Bay of Pigs crisis had been the most 'humiliating experience' of his years in government service". ¹⁶³ Yet, even after a decent period of time passed, even when offered a chance to run for the Senate from Illinois — a gracious and respectable "out" — Stevenson remained at the U.N. He allowed his indignation to be lulled by the realization that Kennedy himself "had been almost as much a dupe of others, almost as much a puppet of events" as he. ¹⁶⁴ They had both been victims of the eager experts of the CIA and the armed forces. Stevenson allowed his anger at Kennedy to be dissolved by hearing that Kennedy had told Schlesinger before the crisis, "The integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our great national assets. I don't want anything to be done which might jeopardize that".¹⁶⁵ Stevenson failed to see that in remaining as Ambassador under the conditions imposed by Kennedy, he was fouling that integrity and straining that credibility far more than the Bay of Pigs could have done.

¹⁶¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in DeWitt Wallace to Adlai E. Stevenson, Sept. 28, 1964, Stevenson Papers, Box 883

¹⁶² Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 30

¹⁶³ Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 147

¹⁶⁴ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 458

¹⁶⁵ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 253

3. JOHN, DICK, AND ADLAI: THE ILLINOIS SENATE RACE

The Bay of Pigs crisis had a profound effect on John Kennedy and on the structure of his government. As a result of the crisis, the president learned to be more skeptical in taking the advice of experts and specialists, and to rely more and more on the members of his own staff and the people he personally had brought into government. As Theodore Sorensen puts it in explaining the President's directive that he and Robert Kennedy should participate more in meetings on foreign policy: "Basically he wanted us in those meetings to observe the judgments of foreign-policy specialists he did not know well with the sceptical eyes of two generalists he did know well".¹⁶⁶ "In the Future", Arthur Schlesinger adds, "he made sure that he had the unfettered and confidential advice of his own people. For our part, we resolved to be less acquiescent the next time. The Bay of Pigs gave us a license for the impolite inquiry and the rude comments".¹⁶⁷ This distrust of experts and specialists, moreover, was directed most pointedly at the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the agencies most directly responsible for the creation and implementation of the Bay of Pigs plan. Control over American foreign policy was placed more firmly in the hands of the State Department, where it belonged.¹⁶⁸ (State was certainly not above reproach in the Bay of Pigs incident — but several of its lower echelon people, as JFK later learned, had opposed the project, and Dean Rusk seems to have been extraordinarily adept at not taking a stand on crisis issues, so State largely escaped the President's postmortem wrath).

Adlai Stevenson soon found that the harm done to his reputation and effectiveness at the U.N. was not irreparable, as he had originally thought. The delegates were quick to see that he was in no way responsible for the Bay of Pigs actions. Moreover, not a few of them had found themselves similarly embarrassed by major policy decisions of which their governments had failed to inform them.¹⁶⁹ "By enduring the injustice with (in public) dignity and forbearance he garnered their sympathy without losing their respect. They continued to believe in his good will; they continued to trust his word".¹⁷⁰ Stevenson, always conscious - and a little vain - of his standing among his fellow delegates, told interviewers for the *Heart* papers in May: "I have been

¹⁶⁶ Theodore C. Sorensen, *The Kennedy Legacy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p.79

¹⁶⁷ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 778

¹⁶⁸ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 460

¹⁶⁹ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 222

¹⁷⁰ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 459

pleased that my defense of the United States Government's position on Cuba has not seemed to have impaired the personal regard I have enjoyed among the membership".¹⁷¹

As for the personal regard Stevenson enjoyed with Kennedy - and vice-versa - some have argued that the Bay of Pigs served to soothe their relations. "Certainly the two men felt that they had been in the same boat on stormy seas, and each admired the other's behaviour during and after the storm".¹⁷² The realization that Kennedy too could taste defeat - and rise above it - impressed Stevenson, who had previously tended to regard the President as a spoiled young man for whom everything came too easily. Kennedy, aware of the tremendous row a public Stevenson dissent or resignation would have created, was grateful that "Stevenson soldiered on". Both the President and Secretary Rusk assured the Ambassador that we would never again be left uninformed about anything in which he and the U.N. might become involved, and even as avoid a Kennedy critic as Richard Walton admits "that to an extent this promise was kept".¹⁷³ But being informed about policy and having a hand in the formulating of that policy are two very different things. The new structure of policy making, oriented to Kennedy staffers and loyalists, worked against an increased involvement by Stevenson in this area. And the increase of State Department control over foreign policy resulted in "emphasizing the subordination of the U.N. Mission and ... diminishing the value of the Cabinet rank ... assigned to Mr. Stevenson..."¹⁷⁴

For a time, the lines of communication between the White House and the U.N. Mission in the Waldorf Astoria seemed more open and less strained. Then, on July 9, 1961, Charles Bartlett, the journalist who had introduced John Kennedy to Jackie, published an article in the Chattanooga Times stating that Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles was in disfavour with the White House. Bowles, an old friend and follower of Stevenson, had taken the lead in reorganizing the State Department along the lines of the liberal Democratic philosophy for which Stevenson had long been the most eloquent spokesman. Bowles had begun to clear out some of the old-line Dullesian diplomats, and to bring talented new blood into the Department and its embassies around the globe. He had attempted to reorient the Department's focus toward the underdeveloped countries as opposed to Europe, and toward political solutions to world problems

¹⁷¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in New York Journal- American, May 21, 1961, p.15-L, in Stevenson Papers, Box 846

¹⁷² Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 459

¹⁷³ Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 33

¹⁷⁴ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 460

as opposed to military ones.¹⁷⁵ But it was not what Bowles did that got him in trouble with the President, but how, he did it. “Bowles spoke the unabashed liberal language of the New Deal; ... the Junior officers of the Second World War disagreed, not with the sentiment, but with that they considered the sentimentality. The New Frontier put a premium on quick, tough, laconic, decided people: it was easily exasperated by more meditative types.”¹⁷⁶ The difference between Kennedy and Bowles was one of style rather than substance — a difference with which Adlai Stevenson could sympathize all, too readily.

Throughout the next week, Bowles began to receive non-too-subtle suggestions from Rusk and Kennedy that he might be happier as ambassador to Brazil or Chile. Convinced that what he was doing was right and important and believing that the problem was basically one of undefined areas of authority, the Undersecretary decided that he would not step down unless the President asked him to publicly and explained his reasons.¹⁷⁷ Bowles had a long career in public service behind him (among other things he had been a Congressman, Governor of Connecticut, and Ambassador to India) and his many - and influential - friends sprang quickly to his defence. Among them was Adlai Stevenson who, reached by transatlantic telephone in Florence, advised Bowles not to quit. And on Sunday, July 16, the Ambassador wired the President:

Don't know details but concerned by rumors of imminent dismissal of Powles or resignation under fire. If true suggest might be disturbing to friendly people abroad and at home who believe he has been right and has tried to introduce new people and attitudes in department after long Dulles regime. Perhaps I could help avoid any embarrassment to you if any change could be delayed until return from his trip and I had chance to talk with him.¹⁷⁸

Kennedy received the wire while weekendng in Hyannis Port. The next Monday, after reading a New York Times story predicting that he would ask for Bowles' resignation, the President told Arthur Schlesinger: “This started out as a management problem. But these stories today have transformed it into a political problem. It's no longer a personnel question: now it has

¹⁷⁵ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*. p. 405

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 406. See also: Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, pp. 80-90

¹⁷⁷ Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p.354

¹⁷⁸ Cablegram from Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy, July 16, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

become a symbolic question”.¹⁷⁹ Kennedy was all too well aware that Bowles, like Stevenson, had a significant personal political following. Moreover, the press —and Bowles himself - had succeeded in uniting that following with those of Bowles friends Stevenson, former Michigan governor G. Mennen Williams, and labour leader Walter Reuther. Any attempt by the President to remove Bowles would be taken as a slap to the liberal wing of the Democratic party, and the political repercussions for the President - who was always unsure of his hold over the left-wing of the party — could be devastating. So JFK backed down. He publicly reaffirmed his confidence in Bowles and said that the Undersecretary would remain in his job.

But Bowles’ victory was a fleeting one. After the furor created by the Bartlett article had subsided, Kennedy waited a few months before announcing a series of personnel changes in the State Department, the prime goal of which was the removal of Bowles from his post as Undersecretary. “Bowles, it was announced, had accepted a there-to-fore nonexistent post as Special Adviser for Asian, African and Latin-American affairs in the White House, a post whose responsibilities and authority were undefined and which the press promptly recognized as a face-saver”.¹⁸⁰ Bowles remained in the post for slightly more than a year before succeeding John Kenneth Galbraith as Ambassador to India.

Adlai Stevenson was fully aware of the implications the Bowles affair had for his own relations with the White House. During the crisis period in July, Bowles had written him a lengthy letter describing the situation and his feelings about it. The last paragraph must have rung in the U.N. Ambassador’s ears for a long time to come:

Adlai, forgive me for this long letter, but I did want you to have the full story, particularly because the group who have misled the President in such an extraordinary way about me have no greater regard for you.¹⁸¹

Within a matter of months, most of Washington was convinced that it was to witness an encore of the Bowles charade, with a script slightly altered and Adlai Stevenson this time in the lead role. As early as June 5, 1961, when he received a letter from Illinois Commerce Commissioner Cyrus J. Colter, Stevenson had been repeatedly confronted with the suggestion

¹⁷⁹ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 409

¹⁸⁰ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 470.

¹⁸¹ Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, p. 625

that he return to Illinois to run against: Everett McKinley Dirksen for the Senate in 1962.¹⁸² It was an entiring thought. The Senate's Minority Leader had been a bitter detractor of Adlai Stevenson ever since the latter's governorship.¹⁸³ The idea of retiring Dirksen from office was an appealing one. But throughout the summer of 1961, Stevenson seems to have regarded the possibility as little more than idle political gossip. To his friend Frank McAdams, who had written to inquire into his thoughts on the matter, Stevenson replied breezily:

The suggestion that you make interests me in a vague sort of way, but I suspect the powers that be have other ideas. Moreover, I am not sure how easy it would be to extricate myself here, were other circumstances propitious.

At all events, if you care to keep me advised I shall appreciate it. And I am flattered by your thought of me again after so many years.¹⁸⁴

In September, in a somewhat more serious vein. Stevenson wrote to Walter Frank, who had informed him of the support of the Dupage County Council of Democratic Clubs:

You tempt me! But I am afraid I am no hopelessly involved here that I could not consider leaving my post until the end of the General Assembly at Christmas time. I am sure you will understand my predicament and the difficulty in these circumstances of urging political leaders to defer decision.

But the Ambassador's ego was obviously pricked. He issued a warm invitation to the Dupage County people to come discuss the matter with him the next time they happened to be in New York.¹⁸⁵

Most accounts date the beginning of Stevenson's interest in the Senate candidacy to Senator Paul Douglas' statement of support in late October. But there are indications that he was considering these summer proposals a little more seriously than he let on, and at least seriously

¹⁸² Cyrus J. Colter to Adlai E. Stevenson, June 5, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

¹⁸³ Brown, *Stevenson*, pp. 186-87

¹⁸⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson to Frank McAdams, Aug. 21, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

¹⁸⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson to Walter Frank, Sept. 18, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

enough to be discussing the topic with his family. For on September 19, Adlai E. Stevenson III, who now occupies Dirksen's old Senate seat, was prompted to write his father;

... Getting messed up in Illinois politics would, it seems to me, be descending to a very low level, relatively speaking. Outside of being President, and perhaps Sec. of State, your stature in the world and, therefore, your influence, is best served by staying where you are.

Add all the problems of getting nominated and elected, and I guess I line up against the idea, subject to the validity of my assumption that your relations with Rusk and JFK are good and that you aren't getting too beat up physically.¹⁸⁶

The possibility of a Stevenson candidacy first came to public attention on October 25, 1961, when the New York Post carried an article in which Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois stated that the U.N. Ambassador headed his list of possible opponents for Dirksen. Stevenson declined to indicate any interest in the nomination. A press aide at the U.N. told the Post "that Stevenson had never uttered a word that would indicate he had any interest in politics now. Intent on pursuing a bipartisan foreign policy, Stevenson was fearful that if he did not keep out of politics, he would compromise his usefulness at the U.N.", the aide said".¹⁸⁷

Privately, Stevenson wrote Douglas;

Thanks, my dear friend, for suggesting me an Dirksen's opponent. In that role, I am tempted. But I am afraid no one else is tempted to tempt me! And besides, it would be hard for me to leave my present post in the midst of all our accumulating troubles. But you were gallant and gracious to think of me, and I flattered.¹⁸⁸

This letter is a far cry from a firm refusal of the idea. Especially, considering Stevenson's well-known habitual reluctance to undertake political campaigns, the letter could very easily be taken as simply playing hard-to-get. Kenneth S. Davis believes that Stevenson early recognized the movement for his Senate candidacy as "a formidable seaport of defense with which "to protect

¹⁸⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson III to Adlai E. Stevenson, Sept. 19, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 836

¹⁸⁷ New York post, Oct. 25, 1961, p. 31, located in Stevenson Papers, Box 835

¹⁸⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson to Paul Douglas, Nov. 5, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 830

himself against the kind of humiliation Bowles had been forced to endure.” Davis suggests that Stevenson’s use of the movement was a stroke of political genius. By declining to quash the boomlet firmly and convincingly, he created a situation in which one of two things would happen. Either the President would have to issue strong public vote of confidence in Stevenson in order to get him to remain at the U.N. or Stevenson could make a gracious and prestigious exit from the U. N. claiming that duty to party forced him to leave the United Nations for the Senate.

The press accounts of Douglas statement unleashed a flood of letters, cables, and phone calls from Illinoisans urging Stevenson to run. Stevenson was pleased to note that one of the callers was Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, the czar of Illinois Democrats. To all, Stevenson reiterated his professions of flattery, lack of interest, and commitment to the U.N.¹⁸⁹

Then, in late November (Bowles got the axe over Thanksgiving weekend), Stevenson lunched with actress Geraldine Page and U.N. Correspondent Milt Freudenheim of the Chicago Daily News. He “indicated he was seriously considering running for the Senate”. Freudenheim immediately contacted the Daily News and Daley was informed of the conversation within hours. The mayor called Stevenson the next day and offered him the nomination.¹⁹⁰ “Stevenson’s response was a typical display of that indecisiveness that was actually a process, a strategy of decision-making. He said he’d ‘have to think it over’ and ‘talk it over with the President’ before he said Yes or No”.¹⁹¹

The Ambassador met with JFK at 11 a.m. on Saturday, December 2 to discuss Latin American affairs. Both men were in a hurry: Kennedy to go to Philadelphia to attend the Army-Navy football game: Stevenson to return to the U.N. to give a speech opposing the admission of Red China.¹⁹² (Stevenson personally favoured the admission of Communist China, and the fact that American policy obliged him to give this speech had certainly increased his displeasure with his job.¹⁹³) The Ambassador told the President briefly about Daley’s offer, and JFK “casually said that he hoped Stevenson would stay at the U.N., but that the decision was Stevenson’s”.¹⁹⁴ As Stevenson left the Oval Office, he told White House reporters that he was not planning to run

¹⁸⁹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 470

¹⁹⁰ “Adlai Decides”, Newsweek, LVIII (Dec. 18, 1961), 28. See also: Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 470

¹⁹¹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 471

¹⁹² “Adlai Decides”, 28

¹⁹³ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 470

¹⁹⁴ “Adlai Decides”, 28

for the Senate, but mentioned “in a truly Machiavellian stroke” that Daley had asked him to run.¹⁹⁵

The publication of the story about Daley’s offer produced a new avalanche of advice from Stevenson’s friends. Paul Simon, a young state senator who had been campaigning hard for the Senate nomination, wrote Stevenson offering to drop out of the race in the Ambassador’s favour.¹⁹⁶ Another friend wrote, “Get the hell out of the U.N. and into some place where you will be a voice and not merely an echo”.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, John Bartlow Martin expressed his opinion of the possible Senate race in the following eloquent telegram: “Why”?¹⁹⁸ An office memorandum between Stevenson staffers Elinor Green and Roxane Eberlein shows that, as of December 18, 1961, Stevenson’s “fan mail” on the Senate matter broke down as follows: “173 stay-where-you-ares, 32 please runs, 11 we support you no-matter-whats, and 11 requiring no answer (mostly abusive)”.¹⁹⁹

Stevenson was quite upset by the lack of enthusiasm the President had shown in urging him not to resign. He reviewed his grievances with his intimates. They’re holding me in too tightly’, he complained to friends. “They are changing words in my speeches’. ‘They’ could only have meant the President and the State Department”.²⁰⁰

One of the people he spoke to Saturday night was Max Frankel of the New York Times. In a front-page story that the President read the next morning, Frankel wrote that “Stevenson. had told the President that he would decide by January 1 whether or not he would resign his U.N. post, and thought he had declined to say what Kennedy’s reaction had been, his report of the conversation suggested that Kennedy ‘made no strenuous effort to hold Stevenson in his position of cabinet rank’”.²⁰¹

Frankel also mentioned that Stevenson’s departure from the United Nations “would increase speculation already rife over the administration’s dropping of prominent members of

¹⁹⁵ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 471

¹⁹⁶ Paul Simon, “Young People Loved Him”, in Doyle, ed. As We Knew Adlai, p. 135

¹⁹⁷ Gerald Johnson to Adlai E. Stevenson, Dec.3, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

¹⁹⁸ Telegram, John Bartlow Martin to Adlai E. Stevenson, Dec. 3, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

¹⁹⁹ Memorandum, Elinor Green to Roxane Eberlein, Dec. 18, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

²⁰⁰ “Adlai Decides”, 28

²⁰¹ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 471.

the liberal wing of the party....²⁰² This statement built on the then-current rumor that Daley's call to Stevenson had been made at the request of President Kennedy. Robert W. Richards of the San Diego Union reported:

This information was learned to have been dropped in high Democratic circles by a member of the Kennedy family, who confided:

“We’ve got Chester Bowles out of the No.2 spot in the State Department with a minimum of bellow from the left, and Stevenson is next on the list”.²⁰³

Dick Daley's role in this incident proved to be a topic of great controversy. According to some sources, he was conspiring with Kennedy to get Stevenson out of the U.N. This theory fell apart when Kennedy later persuaded Stevenson to remain on the job. Others believed that Daley was conspiring with Stevenson to get the Ambassador more influence in the White House.²⁰⁴ This story is highly implausible in view of the fact that the Daley-Stevenson relationship was as bad as, if not worse than, that between Kennedy and Stevenson. The mayor and his former governor had had a final falling out at the 1960 convention. At the one point during the convention when Stevenson seriously considered seeking the nomination, he turned to his home state to see if he had a base of support. After much trouble, he reached Daley, who had been avoiding his calls.

Daley, in haste, and on the floor, informed Stevenson he had no support, Stevenson asked whether he had no support, period, or whether he had no support because it was the delegates' impression he was not a candidate, Daley replied that Stevenson had no support, period. He might have left it there. But he felt called on to add that Stevenson had had no support in Illinois' 1956 delegation either – and that he, Daley, had personally held it together for his former Governor.²⁰⁵

Daley-Stevenson conspiracy on anything was highly unlikely.

²⁰² Ibid

²⁰³ San Diego Union, Dec. 5, 1961, p.8-2, in Stevenson Papers, Box 835

²⁰⁴ Kenneth Crawford, “The Stevenson Story”, *Newsweek*. LVIII, (Dec. 18, 1961), 34

²⁰⁵ White, *Making of the President 1960*, p. 193

What is plausible is that each man was more than willing to use the other to achieve certain ends. Kenneth Davis maintains that, because of the 1960 incident, Stevenson felt no qualms about leading the mayor on a little over the candidacy. He knew that Daley could not afford to pass up the chance that Stevenson, by far the strongest possible candidate, might run. So, despite his letter to the DuPage County Democrats, Stevenson decided to let Daley cool his heels a bit while Stevenson used the mayor's offer to lend credence to his candidacy and thus strengthen his position vis a vis JFK.

Daley, too, had some very practical political reasons for offering the nomination to Stevenson. As an article in Chicago's American explained it, Daley had been repeatedly stymied in his efforts to increase revenues by raising Chicago's sales tax by the Republican-dominated Illinois state legislature. "His objective, of course, was to have headed the state ticket with such a powerful Democratic vote getter that an avalanche of ballots would have swept into office a sufficient number of adherents to break the Republican hold on the General Assembly".²⁰⁶

By Sunday, December 3, President Kennedy had been convinced that the Stevenson candidacy was a matter to be taken seriously. The President was spending the weekend at his new home in Glen Ora, Virginia, and Stevenson had previously been invited to Sunday lunch. JFK went out of his way to make up for whatever warmth he had lacked the previous day, and he talked privately with Stevenson for four hours.²⁰⁷

He told Stevenson that he would feel even more frustrated as a junior Senator than he was at the U.N. and reminded him of Alben Barkley, who when he returned to the Senate after his Vice-Presidency, was just another freshman at the bottom of the list. "I said we needed him in the U.N.", Kennedy said to Schlesinger later, "and that I counted on him to stick around".²⁰⁸

Stevenson left Virginia impressed and pleased, and his friends were soon telling reporters that, this time, the President "was 'vehement in insisting he stay in his job'".²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Chicago's American, Dec. 8, 1961, p.1, in Stevenson Papers, Box 835

²⁰⁷ Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 471

²⁰⁸ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 763

²⁰⁹ "Adlai Decides", 28

By Monday, the United Nations began to react to the possibility of losing its most distinguished delegate. Members were reported as being offended and chagrined. “surely a U.N. ambassador ought to outrank a mere senator!”²¹⁰

On Tuesday, Stevenson decided that he had won this round decisively and that it was time to call it quits. He telephoned Daley to decline the nomination and issued the following press release:

I have today informed Mayor Daley of Chicago that I cannot be the Democratic candidate for the Senate. In recent conferences, the President has greatly reinforced my view that I can beat serve him and the country in the field of foreign policy. I am most grateful for the good will of my party leaders in Illinois and am mindful of the great honour they have done me.²¹¹

The White House was quick to follow this with a statement by the President:

I am delighted with Governor Stevenson’s decision, I expressed to him this week-end my emphatic hope that he will continue at the United Nations and pay an expanding role in the making and execution of our policy. I believe that his work is vital to the cause of peace and of top importance to the country.²¹²

Thus the incident drew to a close. But what of Stevenson: was he ever really serious about making the Senate race? The evidence seems to be strongly to the contrary. On December 18, 1961, Stevenson wrote his old friend Bill Blair:

The Senate race in Illinois was really no temptation, but I wanted to pay Daley and the people out there the courtesy of serious consideration and give the President his opportunity if he wanted it.

²¹⁰ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 471

²¹¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Press Release, Dec. 5, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 835

²¹² John F. Kennedy, Press Release, Dec. 5, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

Things have worked out very well and I think relations with the Department and the White House have been, on the whole, improved.²¹³

A year later, Stevenson informed a reporter why was reviewing his years with the Kennedy Administration: “I must tell you that I never considered running against Dirksen at any time. . I felt the United Nations assignment was more consistent with my interests and talents, if any”.²¹⁴

Stevenson hoped to use the Senate controversy as a double-edged sword. He wanted it to serve defensively as a safeguard against public humiliation. And he wanted it to serve offensively, to win him greater freedom at the Mission and a greater voice in policy making. This is reflected in a letter he wrote to the President the day after declining the Senate nomination. Stevenson had heard that: JFK had been disturbed by remarks he had made to the press after their Saturday meeting at the White House. He was writing to clarify what he might have caused. But he also used the occasion to press for some improvements he would have liked to have seen made:

I want you to know that I said — I think in every case - that the work here was incomparably more important than being another Senator. I made no criticism whatever of my relations with you, Secretary Rusk, of anyone else, but I did suggest to one or two of the more informed people that I thought the traditional practice of the State Department in sending minute instructions to the Mission in New York could well be modified in the direction of greater autonomy.²¹⁵

Never let it be said that Adlai Stevenson was not a good politician.

²¹³ Adlai E. Stevenson to William McCornick Blair, Jr., Dec. 18, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 829

²¹⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson to John Steele, Dec. 10, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

²¹⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy, Dec. 6, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Box 832

4. "THE BITTER AFTERTASTE": THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

On Tuesday, October 16, 1962, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson boarded Eastern Airlines 9 a.m. shuttle flight from New York to Washington, D.C.²¹⁶ He looked forward to a pleasant, relatively uneventful day. He was due at a routine press conference at the State Department at 11 a.m., and at 1 p.m. he was to be a guest at a White House luncheon honouring the Crown Prince of Libya. Stevenson expected to return to New York on the 5 p.m. shuttle that night.²¹⁷

After the luncheon, President Kennedy indicated that he wished to talk privately with Stevenson. Leading the Ambassador up to his private study on the second floor of the White House, JFK showed Stevenson aerial photographs of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and missile sites in Cuba. The President had been informed of this Russian handiwork only that morning.²¹⁸ "'We'll have to something quickly', the President said. 'I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render the weapons inoperable'".²¹⁹

Stevenson was quick to recognize the threat posed by the missiles. "No politician," he remarked, could have missed the significance of Russian missiles in Cuba. We just had to get them out of there".²²⁰ Nevertheless, he was shaken by the militaristic approach which Kennedy seemed automatically to be applying to the situation. In March, 1965, he told Elie Abel, "I was a little alarmed that Kennedy's first consideration should have been the air strike. I told him that sooner or later we would have to go to the U.N., and it was vitally important that we go there with a reasonable case".²²¹ "Let's not go to an air strike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution", he advised the President.²²²

Keeping his promise that Stevenson would be involved in all crucial foreign policy decisions, the president requested that he remain in Washington and take part in the consultations

²¹⁶ Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: J.D. Lippincott Co., 1966), p.45

²¹⁷ AES Schedule, Stevenson Papers, Box 846.

²¹⁸ John L. Steele, "The Adlai Stevenson Affair", *Life*, LIII, No.24 (Dec. 14, 1962), 44

²¹⁹ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 49

²²⁰ Fitzsimons, *Kennedy Doctrine*, pp. 163-64

²²¹ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p.49n.

²²² *Ibid*

of his advisers which had begun that morning. Stevenson agreed to participate to the extent that his U.K. duties would allow. Before parting, he advised the President that he should not cancel his scheduled campaign appearances lest it cause alarm.

One can only guess at Stevenson's thoughts as he left this momentous briefing to join the Presidential advisers in Undersecretary George Ball's conference room in the State Department. Perhaps he thought back to the interview he had given the Hearst papers in May, 1961, when he had been asked on what grounds the U.S. could object to the Russians placing missiles in Cuba, since we had missile bases all around their borders. At the time, Stevenson had replied:

I would think that the American treaties forbid the establishment in this hemisphere of military installations by a foreign power, just as they call for concerted action against intervention by a foreign power.²²³

But, as Stevenson and the panel of interviewers had then agreed, the chances of such an occasion arising were slim.²²⁴

More probably, Stevenson's mind went to the memorandum he had received only the day before from his press aide Clayton Fritchey. Fritchey was reporting on a luncheon meeting he had with Hike Polonik, the Press Chief for the Soviet delegation to the U. N. and a top Soviet press official named Chenyukov. The memo read:

The chief impression I came away with that the Russians are genuinely apprehensive over a serious Cuban incident arising out of exile activities... Specifically they are concerned over the possibility of some of exiles attacking a Soviet boat or one associated with the bloc, and the concern on their part has been greatly heightened by the State Department statement of last week that the exiles, in effect, were free to act on their own. They fear that this provides an opportunity for the exiles to Provoke a crisis which neither the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. would want. (Emphasis added).²²⁵

²²³ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in New York Journal- American, May 21, 1961, p.15-L, in Stevenson Papers, Box 835

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Memorandum, Clayton Fritchey to Adlai E. Stevenson, Oct. 15, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

Stevenson could now understand the Russians anxiety. The possibility of the Cuban exiles capturing a ship carrying the missiles, or perhaps detonating the warheads in an attack was indeed laden with crisis.

The advisers Stevenson joined that afternoon referred to themselves variously as “the War Cabinet, the war Council, or just ‘the Group’”.²²⁶ Later, they wild dubbed the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or as reporters Charles Bartlett and Stuart Alsop popularized it, “ExComm”. ExComm consisted of “Some fourteen or fifteen men who had little in common except the President’s desire for their judgment”: Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Undersecretary George Ball; Latin-American Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin; Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson; former Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric; Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze; General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; CIA Director John McCone; Attorney General Robert Kennedy; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; White House staff members McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorensen, and Kenneth O’Donnell, Vice President Lyndon Johnson; Deputy Director of the USIA Donald Wilson; former Secretary of State Dean Acheson; former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovetts and Ambassador Stevenson.²²⁷

President Kennedy had stressed the great need for secrecy to the group, warning that our initiative would be lost if the Russians learned that we knew about the missiles. Accordingly, for the first few days at least, the members of the committee tried to keep as many of their previously scheduled appointments possible. Attendance at committee meetings was in a state of constant flux. Whether by accident or design, for example, Stevenson and his old nemesis Dean Acheson were never in the room at the same time. “Acheron, long before the missile crisis, had marked Stevenson down as woolly- minded and soft. Stevenson, for his part, tended to put Acheson in the ‘warhawk’ party when, in private conversations, he allowed himself to criticize Administration foreign policy”.²²⁸ The ExComm members were cautioned against telling their wives and secretaries about the crisis. Several found themselves doing their own typing of material related to the situation. “Some of my own basic papers were done in my own

²²⁶ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 115

²²⁷ Sorensen, Kennedy, p.760

²²⁸ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 57

handwriting'. Dean Rusk said to an interviewer after the crisis, 'in order to limit the possibility of further spread.'²²⁹

The discussions that afternoon outlined briefly conceivable response to the Russian move. These talks, like most that first week, were brain-storming sessions. The President purposely, stayed away from most of them to increase the candour, spontaneity, and freedom of expression of the participants.²³⁰ The men threw out ideas at random, argued vehemently for them, and yet felt perfectly free to take the exact opposite stance at the next meeting. Kenneth O'Donnell recalls:

Sitting in on those historic meetings, watching a group of men with high intelligence and impressive administrative and diplomatic experience grouping for the first time with an army's armed threat against the United States. I was taken aback by the uncertainty that many of them showed under pressure, the inability of some to make a thoughtful judgment and stick to it, without changing their minds the next day.²³¹

Most of the participants, including Stevenson, later attributed the openness — and thus the success- of the meetings to Robert Kennedy. It was the Attorney General who, reinforced by his relationship to the President, asked the probing questions and challenged the basic assumptions under which these men were working.

At the time, however, many of the older men especially were not to appreciative of Bobby's contribution, and were offended by the brashness of the younger man. "Adlai Stevenson made no secret of his own early distaste, comparing the Attorney General to a bull in a china shop".²³²

That first Tuesday afternoon, the alternatives discussed ran the gamut from no action whatsoever to the invasion of Cuba. Secretary McNamara did not see the new missiles as a threat,

²²⁹ Ibid., pp. 48-49

²³⁰ Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1971), p.11

²³¹ Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers with Joe McCarthy, "*Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye*": *Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (New York: Pocket Books, 1973), p.361

²³² Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 58

since the Russians already had the capability of launching a nuclear attack on the United States from within their own borders. “A missile is a missile”, he said. ‘It makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile fired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba”, McNamara. along with Ball, Gilpatric, Thompson, and Bundy, opposed direct military action. McNamara’s Assistant Secretary Nitze felt that the differential in warning time between missiles fired from Russia and from Cuba would greatly reduce the effectiveness of our defensive systems. He thus proposed an air strike to wipe out the missile bases. General Taylor and Secretary Dillon agreed with him.²³³

It is not record that Stevenson took a stance in the consultations Tuesday afternoon, or when the committee met with the President again at 6.30 that night. His thoughts however, are clearly reflected in the “memo to self” he wrote on October 17, probably early in the morning. First, he considered the air strike proposal and his mind took a world tour as he foresaw the probable international reactions to such a move. He reasoned that an attack on the NATO bases was equally well justified as one on Cuba, and wondered if we would not be subject to “criticism in NATO for rash action endangering Europe and the world”. He wondered if an air strike against Cuba would not cause a rift in the Latin American nations and lead “some (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay) to say that they don’t want such protection, that the U.S. is not acting in their interest or with their approval and consent”. He considered the long-range practicality of a strike. “The sites in Cuba could be quickly replaced. Are we going to invade and occupy?”²³⁴

Stevenson then turned his attention to a detailed outline of the steps the President should take. He considered first the announcement the President would eventually have to make to the nation, speculating that “probably disclosures or rumours will be swift and he may have to say something by Friday or Saturday”. Stevenson’s prime concern was that Kennedy should tell the nation and the world the full and true facts about the missiles. More immediately, Stevenson proposed the following course of action:

1. A US official (preferably one who was known to be sympathetic with the original Castro revolution) should go at once on an unpublicized visit to Castro carrying a message

²³³ Ibid., pp. 51-53. See also Kennedy. *Thirteen Days*. pp.11-13

²³⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson, Memo to Self, Oct. 17, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

from the Press, and proofs. The message should demand that Castro get rid of IRBMs or we will.....

2. Message of unissary goes simultaneously to Kruschev sic to deliver the President's Message and exhibit proofs... This message recites the message to Castro, including the demand to get rid of IREM.

3. After — or at the same time? — the visits to Castro and Khrushchev, we notify the U.K., France, Germany and then all of the NATO council about what we know, what we are going to do and when...

4. Also a day after (?) the messages are delivered to Castro and Khrushchev we call an OAS meeting to tell them the facts and proposed action — and justification under Inter-American agreements. We must be prepared to make a full public disclosure and act promptly after the OAS meeting which will leak.

5. Second Presidential announcement about the the steps taken followed by immediate strike by bombers at sites...²³⁵

Stevenson put those thoughts down on paper and at that time at least, sincerely believed that this was a sane and feasible course of action. Yet it is necessary to understand—as the Kennedys most certainly did not - that it was Stevenson's way to take a problem and explore it - verbally and even on paper — from every possible angle. Stevenson did not believe that discususing seriously the vices and virtues of a particular plan of action committed him to it. This openness was in the nature of the man and of his job. As a man “he liked to examine a question and then examine it, to ‘cast up the accounts’, as he used to any at his U.N. staff meetings”.²³⁶ He was always willing to admit that he might be wrong, or that he might have overlooked a perception of the problem which could be important. The Ambassadorship to the United Nations demanded this kind of flexibility. Most ambassadors have to worry about how a decision will affect the United States and the country to which they have been sent. The U.N. Ambassador

²³⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, Memo to Self, Oct. 17, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

²³⁶ Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 206

must consider how a decision will affect the U.S. and the 100+ member nations. As Stevenson wrote in the introduction to *Looking Outward*:

Take 100 agenda items and multiply them by 111 nations, and you end up with figure of more than 11,000, Eleven thousand decision to be made. The task of the United States Mission to the United Nations is simple: merely to make sure that those 11,000 decisions are compatible with the national interest - while everyone else is trying to make sure that they are compatible with their national interests.²³⁷

Thus, even as he wrote the memorandum, his sensitivities to world reaction were strongly at work. As he wrote of the ultimatum to Castro, he noted that we “must have a good brief on the justification for an attack if Castro doesn’t get rid of the missiles”. We had to consider on what grounds we could demand the removal of the missiles: Why is he a danger to the U.S., if the U.S. which has far more missiles is not a danger to him? What provision of our Latin-American agreements gives us the the right in self defense to knock out the missiles in Cuba? Don’t we have to take the position that Soviet missiles in Cuba are a threat to the hemisphere from outside?”? ²³⁸

He pondered the mechanics of delivering Kennedy’s message to Khrushchev. Should the “message be delivered to Gromyko on Thursday” when the Foreign Minister had an appointment scheduled with JFK? Stevenson decided that an “emissary from the Press would be better it emphasizes gravity — affords us the chance of finding out Khrushchev’s motives”. Then Stevenson considered what our position should be in regards to the Soviets:

We must be prepared for the argument that if we have base in Turkey, etc., they have a right to have a case in Cuba. Does the Inter- American system protect us our obligation to protect the hemisphere? How much time should we allow them to remove the missiles? What do we say we are going to do? Will Khrushchev retaliate against Turkey etc? Against Berlin? Laca? South Viet Nam? Do we say that all basens are negotiable but not while he has IRSM’s in Cuba? Emphasis added.²³⁹

²³⁷ Stevenson, *Looking Outward*, pp. xvi-xvii

²³⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, Memo to Self, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

²³⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, Memo to Self, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

The end result of Stevenson's musings was a handwritten note which he presented to the President on Wednesday morning. Kennedy was annoyed by the "ambivalence" of the note which, according to Sorensen, read on one hand: "The national security must come first... we can't negotiate with a gun at our head... if they won't remove the missiles and restore the status quo ante, we will have to do it ourselves - and then we will be ready to discuss bases in the context of a disarmament treaty or anything else.."?²⁴⁰ Taken by itself, this statement would probably have pleased Kennedy: it was the kind of short, sharp action proposal which appealed to the he-man New Frontier mentality. But then Stevenson indulged in his mental circumambulation of the problem. On the other hand, he added:

To risk strating a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best and the judgments of history.. seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment... I feel you should have made sic it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything.. I confess I have many misgivings about the proposed course of action...

The "proposed course of action" to which Stevenson was referring was the air strike proposal. The Ambassador proceeded to outline his personal- Presidential-emissary to – Khrushchev plan as an alternative to the strike.²⁴¹ Keenth Davis suggests that part of Kennedy's annoyance could be attributed to the "childing tone" which the misused past tense – "you should have made it clear"- lent to the note.²⁴²

Stevenson's proposal was one of the six alternatives discussed in the ExComm meetings on Wednesday. (The President was absent, campaigning in Connecticut). The first alternative, in line with McNamara's view that the Cuban missiles did not pose a great threat, was to do nothing immediately. It was suggested that the President might demand of Gromyko that the U.S.S.R. remove its missiles. The majority of the committee, however, were opposed to giving the Russians advance warning when military action had not definitely been ruled out.²⁴³ Stevenson's

²⁴⁰ Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 783-84

²⁴¹ Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 784

²⁴² Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 476.

²⁴³ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, pp. 60-61

emissary proposal was soon rejected on similar grounds. The ExComm members envisioned the following scenario:

Khrushchev would simply seize the diplomatic initiative, announce the missiles were in Cuba, and threaten to use them. On signal, the “peace” parties in the Western nations would begin to push the United States toward a “Munich”, where NATO bases in Europe would be traded off against Russian missiles in Cuba.²⁴⁴

Plan number three, which was to indict Cuba and the Soviet Union before the U.N. Security Council, was ruled out by the time-consuming nature of the U.N. machinery, and by the Russian veto. In addition to these three diplomatic proposals, the committee also discussed sending an emissary to Castro, and the possibility of treating the missiles as an administrative error and asking the U.S.S.R. to correct it. This tack was similar to that taken by Khrushchev in the U-2 incident. ExComm quickly disregarded the political approaches and focused its attention on three military plans.²⁴⁵

The first of these proposals, of which McNamara was the strongest advocate, called for a naval blockade of the Island of Cuba, with American ships refusing entry to any ship found to be carrying offensive weapons. The strength of the plan was its flexibility: it allowed the U.S. to avoid a direct military confrontation if desired; it could be tightened as necessary by increasing the scope of the embargo to force the withdrawal of the missiles (an embargo on oil and petroleum products would have a devastating effect on the Cuban economy); it did not rule out the possibility of further military action such as an air strike or an invasion. Its weaknesses were that it did not guarantee the immediate removal of the missiles; it could prove offensive to the Latin American nations and to western maritime nations with a high regard for freedom of the seas: and it was usually regarded as an act of war, and was almost an invitation to the Russians to blockade Berlin in retaliation.²⁴⁶

Many of the military men favored a “surgical” strike to destroy the missiles and their sites. It was definite authoritative action which would remove the threat and take few lives. Determined questioning by Robert Kennedy among others, showed, however, that the hope of a

²⁴⁴ James Daniel and John G. Hubbell, Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis (New York: Holt,chart and Winston, 1963), pp.62-63

²⁴⁵ Abel, Missile Crisis, pp. 61-62

²⁴⁶ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 62. See also: Sorensen, Kennedy, pp.774-75; and Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 12-13

few American bombs eliminating the weapons and ending the incident was as much a pipe dream as had been evidenced in the planning for the Bay of Pigs. It would take long, intensive bombing to ensure that all the missiles and sites were destroyed. It was unlikely that at very least, the Cuban air force would not try to fight back. And it was entirely possible - indeed probable - that thousands of Cuban and Russian military personnel, plus unknown numbers of innocent Cubans would be killed. Most of the strike proponents agreed that an air strike would lead to a full-scale invasion of Cuba.²⁴⁷ Another problem arose in the timing and advanced warning of the attack. Advanced notice of the attack would allow the Russians time to conceal and protect the missiles, invite a retaliation from Khrushchev, and stir up considerable opposition in the world community. Yet a surprise attack would severely damage the nation's reputation and go against the American tradition of fair play. At this point, Bobby Kennedy rose to speak emotionally and eloquently against an air strike. "We're not going to make my brother the Tojo of the 1960s O'Donnell recalls him saying."²⁴⁸ Kennedy entered into a heated argument with Dean Acheson who "rejected the Pearl Harbor analogy with majestic scorn".²⁴⁹ The Nonroe Doctrine and President Kennedy's own repeated warnings against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba were, according to Acheson, more than sufficient advanced warning.²⁵⁰

The final plan to come under discussion was an invasion of the island of Cuba. This idea was not considered at length because of the amount of time that would be needed to prepare properly for such a venture. Gone forever were the days when the President's councillors considered the island an easy target for a couple of thousand exiles.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, McNamara issued orders to start a quiet and unsuspecting movement of troops into the south eastern part of the United States and of Naval forces into the area of the Caribbean.²⁵²

Pressing U.N. business caused Stevenson to fly back to New York on the 4 p.m. shuttle Wednesday afternoon.²⁵³ It is uncertain how much of the discussions he sat in on, but he left a group of men fairly evenly divided between the blockade and air strike proposals.

²⁴⁷ Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 771-73

²⁴⁸ O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye, p.367

²⁴⁹ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 64

²⁵⁰ O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye, p.367. See also: Abel, Missile Crisis, pp.64-65; and Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp.15-17

²⁵¹ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 63

²⁵² Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 15

²⁵³ AES Schedule, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

By the time Stevenson returned to Washington late on the afternoon of Friday, October 19, a majority of the Executive Committee was supporting the blockade plan. There had been a considerable amount of wavering back and forth between blockade and air strike by the various members of the committee. It is important to remember that, as Elie Abel says, “The fact is that nearly every man in the room changed his position at least once - and some more than once - during that anxious week of brainstorming”.²⁵⁴ But, under the guidance of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defence, and with the conversions of Taylor, Dillon, Nitze, and Bundy, a majority had solidified behind the blockade proposal by Friday night. “Dean Acheson decided he had come to the end out of his usefulness” and retired to his Maryland farm.²⁵⁵ But, most importantly, the President, who had attended some of the Thursday meetings and had been thoroughly briefed by Bobby, had by Friday morning “definitely made up his mind to start his action against Khrushchev with a naval blockade of Cuba.” He wanted the committee to keep meeting in order to achieve “a consensus of support”.²⁵⁶

On Friday afternoon, Adlai Stevenson joined in this consensus with a “vast relief that the air strike proposal had lost favor”.²⁵⁷ While supporting the blockade, Stevenson emphasized the wisdom of limiting it, at first to offensive weaponry. “His advice rendered the arsenal of U.S weapons both more humane and more effective. In excluding oil from the contraband list in the first stage, the U.S. avoided the charge that she was trying to starve Cuba into submission, but at the same time she retained in reserve a threat to tighten the blockade and to increase the pressure”.²⁵⁸

Both Schlesinger and Fitzsimons state that it was at this Friday afternoon meeting that Stevenson began to talk about possible diplomatic approaches the U.S. might take. It should be noted here that neither of these accounts suggests that Stevenson set forth these proposals in place of the blockade: they were clearly intended to supplement it. Stevenson now said that the United States should consider offering to give up our obsolete missile bases in Italy and Turkey if the Russians would dismantle the Cuban bases. (This proposal had previously been made by at least one other ExComm member, and Stevenson had discussed it privately with Robert Kennedy

²⁵⁴ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 70

²⁵⁵ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 88-89

²⁵⁶ O'Donnell and Powers, *Johnny We Hardly Know Ye*, pp . 369-70

²⁵⁷ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 40

²⁵⁸ Henry M. Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 30

earlier in the week). He also urged committee members to think a head to the final resolution of the crisis, and what our negotiating position should be in reaching for that goal. He suggested that “a settlement might include the neutralization of Cuba under International guarantees and U.N. inspection; demilitarization would, of course, include our own base at Guantanamo as well as the Soviet installations”.²⁵⁹

On Saturday morning, Stevenson, having received clearance from the President, informed Arthur Schlesinger about the crisis. He “described the seesaw during the work between the diplomatic and military solutions. The quarantine the lens belligerent-sounding label spelled to the blockade, he now felt, was sure to win.”²⁶⁰ Stevenson asked Schlesinger to help him prepare the speech he would have to give in the U.N. Security Council, probably early the next week. Stevenson can through the arguments he felt should be made, and Schlesinger agreed to start work.²⁶¹

The crucial meeting of the Executive Committee convened at 2.30 p.m. Saturday afternoon in the Oval Room of the White House. President Kennedy, cutting short a campaign trip in the Midwest on the pretense of a cold, presided. First, John McCone of the CIA presented the most recent photographs and intelligence data. Dean Rusk, reading from two handwritten pages marked top secret, laid the air strike and blockade proposals before the President. This summary of the committee’s discussions ended with a recommendation for the blockade, listing seven reasons why the path should be chosen. Foremost among these was the flexibility and reversibility of the blockade as opposed to the air strike. McNamara also spoke for the blockade, while other committee members summarised the argument for the air strike.²⁶² A straw vote indicated eleven for the quarantine, six for the strike”.²⁶³ Kennedy decided for the blockade.

Discussion now turned to the timing and mechanics of Kennedy’s announcement of the quarantine”, Because security seemed to be crumbling, the President himself wanted to inform the nation the next evening, Sunday. Stevenson and Rusk, however, joined together to urge that the speech be postponed until Monday in order to allow time to inform our allies and ask for their support. They also suggested that the President present the quarantine not as a fait accompli, but

²⁵⁹ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 739, Fitzsimons, *Kennedy Doctrine*, pp. 164-65

²⁶⁰ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 739; Fitzsimons, *Kennedy Doctrine*, p. 740

²⁶¹ *Ibid*

²⁶² Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 782. See also: Abel, *Missile Crisis*, pp.93-94; and Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p.739.

²⁶³ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 739

as a strategy that was going to be put into effect. Stevenson was particularly concerned about Latin America. The one hesitation he had about the blockade was that it would not be effective without the approval of the Organization of American States. As he said later:

“This was the first time the Latin Americans were also directly involved or threatened. I felt this was extremely important. They were one with us. They could not consider this a remote quarrel between the United States and Russia, as some perhaps were tempted to do earlier”.²⁶⁴

There was considerable disagreement about the likelihood of an on OAS endorsement of the blockade. Sorensen states that the possibility of “obtaining a two-thirds vote in the OAS appeared dubious at best”.²⁶⁵ Richard Walton states that the OAS would, of course, have approved the blockade, even after the fact, as it did three years later after the American invasion of the Dominican Republic...’²⁶⁶ Stevenson’s own view lay somewhere in between these extremes. He did not regard OAS approval as something which we could take for granted; he could very easily see how at least five nations - Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia - would be offended by being presented with a fait accompli and would vote against the U.S. “But if given a chance to endorse the act before it was put into effect, they might join the other Latin American nations in a unanimous gesture of support that could not help but impress Khrushchev and dismay Castro”.²⁶⁷ Kennedy accepted the suggestion, as well as Assistant Secretary Martin’s plan for going to the OAS, provided that the story did not seem likely to break before Monday. He also approved Stevenson’s suggestion that, coincident with the President’s speech, the United States should request an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. The Ambassador “stressed the importance of getting in ahead of the Russians with a resolution that was acceptable to the United States”.²⁶⁸

The meeting had gone smoothly up to this point. Then Stevenson began to speak of the proposals he had mentioned the day before, the trading of the Turkish and Italian for the Cuban bases, and the neutralization of Cuba. Elio Abel refers to Stevenson’s words as “thinking aloud

²⁶⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 60

²⁶⁵ Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 775

²⁶⁶ Walton, Remnants of Power, pp. 40-41

²⁶⁷ Steele, “Stevenson Affair”, 44-45

²⁶⁸ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 94

about further diplomatic moves”.²⁶⁹ Robert Kennedy considered it strong advocacy for the proposals.²⁷⁰ It is clear that different people left the meeting with radically different concepts of the context in which Stevenson was speaking. But he did bring these political approaches under discussion. It was part of his job to do so. As Ambassador to the United Nations, he dealt constantly with Europeans, Asians, and Africans who were used to living with nuclear missiles on their doorsteps. He knew “that it would be hard to make the United Nations understand why it was right for us to have bases in Turkey but wrong for the Russians to have bases in Cuba”.²⁷¹ In the eyes of Stevenson’s constituents at the U.N. such sacrifices as the Turkish and Italia missiles or Guantanamo, each of which was of little value anyway, was not an unreasonable move to make “if the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba was worth any price”.²⁷²

Stevenson was immediately attacked by Dillon, Lovett, and McCone. “They sprang so swiftly and with such angry scorn that Stevenson failed to make clear just how he intended to time his negotiating proposals in relation to the actions already decided upon”.²⁷³ “From all accounts, the attack was personally insulting. No doubt the physical exhaustion and the extreme tension contributed to this, but these were men who had long disliked Stevenson. One of them was reported to have said, “Adlai’s not soft on Communism: he’s just soft....”²⁷⁴ Stevenson stood his ground. During this discussion, Kennedy was interested to hear a member of the previous administration probably — FitzSimons speculates that it was probably McCone or Dillon - agree “that the Thor and Jupiter missiles were obsolete and of little military value and that they had been practically administration”.²⁷⁵

Eventually, the President brought the discussion to a close. “He agreed we should beef up the political side of the speech”, Sorensen says, but he rejected the rest of Stevenson’s ideas.²⁷⁶ He talked about the missiles in Turkey and Italy. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy had recommended early in 1961 that they be removed because of their unreliability. Later that year, Kennedy had, indeed, ordered them dismantled, but the command seems to have become stalled somewhere in the State and Defence Department bureaucracies. (FitzSimons and

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 95

²⁷⁰ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 27

²⁷¹ Muller, *Study in Values*, p. 289

²⁷² O’Donnell and Powers, *Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye*, p.373

²⁷³ Davis, *Politics of Honor*.p. 480

²⁷⁴ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 67

²⁷⁵ Fitzsimons, *Kennedy Doctrine*.p. 166

²⁷⁶ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 785

Muller suggest that Kennedy had assumed his orders had been executed and was surprised and annoyed to discover that the missiles were still there).²⁷⁷ The President said that it would not be appropriate to give up the bases or Guantanamo at that time because it would have the appearance of knuckling under to the Russians.

Ken O'Donnell remembers it as follows:

The President explained to Stevenson that he did not feel that any concessions should be made to the Russians in view of the deception that they had shown in sneaking the offensive missiles into Cuba while protesting that they had the intention of doing so. Furthermore, Kennedy added, making a trade for the Jupiter missiles would have a disrupting effect on the NATO alliance. De Gaulle would be quick to charge that the United States was selling out its friends in Europe in a deal to protect America's security.²⁷⁸

While the most repeated remark to come out of the incident was President Kennedy's comment that "You have to admire Adlai. He sticks to his position even when everyone is jumping on him", it is also true that the meeting inspired more doubts than admiration for Stevenson in the minds of the New Frontiersmen.²⁷⁹ O'Donnell describes a conversation between the President and Robert Kennedy as the three of them stood out on the Truman Balcony after the Saturday meeting:

Bobby was furious with Stevenson for suggesting a compromise with Khrushchev. "He's not strong enough or tough enough to be representing us at the U.N. at a time like this", Bobby said to the President. "Why not get him out of there, and put somebody like John McCloy in his place?"

"Now, wait a minute," the President said. I think Adlai showed plenty of strength and courage, presenting that viewpoint at the risk of being called an appeaser. It was an argument that needed to be stated, but nobody else had the guts to do it. Maybe he went too far when he suggested giving up Guantanamo, but

²⁷⁷ Fitzsimons, *Kennedy Doctrine*, p.166. See also. Muller, *Study in Values*, p. 290; Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp.27-28; and Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 785. The missile bases in Turkey and Italy were quietly removed in 1963

²⁷⁸ O'Donnell and Powers, *Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye*, p.373

²⁷⁹ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 67

remember we're in a situation here that may cost us millions of lives, and we should be considering every side of it and every way to get out of it. I admire him for saying what he said".²⁸⁰

Nevertheless, Bobby's hesitations seem to have had their effect on the President. McCloy was brought back from a business trip in Germany to join Stevenson at the U.N. "Dean Rusk was instructed to handle the situation so that Stevenson would not realize that McCloy was being brought in because of lack of confidence in Stevenson. Rusk said that he would make the suggestion in such a way that it would not only be acceptable to Stevenson but would appear publicly to have been his recommendation".²⁸¹

Schlesinger says that Stevenson took the rejection of his proposals "realistically: he felt he had done his job as the custodian of our U.N. interests in making the recommendation, and the decision was the President's".²⁸² O'Donnell, however, recounts another anecdote which suggests some uneasiness on Stevenson's part. The two men met at a party Saturday night, and asked O'Donnell what the President had thought Stevenson about his statements at the ExComm meeting. When O'Donnell assured him that the President had expressed admiration for his courage, "Stevenson seemed to be very much relieved. 'I know that most of those fellows will probably consider me a coward for the rest of my life for what I said today', he said. 'But perhaps we need a coward in the room when we are talking about a nuclear war'".²⁸³ Elie Abel agrees that it had been a harrowing experience for Stevenson: "The bitter aftertaste of that Saturday afternoon in the Oval Room stayed with him until his death".²⁸⁴

On Sunday morning October 21, the Executive Committee met to go over the quarantine speech Sorensen was preparing for Kennedy. The speech, then in its third draft, was scheduled to be given at 7 p.m. Monday evening. In what was probably an effort to reaffirm his "hardness". Stevenson argued for a toughening of the language of the drafts. He suggested that Kennedy state there would be no more disarmament talks until the missiles were out of Cuba - considering Stevenson's a long and passionate devotion to disarmament, a serious step indeed.²⁸⁵ The

²⁸⁰ O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye, p.373

²⁸¹ PitzSimons, Kennedy Doctrine, p. 168. See also: Abel, Missile Crisis, p.96. Abel says that Bobby presented two names to JFK: McCloy and Herman Phleger, a former adviser to John Foster Dulles

²⁸² Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 741-42

²⁸³ O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye, p.377.

²⁸⁴ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 96

²⁸⁵ Steele, "Stevenson Affair", 45

President rejected this idea, but was more impressed by a matter of semantics which the Ambassador brought up. Stevenson, with his wonderful command of language, pointed out that the President could not simply demand that the Russians “render the missiles inoperable”, lest the Soviets declare them “rendered in- operable” and then refuse to remove them. The President must state specifically, Stevenson felt, that the missiles had to be “dismantled” and “withdrawn”. “I assumed, Stevenson later recalled, that the Russians given the threat of nuclear war, would be in for a long, hard, bargaining session”.²⁸⁶

Also on Sunday, Arthur Schlesinger sat down to work on the speech Stevenson was to give before the United Nations Security Council. Using research material provided by the State Department, Schlesinger wrote an outline of the history of Russian aggressions and broken treaties since World War II.²⁸⁷ He worked until well past midnight on the speech, assisted by Harlan Cleveland, Joseph Sisco, and Thomas Wilson. Stevenson had provided Schlesinger with notes on his views of what our U.N. strategy should be. In outlining his political proposals that day, the Ambassador had eliminated the Turkish and Italian missile based as negotiating points since “this would only divert attention from the Cuban threat to the general issue of foreign bases”. He did however, retain his Guantanamo proposal, adding to it a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. “His negotiating centered on the removal of Soviet military equipment and personnel- i.e., missiles, installations and the several thousand Russian specialists under U.N. observation and the introduction of U.N. influence into Cuba in the hope of ending communist domination of the Cuban government Emphasis added”.²⁸⁸

Stevenson returned to New York on the 10 p.m. shuttle Sunday night.²⁸⁹ On Monday morning, the President instructed Schlesinger to go to New York to assist in the U.N. presentation. Later that morning, Schlesinger and Kennedy went over the draft of the U.N. speech with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and other members of the Executive Committee. The President made a few changes in the draft, including the elimination of the non-intervention guarantee proposals (Stevenson, reports Davis, “was not dismayed by this mission”).²⁹⁰ After the meeting, Robert Kennedy drew Schlesinger aside and told him, “We’re counting on you to watch things in New York. ... We will have to make a deal at the end, but we must stand absolutely firm

²⁸⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Able, *Missile Crisis*, p.105

²⁸⁷ Steele, “Stevenson Affair”, 45

²⁸⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 741-42

²⁸⁹ AES Schedule, Stevenson Papers, Box 646

²⁹⁰ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 481

no.s Concessions must come at the end of the negotiations, not at the beginning”.²⁹¹ Adlai was still soft, as far as Bobby was concerned.

Stevenson and Schlesinger, along with other members of the U.S. Nission to the United Nations. watched the President’s address to the nation on a television set in Stevenson’s office.²⁹² At its conclusion, at 7.30 p.m.. Stevenson sent a request for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to Valerian A. Zorin of the U.S.S.R.. who held the Council’s rotating presidency that month. Attached to the request was a four point draft resolution which would have the security council call for the immediate removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba; authorise U Thant to send a team of U. N. observes to Cuba to verify the removal of the missiles: call for an end to the U.S. quarantine once the missiles have been withdrawn; and recommend negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. “on measures to remove the existing threat”²⁹³

During this period, Schlesinger “found Adlai unperturbed in the midst of pandemonium”.²⁹⁴ Richard J. Walton describes “the sense of dread that pervaded” the United Nations headquarters:

Representatives of the smaller nations were scurrying to and fro, desperately trying to think of something to forestall the diaster that seemed imminent. But they were learning, as they had never learned before, that when the giants are locked in struggle, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, the pygmies can do. They were scared stiff — and they were far from alone — that the world was going to blow up over a struggle in which they had absolutely no interest. There is an African proverb that says “when the elephants fight, the grass is trampled”. They were mortally afraid that the cold war, which they had struggled so hard to keep out of, was nonetheless going to engulf them.²⁹⁵

Stevenson was deluged with requests to speak with his fellow U. N. delegates and, in the hope of winning support for the U.S. position, he granted as many interviews as possible. This left him little time to plot strategy and to work on the speech he would give before the Security

²⁹¹ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 742

²⁹² Ibid., p. 744

²⁹³ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 124

²⁹⁴ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 744

²⁹⁵ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, pp. 42-43

Council, which was scheduled to meet on Tuesday, October 23.²⁹⁶ He had found “Schlesinger’s draft... too long and not to his taste, so the ambassador roworked this section himself. The rest of the speech was all Stevenson”.²⁹⁷ The confusion amid which this rewriting took place, Schlesinger says, “was reminiscent of his presidential campaigns: the last part of his address was still in the typewriter at the Mission on Tuesday afternoon when he had already begun to speak across the street at the U.N.”²⁹⁸

The Security Council met at 4 p.m. Tuesday afternoon. The eleven nations then holding Council seats were: Chile; China; Egypt; Prance; Ghana; Great Britain; Ireland; Romania; the Soviet Union; the United States; and Venezuela.²⁹⁹ The United States, as the nation requesting the meeting, was the first to have the floor. The difference between the Stevenson of the Bay of Pigs and the Stevenson of the missile crisis was marked, and it had an overwhelming effect on his audience. This time it was Stevenson who was prepared, informed sure of his facts, and believing strongly in the cause for which he was fighting, this time Zorin was on the defensive, uninstructed, and perhaps uninformed. Stevenson spoke unemotionally, eloquently — but with strength and confidence. “Convinced that only so much indignation could be worked up over Cuba”, the Ambassador presented to his Security Council and television audience his revised version of Schlesinger’s history of Russian aggression.³⁰⁰

He exposed the myth about American imperialism that the Soviet began proclaiami in 1945, at a time when we were starting to dismantle our great military machine and it was starting its aggression in Eastern Europe. He asked a fair question: “Has the Soviet Union ever really joined the United Nations? Or does its philosophy of history and its conception of the future run counter to the pluralistic concept of the Charter?”³⁰¹

While Stevenson was speaking, Harlan Cleveland in Washington received word that the OAS had voted unanimously to support the United States in its quarantine action. (The original vote was actually 19 to O, with Uruguay abstaining, Uruguay voted in the affirmative the next

²⁹⁶ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 744

²⁹⁷ Steele, “Stevenson Affair”, 45

²⁹⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 744

²⁹⁹ Pachter, *Collision Course*, p. 40

³⁰⁰ Daniel and Hubbell, *Strike in the West*, p. 132

³⁰¹ Muller, *Study in Values*, p. 286

day).³⁰² He immediately placed a call to Joseph Sisco in New York. Watching the speech on television, Cleveland saw Sisco leave the Security Council chamber to take the call, and then saw him return to the chamber, where he placed the text of the OAS resolution in front of Stevenson. The Ambassador gave no indication that he had seen the paper.

At this moment Kennedy, with characteristic attention to detail called Cleveland and asked whether Stevenson knew about the CAS action. Cleveland replied that he had sent a message but feared that Adlai had not seen it. Just then on the screen Stevenson reached for the paper. Kennedy, who was also watching television, said, "I guess he has it now".³⁰³

Working the statement into his speech as if it had been planned all along, Stevenson announced that the OAS had voted:

1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;

2. To recommend that the member states... take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent...

304

The importance of the OAS vote was unmistakeable. Abel states that "there is reason to think that Moscow was staggered by the show of inter-American solidarity and the solid support of the sometimes quarrelsome NATO countries. It left the Russians with no immediate hope of splitting the Western camp".³⁰⁵ It destroyed the Soviet argument the U.S. quarantine was an act of aggression and intervention undesired by the other states of the Western Hemisphere. Nor was the resolution merely rehetoric: within a few days Venezuela and Argentina each sent two destroyers to help endorce the quarantine, and several other Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic, offered assistance through the OAS. Stevenson's advice about

³⁰² Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs 1964* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p.300

³⁰³ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 745

³⁰⁴ Resolution of the Organization of American States, Oct. 23, 1962, in Pachter, *Collision Course*, p.198

³⁰⁵ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 131

consulting with the Latins before acting (the quarantine took effect at 2 p.m. October 24) had been proven wise beyond even his test hopes.³⁰⁶

Shortly after reading the OAS resolution, Stevenson concluded his speech. It is significant that at a time of such great tension, with world more solidly behind the United States than ever before or antildly since, the Ambassador chose to end his speech with words of conciliation rather than threats of destructions. He said;

This is a solemn and significant day for the life of the United Nations and the hope of world community. Let it be remembered, not as the day when the world came to the edge of nuclear war, but as the day when men resolved to let nothing thereafter stop them in their quest for peace.³⁰⁷

Stevenson's calm and pacifie stance had no effect on the Communiste, however. Zorin hotly denied the accusations, declaring that the United States was leading the world into nuclear war. He introduced his own resolution, calling on the Security Council to "condemn the actions of the Government of the United States of America aimed at violating the United Nations Charter and at increasing the threat of war".³⁰⁸ Marlo Garcia Inchaustegui, the representative from Cuban got so carried away in his nationalistic fervor that he swore that Cuba would never allow U.N. observers on the island. This was of no help whatsoever to Zorin who, in an attempt to win support by appearing reasonable, had emphasized "that the Soviet Union would not object to U. N. observers verifying the liquidation of 'all foreign bases on foreign territory'" Inchaustegui recalled to Havana a week later.³⁰⁹

It was clear to everyone that Stevennon had carried the day. At 7.37 p.m., a pleased and impressed President wired:

Dear Adlai;

³⁰⁶ Stabbins, U. S. in world Affairs, p.301.

³⁰⁷ Stevenson, Looking Outward, p. 99

³⁰⁸ Draft Resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations Security Council, Oct. 23, 1962, in Pachter, Collision Course, p. 208

³⁰⁹ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 132-33

I watched your speech this afternoon with great satisfaction. It has given our cause a great start in the forum of the United Nations. I have the highest hopes for the debate which will follow. The United States is fortunate to have your advocacy. You have my warm and personal thanks.³¹⁰

That night, the U.S. Mission informed Washington that they were sure of having at least seven of the eleven Security Council votes. Two of the hold-outs were, of course, the Soviet Union and its satellite Romania. The others were the neutral countries of Egypt and China, which had decided that the safest thing for them to do was to condemn both sides for bringing on this crisis.³¹¹ No vote was ever taken on either of the resolutions; because of the Soviet veto, affirmative action by the Security Council was impossible. The United States knew from the start that its goal in the U.N. was a victory in the court of world opinion.

When Wednesday arrived with no further hope for a peaceful solution, many of the nonaligned nations became squeamish. Viewing the United States as the more likely to back down, some of them began to criticize the U. S. doubting the justification for the blockade, and saying that the U.S. had no proof of missiles in Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy continued their round-the-clock meetings, trying to persuade these countries of the validity of the American position. Both men remained firm. Stevenson finally told these delegates that the best thing they could do to preserve the peace was to inform the Russians of their concern about a possible conflict at the blockade line. "The pressure of Afro-Asian opinion, he suggested, might help the Kremlin to decide against challenging the blockade".³¹²

Thursday, October 25, provided the United Nations with the most dramatic and memorable moment in its history to this date. Pachter suggests that it was a scene "staged" by Stevenson in order to show the Russians up as liars and to reinforce the weakening hold the United States had on the nonaligned nations.³¹³ In view of Stevenson's later reactions to his performance, this seems unlikely. What actually happened was that Adlai Stevenson lost his

³¹⁰ Telegram, John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Oct.23, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 850

³¹¹ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 133

³¹² Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 149

³¹³ Pachter, Collision Course, pp. 47-48

temper- with one of the most positive results any temper tantrum has ever had in diplomatic history.

When the Security Council reconvened at 4 p.m. that Thursday, Stevenson led off with a calm and reasonable rehash of the position of the United States, answering as he went points and criticisms the Russians had made in the previous days' debate. He scoffed at the idea that the crisis situation was due to the U.S. quarantine, declaring. "This is the first time that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary, but the discovery of the burglar.... "To those who felt that the quarantine was too harsh a response to the missiles, Stevenson used the honour of his great idol Lincoln to demonstrate the point of the U.S. action. He told the story

...about the passerby out in my part of the country who was charged by a farmer's ferocious boar. He picked up a pitchfork and met the boar head on. It died. The irate farmer denounced him and asked him why he didn't use the blunt end of the pitchfork. And the man replied, "Why didn't the boar attack me with his blunt end?"³¹⁴ (See Appendix F).

Valerian Zorin found himself in the position Stevenson had been in during the Bay of Pigs crisis. He singly did not know what his government was going to do. He met Stevenson's tension-breaking humour with harshness and evasiveness, accusing the United States of changing its position since Tuesday, of backing down because of lack of evidence and lack of support in world opinion. Stevenson listened intently, jotting down a note from time to time. He was wearied by the sleep-denying anxiety and activity of the last ten days — goaded, too, by bitter memories of last Saturday's White House meeting - and when he rose to reply he let himself go in a rare display of anger".³¹⁵

Speaking extemporaneously from his notes, Stevenson upbraided Zorin for his "talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language and for doubletalk". He said that the U.S. did, indeed, have evidence of the missile sites, and that world opinion was strongly behind the quarantine action. Then, turning the tables on the Russian, he demanded a yes or no answer to

³¹⁴ Stevenson, *Looking Outward*, pp. 100-106

³¹⁵ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 405. See also Walton, *Remnants of Power*, pp. 51-52

the question of whether Zorin denied that the U.S.S.R. was placing missile sites in Cuba. Zorin, maintaining that he was “not in an American courtroom”, refused to answer.

Stevenson pressed the point, declaring, I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over”. Zorin tried to use his position as president of the Council to hand the floor over to the representative from Chile, but the Chilean graciously yielded to Stevenson. At that, Stevenson aides brought a large easel into the Council chamber and proceeded to exhibit a series of enlarged photographs of the Cuban missile sites under construction as the U.S. Ambassador explained each one in detail. At the end of the presentation, Zorin reminded the council members of the last time Stevenson had exhibited photographs before that body, and questioned the authenticity of the pictures. It was, indeed, a sore point, but this time Stevenson was able to reply with a confident challenge:

As to the authenticity of the photographs which Mr. Zorin has spoken about with such concern, I wonder if the Soviet Union would ask its Cuban colleague to permit a United Nations team to go to these sites. If so, Mr. Zorin, I can assure you that we can direct them to the proper places very quickly.³¹⁶ (See Annendix G).

At the request of the neutral nations, the Security Council adjourned at 7.25 p.m. It was not to meet again until the crisis was over.³¹⁷ The meeting was regarded as a turning point, a triumph for the United States and for Stevenson personally. The dramatic presentation brought home “with devastating effect,” as Robert Kennedy would write, the fact that the real danger to world peace lay in the swift and surreptitious construction of the missiles sites by the Russians and Cubans, and not in the American blockade.³¹⁸ Stevenson had stripped the Russians of their mask as defenders of the peace, and separated them once and for all from any claim to the support of world opinion in this crisis.

As for Stevenson, hundreds of letters of praise poured into the U.S. Mission, many from diehard Republicans and long-time Stevenson-haters. As Adlai III wrote his father, “You have now become the country’s idol its hero. Strangers on the street, black Republicans and left wingers alike... are constantly going out of their way to say what an extraordinary job it’s been...

³¹⁶ Stevenson, Looking Outward, pp. 107-112

³¹⁷ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 170

³¹⁸ Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 54

Hope this Irish mafia doesn't get too jealous of your popularity.³¹⁹ He had gone a long way toward burying his "soft" image. "Watching Stevenson in action television, the President was impressed and surprised by his dramatic performance.; 'never knew Adlai had it in him', Kennedy said. 'Too bad he didn't show some of this steam in the 1956 campaign',³²⁰ The President was, in fact, so pleased with Stevenson's U.N. statements that we find him, inadvertently or not, plagiarizing from them. The day after the showdown with Zorin, Kennedy replied to a critical telegram from Kibbitzing pacifist Bertrand Russell by writing: "I think your attention might well be directed to the burglars rather than to those who have caught the burglars"

321

Stevenson, himself, was not so happy about his performance. For one thing, the memory of the Bay of Pigs, had instilled in him a deep reluctance to use photographic evidence. The U.S. Mission had been in possession of the photographs since Tuesday, and many aides had urged a presentation of them on the Ambassador. But Stevenson had refused. The State Department and the White House were also reluctant to release the pictures first at the U.N. "One reason given", recalls Francis Plimpton, "was that they had to be kept for Press Secretary Salinger's Sunday night TV broadcast!" But the groundless accusations of Zorin and pressure from Mission aids finally caused Stevenson to change his mind. Plimpton placed an urgent call to secretary Rusk at the White House to get last minute permission to use the pictures.³²²

More importantly, Stevenson did not feel that his attack on Zorin had contributed anything to the cause of peace. He realized the importance of his speech in solidifying world opinion behind the U.S., but he felt he could have done as much without embarrassing the Russian. "He told several people that, in adopting a prosecuting attorney's role, he felt he had' gone too far'.³²³ He was by nature a polite and gentle man, and he regretted deeply "that in his personal attack on Zorin he had departed from the diplomatic usage in which he himself placed such store". He feared even more that his assault had caused the Soviets to harden their position and become even less willing to negotiate.

³¹⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson III to Adlai E. Stevenson, Oct. 30, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 853

³²⁰ O'Donnell and Powers, *Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye*, p. 387

³²¹ John F. Kennedy, quoted in Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 144

³²² Francis T.P. Plimpton, "They Sent You Our Best", in Doyle, ed., *As We Knew Adlai*, p. 266. See also Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 55

³²³ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, D. 484

This fear proved to be unfounded, although Stevenson himself would be the object of vehement personal attacks by Soviets at the U.N. in later months.³²⁴ And when the Ambassador visited Moscow the following summer for the signing of the test ban treaty, he was confronted by an annoyed Khrushchov. “What’s happened to you, Stevenson, since you started working for the United States Government? Khrushchev asked. ‘We don’t like to be interrogated like a criminal in the dock’”³²⁵

The Security Council debates were not the only contribution the United Nations made toward a settlement of the missile crisis. As Ambassador Stevenson later remarked, the role of the U.N. in the crisis

“was a classic example of United Nations performance in the manner contemplated by the Charter. The Security Council provided for public discussion of our complaint by the parties. It provided a means of focusing public attention on the facts and the threat to peace and security, and it provided through the Secretary General the means of consideration, mediation and negotiation”.³²⁶

Secretary General U Thant’s Involvement in the crisis began at around 2 p.m. Wednesday afternoon when Thant, at the request of approximately forty neutral nations, sent identical letters to Khrushchev and Kennedy. In the interests of peace, Thant proposed “the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine... period of two to three weeks”³²⁷

The message, which was relayed through Stevenson and Zorin to the President and Chairman Khrushchev, was received with very different reactions by the two heads of state. Khrushchev accepted the proposal immediately. put in Washington, Thant’s message was locked upon with a sentiment approaching irritation. Clearly, the proposal simply to halt arms shipments to Cuba offered little of substance to Washington. “From our viewpoint”, Schlesinger wrote. “It equated aggression and response, said nothing about the missiles already in Cuba, permitted work

³²⁴ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 55. See also Davis, *politics of Honor*, p. 484

³²⁵ Abel, *Missile Crisis*, p. 169

³²⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Stebbins, *U.S. in World Affairs*, pp. 332-33

³²⁷ U. Thant to Adlai E. Stevenson, Oct. 24, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

to go forward on the sites and contained no provisions for verification". But Stevenson and McCloy urged the President to soften his rejection in order to keep open the diplomatic channel which U Thant represented.³²⁸

Accordingly, on Thursday Stevenson transmitted to U Thant a reply in which the President stressed that "the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons". At the same time, Kennedy expressed appreciation for Thant's efforts and informed him that Stevenson was authorized to discuss further arrangements for settlement of the crisis.³²⁹

It must have been at about this time that Stevenson made the following notations concerning his behind-the-scenes talks at the United Nations.

Saw Zorin at moon. He said the neutrals must do something. The U.S.S.R. accepted U Thant's appeal - we added conditions. I said it was important? to know from Castro if construction had stopped. Zorin made no comment. Zorin said they can't leave ships on the high seas for 2-3 weeks. Made no comment on the neutrality of Cuba. U Thant says Khrushchev won't accept inspection of ships. He wants a no invasion guarantee from the U. S. ³³⁰

Stevenson also conferred frequently with Thant and made it clear to the Secretary General "that the United States was ready to negotiate on one subject only, the dismantling of the missile sites and its verification".³³¹ In another set of undated notes, apparently directed to U. Thant, he wrote:

we think.... this you should insist on keeping this confined to the question before the Security Council which is Cuba. Turkey is a proper subject for negotiations on detants in the status quo. First the status quo must be restored. That is Cuba and Cuba only.

³²⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 749-50

³²⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, to U. Thant, Oct. 25, 1962. Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³³⁰ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d. Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³³¹ Pachter, *Collision Course*, pp. 46

Your position now could be decisive of any settlement of the Cuban question before there is any trouble.³³²

Within hours after receiving the replies of Khrushchev and Kennedy, Thant, convinced by Stevenson of the firmness of the U.S. position, issued a second a letter to each man. In this letter, the Secretary General was clearly playing for time. He asked Khrushchev “to Instruct the Soviet ships already on their way to stay way from the interception area”.³³³ Kennedy was requested to order “United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships”.³³⁴ This time, but nations agreed to Thant’s proposal.

This marked an end to the U. N. role in the Cuban missile crisis. In the next few days, the U. S. attempted to use Thant as a conduit to inform the Soviets of the exact location of the interception line of the quarantine.³³⁵ Zorin refused to accept the message.³³⁶ After negotiations had shifted to private communications between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Kennedy again tried to use U Thant to ascertain which of the two famous Khrushchev letters - the one agreeing to remove the missiles in return for a U.S non-aggression pledge to Cuba, the other proposing a swap of Turkish for Cuban bases — was the genuine offer.³³⁷ Thant, apparently was unable to come up with the necessary information, and the crisis ended when the President adopted Robert Kennedy’s proposal to reply favourably to the first letter and hope for the best.³³⁸

Many people, apparently disappointed that the actual settlement of the crisis did not take place right within U. N. Headquarters in New York cite the missile crisis as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. However, this does not seem a fair assessment, particularly of the role played by the Secretary General. He was, after all, the first person to start a dialogue between the Americans and the Soviets. Through his proposals of Thursday, October 25, he was directly “responsible for the breathing space that avoided confrontation at sea -- and possible

³³² Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d. Stevenson Papera, Box 846

³³³ Thant to Nikita Khrushchev, Oct. 25, 1962, in Pachter, Collision Course, p. 212

³³⁴ U Thant to John F. Kennedy, Oct. 25, 1962, in Pachter, Collection Course, p. 213

³³⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson to U Thant, Oct. 27, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³³⁶ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 196

³³⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson to U Thant, Oct. 27, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³³⁸ Schlersinger, A Thousand Days, p. 757

escalation into nuclear war”.³³⁹ Moreover, his status as an impartial third party gave Khrushchev the chance to back down with grace. As Henry Fachter sums up the role of the United Nations:

For a long time, the United Nations has served its member states as a face-saver. It is easier to bow before a hundred nations and earn credit for peaceful behaviour than to surrender to an enemy whose purpose is victory. The impartial Secretary General can demand restraint that neither of the conflicting parties could exercise under pressure from the other. U Thant’s requests during this crisis mostly helped Khrushchev, but any nation might at some time find itself in the same position, praying that a distinguished party should request such favours from it.³⁴⁰

Stevenson was not so quickly rid of the crisis as U Thant. After Kennedy and Khrushchev reached an agreement on Sunday, October 20, he and McCloy entered into weeks of negotiations with the Russians to determine the exact mechanics of the withdrawal of the missiles. Soviet jets, and personnel: the inspection of Cuba by a U. N. team; the non-aggression treaty with Cuba; and the end of U.S. aerial surveillance of the island.³⁴¹ While not all of these problems were solved satisfactorily, the missiles and jets were removed from Cuba, and on January 7, 1963, the Security Council was formally disengaged of the issue.³⁴²

It seemed for a time that Stevenson’s performance of the U.N. had led him to new heights in the esteem of John F. Kennedy. The day after he had received assurances from Khrushchev that the missiles would be removed, the President wrote Stevenson:

I want to tell you how deeply and personally I appreciate the contribution you have made to the security of the United States and the peace of the world in the last week. Your vindication of American policy before the the United Nations was

³³⁹ Walton, *Cold War and Counter-revolution*, p. 131

³⁴⁰ Pachter, *Collision Course*, pp. 96-97

³⁴¹ The missile crisis was the last time Stevenson was to spar with Zorin. The Russian Ambassador had offended U. Thant during the crisis by accusing the Secretary General of harboring pro-Western sympathies. Walton, *Remnants of power*, pp.45-48 provides a fascinating account of the incident. Zorin’s replacement at the negotiations was Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov. Stuart Gerry Brown says that “Kuznetsov had been chosen because he was known to be on good personal terms with Stevenson”. See Brown, *Stevenson*, p. 189

³⁴² Davis, *Politics, of Honor*, p. 485

superb; and I know that it accounts in great measure for the understanding and support that pplic Policy has received from our friends abroad.³⁴³

To which Stevenson replied, a bit effusively, that he was “happy to have had an opportunity to participate in this historic incident, which you have directed with such precision, decision, and restraint”.³⁴⁴

Then, in early December, there unfolded an incident so heavily laden with political intrigue and backstairs gossip that it seemed more likely to have come from one of the political novels of the day than from real life. (Time Magazine listed *Pail-Safe*, *Seven Days in May*, and Allen Drury’s *A Shade of Difference* as the best selling fiction of that first week in December).³⁴⁵ On December 1, JFK called Arthur Schlesinger into his office to ask him to warn Stevenson that Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop were writing an article on the missile crisis for the *Saturday Evening Post* in which they accused Stevenson “of advocating a Caribbean Munich” during the ExComm Sessions. Chalmers Roberts was planning a story on the article for the *Washington Post*. Alsop and Bartlett were both highly respected reporters, and Bartlett, the same man who had been responsible for the Chester Bowles article, was a close friend of the President. “Everyone will suppose that the piece came out of the White House because of Charlie”. Kennedy told Schlesinger, will you tell Adlai that I never talked to Charlie or any other reporter about the Cuban crisis, and that this piece does not represent my views”.³⁴⁶

The Alsop-Bartlett article, which received an enormous pre-release promotion focusing on the Stevenson story, actually devoted only two paragraphs to the U.N. Ambassador. But its headlines and photography, including a huge full-page picture of an agonized Stevenson “looking”, as Kenneth Davis said, “as though he were about to burst into tears”, clearly indicated where the authors thought the meat of their story lay.³⁴⁷ The article charged that Stevenson was the only Presidential adviser who “dissented from the ExComm consensus. ‘Adlai wanted a Munich’, says a nonadmiring official who learned of his proposal. ‘He wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian and British missile bases for the Cuban bases’. In addition, the story implied that Stevenson’s proposal for the evacuation of Guantanamo was not necessarily contingent on the

³⁴³ John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Oct. 29, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 850

³⁴⁴ Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy, No.5, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Dox 850

³⁴⁵ “Books”, Time, LXXX, No.24 (Dec. 14, 1962), 78

³⁴⁶ John F. Kennedy, quoted in Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*. p. 763

³⁴⁷ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, pp. 405-06

prior dismantling of the bases, but put forward as an immediate bargaining point. Because of Stevenson's softness. Alsop and Bartlott maintained, "Arthur Schlesinger was assigned to write the uncompromising speech which Stevenson delivered at the U.N. on Tuesday, and tough-minded John McCloy was summoned from a business conference in Germany to work with Stevenson in the U.N. negotiations emphasis added".³⁴⁸

The press had a field day with the article. There was wide speculation that Kennedy was using Bartlett to signal that he wanted Stevenson's resignation. Adding fuel to the fire was the resentment that some members of the press felt at what they believed to be the special privileges granted Bartlett by the President. John Steele, the chief of the Washington bureau of the Time-Life publications, wrote: "Other magazines and newspapers were preparing inside' pieces, but it was the President who urged Bartlett to compose one on his own. He also issued instructions as he had done for several but not all other newsmen, giving Bartlett access to the White House, CIA, and State Department sources".³⁴⁹

How much substance was there in the Alsop-Bartlett charges? Certainly, the proposals outlined by Stevenson at the ExComm meeting of Saturday, October 20 enraged many of the committee members, as we have seen. But the sequence and timing of those proposals is crucial to this discussion. It is undisputed that Stevenson did speak of the evacuation of the Turkish and Italian bases - though not the British - and of the abandonment of Guantanamo and the neutralization of Cuba. But when and in what context did he intend to lay these proposals on the bargaining table?

Dean Rusk was at the Saturday meeting, just as were Dillon, Lovett, McCone, and the others who attacked Stevenson. But his understanding of what the U.N. Ambassador was proposing was quite different from that of his colleagues. "Rusk's impression is that Stevenson was not in fact advocating an American withdrawal from Guantanamo or from Turkey. He was trying to suggest what kinds of demands might be raised if, as many others also expected, the Russians dragged their feet after agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba."³⁵⁰ To Richard Walton, Rusk added: "The mix that turned out had a good Stevenson input in it.

³⁴⁸ Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett. "In Time of Crisis", Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXV, No.24 (Dec. B. 1962), 15-21

³⁴⁹ The Stranger on the Squad", Time, LXX, No.24 (Dec. 14, 1962), 15

³⁵⁰ Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 96

It was a place where his influence was significant. We were all doves and hawks trying to find an alternative in force.³⁵¹ Stevenson himself viewed his proposal as falling between such time as the missiles were “rendered inoperable” and the time when they — and all Russian military personnel — were removed from Cuba. (Recall that JFK had been vague on this distinction, and had originally demanded only that the missiles be rendered inoperable.) In Stevenson’s words, his proposal

was that if the missiles were rendered inoperable and then negotiations followed for their removal from Cuba we might propose, among other things, the withdrawal of all Russian personnel and weapons and the neutralization and demilitarization of the island of Cuba to be policed, by the U.N. in exchange for relinquishing Guantanamo.³⁵²

To be sure, this last statement was written after the fact and in the midst of the Alsop-Bartlett controversy. But a review of the notes and statements he made during the crisis support this contention. We recall that in the first notes Stevenson took on the crisis, he had wondered if the U.S. should “say that all bases are negotiable but not while he (Khrushchev) has IRRM’s in Cuba”.³⁵³

In his handwritten note to Kennedy on October 17 he had written, “if they won’t remove the missiles and restore the status quo ante, we will have to do it ourselves - and then we will be ready to discuss bases in the context of a disarmament treaty or anything else...”³⁵⁴ In view of these statements, the worst that can be charged against Stevenson is that he advocated revealing a willingness to discuss such neutralization proposals before it was strategically sound to do so. If, as many thought, Stevenson supported announcing our willingness to negotiate these issues in the President’s address of the 22nd or his own U.N. speech of the 23rd - even with the explicit stipulation that the missiles must first be rendered inoperable - this would undoubtedly have weakened the American bargaining position. But at no time did the Ambassador ever propose the dismantling of the Turkish and Italian bases and/or the evacuation of Guantanamo as a direct

³⁵¹ Dean Rusk, quoted in Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 65

³⁵² Adlai E. Stevenson, *Miscellaneous Notes*, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁵³ Adlai E. Stevenson, *Memo to Self*, Oct. 17, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁵⁴ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, pp. 783-84

quid pro quo for the removal of the Cuban sites. As Stevenson wrote Stuart Gerry Brown on March 15, 1963.

I think the confusion arose because somebody interpreted my position as offering to trade a base in exchange for rendering the missiles inoperable, i.e., removing the gun from our head, rather than the larger package of removing the Russians from Cuba. But obviously the U.S has long pursued a policy of refusing to negotiate under threat and I had no such idea at the time.³⁵⁵

There is no supporting evidence whatsoever for the statement that Stevenson had been the sole dissenter from the policy adopted by ExComm. All sources agree that Stevenson welcomed the proposal when it had emerged on Friday as the majority opinion of the Committee. As he stated flatly to Hugh Downs on the “Today” Show. I emphatically approved the blockade on further arms shipments to Cuba”.³⁵⁶ Steele says that as a result of the post article, JFK asked Arthur Schlesinger to go over the secret minutes of the ExComm meetings. “Kennedy, it seems, did not recall that Stevenson ‘dissented’ from the decision Schlesinger’s investigation confirmed that Stevenson supported the quarantine from the start, and that he urged negotiations be backed by vigorous military action.”³⁵⁷

The claim that the White House summoned John McCloy from Germany to back up a supposedly soft Stevenson has real merit, probably the only statement in the Stevenson section of the article that does. As we have already seen, the President went to great pains to ensure that even Stevenson himself believed that the assignment had been made at the Ambassador’s suggestion. And Stevenson did indeed, state, again on the “Today” Show, that he had requested McCloy.³⁵⁸ In view of the vehement attacks Stevenson had aroused, however, it is highly probable that the idea did not originate from him. In addition to the scenario already outlined, author Arnold Beichman has suggested another. Beichman, who thinks that the McCloy idea came first from Gen. Lucius D. Clay and not Bobby Kennedy, believes that Stevenson was given the choice between the Dullesian Herman Phleger and the liberal McCloy. Naturally, Stevenson

³⁵⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Brown, Stevenson, p.191

³⁵⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, in Transcript of Interview on “Today” Show, Dec. 5, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁵⁷ Steele, “Stevenson Affair”, 46

³⁵⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, in Transcript of Interview on Today” Show, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

chose MoCloy, and this, says Bichman, is the grounds on which the Ambassador could say he requested Mocloy.³⁵⁹

Finally, the suggestion that Schlesinger was assigned by the White House to write Stevenson's U.N. speech is patently absurd. Arthur Schlesinger had been a Stevenson speechwriter for years. He was Stevenson's closest friend in the White House. It was only natural that the Ambassador request his help in drafting such an important speech. Schlesinger himself relates that he knew nothing about the crisis until Stevenson informed him of it and asked him to help draft the speech.³⁶⁰ It is true that Robert Kennedy told him to keep an eye on things in New York, but it had always been recognized that a major part of the historian's job was liaison between the president and his U.N. Ambassador.³⁶¹

Thus ran the Alsop-Bartlett charges: one was true—but Stevenson had been led to believe it was false; one could only be considered true by a very narrow interpretation of Stevenson's position: two were constructed out of whole cloth. But the obvious weaknesses in parts of the charges only lent strength to the suspicion that the article was intended as a smear designed to secure Stevenson's resignation. Much attention was focused on who the "nonadmiring official who accused Stevenson of advocating another Munich might have been. Most reporters declined to name the President, at least in print. Even Richard Walton wrote that "there is no reason to suspect that Kenney himself had anything to do with it".³⁶² The consensus seemed to be that "What had probably happened was that some other New Frontiersman, knowing of the President's lack of deep affection for Adlai, had felt free to knock him".³⁶³ Much speculation centered on Jean Acheson, whose distaste for Stevenson has already been noted. "But Acheson coolly and flatly denied it. Said he: 'I do not know to this day what Adlai Stevenson's position was, and I don't care. I never bothered to find out where he stood'"³⁶⁴ Others believed that Robert Kennedy was a likely source for the statement.

On Monday, December 4, Stevenson went to the White House to attend a meeting of the Executive Committee for the National Security Council. At this meeting, the President presented

³⁵⁹ Arnold Beichman, The "Other" State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations - Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), p.162

³⁶⁰ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 740

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 742

³⁶² Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 65

³⁶³ "Stranger on the Squad", 18

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 17

to each of his top Cuban advisers a silver calendar with the thirteen days of the October crisis deeply etched and the initials of the President and the adviser inscribed in the top corners. After the meeting the President conferred with Stevenson in the Oval office, assuring him that he had had nothing to do with the Post article and getting Stevenson's approval on a statement to be issued by Pierre Salinger that afternoon.³⁶⁵

This two-paragraph statement expressed the confidence in Ambassador Stevenson. It said that the deliberations of the National Security Council should not, had not, and would not be made public. But it did not deny the charges made by Alsop and Bartlett.³⁶⁶ Theodore Sorensen explains the omission by saying that JFK was "unwilling either to repudiate his friends or to cause more damage by specifying where they erred, and was equally unwilling to take responsibility for what his friends wrote".³⁶⁷

"White House staffers reported that Stevenson left completely satisfied".³⁶⁸ But there is room for doubt. Stevenson may have approved the White House statement it was, after all, half a loaf - but he was hardly pleased by it. What he had wanted the President to say was like this:

I am provoked by these attacks on a distinguished member of my Cabinet and an American respected the world over. His advice in the Cuban crisis was sound and farsighted, and his assistance invaluable. His Patriotism, wisdom and reputation need no endorsement from me, and I hope to have his advice and support for years to come.³⁶⁹

Reporting on that oval office meeting, John Steele wrote, "Kennedy had been almost cavalier, ignoring Stevenson's arguments that presidential advisers should be protected from leaks... indignant only at the notion that anyone could think he would use Charles Bartlett as a mouthpiece".³⁷⁰ Steele's source was Adlai Stevenson.³⁷¹

³⁶⁵ *Stranger on the Squad*, 18

³⁶⁶ White House Press Release, Dec. 4, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁶⁷ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 352

³⁶⁸ *Stranger on the Squad*, 18

³⁶⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, *Miscellaneous Notes*, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁷⁰ *Stranger on the Squad*, 18

³⁷¹ On Dec. 10, 1962, Stevenson wrote to Pierre Salinger saying that he had just sent a letter to John Steele, correcting "his misinterpretations and misstatements" in the *Time* article "which worried the President" Stevenson enclosed a

Schlesinger reports that Stevenson talked Monday afternoon with several reporter friends who convinced him that the article was Kennedy's way of signalling that he wanted Stevenson's resignation.³⁷² One of these reporters was Steele. Stevenson's notes of the conversation reveal that Steele told him that the article was "inspired by the White House. President called in Bartlett several weeks ago and told him to go to work. The President also saw the article on early as last Tues.... Pres. orders his people to talk and not to talk. Steele sided? first refusing, then calling back in few minutes".³⁷³ When Schlesinger talked with Stevenson later that afternoon, the Ambassador said grimly that, if the President wanted him to go, he did not have to go about it in this circuitous fashion".³⁷⁴

Schlesinger then went to Kennedy and, telling him that current rumour had him wanting Stevenson's resignation, repeated the Ambassador's comment that all the President had to do was ask

The President, swearing briefly, said, "Of course I don't want Stevenson to resign. I would regard his resignation as a disaster. Look at it logically. What in the world would I have to gain from his resignation? In the first place, where could I possibly find anyone who could do half as good a job at the U.N.? Look at the alternatives— Adlai would do a far-better job than any of the others. In the second place, from a realistic political viewpoint, it is better for me to have Adlai in the

copy of the lengthy letter he had sent Steele, and told Salinger, "I believe I told you and the President that I was satisfied with the statement, and I have so stated publicly repeatedly. I believe that the feeling that it was cavalier and insufficient emerged from the newspapermen and their interpretation, which evidently Steele shared". Adlai E. Stevenson to Pierre Salinger, Dec. 10, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 852.

But in reply to the letter he received from Stevenson, Steele reveals that the "cavalier" statement came out of meeting he had with the Ambassador, probably on Monday, December 4. Steele wrote: "And regarding the use of the word 'cavalier' — your own word last week — it is my very clear impression that you see regarded the meeting". John Steele to Adlai E. Stevenson, Dec. 12, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 853. Stevenson's last correspondence with Steele raises the suspicion that the Ambassador had indeed called Kennedy's attitude "cavalier" and that his letter of Dec. 10 had been more for Salinger's benefit than Steele's. "More-over", he wrote the reporter on Dec. 14, "I suspect your memory is better than mine - and all the time I fancied myself as a pretty good reporter!" Adlai B. Stevenson to John Steele, Dec. 14, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 853

³⁷² Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 764

³⁷³ Adlai Stevenson, *Miscellaneous Notes*, Stevenson Papers, Box 853. Stevenson mistakenly dated this "Wash — Mon, Nov. 3, 1962" — an impossible date because the article had not appeared yet. Schlesinger's account that Stevenson met with reporters that Monday and John Steele's reference on Dec. 12 to a conversation "last week" make Mon. Dec. 4 the most likely date for these notes

³⁷⁴ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 765

government than out. In the third place, if I were trying to get him out, Charlie Bartlett is a good friend, but he's the last medium I would use".

This was of little comfort to Stevenson, however. When Schlesinger told him of the conversation, he snapped, "That's fine, but will he say it publicly?"³⁷⁵

Stevenson had returned to New York Monday night in order to appear the next morning on NBC's "Today" Show. His performance was a tour de force. Not only did he deny the Alsop-Bartlett charges and clarify his position, but he scored a real coup by linking his personal plight to the higher question of confidentiality between President and advisers.

The worst thing about this article, the real danger, I think, to our country from such journalism is not just that it poisons the wells of history or that it is calculated to injure me. Rather it is, as the New York Times said this morning, that the secrecy of one of the highest organs of the United States Government has been Seriously breached. How is it possible to believe that the opinions expressed therein can have any value if they may appear in the public press the next day — or the next month? How can advisers to the President be expected to give advice freely and easily and at all times honestly and with complete integrity if they have to worry about what their argument will look like in print a few weeks later?³⁷⁶

Later that day, Harlan Cleveland telephoned Schlesinger to tell him "that public action by the President was essential to restore not only Stevenson's morale but his effectiveness in the U.N".³⁷⁷

The President had already written a personal letter to Stevenson in which he regretted the incident, expressed his continued confidence in the Ambassador, talked about the problem of having newspapermen as friends, and offered an onward-and-upward pep talk.³⁷⁸ (Gee Appendix H). He sent Schlesinger off to New York to deliver the letter personally, but by the time the historian reached the U.N. Kennedy had decided that it would be best to release the letter to the press. Conferring by phone with Schlesinger and Clayton Fritchey, JFK dropped the references

³⁷⁵ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 765

³⁷⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, in Transcript of Interview on "Today" Show, Dec. 5, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

³⁷⁷ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 765

³⁷⁸ John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Dec. 5, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 846

to Bartlett and recomposed the letter as a strong endorsement of Stevenson's work at the United Nations. The letter, which was released to the press at 4.40 p.m. Tuesday, read:

This is just a note to tell you again how deeply I regret the unfortunate stir which has arisen over the statements contained in the Saturday Evening Post articles, I think you know how greatly we have all admire your performance at the U.N. in general and during the Security Council discussions and private negotiations connected with the Cuban crisis in particular. I have, of course, valued your advice very highly. That we have eliminated the nuclear menace from Cuba is the best evidence of the prudence of our policy and its execution, in which you have played such an active part.

our government has many important challenges in the days ahead; and your continued work at the U.N. will be of inestimable value. Meanwhile, it goes without saying that you have my fullest confidence and best wishes.³⁷⁹

But even this statement, while it scotched the rumours that the President wanted Stevenson to resign, did not specifically deny the charges made by Alsop and Bartlett. Stevenson thanked the President for his support:

I am sure you know full well how grateful I am for your most kind letters and statements in connection with the recent unpleasantness. I think they have served to allay any misgiving among the people with whom I have to work, and perhaps, from my point of view, that is only exceeding in importance by the consolidation and comfort to me of your own expression of confidence.³⁸⁰

The Ambassador continued to be disturbed, however, by the President's reluctance to issue a categorical denial of the charges.

By this time, however, the Stevenson forces were rallying. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations received five thousand pieces of mail.³⁸¹ Stevenson's personal files alone contain almost eight hundred letters and telegrams from 42 states and several foreign countries, almost

³⁷⁹ John F. Kennedy to Adlai E. Stevenson, Dec.4, 1962(7), Stevenson Papers, Box 850. There is no explanation for the incorrect date on this letter. It should almost certainly be dated December 5

³⁸⁰ Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy, Dec. B, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 850

³⁸¹ Beichman, "Other" State Department, p. 147

unanimously in support of the Ambassador.³⁸² Even anti-Stevensonian newspapers sprouted editorials supporting him. While much of this was spontaneous, the demonstration of support was nursed along by Public Affairs officer Clayton Fritchey. “Fritchey telephoned editors all over the country telling them the issue was not whether or not, they liked Adlai but whether meetings of the National Security Council were to be inviolate or not, or whether the President was not in danger of being surrounded the yes-men, if there were leaks out of the National Security Council:³⁸³ And when asked at a press conference what he thought of Stevenson, Secretary General U Thant went out of his way to lavish praise on the American Ambassador”.³⁸⁴ If Kennedy had intended to use the article to get rid of Stevenson, the plan was the worst backfire his Administration had seen since the Day of Pigs. The strong and vocal reaction for Stevenson reminded the President that, six years after he had run in any election and fourteen years since he had last won one, Adlai Stevenson still had a large and viable constituency.

Sensing the strength of that constituency, JFK realized that it would be a wise move to back down. When asked in his press conference on December 12 if he planned an inquiry into the National Security Council leaks, the President replied:

it is my judgment that this statement or interpretation of Governor Stevenson’s position did not come from a member of the National Security Council.

³⁸² Stevenson Papers, Box 847. The Ambassador particularly liked a poem sent him by an “unknown friend” in Pittsburgh:

“CONFERENCE OF BIRDS

“If you’re a hawk,
They raise no squawk
But if a dove,
Oh, Heavens Above!

“Now most maintain
It seems in vain,
That every bird should sing his special song
And not be labeled either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
When in assembly our good leaders speak,
There never surely should be any leak,
For A and B stand poised with smirching pen
To calumniate the finest of our men

³⁸³ Yet all the lesser birds tied in together
Have not the value of one Adlai feather”
“For a chuckle, also in admiration of a Rara Avis”

³⁸⁴ Beichman, “Other” State Department, pp. 146-47

I satisfied myself on that. I have never heard anyone characterize Governor Stevenson's position in that way, and I am satisfied, myself that no one did.

Later, he added:

I am surprised that anyone would possibly think that it would be in the interest of the country, the Administration, or the White House, that any lessening of Stevenson's influence would be provided.³⁸⁵

Shortly thereafter, the furor over the Alsop- Bartlett article died away, and remained only as a bitter pain in the recesses of Stevenson's memory. When Mary McGrory saw him later that month, "he said he was tired and would soon quit to go home to Libertyville to write his memoirs".³⁸⁶ And one can not help but wonder if there was not a little bit of irony contained in the Christmas greeting Stevenson sent the President that year,

.....At the end of another year of your Administration, I want to say again that I have enjoyed my work rather more than I expected to, and my association with you fully as much as I expected to.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁵ John F. Kennedy, Excerpts from President Kennedy's Press Conference of December 12, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 850

³⁸⁶ McGrory, "Perfectionist and the Press", in Doyle, ed. *As We Knew Adlai*, p. 179

³⁸⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson to John F. Kennedy, Dec. 22, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Box 850

5. "THEY SENT YOU OUR BEST"

"One could not fairly judge what kind of man Stevenson might have become", John Kennedy once remarked to Arthur Schlesinger, "for no experience could have been more destructive of self-confidence than to have been twice defeated for President: victory would have changed him in another direction".³⁸⁸ When I began to examine the last years of Adlai Stevenson, I imagined myself writing the story of a noble old lion harrassed and abused by an ambitious young jackal and a wily grey-haired fox. It is always tempting to write in this manner, with heroes and villains, men in white hats and in black. But history seldom provides us with such a clear dichotomy, and the life of Adlai Stevenson is no exception to this rule.

John Kennedy - and later Lyndon Johnson - was guilty of grievous errors and misjudgements in his dealings with Adlai Stevenson. But it is not entirely on these shoulders that the burden of guilt for the "tragic last years" of Stevenson should be placed.³⁸⁹ The traditional pattern of tragedy has the tragic hero coming to despair : and destruction through an inherent fault or weakness in his character. Adlai Stevenson was a man of heroic proportions. His virtues and strengths of character have placed an indelible stamp on American politics. As President Johnson said in eulogizing him,

It was his gift to help emancipate men from narrowness of mind and the shackles which selfishness and ignorance place upon the human adventure.... For an entire generation of Americans, he imparted a nobility to public life and a grandeur to American purpose which has already reshaped the life of the nation, and which will endure for many generations.³⁹⁰

His name is synonymous with honour, humour, dignity, and peace in the minds of millions throughout the world. Yet, in the period from 1961 until his death, Stevenson was a figure who as often inspired tears as laughter, as often pathos as respect. Despite his great prestige and popularity, he was a man who knew self-doubt and self- pity all too well. Often, Stevenson was his own worst enemy, a tragic hero in the fullest sense.

³⁸⁸ John F. Kennedy, quoted in Schlesinger, *A Thousand days*, p. 428

³⁸⁹ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 3

³⁹⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 259

The decision to enter elective politics is more than the choice of a vocation. In making this decision, a man also selects the standard of measurement against which he will judge his own self-worth. Ballot-box morality was something alien to Adlai Stevenson. He was not adept at - even shunned — the most essential skill of the politician: the ability to take the pulses of the electorate and to adopt stands in accordance with their views. “He wanted ideas and ideas alone to be persuasive”.³⁹¹ He presented himself and his views as they were: his personal identification with the policies he advocated was intense. A man with a tougher skin and a lesser sensitivity could have made the necessary distinction between the public and private self. But, by his very nature, Stevenson could not. Our admiration of the man is due in large part to the personal integrity and honor with which he reinforced his politics.

Stevenson saw a balloting as the public’s judgment on himself. To be sure, he could give voice to some of the other explanations of his 1952 and 1956 losses: that Eisenhower was a war hero; that the Republicans were better organized and better financed; that the Democrats were under the shadow of McCarthy’s charges and the Korean War; that the nation was tired of twenty years of Democratic rule. But deep down, I believe that Stevenson felt that the American people had judged Eisenhower to be a better man than he. He was acutely aware of his inability to package himself in the often inane but effective ways of vote-getting. He could not bring himself to engage in the “political blarney” at which Kennedy, Johnson, and Eisenhower excelled.³⁹² One of the best examples of his deficiency in this respect occurred during the Florida primary in 1956. After leaving one small town, Stevenson turned to one of the advisers who had been urging him to watch his image and asked how he had done. “It wasn’t bad” the adviser replied. “But when you are shaking hands in a supermarket and a little girl in a starched dress steps out of the crowd and hands you a stuffed alligator, what you say is, “Thanks very much, I’ve always wanted one of these for the mantelpiece at Libertyville”. What you don’t say is what you did say: “For Christ’s sake, what’s this?””³⁹³

Comparison is the foundation of elective politics. Seldom is a politician judged solely on the basis of his own merits; instead, his merits are considered relative to those of other candidates. There are no colleagues in politics, only potential competitors. John Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson were never able to overcome this problem in their relationship. Kenneth Davis

³⁹¹ Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 247

³⁹² Whitman, *Portrait*, p. 274

³⁹³ Ibid

described it as “a kind of psychological aggression. The two men had great respect and even admiration for one another - Stevenson’s grew as he came to know Kennedy better — but always there was this covert antagonism, a feeling in each that the other was a competitor if not an opponent”.³⁹⁴

One of their problems was that they were so much alike that they drew upon — and thus competed for — the support of the same constituency. Both were upper class, Ivy League, Eastern Establishment types — in sharp contrast to the other major Democratic aspirants of 1960. Both had reputations for wit, intelligence, style, class, charisma. Both espoused policies—particularly in foreign affairs which were firmly rooted in the liberalism of the Democratic Party’s powerful left wing.

The relationship between Kennedy, Stevenson, and the liberal Democrats was not unlike that of a love triangle. Each man was fiercely jealous of the amount of attention and affection the liberals showed toward the other. It was conceivable to neither man that the liberal wing could love them both. And, curiously, both Kennedy and Stevenson overestimated the other’s influence over the Democratic left. Stevenson, overly ware of what the ballot-box roll call or, in this case, the convention said, felt that Kennedy had won the liberals away from him. For eight long years, Stevenson had conscientiously and skillfully held the stewardship of the party in his hands. Despite his personal defeats, he had strengthened the party against the time when its fortunes might change. Yet, when the tide had shifted, the liberals - albeit reluctantly - abandoned Stevenson for the youth and drive of Kennedy. Kennedy, for his part, was deeply insecure about his hold over the liberals. His liberal credentials had, justifiably, been called into question on such issues as McCarthyism by such left- wing luminaries as Eleanor Roosevelt. He remembered how hard he had had to work for the nomination in 1960 (as compared to the relative ease with which Stevenson garnered it in 1952 and 1956). He recalled - and doubtless gave too much weight to - those moments in the 1960 convention when it had seemed as if it would only take the right words from Stevenson to get his banner lifted for a third time. It was Stevenson, we must remember, and not Johnson, whom Kennedy considered his most serious obstacle to the nomination. Even until his death, Kennedy “felt that the liberal heart of the Democratic party still belonged to Adlai.”³⁹⁵

³⁹⁴ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 469

³⁹⁵ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, p. 205

Stevenson could not help but compare himself to Kennedy. He wanted to understand why he had been displaced from the leadership of his party, and denied the leadership of his nation, both of which he felt he had earned. It requires an enormous amount of ego and self-confidence to seek the Presidency of the United States. This Stevenson had; indeed, he was sometimes accused of outright vanity. But that self-confidence had been profoundly shaken by the experiences of 1952, 1956, and 1960, And it had always been tempered by the ability to laugh at himself and by a deep underlying concern for the feelings of other people. He was especially anxious to be liked and respected by others. Thus, he was disturbed by his losses, especially that of 1960, which, in his mind, signified that he had lost the affection and respect of those he had attempted to serve. Stevenson failed to recognize emotionally that respect and admiration need not be expressed through an office or a nomination. He had felt that the 1952 nomination was the greatest hondrever done him. And he could only understand intellectually that the loss of the 1960 nomination did not diminish the stature he held in the Democratic party.

Adlai Stevenson was an analyzer, “He liked to examine a question, and then re-examine it, to ‘cast up the accounts’, as he used to say at his U.N. staff meetings.”³⁹⁶ One of his favourite opics of analysis was himself. Thus, he brooded over the implications of the treatment (both real and imaginary) he received at the hands of the Democrats and the two Presidents he served. “Stevenson was moody and introspective to a greater degree than was generally realized: he was sensitive about himself. ‘Give me the benefit of your candor and your criticism, he told friends assembled for his sixtyfifth birthday party... but please keep your doubts to yourself, because I have enough of those of my own’.”³⁹⁷

The tumult and intensity of emotions experienced by Adlai Stevenson during his ambassadorship was extra- ordinary. He was a man driven to agonize, “I can’t allow bitterness, will be destroyed by my own? bitterness”.³⁹⁸ Yet, he remained on the job.

Increasingly, he found himself doing and saying things which he did not believe. The first time he lied to the U.N. during the Bay of Pigs crisis, was traumatic experience for him. But he could not resign. His sense of duty to his country prevented this. “His resignation now would be

³⁹⁶ Walton, *Remnants of Power*. p. 206

³⁹⁷ Whitman, *Portrait*, pp.270-271

³⁹⁸ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d. Stevenson Papers, Box 789

a betrayal of the President and the country at a moment of gravest peril, adding to the already terribly high price of folly”.³⁹⁹

But the Bay of Pigs was not the last time Stevenson found himself humiliated by the White House or forced to defend a position in which he did not believe. The Alsop-Bartlett charges of the Cuban missile crisis was the other major incident in the Kennedy years. There would be no public flaps of this sort between the President and the Ambassador during the Johnson Administration. Stevenson defended loyally some of LBJ’s most controversial policies such as the Dominican Republic intervention and Vietnam. He continued to do so even in the face of growing pressure from his intellectual constituency. (See [Appendices I and J](#) for an exchange between Stevenson and some early Vietnam critics.) Yet after his death, many of his friends maintained that he was deeply opposed to these policies and planned to resign soon because of them.

The transition from Kennedy to Johnson Administrations would provide only a temporary improvement for Stevenson. At first, he would be given the Johnson treatment in grand style, the President telling him that, by all rights, he (Stevenson) should have been sitting in the White House now. Yet, by the time of his death, Stevenson would be reduced to asking Vice President Humphrey how to go about getting an appointment with LBJ.⁴⁰⁰ He would come to worry about Johnson’s impulsiveness, sensitivity to criticism, and fondness for power.⁴⁰¹ “In private conversations Stevenson often used the word ‘blunder’ to describe the Administration’s execution of foreign policy. He was appalled by what he regarded as the Johnson Administration’s corn pone”.”⁴⁰²

Three prime reasons for Stevenson’s refusal to resign appear. The first is a sense of duty, an extension, perhaps of the traditional obligation of the upper class to engage in public service (Princeton in the nation’s service). “It’s easy to reconcile a sense of duty with this job,” he once said, “and Stevenson did feel duty-bound, for he was a man intensely loyal to his commitments”.⁴⁰³ He was also very much a team player. When the David McReynolds-Dwight Macdonald-Mitchell Goodman group of intellectuals asked him to resign the ambassadorship in protest over

³⁹⁹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, p. 458

⁴⁰⁰ Walton, *Remnants of Power*, pp. 207-208

⁴⁰¹ Davis, *Politics of Honor*, pp. 489-490

⁴⁰² Cochran, *Patrician Among the Politicians*, p. 330

⁴⁰³ Muller, *Study in Values*, p. 303

Vietnam, he told them, “No, I will not resign. I would never take advantage of my political position to resign for political reasons. That’s not the way we play the game”.⁴⁰⁴

Secondly, Stevenson “sought great power and was eager, perhaps pathetically eager, to grasp what lesser power was available”.⁴⁰⁵ As Bert Cochran puts it,

Stevenson’s hunger for the excitement of public life was like a drug addict’s need for a fix. He had to be near the sources of power and a position to watch the levers. He had to be in the thick of hectic activity and a cog in the machinery of history”.⁴⁰⁶

Most compelling of all, I believe, were the psychological motivations which drove Stevenson. He was clutching not at the remnants of power, as Walton and Cochran would suggest, but rather at the remnants of respect. He was a lonely man, but a man who loved people. For all his virtues, he genuinely did not have enough confidence in himself to believe that people would like and respect him unless he had a position of some importance, a title with a little prestige to it. “I will be miserable if inactive?” he wrote while deciding whether or not to accept the post. “If I don’t accept decline in frustration and loneliness”.⁴⁰⁷ Somehow, this connection had lodged in his mind. He clung in a last desperate hope to the office and title of U.N. Ambassador, afraid to face the world as Adlai Stevenson, Citizen.

These characteristics are mentioned not to disparage this man, but to allow a full comprehension of how much he did achieve. “A great man does not have to be unflawed, nor is he ever. It is sufficient that, flaws and all, he try to help mankind light its way onward”.⁴⁰⁸

“Three Presidents of the United States sent Adlai Stevenson to the United Nations. They sent you our best”?⁴⁰⁹ Dean Rusk’s words ring with truth. If to some extent Adlai Stevenson was a failure, it was largely because he had defined success in lofty terms impossible for mortal men

⁴⁰⁴ Walton, Remnants of Power, p. 176

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 7

⁴⁰⁶ Cochran, Patrician Among the Politicians, p. 319

⁴⁰⁷ Adlai E. Stevenson, Miscellaneous Notes, n.d., Stevenson Papers, Box 789

⁴⁰⁸ Whitman, Portrait, p. 322

⁴⁰⁹ Dean Rusk, The United Nations Memorial Ceremony for Ambassador Stevenson, July 19, 1965, in Prosser, ed. Ethic for Survival, p. 467

to reach. He said that it was possible to be both a politician and a man of conscience and morality. He raised the level of our ideals and our hopes, and was expected more of him because of it.

Did Adlai Stevenson make history in the 1960's? For better or for worse, these pages have shown that he did. What would have happened if Stevenson had decided to actively seek nomination in 1960? Conversely, what would have happened if he had endorsed Kennedy during the primaries, and been given the post of Secretary of State, and held it while decisions were being made on the Bay of Pigs and the Dominican Republic and Vietnam? What if he had resigned the U.N. post during the Bay of Pigs crisis or after the Saturday ExComm meeting of the missile crisis? What if he had run for the Senate from Illinois in 1962 or from New York in 1964, as he had been asked to do? What if he had joined the intellectuals opposing the Vietnam War in 1965 and perhaps lived to play out the role inherited from him by Eugene McCarthy?

But he did not do these things. He acted, instead, in the manner which he believed to be most consistent with his personality and his code of honour. Thus is history made by a man acting out of the strengths and the weaknesses of a sense of duty, and a sense of pride.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to provide a number of insights into the life of Adlai E. Stevenson and to examine the development of Stevenson as a political leader.

Although Governor Stevenson entered politics with the handicap of having little knowledge of state government and machine politics, he learned to perform the difficult dual role of preaching and practicing good government while getting along with the practical politicians who ran the legislature and party machinery. Stevenson quickly developed his political leadership in regard to the State Legislature, for his primary interest was always the creation and guidance of policy. He fought hard for energetic reform legislation, though his methods were ones of moderation rather than coercion. With Republican controlled houses and many hostile legislators within the ranks of his own party. Stevenson had to depend on patience, diplomacy, and bi-partisanship. He developed personal skill and the ability to reconcile and accommodate differing opinions, and to use those powers which were his as, for example, in the proroguing of the legislature.

With his personality and programme the Governor was able to elicit the support of powerful political leaders such as Senator William J. Connors; and yet, Stevenson's unwillingness to compromise certain of his principles alienated such men as House Majority Leader Paul Powell. For Stevenson was clearly an idealist, he refused to play "tongue-in-cheek" politics with respect to mine legislation, and rather than choose the expedient way to achieve passage of the Con-Con resolution, he refused to deal with the West Side Bloc. Respectful of the uses of craft, however, Stevenson often employed the strategic favour or patronage job to help gain political support for his programme. The mustering of public opinion via publicity and the press also performed an essential role in the passage of administration measures.

As Stevenson was a man of high integrity and principles, he could have easily been too dedicated, too idealistic. With such a leader, so different from the regular political scene and personalities, there is always the possibility that government will reach an impasse. Stevenson, however, was free from the Presbyterian rigidity that marked Woodrow Wilson. A moralist without being priggish, the Governor recognized the responsibilities for political leadership which had been imposed upon him because of his office, and sought to accept them. One of

the most remarkable aspects of Stevenson's years in Springfield was his own growth as a politician. Those who thought of him as above and beyond party politics made a great mistake, for he unquestionably proved to be politically minded.

Charles W. Van Devander has written:

No public official who neglected the realities represented by the precinct worker, ward bosses, city and state bosses, would be likely to write any record of great accomplishments in public life in the present stage of democracy.¹

Stevenson recognized these realities and used them successfully, although he had no desire to build a personal machine or become an organization boss. In regard to the Chicago organization, he achieved a division of power with Colonel Arvey. And, rather than a further basis for maligning the Colonel and Democratic organization leaders, this study may help to demonstrate that these men have themselves come a long way in developing responsible political leadership oriented toward good government.

Patronage and personnel recruitment provided the Governor with one of his biggest problems. He would have agreed with Professor V.O. Key, Jr., that "...a major problem of the politics of the states is to provide administrative direction, powerful enough, honest enough, and stable enough to manage competently the very considerable services of the states".² Stevenson attempted to gather about him the best administrative talent available, regardless of politics: his top-level appointments were generally outstanding. In the appointment of Walter Fisher as Chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission, Stevenson opposed vested interests and traditional practice: but recognising the position of organized labour in the Democratic order, he adhered to their wishes in the appointment of Frank Annunzio as Director of the Department of Labour.

The Governor understood the place and value of in the political party system, but he demanded be of the right kind, competent, efficient. qualified. Although Democratic patronage that and patronage professionally politicians could recommend anyone they so desired for a politically controlled position, professional ability would be the determining factor as to whether that. job was finally received. Stevenson was cognizant of the power of patronage for legislation and internal party control. As he pursued the goal of professionalism in his personnel

¹ Charles W. Van Devander, *The Big Bosses*, p. 311

² V.O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction*, p.17

policy, political realities were taken into account. Non-technical state jobs were thrown open to patronage and Democratic county chairmen were carefully looked after.

The Department of Public Welfare provided an excellent case study of the Stevenson personnel programme. The appointment of Fred Hoehler as director was made because of professional competence, not political connections. Although jobs could be “developed” on occasion for special Democrats, rigid qualifications were generally demanded, especially at the higher levels. Consequently, the wrath of many local Democratic leaders was evoked, and certainly some of their gripes could be understood when Republican holdovers were deliberately circumventing Democratic patronage committees. The Hoehler-Stevenson programme also included the elimination of compulsory political contributions by state employees and the publication of state payrolls.

In his drive to achieve economy in state government, Stevenson did not hesitate to veto pork-barrel or pension bills. Both the Governor and the Director of Finance George Mitchell were determined to accomplish state purchasing on a competitive low-bid basis, and to protect the integrity of that procedure. Paul Powell, William Miller, Al Horan, and Joe Gill could testify to Stevenson’s resolution to remove the special privileges aspect from state contract allocations. Nevertheless, in certain purchasing areas such as printing and coal, contracts were still awarded with politics in mind.

As Stevenson had assumed political leadership in the fields of legislation, personnel recruitment, party organization, candidate selection, and finance, he further believed an essential duty of a political leader was to establish a moral tone in government. Using the reorganized state police which he had taken out of politics, the Governor struck hard at commercialized gambling. He unceasingly exposed corruption by public officials, whether they were members of his own party, or not. The significant factor about the administration scandals, he believed, was not that the public trust had been violated by an Individual, but how that violation had been dealt with.

Stevenson had gone from government into politics, and therefore he thought in terms of government. “The best government”, he said, “is in fact the best politics and will pay off in public confidence and votes manyfold what it loses in patronage, profit, and political organisation”.³ It was true that many Democrats thought that patronage could have been

³ Adlai Stevenson, *Major Campaign Speeches of 1952*, p. xxx1

handled more profitably in order to strengthen the Democratic organization and the intense dissatisfaction of certain groups of professional politicians was perhaps the best proof that Stevenson had insisted on making state decisions and awarding state business on the basis of merit. And yet, the majority of Democratic leaders supported the Governor, realizing that the best government in the last analysis probably was the best politics, and that Stevenson was the party's number one asset when it came to that very basic political objective of winning elections.

As 1952 was dominated by the pressures and activities connected with the national convention and the Presidential nomination, Stevenson's term in Illinois was actually only three years in duration. During that period however, he had accomplished a great deal toward fulfilling a desire which he had expressed in his 1949 inauguration speech:

We who meet here in Springfield today can take a long step toward making our government a model, a precept in the best tradition of self-government.... the strongest link in the mighty chain we call the United States.⁴

Stevenson had brought with him into Illinois government the moral honesty to challenge cynicism and corruption, the intellectual ability to formulate dynamic public policy, and a belief in conciliation to overcome differences of opinion. Within the short span of three years he had accomplished many things. For Governor Stevenson had shown that an amateur could assume responsible political leadership; that it was possible for an idealist to work with a powerful political machine, and at the same time maintain his own independence and integrity; that it was possible to recognize the values and use the inherent political power in the patronage system, but strike at its dual weaknesses of incompetence and inefficiency; that some of the influence and special privilege could be taken out of state purchasing; and, that a moral tone could be achieved in government. Certainly the study of Adlai E. Stevenson may provide more evidence to substantiate that definition of politics stated by Frederick M. Davenport:

For what is politics but courage and common sense and the capacity to understand people, to harmonize and compromise, and yet have strength of

⁴ Adlai Stevenson, Inaugural Address before a Joint Session of the 66th General Assembly of the State of Illinois, January 10, 1949 (Mimeographed copy, p.24)

character enough to stick to what you believe is right for the community and the country?⁵

Through his words and mode of life Adlai Stevenson had set an unusually compelling example to the practitioners of politics. The essence of Stevenson's example was that he demonstrated that moral values are relevant to politics. In 1952 he took over the leadership of the Democratic party, which, despite many great accomplishments had grown fat, careless and corrupt. He reorganized the Party's national headquarters, recharged the party's sluggish idealism and gave it a new tone and direction. Four years later, in his second campaign, he set forth in his "New America" programme, most of the intellectual basis for the later New Frontier of John F. Kennedy and Great Society of Lyndon B. Johnson.

Largely because of his leadership, the Democratic Party in the 1950's provided a viable alternative. Senator Eugin McCarthy did not exaggerate when he told his fellow Democrats at the 1960 Los Angeles Convention that Adlai Stevenson was "the man who made us proud to be a Democrat" Nor is it an exaggeration to say of him that he had a more profound and lasting effect on his party as a opposition leader, out of power than his successful Republican opponent had on his Party in power.

To the problems of foreign policy, Stevenson brought his admirable gifts of tact, timing, patience, incisive eloquence and skilful maneuver. His clear moral insight guided him through the ambiguities and indirections of diplomacy. He recognized that peace is not only an end which most men seek, but it is also a means for reaching that end, which many men tend to forget. Stevenson bequeathed to the nation in foreign affairs not a plan or a policy, but a reminder that moral self-restraint in the use of power is a source of strength.

Stevenson knew defeat and disappointment, but he never knew vulgarity, panic or despair. He was no stranger to ambition, but he remembered that win or lose he had to live with himself after Election Day. To the public dialogue of his time he brought intelligence, civility and grace. Those who have been his contemporaries have been companions of greatness.

The United Nation's that Stevenson had helped bring into being, nurtured and served was one expression of his service to the United States and his countrymen.

⁵ Frederick M. Davenport, "The Magnitude of the Task of the Politician". In A.N. Christenson and E.M. Kirkpatrick, ed., The People, Politics, and the Politician, p.22

The vigorous existence of Stevenson Democrats attests one example of his effect. These are the men and women who shunned politics until they were summoned to it by the sound of his voice enunciating a high-hearted vision of public life. And once in politics as participants (rather than as spectators and voters) they remained there.

Moreover, it was not merely as Democrats that this new group was significant, many of them entered public life as office-holders and administrators, thus opening politics on a wide scale to men of intellectual talent. True, there had been brain trustees with Roosevelt, but with and because of Stevenson large numbers of men of brains and dispassion exerted a sustained influence in the United States.

The contribution of Stevenson was aptly summed up by Walter Lipman.

We must wonder whether we have buried with Adlai Stevenson some element of the promise of American life. For in this generation he has stood apart, not only for his deeds and his words and his wit and his loveliness, but as somehow a living specimen of the kind of American that Americans themselves, and the great mass of mankind, would like to think that Americans are. From Lincoln to Adlai Stevenson the heritage is direct and unbroken, a family tradition which began with his grandfather. Like Lincoln he made men feel what the nation had to be if the American experiment was to succeed.

This Lincolnian American is, as compared with Washington or Jefferson, the first authentic American, the new man of the New World. Before Lincoln the distinguished Americans were transplanted Englishmen. Since Lincoln, there has existed the idea of a special American type which is excellent and admirable and holds the promise of a better human future. Adlai Stevenson was a rare, perhaps a late-blooming, example of such an American. He was admired by the discerning all over the world and greatly loved. An essential ingredient of the admiration and the love was the knowledge that only America could have produced him, and that this revealed what America really was.

The question is now whether this country is still devoted to the America idea which he embodied. No one supposes, of course, that the country can be filled with Stevensons any more than a hundred years ago it was filled with Lincolns, any more than Britain is filled with Churchills. It is only occasionally and for a while that nations are represented by their greatest men.

Adlai Stevenson's enemies were not men whom he had injured. He injured no men. His enemies were men who recognized that he did not share and was a living reproach to the new imperiousness of our power and wealth, that he was a deeply established American who had no part in the arrogance of the newly rich and the newly powerful and the newly arrived. His very presence made them uncomfortable, even abashed, all the more because he was so witty when they were so hot, so elegant when they were making a spectacle of themselves.⁶

Shall we see his like again? Or was he the last of his noble breed?. On this question hangs the American future.”

Adlai Stevenson was very sensitive to the well-being of others. His roots are as deep as any in the soil and history of United States. Stevenson is an aristocrat by blood and brains, He had led the good life. His world travels started in boyhood and few (other than John Foster Dulles) have covered as much of the globe as he. He went to good schools: Choate, Princeton, Harvard. His companions have been brilliant people. With a great bent for journalism, he became established as a partner in a distinguished Chicago law firm.

He has had a far more notable career in government, State, national and international, than most people realize. He is a master of English prose, a speaker of rare ability, and one whose well-known wit is as natural to him as breathing. All of his biographers refer to his Calvinist conscience. He is a man of deep spiritual sensitivity and penetrating moral insights.

He is also remembered as the twice-defeated Presidential Candidate. But somehow this fact seems irrelevant and unimportant for Stevenson who was philosophical and wise enough to know that disappointment and failure in life can often be more meaningful, more important than success.

More than any other man of this generation he raised the level of politics.

This is enough for the purposes of this thesis to set forth the man - a man of rich family heritage in the American sense, a man with all the intellectual, cultural privileges of American life, a man of great integrity - so honest with himself that he is always, and too often, self-deprecating a complex, sensitive and courageous, truly a great American, but also a citizen of the world.

⁶ Adlai Stevenson's Public Years edited by Jill Kneerim. pp.6-7. Preface by Walter Lippman. Grossman Publishers, New York, 1966

Millions of words have already been written about Adlai Stevenson. Millions more will be recorded in the future as the scope of his contribution to human betterment is more fully assessed. In 1962 Stevenson mourned the death of his long-time friend Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt “I have lost an inspiration. She would rather light a Candle than curse the darkness and her glow has warmed the world”. To untold millions in all lands who desperately yearn for peace and justice, those words might well serve as a fitting epitaph for Adlai E. Stevenson himself.

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THE ACCEPTANCE SPEECH

Following is Governor Adlai E. Stevenson's speech accepting the Democratic Presidential Nomination, delivered on July 26, 1952 at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

I accept your nomination - and your program.

I should have preferred to hear those words uttered by a stronger, wiser, better man than myself.

None of you can wholly appreciate what is in my heart. I can only hope that you may understand my words. They will be few.

I have not sought the honor you have done me. I could not seek it because I aspired to another office, which was the full measure of my ambition. One does not treat the highest office within the gift of the people of Illinois as an alternative or a consolation prize.

I would not seek your nomination for the Presidency because the burdens of that office straggle the imagination. Its potential for good or evil now and in the years of our lives smothers exultation and converts vanity to prayer.

Responsibility

I have asked the merciful Father of us all to let this cup pass from me. But from such dread responsibility one does not shrink in fear, in self-interest, or in false humility.

So, if this cup may not pass away from me, except I drink it, Thy will be done".

That my heart has been troubled, that I have not sought this nomination, that I could not seek it in good conscience, that I would not seek it in honest self-appraisal, is not to say that I value it the less. Rather it is that I revere the office of President of the United States.

And now that you have made your decision I will fight to win that office with all my heart and soul. With your help I have no doubt that we will win.

You have summoned me to the highest mission within the gift of my people. I could not be more proud. Better men than I were at hand for this mighty task, and I owe to you and to them

every resource of mind and strength that I possess to make your deed of today a good one for our country and our party. I am confident, too, that your selection of a candidate for Vice President will strengthen me and our party immeasurably in the hard, implacable work that lies ahead for all of us.

I know you join with me in gratitude and respect for the great Democrats and leaders of our generation whose names you have considered here in this convention, whose vigor, character and devotion to the Republic have won the respect of countless Americans and enriched our party. I shall need them, we shall need them, because I have not changed in any respect since yesterday. Your nomination, awesome as I find it, has not enlarged my own capacities. So I shall be profoundly grateful and emboldened by their comradeship and fealty.

Let me say, too, that I have been heartened by the conduct of this Convention. You have argued and disagreed because as Democrats you care and care deeply. But you have disagreed and argued without calling each other liars and thieves, without despoiling our best traditions in naked, shameless struggles for power.

The Platform

And you have written a platform that neither equivocates, contradicts nor evades. You have restated our party's record, its principles and its purposes, in language that none can mistake, end with a firm confidence in justice, freedom and peace on earth that will raise the hearts and hopes of mankind for the day when no one rattles a saber and no one drags a chain.

For all these things, for unity, vigor and vision, I am grateful to you. But I feel no exultation, no sense of triumph. Our troubles are all ahead of us. Some will call us appeasers; others will say we are the war party. Some will say we are reactionary. Others will say we stand for socialism. There will be the inevitable cries of "throw the rascals out"; "it's time for a change"; and so on and so on.

We'll hear all those things and many more besides. But we will hear nothing that we have not heard before. I am not too much concerned with partisan denunciation, epithets and abuse, because the working man, the farmer, the thoughtful businessman, all know that they are better off than ever before and that the greatest danger to free enterprise in this country died with the great depression under Democratic blows.

Nor am I afraid that the two-party system is in danger. Certainly the Republican Party looked brutally alive here a couple of weeks ago, and I mean both Republican Parties! Nor am I afraid that the Democratic Party is old and fat and indolent. After 150 years it has been old for a long time, and will never be indolent as long as it looks forward and not back, as long as it commands the allegiance of the young and hopeful who dream the dreams and see the visions of a better America and a better world.

Change

You will hear many sincere and thoughtful people express concern about the continuation of one party in power for 20 years. I do not belittle this attitude. But change for the sake of change has no merit. If our greatest hazard is preservation of the values of Western civilization, in our self-interest alone, if you please, is it the part of wisdom to change for the sake of change to a party with a split personality, to a leader, whom we all respect, but who has been called upon to minister to a hopeless case of political schizophrenia?

If the fear is corruption in official position, do you believe with Charles Evans Hughes that guilt in personal and knows no party? Do you doubt the power of any political leader, if he has the will to do so, to set his own house in order without his neighbours burning it down?

What does concern me, in common with thinking partisans of both parties, is not just winning the election, but how it is won, how well we can take advantage of this great quadrennial opportunity to debate issues sensibly and soberly. I hope and pray that we Democrats, win or lose, can campaign not as a crusade to exterminate the opposing party, as our opponents seem to prefer, but as a great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership, not alone of a rich, prosperous contented country as in the past, but of a world in ferment.

And more important than winning the election is governing the nation. That is the test of a political party- the acid, final test. When the tumult and the shouting die, when the bands are gone and the lights are dimmed, there is the stark reality of responsibility in an hour of history haunted with those gaunt, grim specters of strife, dissension and materialism at home, and ruthless, ineradicable and hostile power abroad.

Let's Talk Sense

The ordeal of the 20th Century-the bloodiest, most turbulent age of the Christian era is far from over. Sacrifice, patience, understanding and implacable purpose may be our lot for years

to come. Let's face it. Let's talk sense to the American people. Let's tell them the truth, that there are no gains without pains, that this is the eve of great decisions, not easy decisions, like resistance when you're attacked, but a long, patient, costly struggle which alone can assure triumph over the great enemies of man-war and poverty and tyranny-and the assaults upon human dignity which are the most grievous consequences of each.

Let's tell them that the victory to be won in the 20th Century, this **portal** to the golden age of man, mocks the pretensions of individual acumen and ingenuity. For it is a citadel guarded by thick walls of ignorance and mistrust which do not fall before the trumpets' blast or the politicians' imprecations. They must be directly stormed by the hosts of courage, morality and wisdom, standing shoulder to shoulder, unafraid of ugly truth, contemptuous of lies, half-truths, circuses and demagoguery.

Everyone's Party

The people are wise-wiser than the Republicans think. And the Democratic party is the people's party, not the labor party, not the farmers' party, not the employers' party-it is the party of no one because it is the party of everyone.

That is our ancient mission. Where we have deserted it, we have failed. With your help there will be no desertion now. Better we lose the election than mislead the people: better we lose than misgovern the people. Help me to do the job in this autumn of campaign and conflict; help me to do the job in these years of darkness, doubt and crisis that stretch beyond the horizon of tonight's happy vision, and we will justify glorious past and the loyalty of silent millions who look to us for compassion, understanding and honest purpose. Thus we will serve our great tradition greatly.

I ask of you all you have; I will give to you all I have, even as he who came here tonight and honored me, as he has honored you-the Democratic party-by a lifetime of service and bravery that will find him an imperishable page in the history of the Republic and the Democratic party-President Harry S. Truman.

And finally, in the staggering task you have assigned me, I shall always try "to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with my God".

APPENDIX B

Figure 1:

-1952 Democratic National Convention
Balloting for the Presidential Nomination¹

<u>CANDIDATE</u>	<u>1st Ballot</u>	<u>2nd Ballot</u>	<u>3rd Ballot</u>
Barkley	48 ½	78	67
Dever	37		
Fulbright	22		
Harriman	123 ½	121	
Humphrey	26		
Kefauver	340	362 ½	275 ½
Kerr	65		
Russell	268	294	261
Stevenson	273	324 ½	617 ½

**= clinched nomination

¹ New York Times, July 26, 1952

Figure 2:**Election Results (Electoral Vote by states) ²**

<u>STATE</u>	<u>Eisenhower</u>	<u>Stevenson</u>			
Alabama	-	11	Nebraska	6	-
Arizona	4	-	Nevada	3	-
Arkansas	-	8	New Hampshire	4	-
California	32	-	New Jersey	16	-
Colorado	6	-	New Mexico	4	-
Connecticut	8	-	New York	45	-
Delaware	3	-	N. Carolina	-	14
Florida	10	-	N. Dakota	4	-
Georgia	-	12	Ohio	25	-
Idaho	4	-	Oklahoma	8	-
Illinois	27	-	Oregon	6	-
Indiana	13	-	Pennsylvania	32	-
Iowa	10	-	Rhode Island	4	-
Kansas	8	-	S. Carolina	-	8
Kentucky	-	10	S. Dakota	4	-
Louisiana	-	10	Tennessee	11	-
Maine	5	-	Texas	24	-
Maryland	9	-	Utah	4	-
Massachusetts	16	-	Vermont	3	-
Michigan	20	-	Virginia	12	-
Minnesota	11	-	Washington	9	-
Mississippi	-	8	W. Virginia	-	8
Missouri	13	-	Wisconsin	12	-
Montana	4	-	Wyoming	3	-
			Total	442	89


Popular Vote:

Eisenhower: 33,936,252

Stevenson: 27,314,992

²New York Times, November 6, 1952

Figure 3:
Proportional Change in Party Representation
in Congress ³




³ U. S. Nws and World Report, XXXIII (November 14, 1952), 24-25

Figure 4:

New York Times Pre-Election Prognosis ⁴

<u>For Eisenhower</u>	<u>For Stevenson</u>	<u>Leaning Eisenhower</u>	<u>Leaning Stevenson</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>
Maine	Missouri	New York	Rhode Is.	Massachusetts
N. Hampshire	Kentucky	Penn.	Delaware	Connecticut
Vermont	W. Wirgina	Mayland	Illinois	Iowa
New Jersey	N. Carolina	Ohio	Florida	Utah
Indiana	S. Carolina	Michigan	Lousiana	Arizona
Nebraska	Georgia	Wisconsin	Tennesse	Nevada
Kansas	Alabama	Minnesota		Texas
N. Dakota	Mississippi	Virginia		California
S. Dakota	Arkansas	Montana		Washington
Idaho	Oklahoma	Wyoming		
Oregon		Colorado		
.....		New Mexico		
73 Electoral Votes	100 Electoral Votes	183 Electoral Votes	65 Electoral Votes	110 Electoral Votes

⁴New York Times, November 3, 1952

Figure 5:**The Candidates and Gallup Poll ⁵**

⁵ “What Gallup Polls Show - Eisenhower Ahead”, U. S. News and World Report, XXXIII (October 31, 1952), 12

APPENDIX C

EXCERPTS FROM PRESS CONFERENCE**December 8, 1960**

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have asked Governor Stevenson to accept the position of Ambassador to the United Nations. I believed that with the increasing importance of the United Nations, the fact that there are now ninety-nine members of the United Nations, I believe increased emphasis will be given in 1961 to the work in New York, that the whole field of foreign policy will be affected by the judgement, energy and responsibility of the United States representative at this vital mission.

I can think of no American who would fill this responsibility with greater distinction. He brings to it long experience careful observation. He has served in the United Nations in its early formative years at the end of world war II. I heard this as one of the three or four most important jobs in the entire administration.

The Ambassadorship and the mission to the United Nations must be strengthened. We must place more senior officers at the United Nations. The mission must be expanded. The Ambassador to the United Nations, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations must play a greater role in policy-making as well as in representing our foreign policy views at the United Nations in New York, itself.

The job is pass of the Cabinet. And it is my hope if Governor Stevenson accepts the position, that he will attend Cabinet meetings and will serve as a strong voice in foreign policy over its entire range. He has always answered the call of duty on every other occasion in his life, and I am hopeful that he will find it possible to serve the United States in this most vital position.

STATEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

February 1, 1961

I have sometimes said that flattery is all right, Mr. President, if you don't inhale. well, you have made it very hard for me not to inhale, thanks to a charity and kindness which have touched me so deeply. In the days- and perhaps nights - ahead of us, I shall always remember with gratitude this hour, and may all our wishes be as good for all of the peoples of the world as your kind words have been good for me today.

As perhaps you know, I had a part in the birth of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, and in its early walks as an infant in London and then in New York in 1946 and 1942. And now I am pleased to be sharing in the problems of its adolescence.

The problems of adolescence are often those of young love. I believe this is true in all countries. Would that all of our problem in this Council were the same.

And though some may not be amiable. I hope that we may deal with even the thorniest of them in an atmosphere of tolerance and of good will.

We are, to use the French phrase, the Nations United. Let us be united – united in a patient and persevering attempt to find the things we can agree upon and to build upon them a structure of understanding and cooperation against which whatever storms may be ahead shall beat in vain.

To one who has been long absent from these councils, it is striking and heartening that the United Nations has not only survived the turmoil and the conflict of the years, but has grown wiser, stronger and an ever more potent factor in the shaping of world events.

We of the United States wish the United Nations to be still more potent, for the grave dangers of this nuclear age demand much more unity among the nations. The common yearning of all men, expressed in the Charter, is to achieve freedom from war, poverty, disease,

ignorance and oppression. That is what binds us all together. Our security, no less than our salvation, is the ability of nations and governments to see through the clouds of conflict and discern the truth about our common interests – and then, boldly and in concert, to act. Only the actions of states, both large and small, can impart vigor to this organization and can redeem the pledge of the Charter.

The United Nations is a sensitive measure of the tremors which shake the community of nations – tremors which have built up to dangerous levels. But we are not helpless spectators. The tremors are man-made and man can still them.

To help the organization meet the task before it, we are too dangerous for anything except the truth – will be guided by certain principles.

First, we know the great importance which the newer and less development nations attach to the United Nations. In their search for peace, for mutual tolerance, for economic development, for dignity and self-respect, our interest is theirs. We don't seek military allies among them, nor do we wish to impose our system or our philosophy upon them- indeed, we cannot, freedom cannot be imposed on anyone. Our concern for these nations is that they should be truly independent members of the peaceful community of nations.

As the oldest anticolonial power, the United States is in favour of freedom and of self-determination for all peoples. We rejoice in the rapid and peaceful revolution which has brought into being and into our midst at the United Nations so many new sovereignties. Our great desire is that this transition should proceed peacefully and in good order, with the least possible suffering, bitterness and new conflicts. We applaud what has been done to bring about this orderly transition, both by the emerging nations and by their former rulers. And we applaud the efforts of this council to assist the orderly transition in the Congo through the Secretary General.

Equally important, if not more so, is the work which this organization can do to further economic development, without which political independence cannot long be sustained. The United States attaches the highest importance to improving the conditions of life to the peoples in the newly Countries. It without work the United Nations has already proved its effectiveness as a source of technical assistance, of expert knowledge about capital investment,

and of administrative personal to help those who are determined to help themselves. And all without any political condition or any ulterior motive. So we shall vigorously support the work of the United Nations in the field of economic betterment.

We shall also do all in our power to use the United Nations as “a center for harmonizing the actions of nations”. We believe the United Nations is an opportunity for preventive diplomacy which can identify and solve potential disputes before they reach the acute stage sometimes induced by the glare of publicity.

The United States Government is giving its most earnest attention to the impose over disarmament. We know, as President Kennedy has said, that “the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace”. We know that progress toward disarmament becomes daily more imperative and we are ceaselessly aware of the vital interest in this problem which is felt by all of the members of the United Nations.

May I also say that if the United Nations is to continue to function, two things are essential. It must be properly financed and the integrity of the office of the Secretary General and of the Secretariat must be preserved. We hope all members from every region will join in fulfilling these indispensable minimum conditions.

Finally, with such a fateful agenda, it is more than ever important that, in these councils, we avoid useless recrimination. Free debate in an essential part of the United Nations process. but let us not demean free debate.

The new President of the United States has said that he regards the United Nations “as an instrument to end the cold war instead of an arena in which to fight it.” we hope that all of the governments here represented will share his view, and that our deliberations in this Council may be uniformly directed toward the calm and constructive solution of the problems that confront us. May peace among the nations begin with peace among the members of the Council.

We are the Security Council, my colleagues, and it should be to us that the peoples of the world look for the security they no desperately long for. It should be to us that the look for

leadership - for strong, sober, constructive leadership. And if they don't look to us with confidence, it is our fault.

So I wholeheartedly pledge myself to the high and the challenging task of cooperation's with you in our common endeavour to provide the leadership the world is asking of us. I devoutly hope and pray that we may fulfil this solemn obligation.

A PREMEDITATED ATTEMPT. THE DREAD REALITIES

Stevenson's First Statement to the Security Council

October 25, 1962,

Today we must address our attention to the realities of the situation posed by the build-up of nuclear striking power in Cuba.

I want to say at the outset that the course adopted by the Soviet Union yesterday to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine is welcome to my government. We also welcome the assurance by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl Russell that the Soviet Union will "take no reckless decisions" with regard to this crisis. And we welcome most of all the report that Mr. Khrushchev has agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary General.

My government is most anxious to effect a peaceful resolution of this affair. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will work with us to diminish not only the new danger which has suddenly shadowed the peace, but all of the conflicts that divide the world.

I shall not detain you with any detailed discussion of the Soviet and Cuban responses to our complaint. The speeches of the Communist delegates were entirely predictable. I shall make brief comment on some points suggested by these speeches and some other points which may have arisen in the minds of members of the United Nations.

Both Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl Russell and Ambassador Zorin in his remarks to this Council argued that this threat to the peace had been caused, not by the Soviet Union and Cuba, but by the United States.

We are here today and have been this week for one single reason because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing, offensive, military build-up into the island of Cuba. While assuring the world that nothing was further from their thoughts.

The Soviet argument, in its essence, is that it was not the Soviet Union which created the threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, but that it was the United States which created the crisis by discovering and reporting the facts.

This is the first time that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary, but the discovery of the burglar - and that the threat is not the clandestine missiles in Cuba, but their discovery and the measures taken to quarantine further infection.

The peril arises not because the nations of the Western Hemisphere have joined together to take necessary action in their self-defense, but because the Soviet Union has extended its nuclear threat into the western Hemisphere.

I noted that there are still some delegates in the Council -I suspect, very few — who say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has, in fact, built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from one to two thousand miles.

Chairman Khrushchev did not deny these facts in his letter to Earl Russell, nor did Ambassador Zorin on Tuesday evening. And if further doubt remains on this score, we shall gladly exhibit the photographic evidence to the doubtful.

One other point, I would like to invite attention to the casual remark of the Soviet representative claiming that we have thirty-five bases in foreign countries. The facts are that missiles comparable to those placed in Cuba are with the forces of only three of our allies, and were only established there by a decision of the heads of these governments, meeting in December, 1957, who were compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to display missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe.

In the next place, there are some troublesome questions in the minds of members that are entitled to serious answers. There are those who say that, conceding the fact that the Soviet Union has installed offensive weapons in Cuba, conceding the fact that this creates a grave

threat to the peace of the world, why was it necessary for the nations of the western Hemisphere to act with much speed? why could not the quarantine against the shipment of offensive Weapons have been delayed until the security Council and the General Assembly had a full opportunity to consider the situation and make recommendations?

Let me remind the members that the United States was not looking for some pretext to raise the issue of transformation of Cuba into a military base. On the contrary, the United States made no objection whatever to the shipment of defensive arms by the Soviet Union to Cuba, even though such shipments offended the traditions of this hemisphere.

Even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the character of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveillance. And only after the facts and the magnitude of the build-up had been established beyond all doubt did begin to take this limited action of barring only these nuclear weapons equipment and aircraft.

To understand the reasons for this prompt action, it is necessary to understand the nature and the purpose of this operation. It has been marked, above all, by two characteristics - speed and stealth. As the photographic evidence makes clear, the installation of these missiles - the erection of these missile sites - has taken place with extraordinary speed. One entire complex was put up in twenty-four hours. This speed not only demonstrates the methodical organization and careful planning involved, but it also demonstrates a premeditated attempt to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli. By quickly completing the whole process of nuclearization of Cuba, the Soviet Union would be in a position to demand that the status quo be maintained and left undisturbed.

If we were to have delayed our counteraction, the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed. This is not a risk which this hemisphere is prepared to take.

When we first detected the secret offensive installations, could we reasonably be expected to have notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the process of calling the Security Council, that we had discovered its perfidy, and then to have done nothing but wait while we debated, and then have waited further while the Soviet representative in the Security council vetoed a resolution, as he has already announced that will do? In different

circumstances we would have. But today we are dealing with dread realities and not with wishes.

One of the sites, as I have said, was constructed in twenty-four hours. One of these missiles can be armed with its nuclear warhead in the middle of the night, pointed at New York, and landed above this room five minutes after firing. No debate in this room could affect in the slightest the urgency of these terrible facts or the immediacy of the threat to the peace.

There was only one way to deal with that urgency and with that immediacy, and that was to act, and to act at once - but with the utmost restraint consistent with the magnitude of this threat to the peace.

And we came to the Security Council, I remind you, immediately and concurrently with the meeting of the Organization of American States. We did not even wait for the OAS to meet and to act. We came here at the same time. We immediately put into process the political machinery that, we pray, will achieve a solution of this grave crisis. And we did not act until the American republics had acted to make the quarantine effective.

We did not shirk our duties to ourselves, to the hemisphere, to the United Nations or to the world. We are now in the Security Council on the initiative of the United States precisely because, having taken the hemispheric action which has been taken, we wish the political machinery of the United Nations to take over, to reduce these tensions, to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to the peace, and to assure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive weapons with the corresponding lifting of the quarantine.

There are those who say that the quarantine is an inappropriate and extreme remedy, that the punishment does not fit the crime. But I ask those who take this position to put themselves in the position of the Organization of American States, to consider what you would have done in the face of the nuclearization of Cuba. Were we to do nothing until the knife was sharpened? Were we to stand idly by until it was at our throats? What were the alternatives available?

On the one hand, the Organization of American States might have sponsored an invasion, or destroyed the bases by an air strike, or imposed a total blockade on all imports to

Cuba, including medicine and food. On the other hand, the OAS and the United States might have done nothing. Such a course would have confirmed the greatest threat to the peace of the Americas known to history and would have encouraged the Soviet Union in similar adventures in other parts of the world. And it would have discredited our will, our determination, to live in freedom and to reduce, not increase, the perils of this nuclear age.

The course we have chosen seems to me perfectly graduated to meet the character of the throat. To have done less would have been to fail in our obligation to peace.

To those who say that limited quarantine was too much in spite of the provocation and the danger, let me tell you a story be attributed like so many of our American stories to Abraham Lincoln - about the passerby out in my part of the country who was charred by a farmer's ferocious boar. He picked up a pitchfork and met the boar head on. It died. The irate farmer denounced him and asked him why he didn't use the blunt end of the pitchfork. And the man replied, why didn't the boar attack me with his blunt end?"

Some here have attempted to question the legal basis of the defensive measures taken by the American republics to protect the Western Hemisphere against Soviet long-range nuclear missiles.

I would gladly expand on our position on this, but in view of the proposal now before us presented last night by the Secretary General, perhaps that is a matter and a discussion, in view of its complexity and length, which could be more fruitfully delayed to a later time.

Finally, let me say that no twisting of logic, no distortion of words can disguise the plain, the obvious, the compelling, common-sense conclusion that the installation in Cuba of nuclear weapons by stealth, weapons of mass destruction, noses a dangerous threat to the peace, a threat which contravenes Article 2, paragraph of the Charter, and a threat which the American republics are entitled to meet, as they have done, with appropriate regional defensive measures.

Nothing has been said by the representatives of the Communist states here which alters the basic situation. There is one fundamental question to which I solicit your attention. The question is this: what action serves to strengthen the world's hope for peace?

Can anyone claim that the introduction of long-range nuclear missiles into Cuba strengthens the peace?

Can anyone claim that the speed and stealth of this operation strengthen the peace?

Can anyone suppose that this whole undertaking is anything more than an audacious effort to increase the nuclear striking powers of the Soviet Union against the United States? When we are about to debate how to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, does their introduction in a new hemisphere by an outside state advance sanity and peace? Does anyone suppose that, if this Soviet adventure should go unchecked, the Soviet Union would refrain from similar adventures in other parts of the world?

The one action in the last few days which has strengthened the peace is the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere.

In view of the situation that now confronts us and the proposals made here yesterday by the Acting Secretary General, I will not extend my remarks this afternoon, I will conclude by reading to the members of the Council a letter from the President of the United States which was delivered to the Acting Secretary General just a few minutes ago in reply to his appeal of last night. The letter says:

I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday.

As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.

In your message and your statement to the Security Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss these arrangements with you promptly.

I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of this matter.

I have nothing further to say at this time, Mr. President.

DRAFT LETTER FROM ADLAI STEVENSON TO PAUL GOODMAN

Dear Mr. Goodman:

Thank you for your letter. Its arguments, I think on a simple presupposition: that I share your belief in the disaster trend of American foreign policy and that I must therefore resign to underline my disagreement, rally public against it and nail the "lies" into which it is being presented to the people

But it is precisely this presupposition that I do not share with you, and I would like to send you my reasons for believing that whatever criticisms may be made over the detail and emphasis of American foreign policy, its purpose and direction are sound.

Our overriding purpose must be to avoid war. Yet we decide to live in a state of bitter national anarchy in which each nation claims absolute sovereignty and great powers believe they can enforce the aims and interests which they consider paramount.

I believe that the ultimate disaster of atomic conflicts can be avoided in this situation only by the pursuit of two clear lines of policy.

The first is to establish a tacitly agreed frontier between Communist and non-Communist areas of influence on the understanding that neither power system will use force to change the status quo. On the other side of it there may (be) change, of course, but not outside intervention off that line.

The second is to move from this position of precarious stability toward agreed international procedures for settling differences, towards the building of an International Juridical and policing system and towards a whole variety of policies designed to turn our small vulnerable planet into a genuine economic and social community.

If you like, the first policy is static and defensive, the second creative and constructive. Both have to be pursued together.

The period from 1947 to 1962 was largely occupied in fixing the post-war line with Soviet line. It is not a very satisfactory one since it divided Germany and Berlin. But the Russians respect it in Europe. so do we.

The Russians are perhaps not wholly committed to it since their doctrine included the sight encourage were of national liberation. “These, we know, can lead to the imposition of governments which are not later answerable any form of popular approbation or control. However, the missile crisis of 1962 may have convinced the Russian leaders that interventions of that sort beyond the tacit frontiers of the two worlds are in fact too costly and dangerous.

We have no such line with the Chinese. Since they are in an earlier, more radical stage of their revolution may be more difficult to establish one. Should we try? is the line we stand on halfway across Vietnam a reasonable line? Should we hold it?

Let me take the second point first. I have no doubt that if France had handled the forces of decolonisation in the prompt and orderly fashion of the British, the situation in Southeast Asia might be much more stable today. It can even be argued that in 1954 we should not have taken any action to guarantee a non-Communist regime to South Vietnam, Yet we did so in South Korea and it was reasonable to argue that the refugees streaming south from Hanoi had as much desire to avoid Communism as the people of South Korea. In any case, the line inherited by the Democratic Administration is the 17th Parallel. History does not always given us the most convenient choice. What sane statesman would choose West Berlin, for instance? Yet can one doubt its pivotal significance?

Since this is the line, should be hold it? The answer depends on the assumptions made about Chinese power. In the past, some Chinese dynasties have been aggressive, claiming sovereignty over wide areas of Asia, including all Southeast Asia and even some of India. So far, the new Communist dynasty has been very aggressive. Tibet was swallowed, India attacked, the Malays had to fight twelve years to resist a “national liberation” they could receive from the British by a more peaceful route. Today the apparatus of infiltration and aggression is already at work North Thailand Thanise maps show to the world’s chagrin the furthest limits of the old empire marked an Chinese. I do not think the idea of Chinese expansionism is so fanciful that the effort to check it is irrational.

And if one argues it should not be checked, I believe you set us off on the old, old route whereby expansive powers push at more and more doors, believing they will open until, at the ultimate door, resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks out.

As President Johnson pointed out the other day my country has suffered 160000 casualties since the last war but aggression didn’t succeed me with your help - in Greece or

Turkey, Iran or Formosa, Korea or Lebanon. And I think timely resistance vastly enhanced the hope for peace and the prospects for the evolution of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes underlined in the U.N. Charter.

While I hesitate to draw historical comparisons with the Chinese. I remind you that the French Revolution led prolonged war before the limits of France's power to control its neighbors were established.

My hope in Vietnam is that relatively small-scale resistance now may establish the fact that changes in Asia are not to be precipitated by outside force. This was the point of the Korean War. This is the point of the conflict in Vietnam. I believe Asia will be more stable if the outcome is the same in both a negotiated line and a negotiated peace. A just and honourable peace which leaves the future of the people of South Vietnam to be decided by them and not by force from North Vietnam.

This brings me to my second point — the hope of transcending this static policy of containment and moving to the more creative task of building a world security based on law and peaceful settlement.

I believe that we must seek a negotiated peace in Vietnam based upon the internationalisation of the whole area's security, on a big effort to develop, under the U.N., the resources of the Mekong River and guarantees that Vietnam, North and South, can choose, again under international supervision, the kinds of governments, the form of association and, if so decreed, the type of reunification of the two states they genuinely want to establish.

If we can achieve this, we begin to offer the small nations of the world an alternative to being within spheres of influence. We are more decisively beyond the age of empires. We would begin to establish procedures by which local revolutionary movements, such as the rising in the Dominican Republic, and for that matter, Zanzibar, are not automatically a prey to outside intervention.

I believe, for instance, that the U.N. effort in the Congo did prevent Central Africa from becoming a Southeast Asia, and I would make the strengthening of these U.N. procedures and activities a cardinal principle in a policy aimed at substituting "due process" for violence as the basis of international life. Meanwhile, I do not believe the opposite policy of retreat in Asia or anywhere else would make any contribution whatsoever to the ideal that violence should not be the formal arbitrator in world affairs.

It is my conviction that American policy is groping its way toward this difficult, but essential ideal and this is the reason both for my support of the policy and for my continuance in a position which gives me some hope of assisting its advance in that direction.

Now it is possible for honest men to differ on every aspect of this interpretation. You may believe the communist powers are not expansive. Or you may believe that the changes they seek to support by violence are beneficent changes which can be achieved by no other way. Again, you may believe that a return to some form of non-involvement in world affairs is the best posture for America. Or you may genuinely believe that America is in Vietnam “for sheer capitalist greed.” These are all possible attitudes and I do not impugn the good faith of those who hold different views.

I would simply ask them, in the names of the courtesies and decencies of a free society, that they should equally refrain from impugning mine.